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
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THE GIFT OF  
John Lewis Capper







**H I S T O R Y**  
**OF**  
**THE WAR**  
**OF THE**  
**SUCCESSION IN SPAIN.**



**BY**  
**LORD MAHON.**  
*Stanhope, P.H. 5th ed.*

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**SECOND EDITION.**

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**LONDON:**  
**JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.**

**MDCCCXXXVI.**



gt  
John Lewis Capper

TO  
HIS GRACE  
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,  
&c. &c. &c.

MY DEAR DUKE,

It is with great pride, as well as pleasure, that I avail myself of Your Grace's permission to inscribe this volume to one whom I so profoundly venerate and admire — who by his unrivalled public services, both at home and abroad, has laid every Englishman under the deepest debt of gratitude — and who in private life has honoured me with many marks of kindness and regard. For these I am happy to have an opportunity

of expressing my most sincere acknowledgments.

The History which I now dedicate to Your Grace, is limited, as much as possible, to what occurred in Spain itself. As the war arising from the Spanish Succession was prosecuted at once, not only on both sides of the Peninsula, but in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, all these could scarcely be combined into one narrative without much confusion and frequent interruptions. In writing this work, I have (besides the usual printed authorities) carefully consulted the MS. papers and correspondence of General Stanhope, who was, at one period, commander of the British army in Spain, and afterwards First Lord of the Treasury in England. These papers fill no less than fifteen or sixteen folio cases, and serve not only to communicate new facts, but to throw light upon others that were doubtful or im-

perfectly known. As to General Stanhope himself I venture to claim the merit of impartiality. Though strongly attached to his memory, I am still more strongly impressed with my own solemn duty to the public ; and I trust and believe that I have never allowed the zeal of the descendant to interfere with the truth of the historian. I am not conscious of having, on any occasion, either misstated, exaggerated, or concealed any of his actions. Still less have I endeavoured to raise his character by depressing those of his rivals and contemporaries. Your Grace will find that full and ready justice is done in this volume to the merits of such great Generals as the Dukes of Berwick and Vendome ; and with respect to Lord Peterborough, who finally became General Stanhope's personal and political enemy, I have been led, by an attentive perusal of the narratives in print, as well as of the MS. memorials in my own possession, to place

his character as a military man, and more especially as a partisan leader, even higher than has, I believe, been done by any former writer.

I have the honour to remain,

My dear Duke,

Your Grace's most faithful and obedient,

MAHON.

London,  
January 19. 1832.



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
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C. Walker. Sculp.

**HISTORY**  
**OF THE**  
**WAR**  
**OF THE**  
**SUCCESSION IN SPAIN.**

---

**CHAPTER I.**

**DURING** the reign of Philip the Second, the Spanish monarchy was, perhaps, the mightiest which the world had beheld since the downfall of the Roman. But bigotry and despotism were already undermining its foundations, and the next century of its annals displays one long unbroken train of losses, humiliations, and disasters. The establishment of the Dutch, and their enterprising spirit, struck a deep blow on its trade, while its domestic industry and population received a still more deadly wound from the fanatic banishment of the Morescoes. The revolt of the Portuguese severed from the empire its most important province, and raised up an active enemy in the heart of the Peninsula. The revolt of the Catalans, though finally suppressed, divided the affections and wasted the blood and treasure of the nation.

**CHAP.**  
**I.**  


CHAP. I. A race of imbecile monarchs, shut up in the seclusion of their palace, were unable to remedy, and seemed scarcely to know, the disasters of their subjects. Every where the people were misgoverned, impoverished, and oppressed, declining in industry, and diminishing in numbers. Nothing was left them but the noble pride which had produced their greatness, and which, then, as now, continued to survive it.

1660. At the peace of the Pyrenees, Philip the Fourth, feeling the miserable weakness into which the monarchy had fallen, hoped to secure it from the future attacks of its most formidable enemy, by giving his eldest daughter, the Infanta Maria

1665. Theresa, in marriage to the King of France. But shortly afterwards, his untimely death left the throne to his only son, Charles the Second, an infant three years of age, thus adding the evils of a long and turbulent minority to those under which the nation already groaned. Had the manhood of Charles proved active and able, the public ruin might yet have been arrested; and the same despotic power which had done, or at least allowed the mischief, would in a strong hand have become the most speedy and effectual instrument of cure. But the young monarch, a prey from his earliest years to manifold disease and premature decline, formed no unfit emblem of the kingdom over which he ruled. As weak in intellect as frail in constitution, his reign was the reign of worthless ministers, and his life a lingering illness. The



misrule which now disgraced the government, the wretchedness which now weighed upon the people, are quite without a parallel in modern times. CHAP.  
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 “Starvation,” says an eye-witness at this dismal period, “spreads even to the royal palace.”\* And this was said of a country into which the treasures of the Indies were yearly poured, and which might still proudly boast, that the sun never ceased to shine upon its conquests!

The hopes, too, which Philip had formed from his family alliance with Louis the Fourteenth were very speedily and completely disappointed. Ambition knows no kindred; and ambition was (in his youth at least) the ruling passion of Louis. In several unprovoked and unnecessary wars, he wrested from Spain many most valuable possessions, and was withheld in his course, not so much by any resistance he encountered, as by the interposition of the other European powers. Latterly, however, his hopes of obtaining the whole Spanish succession made him wish to conciliate the Spanish monarch and the Spanish people, so that at the peace of Ryswick he restored to them no small share of his conquests. By the show of forbearance and generosity he expected to prevail over the other competitors for this splendid prize; and, like a runner at public games, observes a Spanish historian, he threw down his spoils to be more nimble for the race.† 1697.

\* Lettres de Villars, p. 220.

† San Phelipe Comentarios, vol. i. p. 1.

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Charles the Second, though twice married, had no issue, and was the last male of his dynasty. The Spanish law of succession, however, makes no exclusion of sexes; and, after the young Prince of Bavaria, who was considered to have the best claim by female descent, the posterity of Louis by Maria Theresa would have been entitled to the crown, had not that marriage been accompanied by the most solemn, express, and repeated renunciation of any such rights. This obstacle seemed light in the eyes of Louis, whose whole reign was marked by the most perfidious and shameless disregard of his engagements, and he now prepared a long train of artful negotiations and intrigues to overcome it. His chief rival was the Emperor Leopold, whose mother had been a Spanish princess, and who was, moreover, the next male representative of the Austrian line. Leopold, well aware that the other European powers would never consent to see the vast Spanish dominions added to his own, and united under the same sceptre, declared himself ready to resign his claims, and those of Joseph his eldest son, in favour of his second, the Archduke Charles. On the same principle the King of France aimed at the succession for his younger grandson, Philip Duke of Anjou.

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After much hesitation, King Charles at length acknowledged and proclaimed the Prince of Bavaria as his rightful heir; but the sudden death of the young prince once more unsettled this great question. At such a crisis, none of the states of

Europe could remain indifferent lookers-on,—some wishing for the sake of the balance of power to prop and uphold the vast fabric which seemed tottering to its fall, and some only solicitous to snatch some fragments from the ruin. Louis seemed to enter eagerly into the views of the latter partly to conceal his own upon the whole succession, and partly that, in case the Spaniards should decide in favour of the Archduke, he might, at the worst, seize and annex to France his stipulated share of their dominions. A treaty of partition, which had already, during the lifetime of the Bavarian prince, been signed between the Dutch states, William the Third of England, and himself, was now renewed upon another basis. It stipulated, that the Archduke should be acknowledged as successor, and inherit Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands, while the Dauphin, as eldest son of Louis and Maria Theresa, should receive for the sacrifice of his claims the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and the province of Guipuzcoa beyond the Pyrenees, besides the duchy of Milan, which was to be the subject of exchange. This iniquitous compact,—concluded without the slightest reference to the welfare of the states so readily parcelled and allotted,—insulting to the pride of Spain, and tending to strip that country of its hard won conquests,—could not fail to fill it with mingled indignation and alarm. So skilful, however, was the management of Louis, that he turned away the general indignation from himself, and directed it

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 I. forth as the chief promoters of the scheme.  
 1699. Charles himself was roused into resentment ; and, with one of those sudden bursts of resolution which weak minds are equally unable to check or to continue, he cut off all further friendly intercourse with both England and Holland, by commanding Mr. Stanhope, the British, and De Schonenberg, the Dutch, ambassador to leave Madrid.

Meanwhile that capital was the scene of the most active intrigues on all sides for the choice of a successor. The idea of partition made the Spaniards in general less anxious as to the person on whom that choice should fall, than that some choice should be made to keep their monarchy entire ; and their entreaties, joined to the clamours of the French and Austrian partisans, distracted the death-bed of their suffering monarch. His own feeling was strongly against the House of Bourbon, from whose open enmity or pretended friendship he had undergone so many wrongs : his aversion was fomented by his Queen, a German princess, and shared by nearly all the grandees and leading statesmen of his Court. The Emperor's game would, therefore, have been sure and easy in able hands ; but Leopold was narrow in mind and penurious in habits, unconciliating, selfish, and suspicious. Instead of rallying all the Spaniards to his cause, by proclaiming the indivisibility of their dominions, he showed an inclination to obtain the Milanese for himself, he forbade the Arch-

duke Charles to set out for Madrid, and seemed bent upon avoiding any sacrifice of men or money in his behalf. The faults of his diplomatic agent were, perhaps, still more injurious to him than his own. Leopold as well as Louis might each be said to be faithfully represented, not only in their public station as sovereigns, but also in their personal character and disposition, by Count Harrach and the Duke of Harcourt, their ambassadors at Madrid. Harcourt was a man of winning manners, infinite skill, and well timed liberality, eager to make friends on all sides, and fully impressed with the useful maxim, that at Courts there is no such thing as an inconsiderable enemy. In Harrach, on the contrary, a cold and forbidding deportment, which offended the great, was joined to a sordid avarice, which disappointed the needy, and to a slow, pompous, indecisive temper, such as characterised, at this period, the whole cabinet of Vienna. “I know your ministers,” said one day to Harrach the Conde de Mancera, the ablest of the Spanish statesmen at this time, and a zealous partisan of Austria: “they will so mismanage matters, that in the place of the Archduke we shall have some other prince proclaimed at Madrid; we shall swear allegiance to him; and if we have once sworn, no circumstance, no consideration will make us faithless to our new King, however reluctantly acknowledged.” After the event, these remarkable words sound almost like a prophecy.

The skill of Harcourt, the repulsive arrogance

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of Harrach, soon produced their natural effects,—the Bourbon party in Spain rapidly increased in numbers. Above all, it obtained a most powerful accession, and most able leader, in Cardinal Portocarrero, Archbishop of Toledo, whose high rank was supported by splendid genius and ready talents for intrigue. No means were left untried, by this prelate and his friends, to work upon the conscience of Charles, and wring from him a decision favourable to their views. They urged that the renunciation of Maria Theresa could not bind her descendants ; that as little could it change a national law of inheritance ; that, at all events, it had only been intended to prevent the union of the French and Spanish crowns on the same head ; and that if this danger were still guarded against, by settling the succession on the younger son of the Dauphin, the renunciation, in its true and only object, would still remain fulfilled. In support of such arguments, Portocarrero thundered forth in the ear of Charles the most awful threats of eternal damnation, should he, from any private partiality or resentment, act against his own conviction, betray the trust with which Providence had charged him, and appoint any other than the rightful heir ; and these spiritual terrors swayed the mind of Charles with double force as his bodily strength declined. Every thing showed that his frame was rapidly sinking—a dysentery had set in—his pulse beat fainter—his limbs had begun to fail—he had solemnly renounced all feelings of enmity and

projects of revenge, which, considering the tenacity of human hatred, is often the surest symptom of approaching death. The Cardinal and his adherents now beset the King with the most unwearied assiduity, and at length induced him to dictate to Ubilla, secretary of the council, his celebrated testament, declaring Philip, Duke of Anjou, sole heir of the Spanish monarchy. Should Philip die without issue, or become entitled to the throne of France by the demise of his elder brother and that brother's sons, his younger, the Duke of Berry, was named his successor; afterwards the Archduke Charles, with a similar provision against the union of the Spanish and Austrian crowns, and the Duke of Savoy and his descendants were the last in remainder. In the absence or the minority of the new sovereign, the government was to be vested in a junta of regency, consisting of the eight principal officers of church and state, with the Queen-dowager as president; and several other clauses were intended to secure her comfort, her dignity, and even her power. "I am now already nothing!" exclaimed the King several times with bitterness, after signing this important document — yet at what period of his life had he ever been otherwise? The contents of his will were kept profoundly secret till his death, in less than a month afterwards, in the fortieth year of his age and the thirty-seventh of his reign. And thus ingloriously ended the male posterity in Spain of the Emperor Charles the Fifth!

The junta of regency took peaceable possession

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of the government, and immediately despatched to Versailles a messenger with a copy of the testament, and with directions, should Louis refuse the succession on behalf of his grandsons, to proceed to the Imperial Court with a similar proposal for the Archduke. By the activity of his ambassador, and the zeal of his partisans, the King of France had some time before received private intelligence of the intended bequest, and obtained full leisure for his decision upon it. His engagements with England and Holland, by the treaty of partition, were so clear, positive, and recent, that they would have bound any Prince, with feelings of honour, or even with respect for appearances; but in the government of Louis the Fourteenth principles seldom failed to be thrust aside, or stepped over, whenever they seemed to stand before him in the path of ambition. He eagerly grasped at the splendid prize which good fortune — and still more his own good management — had placed within his reach; yet in order to give some colour to his breach of faith, and solemnity to his proceedings, he pretended doubt and hesitation, and requested the advice of his council. Every member of that council well knew that the point referred to its deliberation had been already decided; but the state farce was played with becoming gravity: the Dauphin himself and several ministers spoke warmly in favour of accepting the testament; the Duke of Beauvilliers alone, for form's sake, was heard to prefer the treaty of partition; and Louis, who was present during the discussion,



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affected to acquiesce in its result. He announced his resolution to his grandson and his Court with all that grace and royal dignity of manner in which he has never been excelled. “Sir,” he said to the Duke of Anjou, “the King of Spain has named you his successor. The nobles demand, the nation desires you, and I give my consent. You will reign over the greatest monarchy in the world, and over a brave people who have always been pre-eminent for their loyalty and honour. I exhort you to bestow on them your affection, and endeavour to gain theirs by the goodness of your government.” The brothers of the young monarch then offered him their congratulations; and the Spanish ambassador, the Marquis of Castel Rios, kneeling down, was the first to do homage to King Philip the Fifth.

The Prince, thus called forth to raise the fallen fortunes of Spain, was only seventeen years of age,—two more, however, than his competitor Charles. His youth and inexperience were clearly unequal to his task, nor were they in any degree retrieved by superior talents or active application. With few faults, and few virtues, with just and honourable feelings, but no spirit to enforce them; with that pliant and docile disposition often implanted by nature in feeble understandings, he was well fitted to creep through life in an humble station, but had hardly one attribute of a King. His governor, the Duke of Beauvilliers, used to declare, that during his whole charge his pupil had not

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given him one moment of vexation or uneasiness ; and this he thought high praise — but it is praise never yet deserved by any thing but the youth of mediocrity ! It is very remarkable that, born and bred in a foreign Court, with French instructors and French courtiers around him, and the life of Louis before his eyes, Philip, when chosen to begin a new dynasty, should have so closely resembled in character the princes of the old. Like his Spanish predecessors, he was shy and secluded in his habits, hypochondriac and desponding in his temper, almost mechanical in his regularity of hours, dividing his leisure between the chapel and the chase, and dotingly submissive to his wife. “ Had he not,” said of him a French officer in his service, “ found etiquette already established in Spain, he would have established it.”\* His intentions, it is true, were always good and upright ; he loved his people, and sincerely wished their welfare, but he could only see it through the eyes of others ; his dependence on his ministers was open and undisguised, and the meanest peasant could discern the springs and wires by which the royal puppet was moved.

The character of Philip was by no means known in Spain — indeed at this period it had not yet displayed itself. The people had received the will of their deceased monarch with that implicit submission to royalty for which they have always been remarkable ; and the idea of partition, so artfully

\* Mém. de Tessé, vol. ii. p. 155.

raised by Louis, induced them to consider the choice of either a French or an Austrian Prince as a secondary object, so that their monarchy were but kept entire. They looked forward with hope to a new dynasty and new system : it could not be worse than the old, and, moreover, to an injured people a mere change of oppressors often seems a relief from oppression. The acceptance of the testament by the King of France was therefore heard in general with pleasure ; and Philip was peaceably proclaimed at Madrid, and the other chief cities in Spain. With respect to its dependencies, Louis had taken his measures beforehand with extraordinary skill and success. He had gained over the Duke of Popoli, Viceroy of Naples, and the Prince of Vaudemont, Governor of Milan, though both had been appointed through the influence of the House of Austria as its trusty partisans. The colonies gave no uneasiness : it was known that from the mere instinct of obedience they would follow any orders sent them from Madrid. The Netherlands were administered by the Elector of Bavaria, whom the Emperor with great impolicy had both insulted and aggrieved, at the time when the Bavarian succession was in question, and whose resentment had been so ably worked upon by French agents, that he now consented to resign his government to the Marquis of Bedmar, in the name of Philip, and retired to his own hereditary states. And thus was Philip the Fifth

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speedily hailed as sovereign throughout the whole of the Spanish monarchy.

To obtain the acknowledgment of Philip by foreign states was no less an object with Louis than his proclamation at home. The Pope, the King of Portugal, and the other European powers which had no personal interest at stake, made little difficulty, and required little management; but the case was far otherwise with the Dutch, the King of England, and the Emperor. To the two former Louis was strictly pledged by the second treaty of partition, which, as there is every reason to believe, he had concluded with the fixed intention of breaking. No means of glossing over his perfidy by explanation and address were now left untried. He wrote with his own hand to William the Third, expressing his earnest hopes for the continuance of peace and good understanding between them, and entering into a long and laboured apology for his conduct. He declared that the possession of Naples and Sicily would be far more useful to France and to himself than seating one of his descendants on a foreign throne; but that his wish for peace throughout Europe and his sense of the just claims of his grandson had induced him to forego his personal advantage. The idea of annexing Naples and Sicily to France had been, he added, most unwelcome to both the Dutch and English people: it would be opposed to the utmost by the Emperor and all the Italian states, and could not be enforced

by the small quota of ships and men stipulated in the treaty. He observed that as all the Spaniards to a man were bent upon maintaining the integrity of their dominions, his own adherence to the treaty of partition would only have transferred the offer of the whole succession to the Archduke; and that so far from preserving peace—the very end and object for which that treaty was designed—a war must have been immediately undertaken against both the Spaniards and the Austrians, and waged against the national feelings of the former. Of all the arguments urged by Louis, this one alone seems to bear considerable weight; but it might have been replied, that the feelings of the Spaniards were perfectly well known at the time of the second treaty of partition, and as they were thought no obstacle to its conclusion, could not be admitted as a ground for its non-performance. Similar representations were made by Louis to the government of Holland; and his ambassadors at London and the Hague were instructed to second them by all the exertions in their power. Neither William nor the States General, however, lent a ready ear to all this flattery and falsehood. Besides their just resentment at having been so grossly duped, they were filled with apprehensions at the increase of power in a neighbour already too powerful, and, above all, at seeing the Netherlands—that long cherished object of French ambition, and that most important barrier against it—now almost within its grasp, its real though not its avowed possession. They both

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made preparations for war. But the unpopularity of William at this period, from the treaty of partition, extended to all the measures he proposed : he was thwarted by his Parliament ; and its leading politicians, though startled at the overgrown power of France, seemed to think that by denying they could diminish the danger. In Holland, also, he was but feebly supported in his military views by a rich and thrifty people, so much attached to their possessions, and so much afraid of hazarding them in any war, that their own wealth became, in fact, one of the resources of the enemy.

✓ The first object of Louis was to reduce the Dutch, as the connecting link between England and Austria ; and, finding that he could not succeed in lulling asleep their fears of his power, he determined to take the opposite course, and terrify them into submission. The cities of Namur, Charleroi, Antwerp, and others in the Netherlands, were garrisoned at this time by some Dutch regiments, in virtue of a former agreement, called the Barrier Treaty, with Spain. Through the secret assistance of the Elector of Bavaria, and the rapid march of troops, the King of France in the same night surprised all the Dutch garrisons (they were about twelve thousand men in number), and made himself master of the fortresses. The States General, — with a mighty force thus brought close upon their frontier, and ready to overspread their open country, with a natural wish to free the soldiers so unexpectedly seized, with a large faction at home

drowning the cry of danger in a cry for peace, yielded to circumstances, and acknowledged Philip as sole heir of the Spanish dominions. Their acknowledgment turned the scale in England, and William was compelled, however unwillingly, to defer his projects, and follow their example.

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The Emperor now remained alone. He had been as much surprised and irritated at the testament of Charles the Second, as if it had not been chiefly owing to his own mismanagement. His ambassador, Harrach, left Madrid, after a formal protest, and the Emperor issued another from Vienna. The authenticity of the will itself was called in question; the right of Charles to make it was denied; the family claims of the House of Austria were asserted in opposition to this document, whether forged or real; all pacific intercourse with the Court of France was broken off, and Leopold prepared to follow up this paper warfare by military movements. He undertook an invasion of Italy, no doubt with the selfish view of annexing, in the first place, the Milanese to his own dominions; and while he assembled troops, under Prince Eugene, for that object, he despatched emissaries, with the hope of stirring up Naples to revolt. On the other hand, the French were not inactive: the Mareschal de Catinat was appointed to command a numerous army on the Alpine frontier; and the ensuing summer saw Northern Italy the scene of fierce but indecisive hostilities.

Meanwhile, the young King of Spain was setting

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out to take possession of his throne. His grandfather bade him an affectionate farewell, and, confident of a perpetual union between the two monarchies, made use at the same time of those celebrated words, “Henceforth there will be no Pyrenees!” How little was it then foreseen, that the very first war, which the very next successor of Louis would have to wage, would be against no other than this very King of Spain!\* How much arrogance might not the fore-knowledge of this event have spared to France, how much alarm to Europe! Philip was accompanied by his elder and younger brothers, the Dukes of Burgundy and Berri, as far as the frontier; but, according to the prudent orders of Louis, and for fear of jealousies, only three Frenchmen, Louville, the Count d’Ayen, and the Duke of Harcourt, the ambassador, were allowed to pass it. A splendid suite of Spanish courtiers was in readiness, to welcome their new sovereign; and his progress through the provinces was greeted with every expression of loyalty. He arrived at the palace of Buen Retiro, at Madrid, on the 18th of February, and some time afterwards made his triumphal entry, amidst loud and general acclamations. In strength and spirit he seemed far superior to the late King, in dress he was the same; and thus he doubly pleased the multitude, which usually contrives (and this is true of every country) to show itself, at the same time,

\* “C’était en effet une guerre civile,” observes Voltaire, in his *Siècle de Louis XV*



extravagantly eager for novelty, and extravagantly fond of ancient prejudices.\*

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The arrival of the King put an end, in appearance at least, to the government of the junta, which, from the natural ascendancy of genius, had been, in fact, the government of Cardinal Portocarrero. It was in vain that the Queen-dowager, confiding in her rank, and impatient of control, had attempted to share his power; she soon felt the effects of his resentment, being secretly represented to the King of France as likely to form a party at Madrid in favour of the Austrians, and being thereupon requested to choose some other city for her residence. With much reluctance, and after many delays, she had at length set out for Toledo before the arrival of Philip, so that not even the shadow of the old Court was left to cloud the splendour of the new. The Cardinal did not fail to make full and speedy use of his authority. It had been a common saying amongst the Spaniards, in allusion to the weakness of Charles the Second, that, after a century of bad government, they were

\* His entry was not splendid. An eye-witness says, "His Majesty came in a filthy old coach of the late King, without guards; his better sort of attendants came on horseback, and some in coaches, at half an hour's distance from one another, and divers of the inferior sort attending the baggage in so very ragged clothes, as exposed them extremely to the scorn of the Spaniards." Yet, from eagerness to behold this noble pageant, no less than forty men, women, and children were trodden under foot and killed outright!" Letter from Mr. Jackson to Mr. Pepys, printed in the Correspondence of the latter, and dated February 24, 1701.

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reduced to no government at all \* ; but now, at all events, they could not complain of inactivity in Portocarrero. He hastened to seize upon the best places for his friends and dependants, to strip all his enemies of theirs, and to prepare the elements for a cabinet in complete subservience to his views. Such conduct was not fitted for popularity ; and his manner still less. He was proud and overbearing ; violent in temper, but cold and sarcastic in language ; he took no pains to conceal his contempt when the French ministers showed their ignorance of Spain ; he would not discuss or communicate public affairs, and transacted business either quite alone, or with his single confidant, Don Manuel Arias, President of the Council of Castille. Deeply must the Spaniards have regretted that, in want as they were of some master-mind to raise their sinking monarchy, the vast abilities of Portocarrero should so seldom be exerted for the public good ! In talent he was not, perhaps, inferior to his great predecessor at Toledo, Cardinal Ximenes ; but there was this difference between them, that Ximenes, forgetful of self, devoted himself wholly and zealously to the service of his country, while in the mind of Portocarrero, base personal considerations very far outweighed the interests of Spain. They have each had their reward ! Ximenes lives enshrined in the grateful memory of mankind, with such ministers as Sully, Oxenstiern, or Pitt ; but Portocarrero has his part in public estimation with

\* Mém. de Noailles, vol. ii. p. 91.

the Mazarins, the Wolseys, and those other base intriguers, who have gained their power by slavishness, or wielded it with tyranny.

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It had been the particular injunction of Louis to his grandson to place the utmost confidence in Portocarrero, on account of his past services, as well as of his superior abilities; so that the Cardinal continued in full authority for some time after the arrival of Philip. The system of Spanish administration at this time was to divide business among several boards or councils, such as those of Finance, Grace and Justice, Castille, Italy, and Flanders; and the presidents of these several councils formed again a sort of superior or cabinet council, under the name of *DESPACHO UNIVERSAL*. The secretary to this council, in other countries a very subordinate officer, was here the most important and influential of all; since it was his duty to report the decisions of the *Despacho* to the King, to take his orders, and, in short, to communicate more directly with him than any other member. The secretary at this period, Don Antonio de Ubilla, would, therefore, have become, in fact, prime minister, had not Portocarrero and Arias, to guard against his influence, obtained the privilege of being present when he made his reports; and, at their intercession, the same privilege was granted to the Duke of Harcourt. This mark of confidence and favour shown to the ambassador, seemed indispensable at a time when the Spaniards were becoming so closely

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 L were likely to be made on its military means.

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The certainty of a war in Italy, and the chance of even more extended hostilities made the new ministry turn its first attention to the state of the fleet and army. Both were in the most deplorable disorder. The military establishment for so many different provinces and kingdoms had sunk down to a number insufficient for any one of them. There were only six companies in Naples, three hundred men in Sicily, two hundred in Sardinia, and no more than six thousand in the duchy of Milan, though daily threatened with invasion. All the forces maintained in all the Spanish dominions amounted, incredible as it seems, to no more than twenty thousand men, and even these were ill disciplined, ill officered, ill paid. From jealousy of the grandees, the old military spirit had been checked in the upper classes; from dread of popular encroachments, the national militia was disused. The fortresses along the coasts were entirely dismantled and neglected; and even the breaches in the walls of Barcelona, made in a former siege, had never been repaired. None of the artillery was mounted, none of the stores or arsenals supplied. The workshops were empty, and even the art of ship-building was lost. The royal navy was almost reduced to those armed vessels which protected the South American trade; six gallies, decayed with age and inaction, were

rotting in the bay of Carthagená, and a few more were hired from the Genoese.\* “On seeing this “state of things,” observed Monsieur de Torcy, “and comparing it with that left by the Emperor Charles, we might almost suppose that his “descendants had been labouring to destroy the “monarchy, instead of to preserve it.”†

To remedy these evils, the first requisite was money; but the finances were, if possible, in a still more wretched condition. The taxes were so high, that the price of the wine brought into Madrid for one REAL was raised by duties to five ‡; but precisely because the taxes were so high they had ceased to be productive, and had crushed beneath their weight both cultivation and commerce. Almost every article of manufacture was imported from abroad. The South American mines, however rich, could afford no lasting wealth to a country thus destitute of industry; and, according to a common remark, their gold was to Spain no more than food is to the mouth, which gives it a passage, but derives from it no immediate strength or nourishment. The traders of Genoa and Hamburg, the Dutch and English manufacturers, — these, and not the Spaniards, were the real lords of Potosí and Peru! At Madrid the treasury

\* San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 38.

† Instructions to Count Marsin, dated July 7, 1701.

‡ Despatch from M. Ozon to M. de Torcy, dated May 19, 1701. At present the tax on wine at Madrid is not above 100 per cent. Slidell's Year in Spain, vol. i. p. 353.

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was often unprovided for even the most pressing demands ; long arrears were due ; and the want of pay sometimes reduced even the royal guardsmen to share with beggars the charitable doles at hospitals and convents. The accumulated abuses of many successive reigns clogged the action of government ; monopoly and peculation were all powerful ; and, to aggravate the public poverty, a spirit of waste and extravagance pervaded every department. It will be found that those individuals deriving their chief income from mines—whose yearly produce is uncertain and varying, and seems rather to spring from fortune than to follow industry—are usually careless, unthrifty, and irregular in their expenditure. The example of Spain might tempt us to apply the same remark to states.

In such general want of money, the French agents wished to impose new taxes ; but Portocarrero, foreseeing that they would in all likelihood cause an insurrection, refused to lend himself to this extravagant scheme. With great vigour and activity he attempted to strike the evil in its roots. He enforced in every quarter a system of strict economy ; and the reforms in the royal household were the first and greatest, not only for the sake of example, but because that department had been the most mismanaged, and is the least essential to the public safety. Thus, the gentlemen of the bed-chamber were reduced from forty-two to six, and many other places and pensions were suppressed. There

is not a single writer on Spanish affairs, at this period, who does not severely condemn these measures of Portocarrero, as involving numerous families in embarrassment, as weakening the ties between the nobility and the crown, and as raising an independent spirit in the former.\* Yet I must confess myself unable to perceive what better course the Cardinal could possibly have steered, and by what human exertion he could have administered an insufficient income without curtailing expenses, or curtailed expenses without diminishing patronage.

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As to improvements in the financial system, the Cardinal soon discovered, that it was in vain to expect them from any Spanish financier. Each of them formed a link in the long chain of corruption†; each supported some abuse, because he himself was supported by it. Their very statements as to the distress were as little to be trusted as their conduct; for, besides that self-interest sealed their lips on many points, the Spaniards

\* Coxe, House of Bourbon, vol. i. p. 121. ed. 1815. Targe, Histoire de l'Avénement, vol. i. p. 313. San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 31. Mém. de Noailles, vol. ii. p. 70, &c.

† This is the illustration used by King Frederick William I. of Prussia, in his remarkable advice to the Margrave of Bareith, on the advantage of foreign financiers:—"Vous ne sortirez jamais de l'embarras où vous êtes, si vous ne prenez des étrangers; car vos gens se soutiennent les uns les autres comme une chaîne; qui en attaque un les attaque tous." (Mém. de Bareith, vol. ii. p. 54.)

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often think it a point of honour to disguise their national calamities even from each other ; as if successful measures could ever be concerted from false information ! The Cardinal, therefore, took the just and wise, but unpopular, resolution of appointing some foreigner, well versed in financial operations, but neither confined within the intricacies of the Spanish system nor profiting by them, and accordingly able and willing to sweep them away. He wrote to Torcy, the French minister for foreign affairs, requesting him to select and send over some person likely to answer his views. From the choice made, it might have been supposed that Torcy thought talents of far more consequence than honesty. John Orry was a man of low extraction, bred in a subaltern department of the tax-offices in France, and afterwards steward to the Duchess of Portsmouth, by whom he was dismissed for fraud. He then reverted to his original employment ; and, by dint of activity and skill, soon made himself useful, known, and promoted. Besides his want of character, he was ill suited to the Spanish nation by his manners, which were mean, and cringing to the great ; but, as is commonly the case with flatterers, haughty, overbearing, and imperious to his subalterns. Those who fawn most humbly, are always those who trample hardest. It must be added, however, in justice to Orry, that he was a man of much readiness and resource, skilful in planning and bold in



execution ; that the finances were improved under his management ; and that Spain is indebted to him for several important reforms.

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From the appointment of Orry, and the admission into the cabinet of Harcourt, it is clear that Cardinal Portocarrero was by no means unduly jealous of the French ; and had even such a feeling existed, the address and ability of Harcourt would have been sufficient to dispel it. But at this period the health of Harcourt, borne down by exertion and anxiety, obliged him to withdraw from his embassy, Count Marsin was named his successor ; and thenceforth we find all the French agents in Spain, though often men of talent, displaying the most presumptuous ignorance of Spanish affairs and disregard of Spanish feelings. Even a subordinate agent, like Louville, does not scruple to admit that he has once or twice treated with arrogance\* such men as Arias, the president of Castille, and Portocarrero, the cardinal, primate, and first minister ; and he seems pleased and proud at having done so ! In another of his letters he lays it down as an established maxim, that the French are to rule as masters in the Spanish council, and declares that “ every Spaniard, when driven to the wall, will own himself utterly unworthy ! ” † Count Marsin himself was a good officer, an upright and disinterested man, but destitute both of winning man-

\* “ Avec hauteur,” are his words. Despatch to M. de Torcy, Oct. 24, 1702.

† Despatch to Torcy, Aug. 6, 1701.

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In addition to all these causes of unpopularity, Louis at this period began to disclose the selfish objects of his policy. After having so lately and so solemnly pledged himself against the partition of the Spanish monarchy,—after the ready proclamation of his grandson by the Spaniards in return,—with all his declarations to William and the States of Holland yet upon his lips,—could it be believed of even the most shameless lust of power that he now aimed at the possession of the Netherlands? These provinces were already in his hands, being held by his troops, and administered at his pleasure through the council of Flanders at Madrid; but he wished by a formal and regular treaty to annex them to his own dominions. His letters

\* “ Il arrive de France une infinité de femmes perdues, de gens de sac et de corde, sans aveu, banqueroutiers, fripons, têtes sans cervelle.” Louville to Torcy, Aug. 29, 1701.

having first prepared the mind of Philip by descanting in general terms on the expenses of the war in Italy, on its burden to France, and on the helplessness of Spain, he desired Marsin to take some favourable opportunity for proposing the cession of these provinces as an equivalent, and promised—for what were promises to him?—that on this condition France would undertake to defend, single-handed, all the other Spanish territories. The ambassador, in reply, strongly advised, from his knowledge of the country, that the subject should not even be mentioned. He declared that Philip could not carry through a measure so unpopular; that, except himself and the French about his person, not a single man in Spain could be persuaded of its justice; that it would again awaken national enmities with double violence; that the disaffected would seize it as a ground for a rebellion—the foreign states for a war. The suggestions of prudence had far more weight with Louis than the faith of treaties or the feelings of honour: he consented to defer, but did not lay aside, his project; and meanwhile clung to the Flemish fortresses with a firm and tenacious grasp. At a later period in the war, he availed himself of the straits to which Philip was reduced, to obtain from him a written promise of the cession, which was to be kept secret till the proper moment for its execution. But, happily for Europe and its balance of power, that moment was anticipated by the arms of the Allies, which wrested these provinces from France, and

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CHAP. I. 1701. made her tremble for her own.\* Meanwhile, it can hardly be supposed that the design of Louis, however skilfully concealed, could altogether escape the leading Spanish statesmen, or that it could fail to raise in the highest degree their jealousy and indignation. Cardinal Portocarrero might have overlooked the national honour and advantage; but when he found his own measures thwarted, his own power threatened by the French ministers, he determined to direct against them his usual system of subtlety and intrigue. In order to disgust them with the government of Spain, while appearing devoted to their interest, he overwhelmed them with the most perplexing and wearisome details, and affected to refer the smallest trifles to their decision at Versailles. On the other hand, he held forth these very decisions as proofs of their despotic and encroaching spirit, represented the government at Madrid as reduced to a mere viceroyalty, and secretly stirred up amongst the Spaniards an opposition to this foreign influence.

Through such insidious conduct, and the other causes I have endeavoured to explain, the administration of Philip struck no root in the affections of the people. Their expectations had been raised too high, and under even the wisest rulers must have led to disappointment. All parties joined in loudly calling for the convocation of the Cortes of Castille; a disused but not forgotten assembly, still dear to the recollection of the Spaniards, and which

\* *Mém. de Noailles*, vol. ii. p. 156, and vol. iii. p. 90.

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they then considered requisite to sanction the sweeping reforms intended or begun. Besides, at the commencement not only of a new reign, but of a new dynasty, it seemed just and natural that the representatives of the nation should take the oath of allegiance, and receive, in return, the confirmation of their rights and privileges. This opinion was warmly urged by several members of the cabinet, but others raised the cry of popular encroachment; and while the former were supported by the wishes of the nation, the latter found the fears of Philip on their side. The point was referred to Louis, who prudently withheld his advice on this national discussion; but his own example with respect to the States General of France spoke volumes, and Philip at length adopted the usual policy of weak minds,—a middle course. Afraid to grant, and equally afraid to refuse, the convocation, he evaded it by declaring that it must be delayed till his return from Catalonia. A marriage had been contracted between him and Maria Louisa, daughter of the Duke of Savoy; and it was intended that he should receive her on the frontiers of his kingdom. Accordingly, on the 5th of September, he set out for Zaragoza, attended by several of his ministers, by the ambassador Marsin, and by the secretary Ubilla, lately created Marquis of Rivas; but leaving the government in his absence to a junta, presided, and in fact directed, by Portocarrero. In Aragon he was greeted with every token of loyalty and attachment; but his reception in Catalonia was far less cor-

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dial. The Catalans had been much attached to their late Viceroy, Prince George of Hesse Darmstadt, a German, appointed by the influence of the Court of Vienna, and removed by Cardinal Portocarrero, partly for that reason, and partly because he wished to name his own brother to that high appointment. Darmstadt was a man of no abilities, but of courage, frankness, and popular manners; and his resentment and regret at his dismissal were greatly increased by an attachment he had formed to a lady of high rank at Barcelona. On embarking in the port of that city, he had loudly exclaimed, that he would not only return, but return with another King of Spain; and these words had sunk deep in the minds of the Catalans, who bore with scarcely suppressed impatience the dominion of Castille. One of the first signs of approaching revolution in a people, is a readiness to receive, and an inclination to credit, any rumours of a change.

Hastening forward to the frontier, Philip met his bride at Figueras, and after the marriage ceremonies returned with her to Barcelona. Maria Louisa was then only in her fourteenth year, slight but beautiful in person, and most graceful and fascinating in her manners. Even at so early an age she displayed those commanding talents, that in-born genius for government, which till lately distinguished the House of Savoy; nor does she less deserve the praise of a warm and affectionate heart. Thus accomplished, she soon won, and always retained, the affections of her husband, and ruled over

him with unbounded power. Her amiable qualities also greatly endeared her to the Spaniards: and a foreign ambassador (the Duke of St. Simon) declares, that several years after her death he saw them moved almost to tears by the mere mention of her name.

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From the feeble character of Philip, it had been foreseen that he would infallibly be ruled by his Queen; and, from her extreme youth, it was no less evident that she would be directed by some guide or adviser. The choice of such a guide was, therefore, a matter of the very highest importance to Louis, as the real efficient spring of administration, and as the only channel by which the French could hope to govern Spain. Very long and very anxious were the deliberations at Versailles to fix upon some suitable person for the post of Camerera-mayor, the chief lady in the royal household. It seemed no easy task to find the dignity of high rank without its independence, and a thorough knowledge of Madrid without any share in its cabals. Besides, to name a Spaniard would endanger the French supremacy, and a French woman offend the Spanish pride. All these, and many other difficulties seemed, however, happily avoided by the appointment of Princess Orsini, a name better known under its French corruption of Des Ursins. This celebrated woman, though French by birth, was the widow of a Spanish grandee. Her father, the Duke of Noirmoutier, was of the illustrious family of La Tremouille, and

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stowing hers, or please them by the display of equal talents; and thus, by different means, she attained the same end with all. No one ever showed more taste or talent for political intrigue. Active, bold, and enterprising, yet always calm and cautious, keeping her object steadily in sight, and regardless what loss it might occasion to others, what labour to herself, she was dangerous as an enemy, and hardly less dangerous as a friend. Though now upwards of fifty, she was still fond of dress, and suspected of gallantries; but ambition was her great, her ruling passion. At this period she earnestly desired the post of Camerera-mayor, but was too politic to apply for it, and expressing merely a wish to accompany the young Queen into Spain, skilfully led the French ministers to reflect on her abilities, and resolve on her appointment. Accordingly, she joined her new mistress on her road to Spain. To guard against the intrigues of the Court of Turin, and at the same time against the jealousies of the Spaniards, a secret order had been sent from Versailles, that every one of the Queen's Piedmontese attendants should be dismissed on the frontiers; and this was strictly executed, in spite of their complaints and her tears. But the very grief and loneliness in which she found herself, when thus torn from all her youthful connections, proved favourable to the views of Princess Orsini. Maria Louisa was far too able to be blindly governed; but she soon formed for her accomplished Camerera-mayor a friendship no less

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Philip remained the whole winter with his Queen at Barcelona, being by no means impatient to plunge afresh into all the dissensions of Madrid. Another motive for his delay was to elude his promise respecting the Cortes of Castille; and yet, notwithstanding his fear of such meetings, he was persuaded to convoke those of Catalonia, a province at all times turbulent and intractable, and at this time avowedly disaffected to his government. His chief inducement was the expectation of a free gift, which it was usual for the Cortes to grant, and which the state of his finances rendered most desirable; and he also hoped to conciliate the Catalans by this mark of confidence. The Cortes accordingly met, and though they might be charged with some stormy debates, and some overstrained pretensions, it is very remarkable how little there occurred to justify the apprehensions entertained of these assemblies. Count Marsin had certainly no bias in their favour, yet in one of his despatches\* he allows that “many of their demands are just and reasonable, and have no other object than the public welfare, and good government. Some other of their demands seem to touch the royal prerogatives; but, in truth, tend only to reform the manifold abuses accumulated in this province by the Viceroys, and by the ministers at

\* Letter to the King of France, Jan. 2, 1702.

“ Madrid, during the two centuries which have  
 “ elapsed since any of the Cortes have been brought  
 “ to a conclusion.” This being the real state of  
 things in Catalonia, it is evident that the Cortes  
 might have been held without danger in Castille ;  
 and it is deeply to be lamented, that the maxim of  
 Louis the Fourteenth on the States-General, should  
 have been transplanted beyond the Pyrenees. Its  
 effects in his own country have been most bitterly  
 felt by his descendants ! Had the States General  
 been regularly assembled, and wisely administered,  
 their last convocation would never have led to such  
 dreadful evils ; the second successor of Louis would  
 never have been brought to the scaffold, nor should  
 we have seen all royal prerogative, all hereditary  
 privilege, all religious establishment, trodden under  
 hoof by that people.

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The Catalonian Cortes ended their sittings on  
 the 12th of January, after voting a free gift of six  
 millions of reals, payable in six years. Philip,  
 in return, gave up to them his right of quartering  
 the royal cavalry in the plains ; a right which,  
 according to Marsin, was ruinous to the province,  
 with very little profit to the King. The business  
 being thus concluded, Philip might have returned  
 to Madrid without further delay, but his mind was  
 now bent upon another object ; he wished to take  
 this opportunity of visiting his Italian dominions,  
 and heading the troops in Lombardy, during the  
 next campaign. It was thought that the wavering  
 loyalty of the Neapolitans might be confirmed by

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the royal presence ; and a conspiracy which had lately taken place amongst them, though discovered and suppressed, seemed to make it doubly necessary. The project of Philip, was, however, very unpopular in Spain, which had formerly borne with much impatience the frequent expeditions of the Emperor Charles, and which had not been quitted by any of its sovereigns during the last hundred and fifty years. Portocarrero, and the council at Madrid, not content with openly remonstrating against the intended journey, endeavoured to raise up secret obstacles in its way, as, for instance, by withholding the necessary supplies of money ; but the King being supported by the approbation of his grandfather, and by the presence of the French agents, stood firm, and the Spaniards were compelled to yield. It was settled that the Queen should remain behind as the surest pledge of Philip's speedy return ; that in spite of her early youth she should be invested with the title of Regent and the casting voice in the council ; and that on her way to Madrid she should hold the Cortes of Aragon. A high and difficult commission for a princess of fourteen !

Philip embarked at Barcelona on the 8th of April, and after a prosperous voyage, landed at Naples. His proceedings in Italy form no part of my present subject, which, properly speaking, begins only with the formation of the Grand Alliance, and is limited to its effects on the Spanish Peninsula. I shall, therefore, content myself with stating

that at the approach of summer he joined the French and Spanish army, under the Duke of Vendome; made the campaign against Prince Eugene, in Northern Italy, and was present at the indecisive battle of Luzzara. On these occasions he showed himself destitute of military talents, but possessed of that slow and passive courage — nearly allied to indolence — which never seeks and never shuns danger; and in a very few months he hurried back to his Queen.

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She, on her part, according to the instructions given her, had opened the Cortes of Aragon at Zaragoza; but the management of an assembly so long disused, and so little understood, proved, as should have been foreseen, too weighty for her inexperienced hands. Personally, she had every reason to be satisfied with the Cortes, and owns, in one of her letters to Louis the Fourteenth, that it was impossible to act with more respect, or a greater wish to please her than they had done.\* The public business, however, made no progress. In the eyes of Princess Orsini, and the rest of the courtly tribe, it appeared most insolent and monstrous that the discussion of rights should precede the vote of subsidies†; and even the smallest demands of the Cortes were represented as daring encroachments. Above all, the order of Hidalgos, or gentry, was accused of the crime of independence. Maria Louisa, distrusting her own judg-

\* Mém. de Noailles, vol. ii. p. 272.

† Letter from Princess Orsini to M. de Torcy, June 7, 1702.

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ment, would neither yield nor yet oppose any point, from the fear of betraying the prerogative on the one hand, or stirring up disaffection on the other. Time, by which these difficulties might have been unravelled, even time was wanting, for the Queen had received directions both from Philip in Italy, and Louis at Versailles, to proceed as soon as possible to Madrid, and take her place in the council of regency. What then was to be done? The assembly could not be brought to a regular conclusion within so short a period, and its dissolution would have been a most unpopular measure, justified neither by its acts nor its intentions. She, therefore, according to the advice of the Archbishop of Zaragoza, prorogued it till the return of Philip, and referred all questions of privilege to his decision; and the Cortes accordingly adjourned, after voting her a free gift of one hundred thousand dollars.\* These were the last Cortes ever held either in Aragon or in Catalonia; nor, indeed, did all Spain behold any others for legislative objects until more than a century afterwards, when they arose from her own heroic exertions in the “War of Independence.”

\* Archdeacon Coxe, who takes a strong part against these assemblies both in Catalonia and Aragon, inveighs against “a scanty contribution which never reached the royal treasury,” and calls the free gift of one hundred thousand dollars a “verbal donative.” Yet, only four lines afterwards, he mentions the fact, that the Queen sent these one hundred thousand dollars to Philip in Italy, and this she did before leaving Zaragoza. (House of Bourbon, vol. i. pp. 173. and 192. ed. 1815.) Thus unfairly are the Cortes treated even by English writers.

## CHAPTER II.

FEW events in modern times ever seemed so unfavourable to the balance of power as the union between the French and Spanish monarchies. The former, already too mighty from her increased dominions, her central situation, and her warlike and enterprising people, could now direct the resources of that very state which had formerly weighed the heaviest in the opposite scale. By her progressive encroachments most other states had been struck with dismay, not roused into resistance, and seemed more inclined to sue for her alliance than to dare her enmity. But happily for Europe, the throne of England at this period was filled by a prince of singular ability both in the council and the field. The first endeavours of William the Third to oppose the succession of Philip, and form a confederacy against France, had been thwarted as much by his parliament as by foreign powers, and he had prudently yielded to the tide, but foresaw and awaited its ebbing. He continued to keep his objects steadily in sight, and even their ostensible relinquishment was only one of his methods to promote them. By acknowledging the new King of Spain, and professing great desire for peace, he disarmed the French govern-

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CHAP. II. ment of its caution, and led it to disclose more and more its ambitious and grasping designs.

1701. *W* Nor were these long delayed. Within a few months Louis the Fourteenth began to claim the privileges of the South American trade, struck several blows at British commerce, supplanted the Dutch in the Spanish ASIEN<sup>to</sup>, or contract for negroes, raised new works in the Flemish fortresses within sight of their frontier, and both increased and assembled his armies. Such conduct could not fail to provoke most highly the nations thus aggrieved; and the public indignation, improved by William to the best advantage, gradually grew into a cry for war. The rising discontent in Spain was another circumstance auspicious to his views. He spared no labour, no exertion; he went in person to the Hague, where he carried on the most active and able negotiations, foiled all the counter-intrigues of Louis, and at length succeeded in concluding the basis of the "Grand Alliance" between England, Austria, and the States General. The public mind being yet scarcely ripe for the decisive principles, afterwards avowed and acted on, this treaty was very guarded in its phrases, and confined in its extent. The rights of the Archduke Charles were not yet asserted, nor those of Philip denied; and the chief objects of the contracting parties seemed to be, that France might not retain its footing in the Netherlands, nor acquire any in the West Indies; and that its crown and that of Spain might never be united on the same head.

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A very few days after the signature of this alliance, the dethroned monarch, James the Second, died at St. Germain's, and his son was immediately acknowledged by Louis as rightful King of England. This measure, not only a deliberate insult to the English people, but a violation of his own solemn engagement at the peace of Ryswick, added fuel to the flame. William immediately returned to London, and made use of the burst of general indignation, to dissolve his pacific parliament and convoke another. An appeal to the passions of the people is seldom made in vain. The new House of Commons elected under this influence approved of the late negotiations, voted liberal supplies, and levelled at the Stuarts the celebrated act of abjuration. The exertions of King William at this period deserve the greater admiration, when we consider that his constitution, frail from the first, was now worn down with fatigues and anxieties, that he was broken in health, declining in vigour, and must have looked forward to a speedy dissolution. Though too weak for walking, and only able to ride when lifted on his horse, it was his fixed intention to lead his troops in person. Let those who doubt the dominion of the soul over the bodily powers; who deny that a strong mind can sway, and strengthen, and force onwards a feeble and suffering frame; let such observe, whether, in the last labours of William to form the alliance, or in the alliance itself when formed, they can discover any trace of sickness—one single mark of languor or decline!

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The death of this able monarch, which could hardly have been very long delayed, was hastened by a fall from his horse, and took place on the 19th of March. A few months before, this event might have produced most decisive and disastrous results. But the machine was now constructed and set in motion, and the hand of the master workman was no longer essential to its progress. In Holland, the States General showed themselves still impressed with the spirit of their Stadtholder. His successor in England, Queen Anne, though herself destitute of talents, was guided by skilful ministers; she followed the impulse of her parliament and people, and continued the preparations for war. The Emperor, on his part, displayed unusual energy. He imposed a treaty of neutrality on the Elector of Bavaria, gained most of the other German princes on his side, and at length drew from the Diet of the empire a general declaration of war against the King of France, and against his grandson, as an usurper of the Spanish crown. He undertook to carry on hostilities with vigour both in Italy and Alsace, while the English government sent a considerable force to Holland under the Earl of Marlborough, and in conjunction with the Dutch prepared an expedition against Cadiz. It was in vain that Louis, much alarmed at this formidable combination, had recourse to his usual system of artifice, protestation, and promise; and attempted, by making separate offers and sowing the seeds of jealousy, to disunite the Allies. They

continued firm, and on the very same day, the 15th of May, issued against him a combined declaration of hostility at London, at Vienna, and at the Hague. And here then begins the war of the Spanish Succession—a war prolonged for twelve years, and maintained at once in several quarters—a war, undertaken with justice and waged with resolution—a war, fruitful in great actions and important results.

✓ The expedition against Cadiz, which had been planned during King William's life, was recommended after his death by respect to his military fame. Many arguments might be brought forward in its favour. No place was better fitted as a strong hold from whence the Spaniards could be roused to insurrection, and afterwards assisted with supplies; it would cut off the chief channel of trade with the South American dominions; it would secure to the Allies a large importation of treasure; it would destroy the last remnant of the Spanish navy. A fleet was accordingly fitted out of twenty Dutch and thirty English ships of the line, besides transports and small craft, so as to amount altogether to one hundred and sixty sail. A body of fourteen thousand men was embarked, and its command given to Sir Henry Bellasis and the Dutch general Sparre, while Admiral Sir George Rooke was intrusted with the fleet, and the Duke of Ormond had the supreme direction of the whole. He was a man of high character and con-

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siderable attainments, but nature had by no means marked him out for a statesman or a soldier, and he was ill fitted to encounter and to stem the conflict of different nations and rival services. A strong hand could alone have pressed these jarring elements into one compact form ; and the inexperience of Ormond obliged him often to consult where he ought to have commanded. The other chiefs were still more unhappily chosen. Rapacity and peculation disgraced the character of Bellasis, and afterwards caused his dismissal from the army ; and Sparre added to Dutch obstinacy that strange perverseness of republicans, which prompts them to withstand authority, even in those points to which their own inclination would otherwise have led them.

Arriving off Lisbon, the Duke of Ormond was joined by the Prince of Darmstadt, who had gone forward in hopes of inducing the Portuguese Court to accede to the Grand Alliance, and who was disappointed at finding that as yet it could be brought only to empty promises and half resolutions. Proceeding on the voyage, the fleet came in sight of Cadiz on the 23d of August. Officers and men were impatient to engage, and every hour was of consequence, that the Spaniards might add no further to their preparations for defence ; yet, in spite of these considerations, three days were lost by the chiefs in debates upon the best place for their landing, in ascertaining localities, of

which a map would have previously informed them, and discussing questions which might have been determined on the voyage. A lively and authentic picture of their silly wranglings is given in the private letters of Colonel James Stanhope, one of the officers in this expedition, and the same who, later in the war, rose to be the British commander-in-chief in Spain. "We are," he observes, "not only divided, sea against land, but land against land, and sea against sea. Now if it be true that a house divided cannot stand, I am afraid it is still more true that an army and fleet divided each against itself, and each against the other, can make no conquests."

At this time the Captain-General of Andalusia was Don Francisco del Castillo, Marquis of Villadarias, a man of remarkable zeal, energy, and talent. A soldier from early youth, he had risen to the highest military rank with as much reputation as can be gained in a period of national decline. Thus, for instance, he had been obliged ten years before to surrender Charleroi to the French; but had made a most courageous defence, and held out till his garrison was reduced from four thousand five hundred to twelve hundred men.\* Worthy of his country in her brightest, faithful to her in her darkest, days, he seemed as it were a survivor from those old times when the Spanish armies were the best and most successful

\* Quincy, vol. ii. p. 645.

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 II. enterprises, he had deeply studied his profession ;  
 1702. he understood it well ; and it is not paying him any  
 very high compliment to say, that of all the  
 Spanish generals during this war, he was by far the  
 most active and able. His personal bravery, his  
 chivalrous sense of honour, his forgetfulness of self,  
 (the last quality which common minds can attain  
 or even understand,) are still remembered at Se-  
 ville ; and an anecdote which tradition has pre-  
 served, will not be the less welcome to an English-  
 man, if it brings Sir Philip Sydney to his mind.  
 In one of his battles, Villadarias, most severely  
 wounded, was carried from the field to the rear of  
 the engagement, and the surgeons quitting all in-  
 ferior patients, crowded round to attend the Mar-  
 quis. Gasping with pain, and hardly able to make  
 himself heard, the noble Spaniard yet waved them  
 aside, and pointing to a common soldier, who lay  
 bleeding beside him, “ Dress that wound first,” he  
 said, “ it seems worse than mine.” In short, (to use  
 the words of the most eloquent of the French writers,  
 when speaking of his friend Altuña\*,) he was “ one  
 “ of those lofty spirits whom Spain alone brings  
 “ forth, but of whom she now brings forth too few  
 “ for her glory.” The obscurity into which his  
 name has fallen is a natural consequence of his fre-  
 quent reverses ; but strongly shows the misery of those  
 evil times, when no exertions can retrieve a broken

\* Rousseau, Confess. liv. 7.

army, and a sinking state; when failure and disaster seem inevitable, and when want of means is mistaken by posterity for want of skill.

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✓ The first rumours of the intended armament found Cadiz and the neighbouring coast almost entirely defenceless. Nothing can set forth more clearly the wretched state of weakness and imbecility into which the former government had fallen, and which the new one was unable to repair. The most important city in Spain had only three hundred men for its garrison, and the troops with which Villadarias could line the shore, hardly amounted to as many. Of supplies and military stores he was utterly destitute; and whilst threatened with so formidable an attack from abroad, every thing around him bore the appearance of perfect peace and security. His representations to the Court of Madrid arrived, it might be thought, at a most unfavourable time. The King was absent in Italy, and the junta of regency headed by a princess of fourteen. The administration had no longer the momentary vigour impressed upon it by the strong, but selfish mind of Portocarrero. He was now, on the contrary, employed in distracting and dividing it. His influence had begun to sink before that of Princess Orsini, who was supported by all the French in Spain, and even Orry, though wholly indebted to the Cardinal for his appointment, had become her most devoted partisan. Such was the state of things at Madrid; but the very urgency

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of the danger raised up in the Queen and her ministers the spirit and determination to repel it. She convoked the councillors of state; she laid the case before them with extraordinary grace and dignity, and appealed to the zeal and attachment of the most powerful nobles. The call was readily answered; Portocarrero, Arias, and many others, brought in contributions of money, and raised troops at their private expence, and life seemed suddenly to animate the sluggish machine of government. Anxious to engage in her behalf the personal influence and princely fortune of the Admiral of Castille (this was a high hereditary dignity), the Queen entreated him to take the command of the threatened province, and offered him the most extensive powers; but he declared that, from a just regard to his own reputation, he could not assume an office when entirely without means for fulfilling its duties. Amidst the universal zeal, such an answer was considered, not unreasonably, as a token of wavering loyalty; and when the Admiral afterwards showed some inclination to accept the office, it was not pressed upon him, but was left in the hands of Villadarias. This officer made all the exertions that could have been expected from his previous character and conduct, or that the shortness of the time could possibly allow. He perceived that the loss of Cadiz would draw on that of Andalusia, and the loss of Andalusia that of Spain; and he, therefore, made it his first care to store this city with provisions; to



throw into it the best troops he could collect, and to secure the harbour by drawing a strong boom, and sinking two large hulks at its entrance. So judicious and popular was his government, that the province which the Allies had expected to rise in their favour now strained every nerve to uphold the cause of Philip. The wealthy cities of Cordova and Seville vied with each other in their free gifts, the nobles took up arms against the strangers, the clergy subscribed and preached against the heretics, and the peasantry were enrolled into battalions of infantry ; so that after providing for the garrison of Cadiz, Villadarias could still muster in the field some five or six hundred good horsemen, and several thousand volunteers. These last were, of course, untrained, ill-armed, and unsoldier-like, and are spoken of with much contempt by Stanhope, as “ rascally foot militia ;” while, on the other hand, the Spanish writers do not fail to praise most highly this patriotic, unpaid, and truly national force. So differently do even the most honest men view the same objects according to their party or their prejudices !

The chief reliance of Villadarias was, however, placed in the position and natural strength of Cadiz, some account of which may, perhaps, throw light on the details of the attack. The Isle of Leon, a sandy level of very irregular shape, is separated from the main land by a narrow streight, but connected with it by a causeway, called the Bridge of Zuazo, and jutting out across the mouth

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of an extensive and beautiful bay, bears the city of Cadiz on its furthest point. No situation is more admirably fitted for every purpose of a mart, a fortress, or an arsenal ; and Cadiz has, accordingly, flourished from the earliest times. First, a Phenician colony, it grew in wealth and consequence beneath the Roman dominion ; and in the thirteenth century was wrested from the Moors by King Alphonso the Wise. Its importance had been truly felt and well described by Charles the Fifth, the last sovereign of ability who has sat upon the Spanish throne ; and who, in his parting advice to his son, bid him hold fast Flushing, the Goletta, and Cadiz, as the keys of the Netherlands, Africa, and Spain. The city is defended by strong walls towards the sea and bay, and by still stronger works towards the Isle of Leon. On a projecting point of this island towards the continent is built the fort of Puntal, and one called Matagorda occupies a similar tongue of land nearly opposite ; so that these, by their close approach, form the entrance of the harbour.\* In front of Cadiz is the mouth of the little river Guadalete, renowned for the defeat of the last Gothic monarch, Don Roderic, on its banks, and the whole bay is closely studded with towns and villages, especially Rota, Port St. Mary's, and Puerto Real. Further inland is the little town of Xeres, whose name we have corrupted into Sherry, when speaking of its wine, and whose extensive trade

\* Labat, Voyages, vol. i. p. 289. He visited Cadiz in 1705.

with England in that article of produce has been the main cause of its present prosperity.

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The doubts of the allied generals as to the fittest place for landing were increased by their uncertainty respecting the amount and disposition of the force which could be brought against them. They had not received any intelligence of it that could be relied on, and several amongst them greatly over-rated it, being misled by a stratagem of Villadarias, who always lighted extensive fires at night along the heights. During their deliberations, the Prince of Darmstadt despatched several letters of solicitation to the Spanish Chiefs at Cadiz; and the Duke of Ormond also wrote in the same strain to Villadarias, who, having in the former reign fought so often against the House of Bourbon, might now, it was hoped, be secretly disinclined to its service.\* A proclamation was likewise addressed to the common people in the usual style of such documents, and many copies of it were sent on shore, together with the private letters, by means of some fishermen who had ventured out too far in their boats, and been taken by the English. None of these attempts was, however, attended with the least success, nor ought any, in prudence, to have been made, until the landing of the army had shown, and its discipline inspired, confidence. The great point in debate was, whether the troops should first reduce the forts on

\* See a translation of this letter, and the answer, in Quincy, vol. iii. p. 706.

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the main land, or boldly commence operations at once in the Isle of Leon, and at last, as is usual in divided councils, the less resolute prevailed. On the 26th of August the army began to disembark at a small inlet, called the Bay of Bulls, and the first who set foot on shore was the Prince of Darmstadt, exclaiming, “ I swore to reach Madrid “ through Catalonia, I now will reach Catalonia “ through Madrid !”

The descent of the troops was made with more hazard and difficulty than had been foreseen by the seamen ; for, though the weather appeared calm, there was so high a surf upon the strand that about twenty boats were sunk, as many men drowned, and not one landed who was not wet up to the neck. Scarcely had a few got firm footing when they were exposed to another danger, from the Marquis of Villadarias, who suddenly bore down upon them with a chosen squadron of cavalry. “ You may easily imagine,” writes Colonel Stanhope, “ that men landed in such a condition, with “ their arms and ammunition all wet, could not be “ very fit to encounter an enemy, if any considerable “ strength had opposed them, yet some of them had “ an opportunity to show what Englishmen are “ capable of.” The foremost ranks, which consisted of grenadiers, stood firm against the assailants, and succeeded in repulsing them, though Stanhope speaks with high praise of the bravery of the attack, and owns that two hundred more such horsemen would have spoiled their descent. In this

little skirmish there occurred an instance of the Spanish spirit too characteristic to be left unnoticed. Amongst the other attempts of Darmstadt to draw the Andalusian chiefs from their allegiance, he had made one on Don Felix Vallaro, commander of the cavalry, whom he had formerly known in Catalonia, but who, far from listening to his proposals, laid them immediately before Villadarias. He did not, however, succeed in thoroughly removing the suspicions of that general; and as they were riding forward together, during the charge, “Yonder, comes your friend Darmstadt,” said Villadarias, sarcastically, looking to the English as they disembarked. Stung to the quick, the high-minded young officer made no reply, but setting spurs to his horse, dashed into the thickest of the fight, and in a few moments found the death he sought on the enemy’s bayonets. His bloody corpse, left upon the field, afforded a sad proof of his loyalty, and was the only answer he deigned to make to any imputation against it.

From the Bay of Bulls the allied troops marched upon Rota, where the governor, their secret partisan, admitted them into the town, and this was the first and only man they gained over from any class during the whole expedition. His name is not recorded; but we find that Darmstadt, on behalf of the Archduke, and with much solemnity, conferred upon him the title of Marquis, hoping (and this is the most common source of generosity) that a bribe to one might become a bait to many. The

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generals remained two days at Rota disembarking their horses and stores, and determined to proceed from thence to Port St. Mary's, an ancient, but unwall'd town\*, where most of the wealthy citizens of Cadiz had their country-houses, and from which that city was commonly supplied with provisions, so that its possession seemed necessary as the first step to a blockade. By order of the Duke of Ormond, Colonel Stanhope addressed a letter in Spanish to the governor, clergy, gentry, and inhabitants of this place, acquainting them with the Duke's intention to march thither, and inviting them to declare for King Charles, or, at least, to remain in their houses, where he promised them all manner of good treatment, such as the people of Rota had already met with at his hands. The Marquis of Villadarias was at St. Mary's, when an English drummer brought this communication, and after having threatened to hang him, sent the English general this answer:—"The Spaniards know not how to change their religion nor their King."† These words spoke the feelings of the whole people. Next day, when the English entered the town, they found the houses closed, the inhabitants removed, and every thing silent and deserted. A party of Spanish troops, however, having mistaken their orders, and not knowing the

\* It was built in the thirteenth century. (Mariana, Hist. Hisp. lib. xiii. c. 15.)

† "Los Españoles no mudamos de religion ni rey." Stanhope's Letters, MSS.

Allies to be so near at hand, marched into the town on their way to Xeres, at almost the same time as the English vanguard, headed by Colonel Stanhope, and a skirmish ensued, when the Spaniards were routed without much difficulty. About two hundred of them sought shelter in a large and strongly built house, and attempted to maintain themselves; but upon Stanhope's investing it, they surrendered at discretion. St. Mary's was at this time one of the richest towns in Spain, and the absence of the inhabitants afforded both a pretext and facility for plunder. The greatest excesses were committed by the soldiers in the town, and in the adjoining villages, and that ferocious love of mischief, so common in uneducated men, often urged them to destroy the property which they could not remove or make their own, whilst too many of the officers were more intent on sharing the spoil than on checking the spoilers. It was in vain that the better spirits attempted to stem this torrent of licence and insubordination, which carried every thing before it. Considerations of policy, if not feelings of religion, ought to have saved, at least the churches; but these too were rifled or defaced. Some fine bronze statues of saints which adorned them were torn down\*; and the neighbouring peasantry seem to have felt the injury inflicted on these favourite

\* Compare the short notice of San Phelipe (Coment. vol. i. p. 77.) with the description of Colmenar (Delices de l'Espagne vol. iii. p. 459. ed. 1707.).

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images still more keenly than that which their own persons or families underwent from the invaders.

This course of wanton and most impolitic outrage proved a death-blow to the expedition. All hopes were lost of gaining the good will and assistance of the Spaniards ; and the allied troops, satisfied with the wealth they had so disgracefully amassed, showed themselves far more anxious to keep their booty than to retrieve their reputation. From this time forward all their operations appear planned without skill or concert, executed with remissness, and followed by reverses. Having occupied the little town of Puerto Real, they opened trenches against the Fort of Matagorda, but suffered greatly from its fire as well as from the opposite batteries of Puntal, and from the French and Spanish gallees in the harbour, which were commanded by the Conde de Fernan Nuñez. Little or no progress was made in their works ; and the excessive heat of the season in this latitude proved fatal to many of their northern constitutions. On the land side the Marquis of Villadarias constantly hovered round them with his body of cavalry, avoiding any general engagement, but cutting off all communication, harassing detached parties, and availing himself of any momentary want of vigilance. His still continued stratagem of large and distant nightly fires, together with the total absence of desertion from his ranks, kept them in a great measure ignorant of his real numbers. By a sudden attack he also retook



Rota, where the English had left a garrison of three hundred men, commanded by the former Spanish governor, who was now condemned to death, and executed as a traitor. An attempt to force the entrance of the harbour by the English ships proved unsuccessful; and under all these discouraging circumstances, seeing no chance of the expected rising in their favour, and fearful that the fleet might soon be blown away from the shore by storms in its unsheltered situation, it was determined, in a general council of war, to relinquish this hopeless enterprise. Several officers, more especially the Prince of Darmstadt, warmly opposed this resolution, and brought forward other plans of attack, but they were over-ruled, and the troops were accordingly embarked, not without suffering some loss from the angry peasantry, and the active force of Villadarias. They sailed from Cadiz on the 30th of September, and steered homewards, with the hatred of Spain behind them, with the resentment of England in prospect, and, according to the expression of Stanhope, “with a great deal of plunder and of infamy.” The generals threw, or at least attempted to throw, the blame of their mismanagement and failure on Sir George Rooke and the other seamen, whilst these, unable to clear themselves entirely, replied chiefly by recrimination, which, though in theory the weakest mode of defence, is commonly found in practice more effectual and convincing than any.

Fortune, however, now presented the Allies

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with an unexpected opportunity of both redeeming their disgrace and adding to their booty. The yearly fleet from the West Indies, laden with treasure and merchandise, being shut out from the regular port of Cadiz, had steered northward, and run into Vigo Bay. Some French ships of war attended it as an escort; their admiral was the Count of Chateau Renault, the Spanish, Don Manuel de Velasco. They anchored on the 22d of September, and, had the cargoes been forthwith disembarked, there would have been ample time for removing them into the interior of the country, and thus securing them from danger; but this was prevented by an untoward discussion at Madrid. The citizens of Cadiz enjoyed by royal grant a monopoly of the West Indian trade, and were entitled to a certain per-centage on all the bullion landed in that port. Anxious, therefore, that the fleet should not be allowed to unload elsewhere, they sent to Court a strong remonstrance, which was laid before the Council of the Indies, but treated with the usual slowness and procrastination of Spaniards. At length, unable to come to a final decision, and justly fearing that they might lose the substance whilst deliberating on the shadow, the Council granted permission to land the bullion, reserving the question of the duties upon it for after inquiry, and directing that the merchandise, though it was even higher in value, should still be left on board. These orders came too late. Some ships of the allied armament having

touched to water on the coast of Algarves, received tidings of this fleet, and the generals immediately formed the resolution of attacking it. Although becalmed for some days, they arrived before Vigo on the 22d of October; and at the prospect of a prize so rich and so defenceless, displayed a very different spirit from that which had brought on their failure at Cadiz. Avarice now became the ally, not the antagonist, of honour.

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The bay of Vigo is one of those deep and narrow inlets common on the coast of Galicia, and would be of greater importance, both in a commercial and military point of view, were it not for the poverty of this province, and for the neighbourhood of Ferrol and Coruña. The town itself is built about half way down the gulf, and might contain, at this period, between two and three thousand inhabitants. It was walled, and had a castle flanked by four bastions, besides which, two ancient towers called Rada and Corbeyro defended the entrance of the bay; but these works, never very strong, had become ruinous from age and neglect.\* Now that the danger was close at hand, it was useless to think of repairing them: but such preparations for defence as the time admitted had not been forgotten. A boom had been thrown across the harbour, the ships of war (ten of them were French) had been moored along the shore,

\* See a description of Vigo in the Hist. of Europe for 1702, p. 391; and another in Southey's Peninsular War, vol. iii. p. 277. 8vo. ed.

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and the neighbouring peasants, who showed themselves both willing and warlike, had been enrolled, and joined to such soldiery as could quickly be brought together. But what were all these means against a fleet, which, according to the boast of the Prince of Darmstadt, held on board more troops than could at that moment have been found in the whole of Spain?\*. Two thousand men, headed by Ormond in person, scaled the entrance towers, some English ships broke through the boom, and the brave resistance of both the French and Spaniards could only for a few hours delay their overthrow. Great bravery was also shown on the part of the Allies; but in the Duke's public account† only two officers are mentioned as having more particularly distinguished themselves; first, Colonel Stanhope, and after him Lord Tunbridge. While the French ships of war still maintained their line, the galleons slipped their anchors and ran further down the gulf, with the view of unloading in safety, and some merchandise and treasure was accordingly brought on shore, but they were soon pursued and overtaken by the English squadron. By order of the French and Spanish Admirals the greater part of the cargoes was then thrown into the sea, and the vessels set on fire; but the English exerted themselves in extinguishing the flames, and succeeded in securing six galleons and seven ships

\* San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 80.

† London Gazettes, 1702.

of war. The roar of the artillery, the crackling of the flames, and the plunging of sailors from the burning ships into the sea, mingled their various sounds with the lamentable shrieks of the wounded, and the exulting shouts of the conquerors. War has seldom assumed so hideous an aspect as Vigo now displayed, and two thousand French and Spaniards are computed to have perished on this dreadful day. Before the fighting was over, Chateau Renault appears to have fled from Vigo on the road to Santiago de Compostella, declaring it to be his immediate duty to secure against attack a city so important to the Spaniards, and indeed to the whole Catholic world, from its supposed religious sanctity, and so alluring to invaders from its accumulated votive offerings. To the same place, also, was forwarded in all haste, the small remnant of the bullion and merchandise which the Spaniards had succeeded in saving; but this remnant became still further diminished, and, in fact, brought down to nothing, by depredations at Santiago and its neighbourhood. It is remarkable, that the residents in places of pilgrimage or reputed holiness, who might be supposed more pious, are commonly far more base, unprincipled, and depraved than other men.

Next morning the Allies sent down some divers to recover, if possible, the treasure thrown overboard by the Spaniards; but, annoyed by the firing from shore, and satisfied with their spoils, they soon desisted from the attempt, and steered homewards. The loss of the Spaniards on this occasion,

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in goods and treasure, exceeded eight millions of dollars, but from the quantity sunk or destroyed, it is certain that not one half this value was gained by the Allies. The want of these expected supplies at a period of great distress, and at a court crowded with greedy claimants, proved most embarrassing to Philip, and obliged him to leave unperformed many promises and contracts. He found himself deprived of his best, almost his only fleet, and was therefore compelled for some time to throw the American commerce into the hands of the French, who had long been grasping at this important privilege, but who, by its exercise, offended all the Spanish merchants. On the other hand, the attacks on Cadiz and Vigo proved almost as injurious to the Archduke, from the unpopularity they raised against his cause and his allies; and to counteract this first feeling required the operation of some time, of many causes of internal discontent, and of many striking examples of defection.

Of these the chief and most important was that of the hereditary Admiral of Castille, Don Juan Henriquez y Cabrera. His high rank, his princely fortune, and his extensive influence, gave lustre to great natural abilities, and a love of literature and learning, seldom found among Spanish grandees. A candidate for Court favour during the last reign, he had endeavoured to stem, but at last sunk beneath the overwhelming power of Portocarrero, who considered him as his most formidable rival,

and who made use of his authority at the accession of Philip, to dismiss him from his office of Master of the Horse. Even before this time he had been looked upon as no well-wisher to the House of Bourbon; and now with this indignity rankling in his mind, he became an enemy the more dangerous because disguised. An humbler individual might have safely avowed his discontent at his dismissal, and indulged in the pleasure of complaint, but not so the Admiral — his rank was so exalted that he could only secure his safety by the most abject submissions to the crown. So great were his talents for intrigue, that he found means whilst treating with Vienna, and stirring up the disaffected at home, to become in some degree a personal favourite with the Queen and Princess Orsini. Much alarmed at his increasing influence, Portocarrero determined to remove him altogether from its sphere. He accordingly induced the government to name the Admiral ambassador at Paris, an appointment, which, however high, was looked upon by the haughty noble as below his expectations, and which he feared might be intended as the first step to arrest, imprisonment, or even death, when once removed from his country and connections.

In spite of such forebodings, the Admiral was too skilful a politician not to know that danger is often incurred by the mere expression of fear; and, far from betraying his uneasiness, he seemed to receive the appointment with pleasure, and to make every

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préparation for filling it with dignity. He selected the persons for his suite ; he fixed a time for his journey ; he accepted from the treasury a large sum of money for his expenses, and requested the royal permission (requisite in Spain for these purposes) to raise some more by mortgage on his own domains. During this time he actively employed himself in completing his negotiations with the Archduke, and arranged a plan for retreating into Portugal. Having taken a solemn leave of the Court, he set out on the road to France, but had only proceeded three days on his journey, when a sealed despatch, which he had left behind him for this very purpose, was brought him by express. He read it with an air of surprise ; and, turning to his attendants, informed them that he had just received counter-orders from her Majesty (the King was still in Italy), and was now instructed to proceed in the first place to the Court of Portugal, and attempt to confirm its wavering alliance. Believed and followed by all his suite, he forthwith turned to the left and made for Zamora, where the authorities were deceived by the same pretence, and afforded him every facility for passing into Portugal. Even after crossing the frontier, he did not throw aside the mask, but still protesting of his attachment to King Philip, declared that the base intrigues of his enemies at court, and the unjust suspicions to which these had given rise, induced him to withdraw for a time until his innocence should be felt and acknowledged. Such was his power of dissi-



imulation that he again obtained full credit with all those whom he addressed; and proceeding to Lisbon, entered that city in state with a great number of carriages and a train of three hundred persons. He was received with much distinction by the King of Portugal, and took up his abode in a palace of the Duke of Cadaval, from whence he soon published a manifesto, asserting the will of Charles the Second a forgery, and transferring his allegiance to the Archduke as to his rightful King. Most of the gentlemen who had accompanied him followed his example, although several, and his own nephew Don Pascal Henriquez, remained steadfast in their loyalty and hastened back to Spain. His flight excited no small surprise and alarm at Madrid, where he was proclaimed a traitor, and attainted in body and estates; and though the former was safe from the sentence, the latter were eagerly seized. The Admiral perceived that the scabbard was thrown away on both sides, and that he must remain an exile for life should his party not prevail. Stripped of all his domains, he knew the importance of money to him in such circumstances, and how much his means of subsistence, or at least of respect amongst strangers, would depend on its possession. Yet with the true Spanish sense of honour, he instantly sent back to Madrid the large sum which had been paid him for the expenses of his embassy, and which he would not consent to use for any other purpose.

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The Admiral now applied himself with equal

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talent and activity to forward the cause he had espoused. His two first objects were to induce the Emperor to send over the Archduke Charles, and to obtain the co-operation of Portugal, an ally more important from its position than its power. Each of these schemes was, however, attended with peculiar difficulties. Leopold had only one son besides Charles, and that son having only as yet daughters by his marriage, he was unwilling to expose the last hope of his succession to the uncertainties and dangers of a distant expedition, more especially when he considered his own advanced age and declining health. The King of Portugal, on the other hand, was in character thoroughly selfish, and like all selfish men, he was naturally prone to indecision, as always desirous of combining incompatible advantages. For many months he wavered between the arguments of the Admiral and those of the Duke of Cadaval, the first of the grandees, and a zealous partisan of the French. On the one side, the Admiral held out as lures an increase of territory, and the payment of subsidies; he spoke highly, like all exiles, of his influence and connections at home; he urged that the weakness and disunion of Spain would render it an easy prey, and somewhat inconsistently asserted, that its existing government entertained a serious and settled plan of conquering Portugal. "What matters it," exclaimed the Duke of Cadaval in reply, when the subject was discussed at council,—“what matters it to us whether the ruler

“ at Madrid be of the House of Hapsburg or of  
 “ Bourbon ? In either case he will be the King of  
 “ Spain ; he will act as such against the Portuguese ;  
 “ he will never consent to yield to them one foot of  
 “ land from his provinces ; and, least of all, from  
 “ those which serve as a bulwark and safeguard to  
 “ the rest. The cessions which the Archduke is  
 “ now so ready to promise will be prevented by his  
 “ interest if victorious, by his inability if vanquished.  
 “ It is easy to be liberal with the property of others.  
 “ To carry on a war we should need many auxiliary  
 “ troops, and must expose our pure Catholic popu-  
 “ lation to be corrupted and defiled by so much in-  
 “ tercourse with the Dutch and English heretics.”

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These arguments were not without their weight, but, through a master stroke of policy, the Admiral found means to neutralise the obstacles at Vienna and at Lisbon by playing off the one against the other. To the Emperor he represented the arrival of the Archduke as an indispensable condition; without which the Portuguese would never stir : at the Court of Lisbon he affirmed that its accession to the Grand Alliance was the only means of inducing Leopold to part with his son. Thus artfully drawing aid from opposite difficulties he succeeded in his views. A treaty between Portugal and the allied powers was signed at Lisbon on the 6th of May acknowledging Charles as King of Spain, and undertaking to vindicate his rights.\* It stipulated that Don Pedro should maintain at his expense

\* Lamberty, vol. ii. p. 501.

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II. raising thirteen thousand more, so that the whole  
1708. Portuguese army might amount to twenty-three thousand foot and five thousand cavalry, besides which he was promised the aid of twelve thousand auxiliary troops. Two other private articles, moreover, agreed, on the part of Charles, that as soon as he should be seated on his throne he would cede to the King of Portugal several cities, such as Badajos and Albuquerque on the Estramaduran frontier, on the Gallician those of Tuy, Bayona, and Vigo, and in America the district of Rio de la Plata. These articles were kept most strictly secret, it being foreseen how offensive they would prove to the national pride of the Spaniards ; and, in fact, some years afterwards their premature disclosure was of all the events in the war one of the most unfavourable to the cause of Charles.

On his part the Emperor duly performed his engagement, after some of that procrastination and delay by which the most hopeful undertakings are so often marred at Vienna. On the 12th of September he held a public court, and with much solemnity renounced his claims to the crown of Spain in favour of Charles ; his eldest son the King of the Romans did the same, and a few days afterwards the young monarch set out on his journey. So ill had he been provided with the means of pushing his pretensions, or even maintaining his dignity, that he found it necessary in Holland to raise some money by pawning his jewels—an inaus-

picious commencement to a reign! Early next  
 January he arrived in England, where he was re-  
 ceived with royal honours, and paid a visit to Queen  
 Anne at Windsor; after which he re-embarked for  
 Lisbon.\*

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Meanwhile the return of Philip from Italy had  
 been hastened by the news of the attack on Cadiz  
 and of the disaster at Vigo. On his arrival at  
 Zaragoza he was strongly urged to resume the sit-  
 tings, and ratify the acts of the Cortes convoked by  
 the Queen; but he evaded a request which he  
 thought dangerous to his prerogative, and his refusal  
 did not fail to raise great discontent in Aragon.  
 Most of the members of these Cortes were men of  
 great personal weight and character; and even had  
 they been the reverse, it is one of the most common  
 weaknesses of mankind to revere collectively those  
 whom they despise as individuals. Philip reached  
 his capital on the 17th of January amidst great  
 public rejoicings, and attended by the new French  
 ambassador. The Cardinal d'Estrées (such was  
 his name and dignity) had been selected by  
 Louis with peculiar care. His family was no less  
 illustrious than his station in the church, and both  
 of these seemed likely to endear him to so proud  
 and so pious a nation as the Spaniards. His diplo-  
 matic talents had been tried in several important  
 missions, and matured in the favourable air of Italy,  
 but his real character was one of inordinate vanity,

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\* Tindal's Hist. vol. 3. p. 569. ed. 1763.

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petulance, and indiscretion. He came to Madrid deeply impressed with the incapacity of Philip's ministry and with his own superior skill, and expecting to rule every thing without restraint or opposition. Accordingly he attempted to carry on matters with a high hand, plunged at once into the most intricate affairs, and at his very outset wilfully embroiled himself with the two chief persons at Court, Cardinal Portocarrero and Princess Orsini. Even to their Catholic Majesties he showed but little respect, and insisted on the right of immediate admission to their presence on all occasions, not only for himself but for his nephew the Abbot d'Estrées.\*

A succession of petty quarrels now ensued, which from the number and garrulity of French memoirs — for in France during the old system there was hardly an underling in office, or a valet near the Court, who did not think himself entitled to print his recollections, — might be detailed with great minuteness, but which seem scarcely to deserve it. Nor is it always easy to discern the truth on such trifles, which lie so near the ground, that the dust raised up by the disputants in the fury of the combat obscures them from the eye of the historian. I shall, therefore, pass lightly over a long train of plots and cabals; representations and counter-representations to Louis, orders from him to his grandson, and lamentations from the latter and his Queen.

\* San Phelipe, Coment. vol. i. p. 88. Mém. de Noailles, vol. iii. p. 3.

Perplexed and bewildered by these contradictory reports the King of France, though strongly leaning to the side of d'Estrées, and espousing his views on all occasions, hardly knew at length what to believe or what to do.

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It may be observed, that female talents, though inferior in state affairs, seldom fail to prevail in court intrigues. The Cardinal d'Estrées found to his cost that Princess Orsini was not to be thwarted and defied with impunity. So well established was his influence at Versailles, so powerful his connections, and so high the esteem which Louis entertained for him, that he thought his own disgrace impossible—as if there were ever any impossibilities to the vengeance of a woman! A fitting tool for her purpose was found in his own nephew the Abbot, whom she artfully inspired with the wish and design of supplanting the Cardinal as ambassador. While, therefore, she plied the French Court with incessant complaints against the Cardinal, whilst the King and Queen under her direction wrote in a similar strain, a secret representation was also made by the Abbot, which received the greater credit as his relationship seemed a pledge of his sincerity. He was even thought at Versailles highly deserving of promotion and reward for the violence thus put upon his private feelings in drawing the veil from the errors of his kinsman; and the recall of the Cardinal having first been wrung from Louis by these means, a subsequent application to Philip

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easily obtained the appointment of the Abbot in his room.

For a time every thing now went on smoothly from the implicit deference of the new ambassador to the Princess. But he soon became anxious to attain some portion at least of the high authority which his predecessors had enjoyed, and the success of his former duplicity encouraged him to more. The Princess was informed, that whilst in his public despatches he affected to extol her plans and her proceedings, his secret letters were filled with the most bitter invectives against both. To ascertain the fact, she obtained an order from Philip to the Post-office, and seized on one of these confidential communications, which fully confirmed the suspicions she had formed. Not only did it inveigh in the severest terms against her administration, but it entered into all the details of her private life, and endeavoured to make her appear ridiculous as well as hateful. All the woman broke forth in the Princess as she read these revilings ; and forgetful of her usual prudence and discretion, she added comments in her own hand on the margin, instead of closing the parcel, and endeavouring to conceal her fraudulent knowledge of its contents. One of her notes is too characteristic to be left unnoticed. D'Estrées had accused her of gallantries with her secretary, D'Aubigny, and of having afterwards secretly married him : she made no remark on the first charge, but wrote opposite the second :—



“As for married,—No!” With such additions, the letter was again committed to the post, and together with several copies taken by the Princess and forwarded to her friends, in due time reached its destination at Versailles\*.

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This bold measure did not fail to ruin D'Estrées, by showing the opposition between his public and private statements; but it also ruined the Princess. Had the despatch been allowed to proceed unopened, or (what would have been the same) had her opening it been unsuspected, its charges might probably have been disbelieved, or at least not thought of sufficient consequence to ground any measures upon them; but to find it intercepted was a gross and glaring breach of faith, and, moreover, the strongest proof of her unscrupulous, daring, and vindictive character. In this instance, as in many others, the indiscretion of the answer proved far more injurious than the violence of the accusation. From that moment it is believed that Louis determined to recall from Madrid both the Princess and the Abbot; although he considered it expedient, at first, to suppress his displeasure, and to convey to her new expressions of esteem and regard. Resentment, however, always gathers strength from the necessity of concealing it, and Louis kept his object steadily in sight. It was not to be accomplished without some difficulty. The Princess entirely governed the Queen, and the Queen her husband; so that a positive order from

\* Mém. de St. Simon, vol. iii. p. 163. ed. 1829.

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Louis, without any preparation, might have been met by Philip's positive refusal, and have produced a total rupture between the two Courts. The best policy, therefore, was to wait patiently for some months, until Philip could be separated from the Queen, and the approaching campaign in Portugal seemed a favourable opportunity for this purpose. He was eagerly pressed by the ambassador to show himself at the head of his army : he consented ; and no sooner had he reached Placentia than D'Estrées put into his hands a letter from Louis, requiring him to dismiss Princess Orsini, and to select another Camerara-mayor from a list of four ladies which was laid before him. Removed from the circle of the magician, the King no longer obeyed the spell, and after some lamentations and complaints, complied with the wishes of his grandfather. At the same time the Abbot was informed of his own recall, which was represented as a peace-offering to their Catholic Majesties.

Another French agent at Madrid had the unwelcome task assigned him to inform the Queen of the exile of her favourite, and exhort her to submission. Maria Louisa heard this communication in sullen silence, and seemed brooding over some project of resistance ; but the Princess, at this crisis, displayed all the prudence, skill, and mastery of temper for which her character in general was so remarkably distinguished. Without giving way to any useless tears or wailings, she perceived at once the whole extent of her disaster, and immediately formed a

plan for retrieving it, and once more rising in the favour of the Court of Versailles. Not only did she obey the terms of the decree by setting off from Madrid the very next morning, but made no attempt to see the Queen before her departure, and even exhorted her by letter to submit with resignation. Having, however, thus given her both the advice and the example to obey, she seized every pretext for lingering in several towns, on her road to Bayonne, in order to concert a system of combined action and regular correspondence with her friends in Spain. Our next view of the Court of Madrid will exhibit the patience, perseverance, and dexterity with which both she and the Queen applied themselves to obtain her return, converted every incident that arose into an instrument for that object, and steadily pursued it through every change of circumstances; but we must now turn for a while from state intrigues to military operations.

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## CHAPTER III.

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IN the spring of 1704, both parties prepared to push the war in Portugal with vigour ; and according to the treaty concluded with that Court, four thousand Dutch and eight thousand English troops were sent over, the former commanded by General Fagel, the latter by the Duke of Schomberg. The fleet was intrusted to Admiral Sir George Rooke ; and, amongst the officers of note on board, may be mentioned the Earl of Athlone,—a Dutchman by birth and descent, though an Irishman by title,—and Colonel Stanhope, who, in the interval since the affair at Vigo, had been serving under Marlborough in Flanders. Charles himself arrived in the Tagus on the 8th of March, and was received by Don Pedro with the highest honours,—more, probably, than that jealous Portuguese would have paid to a real and undisputed King of Spain. He had just lost his daughter, the Infanta Theresa, who had been intended for Charles's consort ; but, by a royal decree, the public mourning was suspended for three days, and replaced by illuminations and other signs of joy. The first visit was paid by the King of Portugal on board the Admiral's ship ; he gave way to Charles as to his superior in rank, and escorted

him, under triumphal arches and amidst applauding spectators, to the palace. But when from these festivities the two Princes, or rather their military advisers, turned to consider their means of warfare, they found these altogether inadequate to the hopes they cherished, and to the schemes they meditated. A long period of peace and inactivity had brought Portugal down to the same state which might have been expected from the most disastrous and exhausting war. Its fortresses were as much dilapidated by time as they could have been by hostile cannon ; and its armies were not only thinned by neglect or mismanagement as they might by the sword of the enemy, but had undergone a moral degradation which no mere reverses can inflict. Their pay was often withheld—their merit always unrewarded. No stores, horses, or artillery, were in readiness ; no preparations of any kind had been made ; and every thing bore the stamp, either of active speculation, or of lazy torpor. The chief command was vested in the Duke of Cadaval, a civilian, who thus held the power without the responsibility of General.\* Instead of appointing one supreme chief to the Portuguese army in the field, he adhered to the old system of leaving the defence of each province to its Captain-General or Governor ; a plan repugnant to the plainest military rules. He

\* “The Duke of Cadaval has the chief direction and command of all the troops. He caressed our Duke (Schomberg) extremely at his arrival, and governed him in every thing.”—Col. Stanhope's Letters. MSS.

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does not appear to have consulted the Marquis Dás Minas, or any other Portuguese officer of distinction; and, from all his conduct, might have been thought determined to justify his own advice when dissuading the war. Fagel and Schomberg, who ought to have retrieved this system, pursued nearly the same: they separated their troops, and spread them over a great extent of country,—the Dutch mostly on the northern bank of the Tagus, and the English on the southern; and, by throwing garrisons into every petty place on the frontiers, they reduced their disposable force to a few regiments of cavalry. Under such circumstances, any brilliant successes were impossible, and it was agreed to give up all idea of conquest, and to keep strictly and entirely on the defensive.

Very different was the conduct of the Court of Madrid, then directed by one of the most able and distinguished men who shone forth during the course of this war. The Duke of Berwick was a son of King James the Second, and also nephew of the great Duke of Marlborough, his mother being Arabella Churchill. A foreign education, his Catholic faith, and two campaigns in Hungary, in very early youth, had made him almost a stranger to his native country, even before the dethronement of his father compelled him to renounce it for ever. With military talents akin to those of his illustrious uncle, he embraced the opposite side, and gradually rose to the highest rank in the French armies. His courage, per-

severance, and skill, proved on many occasions, were highly esteemed and often employed by Louis the Fourteenth, who, with little merit of his own, certainly possessed very great discernment of merit in others. His manners, however, were strongly marked with haughtiness and reserve: he avoided all party intrigues, and seldom thrust himself into the hurry and babble of the Court. Never manifesting, and rarely feeling, emotion, he had but little indulgence for the faults and frailties of his subalterns; and his severity, however effectual, might sometimes be censured as excessive. Accordingly, though much revered and confided in, he was but little beloved, and says of himself, in his Memoirs, that he never looked upon any one as a friend or as an enemy but for the good of the service.\* Such calculating coldness would, in most cases, have formed a merely selfish man; but the same principle which, in common minds, degenerates to selfishness, becomes in noble natures the love of fame. This aspiration never forsook him: it made him scrupulous in the performance of every civil or military duty, strictly honourable, contemptuous of money, generous, and liberal; but all without that warmth and frankness which win their way into the heart. He had now been sent into Spain as generalissimo of its armies, and at the head of twelve thousand

\* Mém. vol. i. p. 163. ed. 1778. These Memoirs are written with great frankness and simplicity, and afford some of our best materials for the War of the Succession.

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auxiliary French. He arrived at Madrid in the middle of February, and his presence immediately kindled life and vigour in the council. Troops were collected from all quarters, even from Flanders ; new levies were enrolled, the old regiments clothed and organized, magazines established, money supplied ; and it was determined to anticipate the designs of the enemy, and make a bold effort for the conquest of Portugal. Philip himself caught some sparks of military ardour, and was induced by the persuasion of some French agents to join the army : their object being, as has already been explained, to remove him for a time from the influence of the Queen, and bring about the exile of Princess Orsini in his absence.

Before the commencement of spring, the exertions of Berwick had collected an army of nearly thirty-five thousand men, besides a reserve, under the Marquis of Villadarias, in Andalusia. It was intended that one detachment, headed by Don Francisco Ronquillo, should make a diversion opposite Almeida ; that Berwick with the main body should push forward into Beira along the northern bank of the Tagus ; and that the Prince of Serclaes, a Fleming in the Spanish service, should with eight thousand men reduce the frontier fortresses to the southward of that river, and communicate with Berwick by a bridge of boats at Villa Velha. Both these divisions were then to join for the reduction of Abrantes, the key of Lisbon ; and that capital, thus left open and defenceless, formed a glorious



prospect for the close of the campaign. This plan was not unworthy of the genius of Berwick, which had formed it, but had not sufficiently taken into account the rugged and mountainous nature of the country, and required too much concert and combination for an army made up of such discordant elements. The French and Spanish soldiers were now indeed joined together by the will of their rulers, but still divided by the memory of mutual wrongs ; and it is more easy to command unanimity than to render it cheerful and effective. All preparations being completed, and King Philip having reached the head-quarters at Alcantara on the 3d of May, Berwick set the troops in motion the next morning. On the bank of the little river Elga, which here forms the frontier of both kingdoms, stands the Portuguese fortress of Salvaterra ; and this was the first object of attack. Its garrison did not exceed one thousand men ; but the works were very strong, and the governor, Don Diego Fonseca, was an officer of tried courage and long service. During the two first days of the investment a brisk and well-directed fire was kept up against the besiegers : they made but little progress ; and Berwick foresaw that twelve days at least must elapse before the place could be stormed. On the third morning, however, he summoned it to surrender, in the name of his Catholic Majesty, rather that he might not reproach himself with having lost an opportunity, than with any expectation of prevailing. To his surprise, his demand was agreed

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to by the Portuguese officer as soon as he learnt that the King of Spain stood in person before his walls ; and he even added many apologies for the discharge of his guns ! “ I was not aware,” he said, “ of his Majesty’s presence, or I should not thus “ have failed in the respect and forbearance I owe “ him\* !” We may smile at such an answer, as a shallow excuse of cowardice ; but when we recollect the superstitious veneration for their sovereigns in which the Spaniards and Portuguese are bred, we shall not think it incredible that the strange feeling of foreign loyalty professed by the besieged may have really existed in their minds.

From Salvaterra, Berwick turned his arms against Segura, Rosmarinhal, Idanha-a-nova, and Monsanto, which he took with slight resistance. Greater loss, however, was caused by the peasants, who, naturally fierce and warlike, were roused to arms by the rancorous hostility which the borderers of different kingdoms seldom fail to entertain against each other. Scarce a village or a hamlet was occupied without a struggle ; and the havoc and pillage by which the Spanish soldiers punished this desperate opposition, only served to raise up more as they advanced. In his account of this campaign, Berwick expresses his astonishment that, whilst he succeeded so easily in reducing fortified bulwarks and regular garrisons, he should encounter such obstinate resistance from the most open and

\* Berwick, *Mém.* vol. i. p. 153.

indefensible towns; and it is very remarkable how often the same observation holds good with respect to the last Peninsular war. The cause is to be found in the joint result of a brave people and of a wretched government, which corrupts and degrades the army, and every other public institution, to secure its own miserable despotism. Its strength against its subjects is its weakness against strangers.

Fighting their way through an angry population, the Spanish army arrived before the walls of Castel Branco, one of the chief places on this frontier, or, indeed, in Portugal. Built upon the site of an ancient Roman encampment, it also contains a Moorish citadel; and even in the present century, though stripped of its fortifications, it is looked upon as a highly important military station.\* Its walls had lately been repaired; it held a sufficient garrison; and a body of Portuguese cavalry, though driven off at the first approach of the besiegers, still hovered around them, in hopes of succouring the city. The artillery of the Spaniards was scanty and ill served; they had but little ammunition; they could obtain no supplies of provisions in Portugal, and those from their own frontier did not reach them with sufficient regularity. To add to these obstacles, the rain, which in these countries falls seldom, but strongly, began to pour

\* Recollections of the Peninsula, p. 96, sec. ed. Broughton's Letters, p. 128.

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down in torrents, and the trenches could not be opened without much difficulty and delay. The soldiers' labours were, however, cheered by frequent visits from the King; and, laying aside his royal state, he was seen, after his inspection, to take a hasty meal upon a drum, without even sitting down. By great exertions the city was taken, after four days of open trenches, and given up to pillage; an indulgence which had nearly been attended with the most fatal consequences, by raising a quarrel on the division of the booty between some French and Spanish soldiers. Not understanding each other's expostulations, they soon betook themselves to the more universal language of blows: many shots were exchanged, several men fell, and some balls even reached the quarters, and endangered the person of Philip; nor could this dangerous germ of dissension be suppressed without the presence and the severity of Berwick.

The Dutch and Portuguese troops to the northward of the Tagus had meanwhile strictly adhered to the defensive system which their weakness rendered necessary. Leaving the lowlands open to Berwick, and divided into several bodies, they lined the ridge, or guarded the passes, of the Sierra Estrella. The chief post, consisting of two Dutch regiments, and commanded by General Fagel in person, was stationed near Sobreiro Formosa, some fifteen or twenty miles from Castel Branco. Fagel, a true Dutchman, unused to

mountains in his own country, greatly over-rated their defensive strength elsewhere, and thought himself so thoroughly safe amidst the wild recesses of the Sierra, that he seems to have neglected the most common precautions for security. Berwick, hoping to avail himself of this want of vigilance, sent one of his best officers, the Marquis de Thouy, with a large body of troops, which marched all night, and made their approach undiscovered ; so that at daybreak Fagel found himself completely surrounded. The Dutch, though surprised, made a brave resistance, but were overpowered by superior numbers. Mounting his horse, Fagel made his escape almost alone, whilst his whole division was compelled to lay down its arms ; and Berwick skillfully improved the first moments of panic and surprise. The Portuguese were driven from a camp which they had formed in the heart of the mountains, and fortified with trunks of trees and fragments of rock ; and their scattered detachments fled across the Sierra Estrella in the utmost confusion. The consternation caused by these defeats was great and not unreasonable. “ I see no human possibility,” writes Colonel Stanhope, at this juncture, “ of saving Lisbon but by a treaty, if the enemies push their advantages ;” —and Berwick was not a man to neglect them. Immediately after his success he turned southwards to Villa Velha, where he threw a bridge of boats across the Tagus, and expected, according to his orders, to form a junction with Serclaes.

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That prince, however, being of a slow and unenterprising disposition, had by no means followed either the instructions or the example of Berwick. He had under his command, as already stated, no less than eight thousand men, while the Portuguese and English encamped in front of him at Estremoz could muster in the field only thirty companies of cavalry ; so that nothing but his own fears prevented him from being formidable. Instead of commencing offensive operations, he lingered, he wavered, he foreboded that his communications would be intercepted, his supplies withheld ; and it was with great difficulty that Asfeld (a spirited young Frenchman, whom Berwick had placed about him, to counteract his timid temper,) could prevent him from seeking shelter under the guns of Badajos. Thus the commander in chief found himself compelled to forego his advantages, to change the whole plan of the campaign, and, after wasting many days in Villa Velha in fruitless expectation, to cross the river in search of the southern division of his army. He left behind him, however, garrisons in the captured fortresses, one small body of troops at Castel Branco, and another to guard the bridge ; and, after marching as far as Portalegre, he was at length met by the Prince of Serclaes, whose disobedience would have justly deserved some signal punishment, had it even proceeded from a less unworthy motive. But Serclaes, as is commonly the case with inferior minds, could display firmness and

judgment to defend though not to direct his actions; and worked so successfully upon the weakness of Philip, that, instead of being brought to trial, or dismissed the service, he was even continued in command.

The weakness of Serclaes saved Lisbon from its impending fate; and Berwick, now brought back again upon the Spanish frontier, and obliged to change his plans, applied himself with the whole united army to the siege of Portalegre. This city is built upon the crest of a steep hill, and surrounded by several others; those to the north being planted with vines to their very summits, while those to the south are clothed with woods on their sides, but terminate in high and broken ridges of rock.\* The garrison consisted of one English and two Portuguese regiments; the former that of Colonel Stanhope. He had led it thither several weeks before; but had immediately on his arrival been seized with a violent illness, which (he being attended by a Portuguese physician) rapidly increased to such a pitch, that it was found necessary to intrust the fortress to the second in command, and to remove him in a litter, and by easy journeys, to Lisbon. Besides the large garrison, the inhabitants of Portalegre had enlisted in bands of volunteers; and the strength of the fortifications seemed to the experienced eye of Berwick to require the attacks of a numerous artillery. Yet these difficulties,

\* Recollections of the Peninsula, p. 47.

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which might have delayed the army during several weeks, were overcome by the skill and activity of Asfeld in six hours. During the night he found means to have some cannon dragged up one of the neighbouring heights which had been considered inaccessible, and which completely commanded the works of the city; so that, after some firing, the garrison were driven from the walls, and compelled to lay down their arms.

This success was, however, much more than counterbalanced by the unfavourable tidings now brought to Berwick from the northern bank of the Tagus. His absence from that quarter, and the cessation of his march upon Lisbon, had both encouraged and enabled the Portuguese to act, and they were fortunate in having, at this crisis, a man of talent to command them. This was the Marquis Das Minas, the only officer of any note whom Portugal produced in that century. The house of Sousa, from which he sprung, is one of the most ancient and illustrious of that kingdom; and his father, the third Conde de Prado, had received the title of Marquis Das Minas for his direction and improvement of the Brazilian mines.\* Under him the second marquis had begun his military life in his fourteenth year. He was now in his seventieth: had in this long career filled many important offices both at home and abroad; amongst

\* Caetano de Sousa, *Dos Grandes de Portugal*, p. 159. ed. 1755.



others, that of Governor of Brazil \*; and whilst acquiring the skill and experience of a veteran, still retained in a very remarkable degree all the ardour and activity of youth. With considerable natural endowments, but no education, it might be said of him as of Turenne, that sieges and battles were the first instructors of his childhood.† As a general he showed himself rapid and enterprising, but he knew little of the theory of his profession; he was attached to ancient forms, little swayed by the judgment of others, and stubborn in his own. At this period he was Captain-General of Beira; and stationed at Almeida with some forces, which he very actively increased by the scattered detachments of Fagel and Athlone as they hurried beyond the Sierra Estrella, and he soon could muster eighteen battalions of infantry, and as many squadrons of horse. With these he took the field, drove before him Don Francisco Ronquillo and his division, then passed the frontier, and sacked the Spanish town of Guinaldo. From thence, rapidly re-entering Portugal, he crossed the Sierra Estrella by the defile of Peñamacor, invested the garrison left by the invaders at Monsanto, threatened the communications of Castel Branco, and thus compelled the Spaniards stationed there to fall back. They hastened to join Ronquillo at Zarza, within their

\* Southey's History of Brazil, vol. ii. p. 585. See also the *Mém. de St. Simon*, vol. xi. p. 55. ed. 1829.

† Fléchier, *Oraisons Funèbres*, vol. i. p. 73. ed. 1803.

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own frontier, and put themselves under his orders ; so that all the open country lately conquered was again left in possession of the Portuguese. By this junction, however, Ronquillo found himself at the head of a considerable force ; and thinking himself equal to Das Minas, determined to risk an engagement, and attempt the relief of Monsanto. He accordingly advanced to that fortress ; and a sharp skirmish ensued under its walls between the cavalry, which formed the vanguard of both armies. At first the Spanish veterans seemed to gain some ground over their raw and undisciplined opponents ; but the bravery of Das Minas, who threw himself forward amidst the combatants, changed the fortune of the day, and the Spaniards were repulsed with considerable loss. Their retreat, which at first was orderly, soon grew into a flight, from a sudden and groundless panic which seized the infantry, who had not fought, and were not pursued, but who now hurried back like madmen, even beyond their own frontier, and could not be made to halt before reaching the Tagus.

The news of the disaster at Monsanto showed Berwick the necessity of vigorous measures on his part. Stationing in a camp at Niza all his heavy troops, all his baggage, and that still more cumbersome pageant of royalty, King Philip, he himself, with some thousand of his best soldiers, hastened across the Tagus, to seize again on Castel Branco. Nor was there any time to lose ; for the unwearied Das Minas, though severely wounded in the late

engagement\*, was already on his march to break the bridge of boats at Villa Velha, and thus intercept the communication. Berwick, however, anticipated this attempt, and reached Castel Branco without hindrance; but found himself too late for the relief of Monsanto, which had already surrendered. His next object was to bring the Portuguese to a battle, and with this view he sent orders to Ronquillo to join him with his whole division. He hoped to interpose between Das Minas and the mountains, and cut him off while yet engaged in his advance to Villa Velha. But that veteran, neither flushed by his late successes, nor ignorant how much his troops were over-matched on this occasion, skilfully evaded the danger by a forced march, wheeled round the enemy's force, and intrenched himself in the pass of Peñamacor. It was in vain that the French general tried every stratagem and every provocation to draw him to a battle: Das Minas remained immoveably fixed on the summit of his cliffs, ready again to pour down his force into the plains on the first favourable opportunity; and he had also taken care to line with some new levies the chain of mountains between Villa Velha and Abrantes, so as to defend the latter town. Thus baffled, Berwick, having no cannon with him for a second siege of Monsanto, and seeing no other enterprise

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\* Dos Grandes de Portugal, p. 167.

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III. camp at Niza.

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On his arrival, he found the army reinforced by the Marquis of Villadarias and his troops from Andalusia, and immediately intrusted to that enterprising officer the reduction of Castel de Vida. But the summer heats, which in Estremadura and the neighbouring districts are proverbially scorching and unhealthy, had now set in with more than usual violence: disease, their natural consequence, was raging through the camp; and they also completely spoiled, and made unfit for use, the bread brought from Spain for the army. Under these circumstances, Castel de Vida might have given Villadarias much trouble, garrisoned as it was by one English and two Portuguese regiments, had not the latter been commanded by a coward. The scanty artillery of the Spaniards had played but four days, and had merely, according to the expression of Berwick, scratched the walls of the place, when this worthless Portuguese offered to surrender; and finding the English still determined to hold out, contrived to steep in water their stores of powder, and thus compelled them to follow his example. With this capitulation ended the campaign. It was no longer possible to keep the field under that burning sun, had even sickness spared a sufficient number of men for active undertakings. Of the French horses two thirds had already died from the effects of the heat; and the Spanish had

suffered almost as severely from the want of barley; which Berwick could not believe to be so absolutely necessary for them as the natives represented. The truth of this singular fact, which was tried by the Duke of Wellington in nearly the same district a century afterwards\*, now cost the Duke of Berwick all present service from his cavalry. On the 1st of July he broke up his camp at Niza, and marched back to Spain, having first, however, rased the fortifications of Castel Branco, Portalegre, and nearly all the other places taken during the campaign. He fixed his own headquarters at Salamanca, to observe and restrain Das Minas at Almeida; and stationed Serclaes at Badajos, while the King returned to Madrid, and Villadarias to Andalusia.

On the other part, Das Minas was reduced to the same inactivity, not only from the same effects of the season, but from the feeble character of the English general, with whom his power was unfortunately shared. Nothing, indeed, could be less honourable than the part performed by the Duke of Schomberg during the whole course of this campaign. His army, it is true, far inferior to that of the Spaniards, was unable to cope with them in the field; but might at least have intercepted their

\* “ We have lost many hundred horses by the use of other grain, barley being the only wholesome food for horses in this country.” Letter from Sir Arthur to the Marquess Wellesley, dated Deleytosa, Aug. 10, 1809, and printed in the papers laid before Parliament, B. 24.

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communications and stopped their supplies ; might have raised the peasantry against them in the Alentejo, as Das Minas had done in Beira ; might have destroyed their scattered parties and detachments ; might, in short, have carried on that guerrilla warfare so peculiarly suited to the nature of the country and to the temper of the people. Instead of this, “ he did not even,” says Berwick, “ take the trouble to watch our plans and proceedings ; but stood aloof, with his arms folded, merely moving from Elvas to Estremoz, and from Estremoz back again to Elvas.” The opinion of Colonel Stanhope, on the other side, is not at all more favourable to that general. One of his letters from Lisbon\* severely reflects on the “ ignorance and pride both of the Portuguese ministers, and of those who ought to have advised them better, if they had been capable of giving good advice or a good example. . . . In short, if the King of France had an Intendant here to make a disposition of military matters, it could not have been more to his advantage.” The dissatisfaction at Schomberg’s conduct was, as might have been expected, loud and universal in England, where the people are ready enough to cavil at even a victorious general ; and a formal complaint having been sent over from the Portuguese Court, he was recalled in the course of

\* To his father, May 31, MS. He was then recovering from his illness in the ambassador’s house, and hoped to be able to join his regiment again in a fortnight ; but it was taken at Portalegre before that time.

the summer, and the Earl of Galway appointed in his room.

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
The same period was also productive of important transactions in other parts of Spain. The Prince of Darmstadt had always advised the equipment, and wished to undertake the command, of an expedition to Catalonia, where he carried on an active correspondence with the malcontents. To them he had promised the aid of twenty thousand men, headed by Charles himself: to the English he had held out the strongest assurances that the province would rise as one man on their approach. In compliance with his views, a force of five or six thousand men was entrusted to his direction, and embarked in a fleet commanded by Sir George Rooke. It sailed from Lisbon in the beginning of May, and appeared off Barcelona at the close of the same month. The place, and, indeed, the whole province, was nearly destitute of means for defence; and had no resource but the firmness and decision of the Viceroy, Don Francisco de Velasco. By great exertions, and by what in such times is still more effectual, weight of character, he bore up against the disaffected; who were, moreover, justly incensed at the smallness of the English armament, who expected the personal appearance of Charles, and who, as is usual in such cases, were far more willing to join an insurrection than to strike its first blow. Darmstadt proceeded to land his men, and lead them against the city; but, trusting much more to the exertions of the Catalans

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than to his own, he brought no cannon to bear against the ramparts, and only threw a few bombs to terrify the garrison. These, however,—his force being, in fact, altogether inadequate to a regular investment,—tended rather to exasperate than to frighten; and though conspiracy was busy within, and numbered in its ranks the VEGUER (one of the chief magistrates), it was in all its undertakings anticipated and baffled by Velasco. From without, few or none of the Catalans came to join the English standards. The Admiral, expecting the attack of a French squadron, was impatient for departure, which Darmstadt, on the disappointment of all his hopes, could not venture to oppose; and they accordingly re-embarked and set sail. Their failure, however, was perhaps more apparent than real; for though the harvest of rebellion had not been gathered, its seed was sown, and, as we shall find, sprung forth in the ensuing year.

Anxious to retrieve their reputation, the Prince and Admiral planned, on their return, an attack on Gibraltar. Few situations are so singular and striking as that of this celebrated fortress. The mountain under which it is built rises steeply from the sea in front of Africa, and is only connected with the Andalusian coast by a narrow strip of sand. The Moors, feeling the importance of this station, had fortified it by a castle whose ruins yet remain; and a rampart across the mountain, and many other works, had been added by the Emperor Charles the Fifth. At this period, however, it was





far from being prized as it deserved : its value had not yet been proved by the number, nor its strength by the failure, of long and bloody sieges ; nor was it considered, as now, the key of the Mediterranean, and the natural bulwark of Spain. Though strongly fortified, its garrison could scarcely muster one hundred effective men : but its governor, Don Diego de Salinas, a brave veteran, considered rather his spirit than his strength, and rejected all proposals for surrender. On receiving his answer, the Prince of Darmstadt immediately landed with eighteen hundred marines upon the isthmus, while Sir George Rooke opened his batteries by sea. The bombardment began on the 2d of August, and continued on the 3d, when a part of the garrison and inhabitants, recollecting that this was the festival of one of their favourite saints, conceived that they should more effectually contribute to the defence of the place by offering their prayers at his shrine, than by remaining at their posts as sentinels or soldiers. Whilst thus devoutly employed, the eastern quarter of the rock was left unguarded, and a party of English sailors seized this opportunity to scale the almost inaccessible precipice ; thus threatening the fortress from the heights which overhang it. At the same time also the Admiral directed a Captain (his name was Whitaker) to man his boats, and storm in front the South Mole Head ; and this service was very gallantly performed. The foremost who landed were blown to pieces by the springing of a mine beneath them ; forty men were

CHAP. killed, and sixty wounded: but the survivors still  
 III. pressed on with undaunted bravery, drove the  
 1704, Spaniards before them, and, in a few minutes more,  
 stood victorious on the summit of the rampart. Any further resistance now became impossible; but Don Diego still obtained honourable terms for his little force, and marched out next day with all the honours of war. On entering the town, Darmstadt began by hoisting the Spanish standard and proclaiming King Charles; but the Admiral interposed, and took possession of the place in the name of the Queen of England. “And this,” says a native historian, “was the first stone that fell from the vast but ruinous edifice of the Spanish monarchy.” \*

A garrison of two thousand men, headed by Darmstadt himself, was left at Gibraltar. The English Admiral then set sail; and after an unsuccessful attempt on Ceuta, steered into the Mediterranean, and met the French squadron, with which he had been for some time expecting to fall in. It had been equipped at Toulon, and was commanded by the Comte de Toulouse, son of Louis the Fourteenth by Madame de Montespan, and, at this time, High Admiral of France. He had been joined by some Spanish, as Rooke by some Dutch, vessels, so as to compose on both sides a formidable armament. The whole naval

\* San Phelipe, Coment. vol. i. p. 130. See also Cunningham's History, vol. i. p. 400. Campbell's Lives of the Admirals, vol. iv. p. 355, &c. The French writers make a scape-goat of the Spanish governor.

force on this occasion is differently stated; but, according to the French account, they had forty-nine ships of the line, and Rooke only forty-seven.\*

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On the 24th of August the two fleets met off Malaga, and engaged in a long cannonade, which in those days was termed a battle, and described with the greatest minuteness; but which, after such engagements as the Nile or Trafalgar, seems by no means to deserve that name, nor that notice. Several thousand men were killed, but no ship was either sunk or taken; and the approach of night put a period to the conflict. The victory may be looked upon as undecided, although of the two the English seem to have the better claim to it; having afterwards remained in the same station, while the French withdrew, and having suffered a much less heavy loss of men in action. Both parties, however, declared themselves conquerors, so loudly and ostentatiously as to show their secret doubts of their own success; and public thanksgivings were offered up alike at Madrid, at Paris, and at London. On the other

\* Targe, Hist. vol. iii. p. 372. Quincy, vol. iv. p. 428. There are very full particulars of this engagement in the "Life of Leake:" but I have found this work extremely partial and inaccurate, and shall not quote from it. Great injustice is done to the memory of that gallant admiral by the absurd zeal of his biographer; who thus, for instance, actually denies all merit to Lord Peterborough; and in one place (p. 157.) speaks of the "folly, if not treachery," of those who appointed him! This work was printed in 1750, but very prudently limited to private circulation, and to the number of fifty copies.

CHAP. hand, to judge by the movements of the fleets;  
III. each seemed to act as if defeated ; for, after a short  
1704. delay, the Comte de Toulouse returned to Toulon,  
and Sir George Rooke to England.

Aug. 13. But whatever light the action off Malaga might  
else have reflected on either the French or British  
arms disappears as a lesser star before the sun-  
like brilliancy of Blenheim, which was fought  
within only a few days' interval of the other. This  
battle, one of the greatest and most decisive ever  
gained, not only annihilated the best army of the  
French, marred their projects of conquest, and  
reduced them to defend their own frontier on the  
Rhine, but saved the Germanic empire from down-  
fal, and Europe itself from the ascendancy of one  
too powerful state. Its details do not fall within  
the limit of Spanish affairs ; but its effect upon  
them was strong, and quickly felt. It was the first  
important check which the arms of Louis had  
experienced : to the superstitious it seemed an  
omen, to the reflecting a cause, of decline. The  
partisans of Philip foresaw that the chief brunt of  
the war in Spain must now fall upon themselves ;  
whilst the Austrian faction throughout the king-  
dom, and especially in Aragon and Catalonia,  
raised its head and daily added to its numbers.  
That party, too (in all countries a large one),  
which never fails to declare in favour of the pros-  
perous, now began to consider Charles' as the safer  
side. In civil contests, power always begets power ;  
and that leader, however unjust his pretensions,

who is commonly supposed to have most allies and partisans, may rely on being joined by many more.

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Encouraged by this great though distant victory, the allied Generals in Portugal determined, as soon as the summer heats had passed, to renew the campaign by taking the offensive. The Marquis Das Minas had now been appointed to the chief rank in the Portuguese army; but his command was shared, and his usefulness checked, by Lord Galway, a man utterly destitute of talent, and with few other requisites for a soldier beyond high honour and great personal courage. A Frenchman in birth, and a Huguenot in faith, under the name of the Marquis de Ruvigny, he had left his country at the revocation of the edict of Nantes, and had risen to high employments and an earldom in England, — not so much from any supposed military merit as from his undoubted zeal in behalf of the Protestant religion. And thus, by a singular chance, when he and the Duke of Berwick encountered each other in the field, the English were headed by a French, and the French by an English, General. The King of Portugal and the Archduke Charles also left Lisbon to be present at this campaign, and fixed their station until its commencement at Coimbra. In their train, on this occasion, might be observed the statue of St. Anthony of Padua, who then appeared, and still appears, upon the Army List of Portugal as an officer

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in its service ; who (though never clamorous for promotion) has obtained it from time to time ; and who regularly receives (through his monks) a pay proportioned to his military rank\* ! The statue was, no doubt, expected to perform valuable duty in this campaign ; and, indeed, we should be doing it injustice were we to deny that it was fully as efficient and useful as many of the Portuguese *fidalgos*. The army amounted to twenty-three thousand effective men ; while that of Berwick, thinned by disease, and receiving no reinforcements, could hardly muster half as many : but the greatest hopes of the Allies were derived from the promises of the Admiral of Castille, who had also joined their army, and who looked forward to numerous and important desertions from the Spanish ranks. At the end of September, the Portuguese having concentrated their forces at Almeida, advanced against the head-quarters of Berwick, at Ciudad Rodrigo ; but the French General, though harassed by contradictory orders from Madrid, and inferior in strength, did not give way at their approach. He determined to maintain the line of the Agueda ; and so skilfully disposed his troops along its banks, that the Allies could not effect its passage without coming to a general engagement ; and this was prevented by their jarring counsels, and especially the incapacity of Galway. On the other hand, the Spanish soldiers showed no dispo-

\* *Mém. de Berwick*, vol. i. p. 167. *Costigan's Sketches of Portugal*, vol. i. p. 74.

sition to desert, nor the Spanish peasantry to rise ;  
 so that, after a series of marches and counter-  
 marches, the campaign was at length closed by the  
 autumnal rains, and the Allies withdrew in disap-  
 pointment. Amongst the other expedients em-  
 ployed on this occasion to confirm the Spaniards  
 in their allegiance to Philip, a medal had been  
 struck of his competitor, with the following sar-  
 castic motto, in allusion to the title usually borne  
 by the Spanish monarchs, and to the Allies, by  
 whom the Archduke was striving to assert it :—  
 CHARLES THE THIRD, BY THE GRACE OF THE HERE-  
 TICS, THE CATHOLIC KING.

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Even before the end of this campaign, Berwick, in reward for all the skill, and perseverance, and fidelity he had displayed in its course, received an order of recall from Versailles. It had been obtained at the application of the Court of Madrid, now more than ever a labyrinth of cabals and intrigues. In these the plain and straightforward character of Berwick did not allow him to take any share ; and all the factions, therefore, united against him, in the hope that his successor might become their partisan. So little was he intrusted with state affairs, or fitted for them, that he had not even been made acquainted with the designs of the King of France against Princess Orsini ; and had, according to his instructions, urged the journey of Philip to the frontiers, without knowing its secret purpose. The Queen now perceived that such a man neither would nor could take any measures in behalf of her darling object—the return of

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the Princess: she therefore determined to remove him\* ; and her attempt was seconded by the new French ambassador, the Duke de Grammont, who had entered Spain with the expectation of ruling it in every department, as a Viceroy might a conquered province. To his surprise, he found that Berwick very properly refused to admit his overstrained pretensions, and to receive military directions from an ignorant civilian. Besides this reason for wishing to see him displaced by another more pliant General, Grammont appears to have been mindful of some ancient petty pique or rivalry between them. Men often complain of short memories ; yet how seldom do they forget even the slightest circumstance of even the slightest injury !†

In the place of Berwick, Louis sent into Spain the Mareschal de Tessé, the least distinguished and least able of all the French marshals in his time. Frivolous and empty, yet vain and overbearing, his character bore a great resemblance to that of Grammont ; and from that very resemblance they did not fail to quarrel very soon, and very bitterly. All their public transactions display alike a singular readiness to judge without inquiry, and

\* “ Pourquoi donc l'avez vous fait rappeler,” said Marshal Tessé to the Queen. “ Que voulez vous que je vous dise ?” was her reply. “ C'est un grand diable d'Anglais sec, qui va toujours droit devant lui !”—Mém. de Berwick, vol. i. p. 177.

† Compare Mém. de Noailles, vol. iii p. 252. and Mém. de Berwick, vol. i. p. 175 ; Mém. de St. Simon, vol. iii. p. 238. ed. 1829 ; and Letters from the Marquis de Montandre to Col. Stanhope, MS.



to condemn every thing which they could not understand. It will hardly be believed, for example, that Grammont, who had never till then been in Spain, wrote back to his Court deliberate opinions on the Spanish government and Spanish people, before he had even crossed the frontiers; and it need not be added that these opinions proved entirely erroneous.\* The instructions he had received for his embassy were ample and well considered; but, like his own opinions, were partly founded on false or insufficient premises. He was assured that, since the recall of the Princess, he would find the Court without factions, and the people without discontents; and was expected to satisfy the Spanish ministers by adherence to their established forms whilst withdrawing from them all essential power.† Several other points in these instructions do honour to the judgment and penetration of Louis the Fourteenth; but one deserves to be particularly mentioned, as displaying a quality for which he was much less eminent,—humanity. He expresses a wish that the dungeons of the Inquisition may be cleared of their crowd of captives; many having languished there for years, without having yet been able to obtain even the favour of a trial. Amongst these was Froylan Diaz, confessor of the late King Charles the Second. He had endeavoured to persuade the dying

\* Despatch to M. de Torcy, dated May 25, 1704.

† Instructions from Torcy, dated April 27, 1704.

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monarch that his illness arose from the spells of some malicious sorcerer; and as the best means of counteracting them, recited over Charles the form of exorcism prescribed by the Roman Catholic church. It failed, and Diaz was disgraced. And this happened in Europe, less than a century and a half ago!

The very first audience which Grammont had of the young Queen showed him how mistakenly he had reckoned on the usual fickleness of fifteen, and levity of Courts, in hoping that the loss of the Princess would be speedily forgotten. With much force and feeling, Maria Louisa complained of the harsh treatment which her favourite had undergone, and of the base and unfounded accusations from which it had proceeded. “Is it not lamentable,” she exclaimed, “that the King of France, the wisest and most prudent of men, though knowing the frank and upright character of his grandson, and the envious cabals by which he is surrounded, should yet admit every calumny of the latter, and refuse all credit to the first? No, Duke of Grammont,” she added, bursting into tears, “I do not deceive you when I say, that I can never, never be consoled!”

Grammont did not fail to transmit these earnest representations to his master; but the answer of Louis showed him as unbending in his purpose as haughty in his style. “Acquaint the Queen of Spain,” he wrote, “that I removed Princess Orsini after full deliberation, and through reasons so strong as to render any change

“ impossible. Let her be convinced, that no  
 “ cabals or calumnies from the enemies of her  
 “ favourite have misled me. Above all, explain to  
 “ her that I determine on every thing myself, and  
 “ that no one should dare to suppose that the facts  
 “ which I admit are contrary to truth ; since I  
 “ always learn them from different channels before  
 “ I consider them as certain, or allow them to in-  
 “ fluence my conduct.” With such ideas of his  
 own infallibility, it is no wonder that Louis, in the  
 whole course of his reign, was so frequently and  
 so grossly duped ; and we shall see hereafter how  
 long he was able to persevere in the purpose which  
 he now declared unchangeable. Meanwhile, he  
 not only rejected an application from the Princess  
 to appear at Versailles and justify her conduct,  
 but ordered her to proceed to her former residence  
 at Rome ; and bestowed honours on her two mortal  
 enemies, the Cardinal and Abbot d’Estrées. He  
 also determined to break up the administration at  
 Madrid, from which the Princess had removed  
 nearly all the old and trusty friends of the House  
 of Bourbon, to make way for her own friends and  
 partisans. Even Cardinal Portocarrero had yielded  
 to the torrent which he could not stem. Disgusted  
 with the predominance of French agents and of  
 French councils, the overwhelming influence of  
 the Princess and the decline of his own, he had  
 several months before retired to his metropolitan  
 palace at Toledo, and resigned all his employments.  
 He could not, however, at the same time divest

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himself of his lofty genius, his habits of business, or his fondness for cabals: he was naturally restless in retirement, and from Toledo his influence was unseen but not unfelt at Madrid. Louis, who knew his talents, and remembered his services, would have wished to have seen him again in some active department of government, were it only to prevent his intriguing against it; but the Cardinal was personally hated both by the King and Queen of Spain, for no better reason, apparently, than because they themselves, after all their obligations, had latterly slighted and offended him. Strange as it seems, experience shows that we usually feel far more animosity against those whom we have injured than against those who injure us: and this remark holds good with every degree of intellect, with every class of fortune, — with a prince or a peasant, a stripling or an elder, a hero or a woman.

Louis did not think it judicious to insist on the immediate reinstatement of the Cardinal, but was bent upon crushing Orry, the creature and chief minister of the Princess. As such, he had been bitterly inveighed against by the two successive French ambassadors, the Cardinal and Abbot d'Estrées; and his disgrace, though hitherto delayed, had been for some time decided at Versailles. The request for his dismissal found, however, the Court of Madrid impressed with very different feelings towards him. The Queen supported him for the very reason of his recall, as the

favourite of her favourite. The King had derived great advantage from his care, foresight, and arrangement in the late Portuguese campaign; and both had so entirely committed all money transactions to his hands, as to feel quite helpless and bewildered in his absence. Orry, like other subtle and unprincipled persons of that stamp, had contrived to involve the finances in an intricate web, of which the folds and windings were known to himself alone; and had thus, in some degree, made himself necessary to his office. He was a knave, undoubtedly — such the Court believed, and such his vast acquisition of riches proved him to be; but he was a daring, dexterous, useful knave, who filled the coffers of his master after filling his own, and who, by the very frauds he practised, understood how to detect or prevent frauds in others. With much pain, therefore, did Philip and Maria Louisa hear of his being summoned to Versailles to explain and defend his conduct; and with much difficulty was a reluctant consent wrung from them by the Duke de Grammont. The next mandate, however, found them less complying. They were asked to re-appoint Ubilla, now the Marquis of Rivas, as sole secretary of the cabinet; but he being a personal enemy of the Princess, it was considered by the Queen that his appointment would be an additional bar to her return, and she therefore exerted all her influence over Philip to prevent the proposed nomination. His spirit was also roused by seeing the state of vassalage to which it was clearly

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intended to lower him, and by perusing a memorial presented at this juncture by the Marquis of Mancera, the oldest of his ministers. This venerable statesman, then in his ninetieth year, and speaking with the just authority of age, and the never-failing eloquence of truth, expressed his wish of withdrawing from public life ; and took that opportunity of beseeching his royal master to govern alone, and cling to Spanish forms and to Spanish maxims. A remonstrance, so upright and so well intended, greatly weighed with Philip in rejecting Rivas ; and the utmost exertions of the Duke de Grammont could not overcome his resolution. Thus the ambassador found himself thwarted and stopped short in one of the very first steps of his mission ; and, where he had expected easy and unlimited obedience, had to struggle with every sort of difficulty and embarrassment. From the extreme of confidence (the mood in which he entered Spain) he passed at once to the extreme of despondency. Seeing many cabals around him, he supposed every new event to arise from them ; and so foolishly fancied himself beset with traitors, as to neglect the advice and refuse the co-operation of all his truest friends. Whatever may be thought of confidence and blindness, a doubting and suspicious temper is, perhaps, still worse for success in state affairs ; and Grammont certainly lost more by his own distrust than he could have done by the blackest and most universal treachery in others. His despatches to his Court at this period are sin-

gular specimens of vulgarity in style and vacillation in judgment. In one he requests Louis to “show his teeth;” in another, dated only a few days afterwards, he advises a directly opposite course of conduct, and recommends “a velvet paw.” Finding it impracticable to prevail over Philip, and, goaded on by instructions from Versailles, he was speedily reduced to the old system which he himself had ridiculed and blamed,—of employing the influence of the Queen, and governing her husband by her aid. He accordingly besought her intercession; but Maria Louisa, seeing her vantage ground, determined to preserve it, and met his request with many specious expressions of humility. At the same time, while declaring her incapacity for business, she showed herself deeply resentful of the late attempts to shut her out from it. “How can,” she said ironically, “a girl of “fifteen” (this was the very phrase which had been applied to her), “presume to touch affairs of “state?” Yet; whilst so diffident and submissive in her language, every transaction of importance (and Grammont knew it) was passing through her hands and regulated by her will. She caballed with disaffected nobles; stirred up opposition in all quarters; and, every evening, held a secret council, which over-ruled the public decisions of the Cabinet: in short, according to the remark of Tessé, she seemed determined to lose her crown, and overthrow the monarchy, rather than fail in her leading

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object, —the re-establishment of the Princess.\* Every thing, in consequence, fell into a state of anarchy. No orders, or, what is the same, contradictory orders, were issued in the most pressing emergencies ; confusion, inefficiency, and discord prevailed in every department, at the very time when the attacks of the Allies from without, and the intrigues of the Austrian party at home, called most loudly for a firm, able, and united government. The army itself was utterly neglected ; and the ambassador could not even succeed in obtaining, at the proper offices, authentic accounts of the soldiers, stores, and ammunition.†

As a last resource, the Duke de Grammont, beginning to see how impolitic had been the removal of the Princess, and the consequent exasperation of the Queen, earnestly applied to Louis for his intercession with the latter. The King of France, accordingly, wrote to her in terms of such affection and esteem as the circumstances of the time made it expedient to profess : he praised her judgment, as far beyond her years ; he entreated her to forego the resolution she had expressed to Grammont, of never offering advice to her husband, or interfering in state affairs ; and he even condescended to solicit her influence for the nomination of Rivas and the settlement of the mi-

\* Mém. de Tessé, vol. ii. p. 157. Mém. de St. Simon, vol. iii. p. 341. ed. 1829.

† Despatch of Grammont to Torcy, dated July 29, 1704.



nistry. The resolution, however, which had stood firm against a political tempest, was not to be shaken by the gentle breath of flattery. Maria Louisa, indeed, expressed herself most dutifully and decorously; and consented, as a sort of personal favour, and with much apparent unwillingness, to take, once more, an avowed share in business: but she still continued to oppose and prevent the appointment of Rivas; and it became every day more and more evident that Philip could be governed only through his Queen, and the Queen only through Princess Orsini.

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Such was the state of things at Madrid, when the news of the fall of Gibraltar filled the Court with alarm and the people with indignation. Grammont did not fail to lay hold of this event to charge it on the neglect and improvidence of his adversaries, and to justify his late gloomy forebodings. "Behold," he wrote to Louis\*, "the effects of the wise management of Orry! Were justice duly awarded, he would deserve to lose his head. God grant that the people may not rise in arms against the Queen and her wretched ministry!" For the moment the ambassador triumphed: Philip and Maria Louisa were terrified into submission, and not only consented to appoint Rivas, and new model the whole administration according to the plan proposed to them, but declared their firm intention to follow, in future, the advice

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\* Despatch of Grammont, dated August 10, 1704.

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of Louis, to be guided by his will on all occasions, and intrust to his hands the preservation of the Spanish monarchy. On his part, Grammont made some concession, —yielding to their Majesties' personal dislike of Cardinal Portocarrero, and not insisting on his recall; and he was completely duped by the appearance of union and tranquillity which every thing began to bear. His camelion-like despatches, now again assuming a different hue, began to praise the prudence and discernment of the King and the "excellent heart" of the Queen.\* In a very short time, however, he reverted (and not unreasonably) to his former opinions. The change in the Court of Madrid was found to go no deeper than the surface. The ministry, indeed, had now been newly framed according to the wish of Louis; but it was only a ministry in name, and the real direction of affairs rested, as before, with the secret junta of the Queen; so that the monarchy was threatened with the same evil which always weakens, and generally ends, democracies,—their singular separation between legal authority and effective power. The Queen frankly declared to Rivas, that she placed no confidence in him, and that he owed his appointment to French influence alone; and both she and Philip wrote to Louis, entreating, in the most earnest terms, that Orry might be permitted to return, as the only hope and resource of their finances. In spite of the distress

\* *Mém. de Noailles*, vol. iii. p. 238.

of this department, a pension of two thousand ducats was granted to Aubigny, the secretary and favourite of the Princess; and, from her exile, her ambitious spirit continued to rule the councils in which she had so long presided.

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A result so contrary to his views deeply grieved and disappointed Louis. He had always hoped that time would soften the Queen's enmity against the enemies of the Princess; but this "girl of fifteen" had a mind of extraordinary firmness; and besides, even the most fickle changelings can be steady and persevering in projects of revenge. He now perceived that he had mistaken his road; that he must retrace his steps, and treat the Princess not only with courtesy, but with kindness and indulgence. Accordingly, he made to her advances of conciliation: he promised to confer an embassy on her brother, the Abbot de la Tremouille, and to use his influence for gaining him a Cardinal's hat\*; and he allowed the Princess herself to winter at Toulouse, instead of insisting, as before, on her speedy journey to Rome. It was, at the same time, insinuated to her, that her best mode of requiting these favours, and obtaining more, was by inducing her royal patroness to forward the views of Louis, and soothe the opposition which prevailed. The effect of these milder measures was great and immediate at Madrid. The Queen laid aside her tone of sullen coldness; received the advice of

\* Letter from Torcy to Grammont, dated Sept. 15, 1704.

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Grammont with confidence and openness, and ceased to thwart his projects for a time ; so that the ambassador, always vain and hasty, thought all the difficulties of his mission overcome. In his despatches at this period, he boasts of having “ cut off the heads of the hydra ;” once more reverses his judgment on all the leading men of Madrid ; and, to excuse his frequent contradiction, compares them to the winds which change from day to day,—a comparison directly opposite to the slow and stately character of the Spaniards, but singularly applicable to his own. Perceiving that this happy change was entirely due to the influence of the Princess, Grammont expressed much gratitude for her services, and loaded her with praises. Thus the animosity of Louis against her was still further weakened and allayed ; nor was it long before the Queen put his more favourable disposition to the trial. Too artful to demand at once the return of her favourite to Madrid, which would have been denied to her, she entreated, as a sort of preliminary favour, that the Princess should be allowed to appear at Versailles to meet her accusers, justify her conduct, and inform Louis on the real state of Spain. The answer of the King of France declared that it was impossible for him to withstand the wishes of his dearest grand-daughter ; and thus the required permission was granted.

Once at Versailles, and the triumph of the Princess was certain. Her fascinating manners and natural talent for flattery were exerted with signal

success upon Madame de Maintenon, and upon Louis himself, who daily appeared more fond of her society, and who was, moreover, now assailed with renewed entreaties from the Queen of Spain. Her levee was attended by a never-failing crowd of courtiers; and she seemed to have arrived rather to dispense than to solicit favours. The probability of her approaching return was, however, most unwelcome to Grammont, and the other French agents at Madrid. They had been happy to make use of her influence from afar; and, in hopes of continuing to derive the same advantage from it, they wished her to be treated with all kindness and distinction in her exile; but they foresaw that, on her recall, their own power and consequence must forthwith dwindle to a shadow, and all business pass through her hands alone. Might not, they argued, the Princess very probably be animated with the deepest resentment against the French, as the authors of her disgrace, and only wait to manifest it until the hour of victory and vengeance had arrived? Under this impression, and knowing that it was hopeless to detach the Queen from the Princess, Grammont determined on an attempt to detach the King from the Queen. For this end, he found a useful tool in the King's confessor, D'Aubenton, a French Jesuit; and while the one stung the pride of Philip with the disgrace of being governed by "a girl of fifteen," the other alarmed his conscience at the crime of a delegated trust. Roused for a moment by this

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two-fold influence, the feeble monarch consented to write — or at least to sign — a secret letter to his grandfather, deprecating the return of the Princess as distasteful both to his subjects and himself, and declaring that his former solicitations for it had arisen only from affection to the Queen. Grammont, at the same time, sent home a despatch in his usual tone of ignorant presumption. I have observed, that the most feeble and fluctuating minds are generally the most ready to believe in the steadiness of others : and thus, the ambassador protested that he had hitherto mistaken the character of Philip, who had now shaken off the chains of conjugal obedience, and shown both the will and the ability to govern.\* The confessor concurred in the same representation ; and could only ascribe this sudden change to the immediate interposition of God.

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These confidential letters were seen by no one at Versailles but Madame de Maintenon, the King, and Torcy, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I name in the order of their comparative importance in the state. They perceived at once that the ambassador was blinded by his vanity, and that no dependence could be placed on the talent or consistency of Philip. “ You know his “ weakness,” wrote Louis, in reply : “ In his next “ change of opinion he may, probably, tell the “ Queen that you spared no pains to make him

\* Despatch from Grammont to Torcy, dated Dec. 25, 1704.

“ govern independently ; that you did so by my  
 “ orders ; and that I look upon her control as dis-  
 “ graceful to his understanding and destructive of  
 “ his interests. She would resent, as the deepest  
 “ injury, any insinuation aimed against an autho-  
 “ rity to which she is, perhaps, not less attached  
 “ than to her husband. Let us not be misled by  
 “ the mere promise of a firmness which has never  
 “ yet appeared in action, and which his whole  
 “ character belies. The Queen will always reign  
 “ over him ; and prudence, therefore, bids us use  
 “ and direct her influence, rather than vainly at-  
 “ tempt to overthrow it.”

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The judgment and foresight of Louis were very speedily shown by the event. Philip—one of those weak minds, over which habit is far more powerful than principle or argument—almost immediately sunk back, without a struggle, into his old chains of conjugal obedience, and confessed to Maria Louisa the steps he had taken and the advice he had received. The only result of an intrigue from which Grammont had expected so much, was his own disgrace. Inflamed with resentment against him, the Queen undertook to urge his recall to Versailles with as much ardour as that of Princess Orsini to Madrid. Under her dictation, a letter from Philip to his grandfather disavowed the part he had so lately played—the sentiments so solemnly professed ; and, while he declared his unabated regard for the Princess,

CHAP. III.  bitterly inveighed against Grammont and his own confessor, and requested their dismissal.\*

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Such wavering imbecility was well fitted to confirm Louis in the intention he had already formed—of placing no reliance on Philip himself, but governing him through the Queen, and the Queen through Princess Orsini. To the latter, therefore, he made known that he not only felt for her his former confidence, and desired her return to Madrid, but that he would grant the dismissal of Grammont, and leave to herself the choice of his ambassador. These high and honourable terms, which had been so eagerly pursued, were not, to the surprise of Louis, eagerly grasped by the Princess. With every expression of respect and gratitude, she avowed much unwillingness to return to Spain; and declared that her health no longer admitted of her undertaking the laborious duties of Camerera-mayor, or, still less, the high political character she was expected to fill. After much entreaty, however, she promised to comply with the wish of Louis, if he should think it absolutely necessary for his service; but even in that case she pleaded that she could not venture on such a journey in winter, and must be allowed a respite for some months.

This unwillingness was, no doubt, partly pretended, to show forth or enhance her own import-

\* Letter from Philip to Louis, dated March 10, 1705.



ance ; but it was also partly real. Struck with the gracious reception she had found at Versailles, and with the growing partiality which Louis displayed for her company and conversation, she had conceived hopes of rivalling, or at least of succeeding, Madame de Maintenon in his favour. To rule was still her darling passion ; but to rule at Versailles was a far more splendid prospect than to rule at Madrid. The love of pleasure also, which, even in the most aspiring minds, sometimes clogs or outweighs ambition, made her shrink from returning to a Court whose monotonous dulness was only enlivened by dissensions and disputes. Resolving, however, not to relinquish a substance for a shadow, she sent forward Orry, on whom she could thoroughly depend, to Madrid, to administer once more the Spanish finances, and act as her deputy and tool. At the same time she selected, as French ambassador, in the place of Grammont, the President Amelot, who had shown abilities, and gained experience in several former missions ; whose humble birth—unlike Grammont's or D'Estrées'—could not clash with the pride and pretensions of the Spanish grandees ; and whose promises of future deference and submission to his patroness seemed still more powerful recommendations in her eyes. He and Orry set off for Spain together.

Meanwhile the Princess continued to play a splendid and successful part at Versailles. The French ministers of state treated her almost as

CHAP. they might a foreign sovereign, the Spanish am-  
 III. bassador, the Duke of Alva, almost as his own ;  
 1705. and the little Chamberlain's mind of St. Simon  
 appears quite overwhelmed by the weight of the  
 distinction and precedence she received.\* In  
 spite of these outward honours, however, she was  
 induced to relinquish her hopes of governing in  
 France, on further observation, together with the  
 advice of her nearest kinsmen and most trusty  
 friends. They perceived that the increasing de-  
 votion of the King, and his secret marriage with  
 Madame de Maintenon, rendered her influence  
 altogether unassailable ; that her intercession had  
 been one main cause of the favourable reception  
 of the Princess ; and that this intercession would  
 be turned with equal effect in the opposite direc-  
 tion, from the very instant she suspected her own  
 power to be threatened. Convinced by these re-  
 presentations, and having exhausted all pretexts  
 for delay, the Princess at length, in the middle of  
 July, took her departure for Madrid, to the inex-  
 pressible joy of Philip and Maria Louisa, who went  
 out to meet her two leagues from their capital,  
 and received her, says a Spanish writert, with  
 greater honours than had ever yet been paid by  
 sovereigns to a subject. They wished her to re-

\* St. Simon, Mém. vol. iv. p. 346. ed. 1829. She even  
 ventured to appear at a Court ball with a lapdog in her arms ;  
 and the animal, says St. Simon, had the high honour of being  
 patted by his Majesty *à plusieurs reprises*.

† San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 151.

turn with them in the royal carriage ; a distinction which—so contrary was it to Spanish forms, and so almighty were forms in Spain—would, perhaps, have stirred up serious discontents, had not the prudence of the Princess declined the dangerous honour. She proceeded to Madrid in a more humble conveyance ; immediately resumed her ascendancy at Court ; and, together with Amelot and Orry, plunged into a fresh labyrinth of intrigues, dissensions, and cabals. Considering her former unpopularity amongst the Spaniards, her return was much less displeasing to them than might have been expected : and this, probably, arose from its having been so long deferred. In every country the multitude are apt to expend all their energy against the mere early rumours of a hateful measure ; so that none is left to oppose its execution.

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## CHAPTER IV.

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THE possession of Gibraltar was, at first, very far from being appreciated in England as much as it deserved. A barren rock—an insignificant fort—an useless charge,—such were the terms with which the first news of its capture were received; and during all the reign of George the First, the ministers, justified in this by the public opinion, were by no means unwilling to restore this conquest as one of the terms of a peace. It was not till a later period that Gibraltar grew into the hearts of the English people; so that at present even the cession of Kent or Cornwall would hardly raise a louder or more universal cry. The Spaniards, however, discerned its importance from the moment they had lost it, and as soon as their sense of its value could no longer be of use to them. For its recovery they immediately made extensive preparations, of which one hundredth part, a few weeks sooner, would probably have been quite sufficient to secure their possession of the place. So early as the October following, the Marquis of Villadarias, as Captain-General of Andalusia, commenced the siege with eight thousand men; but the place, in itself almost impregnable, was most bravely defended by the Prince of

Darmstadt. Constant succours were introduced by sea : a French squadron, under Baron de Pontis, found itself unable to prevent them ; and from the improvidence of the Spanish Ministry, the besiegers were far worse supplied than the besieged. Under these circumstances, the Spaniards made, of course, but little progress ; and the Court of Versailles, ascribing this slowness to want of skill, directed Tessé to hasten to the siege, and direct its operations in person. Villadarias was required to put himself under the command of this officer,—his inferior in age, in experience, and in reputation, and no more than his equal in rank ; since the title of Marshal does not exist in Spain, and that of Captain-General is admitted as equivalent to it. Villadarias could not but feel—could not but resent this unworthy treatment, and respectfully applied for leave to resign his commission ; but his military talent was too great to be so easily relinquished, and his spirit too noble to refuse the call of his King, in any rank or under any circumstances. At the request of Philip, he continued before Gibraltar as a subaltern\*, and the injustice done him was soon declared by the event. With greater means, Tessé made even less progress in the siege. His despatches, at this period, are filled with lamentations and complaints against all things and all persons ; like a froward child, which, in its passion,

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\* The reverse is asserted by Targe (vol. iii. p. 391.); but his authority is very far inferior to that of the *Mémoires de Noailles* (vol. iii. p. 275.), founded on the original documents.

CHAP. strikes at every object in its reach. His attacks  
 IV. were repulsed, his projects baffled; the squadron  
 1705. of Pontis, being attacked by Admiral Leake, was partly scattered, partly taken or destroyed, and at length, in April, he found it requisite to raise the siege.

May 5. A very few days after this event, the Emperor Leopold died at Vienna, in his sixty-fifth year, and was succeeded by his son Joseph, King of the Romans: but this change was hardly felt beyond the precincts of the palace; as the new sovereign adhered in every respect to his predecessor's course of policy. A far greater loss to the allied cause was that of the Admiral of Castille, who had long been pining under repeated mortifications from the Archduke Charles — at finding his person disliked and his counsels slighted by that very Prince for whom he had sacrificed so much. He sunk at last, a victim to his disappointment and ambition; a great man, were it possible to be so without fixed principle, and unfortunate chiefly from his own restless and aspiring mind. Had he been less able, he would have been more happy.

To these deaths I am almost tempted to add that of the King of Portugal; since there is so little difference, either to oneself or to others, between the loss of mental faculties and the loss of life. In earlier years he had been distinguished for his bold and enterprising spirit, which had enabled him to supplant his elder brother both in the marriage-bed and on the throne, and to confine that brother, a help-

less captive, in the solitude of Cintra. Now, however, an attack of apoplexy reduced him to a state of imbecility; but he continued to linger till December next year, when the sceptre devolved on his son Don John, a Prince whose intellect was hardly stronger by nature than his father's by disease. These unfavourable changes were of course productive of some on the Portuguese army. With the Dutch and English troops, they mustered about four and twenty thousand men upon the frontiers; but the generals could by no means agree on any common plan of operations, nor on their respective claims to superiority; and were reduced to the wretched compromise that Fagel, Lord Galway, and the Conde de Corzana should each take the chief command for a week in his turn. This absurd arrangement was in some degree counterbalanced by the inefficiency of Marshal Tessé, who, after his failure at Gibraltar, had put himself at the head of the Spanish army to cover Estremadura; and in the result there were but few undertakings on the one side, and but feeble resistance on the other. Valenza, Salvaterra, and Alburquerque were successively besieged and taken; and, after some petty demonstrations against Badajos, the Allies quietly withdrew to summer quarters. Few or no attempts seem to have been made by Tessé to relieve these fortresses; and, so far from appreciating the peculiar fitness of the Spaniards for sieges, and their unparalleled bravery behind walls, he declares in one of his letters that he

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“ would not willingly trust any Spaniard with the  
“ defence of even a steeple.”\* So great were his  
ignorance and presumption !

In the autumn, however, the allied forces renewed the campaign ; and passing the Guadiana, undertook the siege of Badajos. Their operations before this place hardly deserve the minute detail of which they would admitt† ; since Badajos has been the scene of so far greater British achievements. An accident to Lord Galway hastened the failure of their plans. His right hand having been struck off by a cannon ball fired from the town, it was found necessary by the surgeons to amputate the arm, and by himself to withdraw from the siege. Discouraged by his absence, by the appearance of Tessé close at hand with considerable forces, and by that Marshal's success in introducing succours into Badajos, the Allies very speedily raised the siege, and retired over the Guadiana, with the loss of much honour and several hundred men.

But these events in Portugal, trifling in themselves, will appear yet more trifling, if we look to those in Catalonia at the same period ; and the names of Galway or Fagel shrink into utter insignificance, when compared with that of Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough. This very remarkable man—the most remarkable, perhaps, of

\* Mém. de Tessé, vol. ii. p. 205.

† Journal of the Siege of Badajos, MS., &c.



all those brought before our view in the war of the succession — had just been appointed by Queen Anne to the command of a new expedition against Spain. Closely resembling in his character the ancient heroes of that nation which he was sent to gain over or subdue, Lord Peterborough may be called the Don Quixote of history. Like the renowned Knight of La Mancha, much that appeared little and ridiculous was singularly blended in his mind with much that was great and noble. His chivalrous turn of mind seemed to soar above the low and selfish level of modern times; but, whenever shut out from any adequate employment, would waste itself, and degrade him by freaks and eccentricities. At eighteen, he had fought against the Moors in Africa; he had been the first English nobleman to join William the Third in Holland; and was now in his forty-seventh year. Though devoting all his intervals of leisure to frivolous and fickle amours, he yet, at any call of duty or any pressure of danger, shone forth a skilful general, an unwearied and enterprising soldier. His talent for partisan warfare, more especially, has very seldom been equalled, hardly ever exceeded. On every occasion we may admire both the secrecy with which he planned, and the speed with which he executed, his designs. His courage was carried to the verge of rashness, his generosity to the verge of profusion. He was rapid in decision, and fertile in expedients; but all his great qualities were often counterbalanced by the high

CHAP. opinion which he himself entertained of them,—  
IV. by a fretful and irritable vanity, which never left  
1705. him in repose, which urged him to unceasing  
journeys and intrigues, and made him, as was  
usually said of him, see more Kings and postilions  
than any other man in Europe. Under the influ-  
ence of this froward temper, he was often as dan-  
gerous to his friends as to his enemies, and far  
better fitted to encounter the latter than to con-  
ciliate the first. Perhaps his very inconsistencies  
might tend to enhance his reputation with his con-  
temporaries; for the most capricious freaks of  
great men are often admired by the multitude as  
deep-laid designs: but the impartial tribunal of  
history, while it admires Peterborough's genius,  
and praises his disinterestedness, must lament that  
his conduct was so frequently guided by wounded  
vanity and personal resentment, and seemed always  
to proceed from momentary impulse, instead of  
settled resolution.

On the 3d of June Lord Peterborough sailed  
from Portsmouth, with a body of about five thou-  
sand foot and artillery, nearly one third of them  
being Dutch, and the remainder English. Neither  
cavalry, stores, nor money had been duly provided  
for the expedition. His instructions directed him  
to afford assistance to the Duke of Savoy, who had  
just declared for the Allies, and thus exposed him-  
self to the resentment of his powerful and vindictive  
neighbour, Louis the Fourteenth; but they also  
pointed out several sea-ports in Spain, more espe-

cially Barcelona and Cadiz, as proper objects for an enterprise. They stated, that “the principal design of the expedition was to make a vigorous push in Spain;” and, on the whole, they left Lord Peterborough a degree of discretionary power well suited to the genius of the general and the hazard of the service. Moreover, he was not only invested with full authority over the land forces, but shared with Sir Cloudesley Shovel the command and direction of the fleet. Among the inferior officers in this expedition, may be mentioned Colonel James Stanhope, now promoted to the rank of Brigadier, and Captain George Carleton, who has left us a plain, soldier-like narrative of what he saw and heard,—the most valuable, perhaps, because the most undoubtedly faithful and impartial, of all our materials for this war.

Arriving at Lisbon on the 20th of June, Lord Peterborough immediately disembarked, and held several conferences with Lord Galway and the Archduke. His want of money and of stores compelled him, in the first place, to raise 100,000*l.* on Treasury Bills, and to make a contract for the supply of bread and meat to his troops. His want of cavalry, also, was seasonably supplied by Lord Galway’s permitting him to take from the English troops in Portugal two weak regiments of dragoons, which, however, were to be equipped with horses by himself.\* Another accession, which he received

\* Compare Tindal’s Hist. vol. iv. p. 156. ed. 1762, with Lord Galway’s Narrative, in the Parl. Hist. vol. vi. p. 941.

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at Lisbon, will seem still more important to those who know the value of a name in civil wars. The Archduke Charles, disgusted with the failure of the late Portuguese campaign, and anxious to try his fortune in another quarter, determined to join Peterborough's expedition. The English General had here another opportunity to display his characteristic generosity. Having taken the Archduke and his numerous suite on board, he maintained them at his own expense, and with great magnificence, during the remainder of the voyage.

Proceeding in his expedition, Lord Peterborough was joined off Tangier by the expected ships of war under Sir Cloudesley Shovel, and the combined squadron sailed to Gibraltar. There Lord Peterborough found means to increase the efficiency, though not the numbers, of his force, by taking from the garrison two battalions of veterans, and leaving in their place as many of raw recruits. There also the Prince of Darmstadt embarked in the fleet. Its further destination had not yet been finally resolved upon, and several anxious discussions now took place upon the subject. The Prince of Darmstadt, faithful to his original plan of obtaining Barcelona by a siege, and Catalonia by an insurrection, urged his views with all the eagerness of private interest, and all the authority of personal experience. Lord Peterborough, on the other hand, was of opinion that his force, which consisted at this time of only seven thousand men

fit for service\*, was altogether inadequate to so great an undertaking. He also considered it of greater, or at least of more immediate importance, to relieve the Duke of Savoy from the pressure of the French, and to postpone till afterwards any attempt on Spain. But Darmstadt, as a German, soon obtained a great ascendancy over the mind of his countryman the Archduke, and that young Prince so warmly espoused his idea of besieging Barcelona, that at length a reluctant consent was wrung from the English general, and the expedition set sail for this momentous enterprise. To weak minds, all undertakings seem easy at a great distance.

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After leaving Gibraltar, the fleet touched first at the bay of Altea, near Valencia, where its reception was such as to surpass the most sanguine expectations. The general discontent as to the French influence at Madrid, grafted on the ancient and deeply-rooted jealousy of Castille, had produced in this province a strong feeling in favour of the Archduke. To avail himself of this favourable opening, Lord Peterborough immediately circulated a proclamation, declaring, that he (a true Spaniard, no doubt,) had come to deliver the nation from the yoke of foreigners†, and several

\* Earl of Peterborough's Conduct in Spain, by Dr. Freind, p. 13. ed. 1707. Dr. Freind was Lord Peterborough's physician, and attended him in Spain; and his work was written under Lord Peterborough's direction.

† See the original in the History of Europe for 1705, p. 326. with other details. See also Carleton's Memoirs, p. 103. ed. 1808; and for dates, a Journal of Lord Peterborough's Proceedings in Spain, MS., written, I believe, by his secretary, Mr. Furly.

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Austrian partisans were also put on shore, especially General Basset y Ramos, an active enterprising officer, and a native of this part of the country. The effect of these measures was soon apparent. Crowds of people from all the neighbouring districts came rushing down to Altea with loud acclamations of, VIVA CARLOS TERCERO ! VIVA ! (Long life to Charles the Third ! ) and loaded with all kinds of fresh provisions for the use of his army. The flame of insurrection, once raised, rapidly spread throughout the province. Amongst men, as amongst certain tribes of animals, it is sometimes only necessary that one of the herd should step forward, and lead the way, to make all the others follow with submission and alacrity. The garrison of Denia, “ a castle,” says Captain Carleton, “ rather fine than strong,” was easily overpowered by the appearance of a frigate and two bomb vessels. General Ramos became its new governor, at the head of four hundred men ; and in this small town, the ancient strong-hold of the Dukes of Lerma, Charles was for the first time publicly proclaimed as King of Spain and the Indies. Lord Peterborough, with all the quickness of genius, perceived that the opportunity was unexpectedly favourable for striking a great blow, and devised a daring project, whose detail will exhibit, in strong colours, his rare union of the most calculating skill with the most chivalrous courage.

The scanty forces of the Spanish monarchy were at that moment stationed at its two opposite ex-

tremities ; partly at Barcelona, where another attack was expected and guarded against by the government, and partly on the frontiers of Portugal, under the Duke of Berwick. The other provinces were almost entirely destitute of troops, and at Madrid itself there were only a few squadrons of cavalry as guards. In the province of Valencia Lord Peterborough saw the people friendly, the local authorities dismayed. What, then, was to prevent him from pushing forward at once to the capital ; seating the Archduke on the throne ; and, as it were, surprising the whole Spanish nation into acquiescence and approbation of the change ? Such a step might, indeed, appear rash and adventurous ; but Lord Peterborough well knew that what would be prudent in a foreign war is dilatory in a civil contest, whose success can only be secured by promptitude and vigour. The distance of Madrid from Valencia was only fifty leagues ; there were no fortified towns, except Requena, on the way ; the means of transport were ample, and the supplies of provisions unexhausted ; and the English army might therefore easily reach Madrid long before it could be relieved from either the Portuguese or Catalonian frontiers. Nor, indeed, could the troops from the latter move at all, without leaving the ill-affected city of Barcelona exposed to the double danger of foreign attack and domestic insurrection. The Duke of Berwick, it is true, had no such considerations to restrain him ; and might immediately commence his march against the invaders at Madrid. But then, as Peterborough

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justly observed, Berwick could not move alone : he must be closely followed by Galway and Das Minas ; and, while marching to repel one invasion, would undoubtedly draw another into the heart of Spain. Thus, on approaching Madrid, he would not only find the English in possession of it, and ready to meet him in front, but would be pressed by a second army from behind, would, therefore, be placed between two fires, and either be beaten in a battle, or compelled to a retreat. But if even Lord Galway should fail in this expected pursuit of the French marshal, it would still be practicable for Lord Peterborough to make his retreat upon Gibraltar ; and that fortress, as a base of operations, seemed far preferable to Barcelona, which is at a greater distance from England by sea than almost any other place in Spain ; which could not, therefore, readily receive supplies from home, and which, at all events, could not be reduced without a long and laborious siege.

This project, it may be observed, was by no means irreconcilable with Lord Peterborough's vague instructions, and, had it depended only on himself, would have been put into immediate execution. But the presence of Charles in his expedition, while it supplied him with a most advantageous hold on the public enthusiasm, on the other hand, galled him by the control of a superior. It was impossible to act without the consent and concurrence of the prince on whose behalf the war was undertaken. Now both he and Darmstadt



clung, with inflexible tenacity, to their project of besieging Barcelona; and a council of war, to which Peterborough submitted the question, decided, as such meetings usually do, in favour of the least adventurous counsels. The English general was, moreover, fettered by the want of money, which would have been absolutely necessary for the long and rapid marches he proposed. It was therefore determined to re-embark the troops for Barcelona; and if, on close inspection, any attempt against that city should be really found impracticable, to proceed, as first intended, to the assistance of the Duke of Savoy.

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On arriving before Barcelona, on the 16th of August, Lord Peterborough found the difficulties of the undertaking even greater than he had supposed. The fortifications were very strong, and so extensive, that, according to the most moderate calculation, an army of thirty thousand men was requisite to form the first line of circumvallation. The garrison, too, at this period, was equal, if not superior, in numbers, to the troops that came to besiege it. Velasco, the gallant Viceroy, who had saved the province last year, was still at its head, assisted by the Duke of Popoli and several other experienced officers. Under such circumstances, Lord Peterborough, not less prudent when the opportunity seemed unfavourable, than ready to strike when any vulnerable point lay bare, was decidedly averse to any attempt on Barcelona; and, on this occasion, his judgment was backed by that

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of a council, held, on the 16th of August, on board his flag-ship, the *Britannia*. All the officers thought, with Lord Peterborough, that the troops ought not to be landed on this hopeless service ; but should either pass over to Italy, or direct their arms against some other Spanish city on the coast. Charles, however, still continued as eagerly bent as ever upon the enterprise ; and at length entreated, as a personal favour, that the siege might be attempted for the limited space of eighteen days. Even then the difficulties of the undertaking were thought so formidable, that, at a second council, on the 22d, when each officer gave in his separate opinion in writing, none but Lord Peterborough himself, and the Brigadiers Stanhope and St. Amant, approved of the trial. At a third council, next day, the General, with some difficulty, obtained from the rest a sullen acquiescence. The troops accordingly landed on the 27th, and occupied a camp, which they partially entrenched, at some distance from the city ; their left protected by the stream of the Llobregat, and their right by the sea. There it was speedily seen how little reliance should be placed on the promises of exiles. Instead of the universal and immediate rising of the country in their favour, as the Prince of Darmstadt had anticipated, the standards of Charles were joined by no more than fifteen hundred Miquelets. These, the irregular force, or armed peasants of the province, are so called from one of their favourite chiefs in old times ; and sometimes Somatenes, from

the SOMATEN, or alarm bell, which summons them together; and they have been considered (and these are the words of an enemy\*) the best light troops in the world. They are, however, most impatient of control; and, as Captain Carleton complains, “come when they think fit, and go away when they please, and cannot be brought under any regular discipline.” Great disgust was also given to the Allies by the Prince of Darmstadt, who, anxious to fulfil his own predictions of numerous insurgents, attempted to increase their importance by demanding pay for such stragglers as officers and soldiers. “Thus,” says Carleton, “we came to Catalonia upon assurances of universal assistance; but found, when we came there, that we were to have none, unless we paid for it. And as we were sent thither without money to pay for any thing, it had certainly been for us more tolerable to have been in a country where we might have taken by force what we could not obtain any other way.”

During three weeks the troops lay before Barcelona; but little or no progress could be made in the siege. In moments of peculiar suffering or difficulty, men usually take care to fill up the measure of their calamities by discord; and thus it was with

\* Marshal St. Cyr, who fought against them in 1809; but Colonel Napier is very angry with him for this compliment to the Spaniards (vol. ii. p. 104). Colonel Napier's is certainly by far the best French account yet published of the Peninsular war.

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the Allies. Charles and the Prince of Darmstadt were full of wild and headlong schemes of assault ; and though they were vainly called upon to suggest some practical and effective scheme by which seven thousand men might be made to do the work of thirty thousand, they were full of complaints at not finding impossibilities performed for them. On the other hand, the Dutch general declared that he would disobey the orders of the commander-in-chief, rather than wantonly sacrifice his men. Several successive councils of war protested against the enterprise, as “ visible ruin, without any prospect of success, and against all military rules ;” and they therefore urged Lord Peterborough to re-embark the troops.\* Few men have ever been placed in a more painful and perplexing situation. His instructions directed him to pay great deference to the wishes of Charles and to the opinions of the councils of war ; and now these were in opposition, not only to his own judgment, but also to each other. “ Such,” says Carleton, “ are the “ present unhappy circumstances. Impossibilities “ proposed ; no expedients to be accepted ; a “ court reproaching, councils of war rejecting, and “ the Dutch general refusing the assistance of the “ troops under his command !” Unworthy insinuations were also thrown out as to his motives ; and

\* See in Dr. Freind’s “ Account of the Earl of Peterborough’s Conduct in Spain,” the official Minutes of these councils, countersigned by Mr. Furly, private secretary at that time to Lord Peterborough, and afterwards to General Stanhope.

he was charged by the Prince of Darmstadt with privately influencing the councils of war, and otherwise thwarting the enterprise, in order to justify his former advice against undertaking it. So unmeasured, indeed, were the expressions of the Prince, that Lord Peterborough found it absolutely necessary to break off all correspondence or personal intercourse with him. Opposite complaints for not re-embarking were, at the same time, made against him by the soldiers: they were quite hopeless of any success, and only willing to make some attack on Barcelona, that they might not (to use their own phrase) be taunted with "first coming like fools, and then going away like cowards."

These obstacles, which might have dismayed and overpowered any common mind, only animated the genius of Peterborough. A careful consideration of the localities around him, enabled him to devise a most skilful though daring design. The city of Barcelona is commanded on one side by the strong fort or citadel of Montjuich, built on the last summit of a rugged ridge of hills, and both from its position and its works considered nearly impregnable. At all events its siege was universally looked upon as consequent only upon the siege and reduction of the city; and the idea that it might be stormed and taken the first, never seems to have occurred to either party. This very conviction in the public mind, raised up in Lord Peterborough a hope that the garrison of Mont-

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juich might be lulled into remissness by their fancied security, and open to some sudden attack. Unknown to any person but an aide-de-camp who attended him, he went out to view the fortifications; and having convinced himself by personal observation that his conjecture was well-founded, and the garrison negligent and unguarded, he formed his plan with extraordinary boldness, and kept it with as extraordinary secrecy. To none, not even to his confidential friends, Stanhope and Methuen (the same who was afterwards ambassador in Portugal), did he impart the least hint of his intentions; but announced to all alike his resolution of raising the siege on a particular day, and passing over with his troops to Italy. Accordingly, the heavy artillery landed for the siege was again sent on board, and every thing made ready, in appearance, for the immediate embarkation of the soldiers; during which time Peterborough bore, with immoveable firmness, all the taunts and upbraidings of Charles and his German courtiers. So well did these seeming preparations for retreat disguise his real purpose, that, on the very night when his troops were on their march to the attack of Montjuich, there were public entertainments and rejoicings in Barcelona for the raising of the siege.

On that memorable night (the 13th of September), the Prince of Darmstadt, when staying at his quarters, was suddenly told that the Earl of Peterborough, with whom he had not exchanged

one word for above a fortnight, was there, and desired to speak with him. The English General soon appeared, advancing at the head of twelve hundred foot and two hundred horse. "I have determined," said Peterborough, "to make this night an attempt upon the enemy. You may now, if you please, be a judge of our behaviour; and see whether my officers and soldiers really deserve the bad character which you, of late, have so readily imputed to them." The Prince, much astonished at this sudden intelligence, immediately called for his horse, and joined them; and these two brave men, so lately enemies, went on together, side by side, to the onset.

Lord Peterborough had previously taken care to get ready some light field artillery, and to post a reserve of one thousand men, under Stanhope, at a convent midway between the camp and the city. He himself, leading his troops, by a circuitous route, along the foot of the heights, made his way, unperceived, under the hill of Montjuich, not a quarter of a mile from the outer works. It being then two hours before daylight, it was taken for granted, by his men, that, whatever might be the design of the General, he would avail himself of the darkness for its execution; but Peterborough, now calling the officers together, unfolded his plan, and his reasons. He showed them that there could be no chance of success, unless the enemy should come forth into the outward ditch to

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meet them ; and that then the English, after receiving their first fire, might leap in upon them, drive them into the upper works, and, by following them close, might succeed in storming the fortress. For this purpose, Lord Peterborough observed that it was necessary to wait till the dawn ; and concluded by promising ample rewards to such as should discharge their duty with zeal. He then distributed his men into several parties, taking with himself, and the Prince of Darmstadt, two hundred and eighty to the post of the greatest danger ; the assault of a bastion on the side of the town.

At break of day, and at an appointed signal, this detachment advanced to the charge, and, according to the General's plan, after the first fire of the Spaniards, came rushing pell-mell amongst them ; who, being thus boldly attacked by the foremost, and seeing others pouring in upon them, retired in great confusion. The Earl and Prince, to push their advantage, pursued the flying forces through the covered way, and in a few moments found themselves masters of the bastion. Fortunately for them, there lay in the gorge of the bastion a pile of large stones for the repairs of the rampart, with which the troops made a sort of breastwork to protect themselves, before the Spaniards could recover from their surprise, or direct any considerable fire against them from the keep or inner fort. Meanwhile the Spanish commander,



expecting no other attack, called off to his assistance the men from the western and most distant part of Montjuich ; so that the English party which had been sent to that quarter scaled the outer wall, and got possession of three pieces of cannon, with hardly any opposition. They had even leisure to cast up a little entrenchment, and made use of the guns they had taken to defend it. “ In this situation,” says Captain Carleton, “ the enemy in the keep “ would have been exposed to our fire from the “ places we were possessed of, had they offered to “ make any sally or other attempt against us. “ Thus we every moment became better and better “ prepared against any effort of the garrison. And “ as they could not pretend to assail us without “ evident hazard ; so, on the other hand, nothing “ remained for us to do till we could bring up “ our artillery and mortars. Now, therefore, it “ was that the General sent for the thousand “ men, under Brigadier Stanhope’s command.” Thus for a short time there ensued a total cessation of hostilities ; the soldiers on both sides being under cover. But the Viceroy, Velasco, having heard the former firing, immediately sent off four hundred dragoons from Barcelona, with orders that half of them, dismounting, should reinforce the garrison of Montjuich, and the other two hundred return with their horses to the city. These orders, judiciously given, were no less successfully executed ; the two hundred dragoons

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reached the keep, and were welcomed by their comrades within it by loud shouts of exultation. These the Prince of Darmstadt unhappily mistook for signals of surrender, and incautiously advanced at the head of near three hundred men, who followed him, without any orders from the general-in-chief. The Spaniards allowed them to enter the ditch of the keep, and then, suddenly sallying forth and surrounding them, took two hundred of them prisoners, and opened a fire on the rest as they fled back again. Hearing these discharges, Lord Peterborough hastened to the spot in person, and met the Prince retiring with his men; but had scarcely exchanged a few words with him, when a shot from a second fire struck the Prince in the artery of the thigh, and laid him lifeless at the feet of the General.

At almost the same moment that the Allies thus lost one of their bravest officers, an aide-de-camp came up with the intelligence, that a large body of troops, at least three thousand strong, was on its march from Barcelona to the fort. Lord Peterborough immediately mounted, and rode out of Montjuich, to take a nearer view of these forces, leaving all the posts well secured and manned, with the allotted numbers of officers and soldiers. His momentary absence, however, displayed how much the genius of one man can decide the success of enterprises, and how soon they miscarry whenever that genius is withdrawn. A sudden panic seized

upon the soldiers ; which influenced, if it did not reach, their commander, Lord Charlemont, — a man of personal, but no moral courage ; and, under this prevailing terror, the troops quitted their stations, and marched, or rather fled, out of the fort. A few moments more, and all would have been lost ; but Captain Carleton, on the first appearance of the panic, instead of losing time in remonstrance, had hurried after Lord Peterborough, to acquaint him with what he truly called “ this shameful and surprising accident.” The Earl, with one indignant exclamation, “ Good God ! is it possible ! ” put spurs to his horse, and galloped up the hill of Montjuich, till he met his troops, who were already half way down. As soon as he came up to them, he sprung from horseback, snatched the half-pike from Lord Charlemont’s hand, and, turning to the officers and soldiers, told them, that if they would not face about and follow him, they should have the scandal and eternal infamy upon them of having deserted their posts, and forsaken their general. “ It was surprising,” says an eye-witness, “ to see with what alacrity and new courage they faced about, and followed the Earl of Peterborough. In a moment they had forgot their apprehensions ; and, without doubt, had they met with any opposition, they would have behaved themselves with the greatest bravery. But as these motions were unperceived by the enemy, all the posts were regained, and anew possessed, in less than half an hour,

CHAP. “ without any loss ; though, had our forces marched  
 IV. “ half a musket-shot farther, their retreat would  
 1705. “ have been perceived, and all the success attend-  
 “ ing this glorious attempt must have been entirely  
 “ blasted.”\*

During this time, the Spaniards in the keep sent down to Barcelona the two hundred prisoners they had made from the party of the Prince of Darmstadt. These were met by the three thousand men coming from the town ; and being examined separately by the commander of that force, all agreed that both Peterborough and Darmstadt were at Montjuich. The Spanish officer, naturally concluding that the General and the Prince would not have headed so desperate an enterprise without their whole army to support them, and that there was now some design on foot to intercept him, gave orders for retreating to the town. Thus it so happened, that the loss of these two hundred men turned to the advantage of the English, by preventing the attack of the enemy at a most critical moment, and against a very inferior force. Soon afterwards Stanhope's thousand men came up, and the place was then fully secured against any future attempt from the Spaniards. By the General's orders, the cannon were again landed, and brought to bear upon the keep. It could not, in any case, have held out very long ; but its fall was hastened on the second day, by one of the shells, which,

Sept. 17.

\* Carleton's Memoirs, p. 139.

alighting upon its powder-magazine, caused a terrible explosion; killed the Governor, and many principal officers then at dinner with him, and blew up the face of one of the bastions. The vigilant Miquelets below the hill, perceiving the rent in the wall, immediately ran up, and rushed into the works; while Lord Peterborough supported them on the other side, and by his presence saved the garrison from the cruelty of the Catalans. Nor had he neglected during the bombardment to pay proper funeral honours to the gallant Prince of Darmstadt. His body was first laid out in state; “it lies” (I quote the singular description of an eye-witness) “at a convent hired by the Earl of Peterborough for that purpose. He is dressed with his wig, hat, and usual clothes, with his boots on, a sword in one hand, and a cane in the other; a priest is continually about his corpse, praying, and the place is ever crowded with Spaniards who come to see him.”\*

In spite of the reduction of Montjuich, the siege of Barcelona still appeared a matter of considerable difficulty. But the enthusiasm which always follows any unexpected success, now acted on the minds of the soldiers; and even the seamen, forgetting their element, formed into companies on shore, and regularly worked in the trenches. Large reinforcements, too, of Miquelets began to pour in; and the heavy cannon and mortars being placed

\* Letter from a naval officer, in the General History of Europe, 1705, p. 328.

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in battery against the ramparts, played upon them with great effect. These works were directed by General Stanhope, who pitched his tent close to the trenches, and there received every day both the English officers and the Catalan chiefs. An affecting incident, which took place on one of these occasions, was witnessed by Captain Carleton, and cannot be told better than in his own words. “ I remember I saw an old cavalier, having his only son with him, (who appeared a fine young gentleman, about twenty years of age,) going into the tent to dine with the Brigadier. But whilst they were at dinner, an unfortunate shot came from the bastion of St. Antonio, and entirely took off the head of the son. The father immediately rose up, first looking down upon his headless child, and then lifting up his eyes to heaven, whilst the tears ran down his cheeks, he crossed himself, and only said, ‘ FIAT ‘ VOLUNTAS TUA !’ and bore it with a wonderful patience. It was a sad spectacle, and truly it affects me even now whilst I am writing.” How lightly are such private calamities touched upon in history, and yet how many go to the making of every military exploit recorded in its pages !

By the constant cannonade a breach was soon made in the walls, and every thing prepared for a general assault. The Viceroy, Velasco, still stood firm ; and, sooner than surrender the city, declared that he would bury himself under its ruins. His soldiers, on the contrary, were either disaffected or

disheartened; and obliged him, however unwillingly, to enter into terms. It was agreed that Barcelona should be surrendered in four days, should no succour arrive before that time; that the garrison should march out with all the honours of war, and be escorted to Gerona, Tortosa, or some other neighbouring fortress. But the very night after this treaty (the 9th of October), matters were unexpectedly hurried to a more speedy conclusion. The Viceroy had, in such difficult times, been driven to many acts of necessary rigour, which had hitherto upheld his tottering authority. Now, however, that this authority was about to close, and that it had, moreover, been nearly overthrown by the mutiny which compelled him to surrender, the Austrian party in Barcelona determined to take this opportunity of wreaking its vengeance upon him. Great numbers of the Miquelets from the English camp had also found means (as was always done afterwards in the War of Independence) to introduce themselves by stealth into the city. Early next morning, accordingly, they and many insurgent townsmen rose to arms; and, not succeeding at first in discovering the retreat of Velasco, threatened all his friends and adherents with their fury. The whole city was full of tumult and alarm, plainly distinguished even in the English camp. Lord Peterborough perceived that nothing but his own ascendancy could prevent a general pillage, or perhaps a general massacre. The populace of cities, like

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young tigers brought up tame, may go on many years without any symptoms of ferocity ; but if they only once taste human blood, they acquire an appetite for it. Without a moment's delay, Peterborough mounted his horse, and rode up to one of the gates, attended by several officers, and amongst others by Captain Carleton. He demanded admittance : the Spanish guard, under fear and surprise, opened the wicket, and the English general found himself in the midst of the enemy's town. His first act was to rescue a lady of apparent high rank and undoubted beauty (she afterwards proved to be the Duchess of Popoli) whom he met flying from the fury of the Miquelets. By his presence and authority he awed the rioters into submission, suppressed the riot\*, and succeeded in saving the life of the Viceroy, whom he had privately embarked, and conveyed by sea to Alicant. He then left the town, though quite at his mercy, refusing to take possession of it before the stipulated term ; but Velasco, with equal generosity, left orders, at his embarkation, that it should be immediately given up to his preserver. The English troops, accordingly, marched in ; and thus did the genius of Peterborough succeed in reducing a city which, in

\* “ Stanhope (who was one of the officers attending Peterborough) said to me they ran a greater hazard from the shooting and fire that was flying about in that disorder than they had done during the whole siege.” Burnet's Hist., vol. ii. p. 422, folio ed.



the judgment of Napoleon, might sometimes be defended against an army of eighty thousand men.\*

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Charles himself made his solemn entry into Barcelona, on the 23d of October, amidst general rejoicings. He was again proclaimed as King of Spain; and in his manners as well as in his measures (the former are perhaps the most effectual) endeavoured to conciliate the favour of the people, and gratify their political or religious feelings. Thus, for instance, on one occasion, meeting the Host in the street, he dismounted from his carriage; and, taking a lighted torch in his hand, followed the priest, bare-headed, up a narrow alley, to a dwelling of poverty and a bed of sickness. On his part, Lord Peterborough actively employed himself in military preparations; and, trusting that his past success might urge the English government to fresh efforts, he despatched General Stanhope to England, to announce the capture of Barcelona, and solicit further supplies and reinforcements. He also, according to the authority which he had received from the Queen for that purpose, made solemn assurances that she would engage to secure to Catalonia the confirmation and enjoyment of its ancient FUEROS, or provincial rights and liberties.†

Oct. 24.

\* Napier's Peninsular War, vol. ii. p. 54. The true circumstances of this siege of Barcelona are, in Voltaire's *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, changed for effect, as they might be in an historical novel.

† "Case of the Catalans," in Tindal's History, vol. vi. p. 254.

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This promise, and the reduction of Barcelona, — in itself so splendid an achievement, — entirely won over the wavering affections of the Catalans. Of the soldiers in Barcelona, not more than one thousand availed themselves of the terms of the capitulation, and the rest, embodied in six new regiments, and strengthened by numerous recruits, entered the service of Charles. All the open country declared in his favour ; whilst Tarragona, Tortosa, Gerona, Lerida, and almost every other stronghold in Catalonia, either proclaimed him of their own accord, or yielded at the appearance of the first detachment sent to summon them. The chief popular leader was the Conde de Cifuentes ; a man of high rank and powerful eloquence, who had last year endeavoured to form a conspiracy at Granada, but who, failing, had been arrested, and brought before the Council of Castille. Whilst the officer who had seized him went into an inner apartment to confer with the President, and the alguazils were guarding the door, the Conde tore off an iron bar from the window, sprung out into the street, and effected his escape.\* He now openly declared for King Charles, and stirred up insurrection all over Catalonia and Aragon. The flame also continued to spread in Valencia : most of its principal places cast off their allegiance to Philip ; and the insurgents, headed by Generals Basset and Nebot, advanced to the very gates of the capital. Its Viceroy, the Marquis of Villa Garcia, endeavoured

\* San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 119.

to make some resistance, or at least delay: but Nebot availed himself of the general enthusiasm; and, putting himself at the head of a troop, with his drawn sword in one hand and a portrait of Charles in the other, he forced open one gate, and obliged the magistrates to throw open the others, and declare for the Austrian prince. Ramos was proclaimed as the new Viceroy; and so great was the popular sense of his services, and the popular favour to his cause, that the words of Holy Writ on the Virgin Mary were actually applied, by several fanatic preachers, to his mother\*! All the Bourbon partisans were freely permitted to leave the city; and among them was the Archbishop, who did not, however, long persevere in his fidelity to Philip; becoming, soon afterwards, one of the chief and most confidential advisers of Charles.

Meanwhile Lord Peterborough, in his active preparations at Barcelona, had found himself continually checked by the avarice and ignorance of Charles's German ministers, especially Prince Lichtenstein and M. Zinzerling. The Austrian statesmen of this period were by no means remarkable for the skill and judgment which they have since displayed. Incapable of great enterprises, and only thinking how to increase their fortunes or preserve their places by makeshifts and expedients, "their minds," said a former Spanish ambassador, "seem to me like our goats' horns in Catalonia — narrow, hard, and crook-

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\* San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 182.

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“ed.”\* Lord Peterborough speaks of them at this time with still more bitterness. “God preserve,”† says one of his letters, “any country from the best of German ministers! What, then, must be the circumstances of this country, exposed to the worst of them! Riding us with German pride and insolence, and sacrificing us by their folly, they have not assisted us in the least circumstance, have suffered a thousand of our men to perish by ill usage; and if our troops were not possessed with the desire to bring about some things of great consequence, they would lose patience, and mutiny.” The Dutch officers also gave considerable trouble; and, though they had shown themselves but sluggish in the field, were active and forward in debate. They opposed every plan of operation; they thwarted all Peterborough’s views; and they advised—for even those men who are the least capable of action, always think themselves endowed with talents for advice—that the troops should be quietly stationed for some time at Barcelona. Peterborough, however, prevailed so far as to have strong garrisons sent to the newly acquired fortresses on the frontiers of the province: a body of one thousand foot and two hundred horse was stationed in Tortosa, and San Mateo was intrusted to five hundred Miquelets, under Colonel Jones. The greater part of the fleet

\* Note du trad. de St. Philippe, vol. i. p. 30.

† To General Stanhope, dated Nov. 18, 1705. MS.

was, according to the decision of a council of war, sent back to Lisbon or to England.

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On the other hand, the Court of Madrid was taking every measure in its power not only to check the progress, but to recover the ground, of the Catalan and Valencian insurrections. All the disposable force that could be collected was sent into the latter province, and intrusted to the Conde de Las Torres, a veteran officer, who had served in the wars of Italy with considerable reputation. The first object of the new general was San Mateo,—a town of considerable importance, as commanding the main pass, and therefore the communication, between Barcelona and Valencia; and he began its siege with great vigour and bravery. Colonel Jones, the governor, soon found himself reduced to the greatest difficulties. He sent most pressing entreaties for relief to Charles, and Charles had recourse to Peterborough. His letter of instructions\* required the English general to hasten with the troops already at Tortosa to the relief of San Mateo, and at the same time gave the most unfounded representations of the state of the besieging force, either having himself received too favourable reports, as is commonly the case in Spanish warfare; or else inventing them, in order the more fully to secure Lord Peterborough's compliance. The letter stated that the enemy's army amounted only to one thousand horse, and as many foot; that it was already

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\* See this letter, dated Dec. 31, 1705, in Dr. Freind's Account, p. 203.

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surrounded by sixteen thousand armed peasants, who had possessed themselves of all the passes ; and who, to complete their victory, required only the appearance of a small regular force. “ According to the “ situation,” added Charles, “ in which the enemy “ now is, it is impossible that any can escape, if “ the troops of the Queen, which are at hand in “ Tortosa, assist in time to animate the country- “ people.” With these instructions, Peterborough, not yet aware what large deductions must be made from Spanish military statements, did not hesitate to send orders for the troops at Tortosa to pass the Ebro, whilst he himself, setting out shortly afterwards, and travelling day and night, reached Tortosa almost as soon as his express.

Jan.

His first step at Tortosa was to call together the governor, officers, and magistrates, in order to ascertain the progress and the position of the army of sixteen thousand peasants, which he expected to join. To his utter astonishment, he was now informed that there was no such army in existence at all ; and that the enemy's, so far from consisting of only a thousand horse and as many foot, amounted to three thousand of the former and four thousand of the latter. Almost every other general would have given up the relief of San Mateo in disgust, more especially as all the inferior officers loudly exclaimed against the madness of such an attempt, under such circumstances. But Peterborough's genius did not fail him at this crisis. Any open attack, with his little force of

twelve hundred men, was, indeed, utterly out of the question ; but no man better understood how to make skill supply the place of strength. He first divided his body of men into very small detachments, directing each to march, singly by night, through the least frequented paths, and to re-unite at Traguera, a small town about six leagues from San Mateo. The troops having executed these orders without raising the slightest alarm, Peterborough ordered the gates of the town to be closed and guarded, thus preventing any person from going out to give Las Torres intelligence.

His next object was to overawe the enemy, and induce them to raise the siege of San Mateo, by a persuasion that his small force was very far superior to theirs. With this view, he sent out two Spanish spies, for whose trusty obedience he took security according to his usual practice ; “ for,” says an eye-witness, “ my Lord never made use of any Spaniards without getting the whole family in his possession, to be answerable for those he employed.”\* To only one of these spies, moreover, did he impart his full confidence. The other was merely desired to pass the enemy’s lines, with a letter to Colonel Jones, in which Peterborough announced his approach at the head of a very large force ; seemed confident of an easy victory over Las Torres, and desired him only to have his Miquelets ready to issue forth, pursue, and plunder ;

\* Dr. Freind’s Account, p. 208.

CHAP. since nothing else would be required of them.  
IV. The two spies set out at night ; and, according to  
1706. Peterborough's directions, the one most trusted  
went over to the enemy ; pretended to betray the  
approach of a great English army, and reported  
that a countryman had been despatched from  
Traguera, with the hope of making his way into  
San Mateo. By this clue the second spy was, ac-  
cording to Peterborough's wishes, intercepted with  
his letter ; and Las Torres, unsuspecting of stra-  
tagem, became convinced that his own position  
was one of considerable danger. He waited in  
much perplexity and apprehension till the morning ;  
when, according to the promise in the letter,  
he saw English outposts actually advancing on the  
summits of the hills above his camp, and availing  
themselves of the wooded and uneven ground to  
conceal their real weakness, and present the appear-  
ance of a considerable army. Las Torres then,  
without further delay, ordered his tents to be  
struck, his artillery to be spiked, and his troops to  
retreat, as rapidly as possible, on the road to  
Valencia. Thus did Peterborough's twelve hun-  
dred men, driving seven thousand before them,  
enter in triumph the walls of San Mateo. But,  
instead of indulging in the repose which his fatigues  
required, or the congratulations which his skill  
deserved, the English General pressed forward  
through the town, and hung upon the rear of the  
enemy ; thereby both ascertaining the direction and  
increasing the speed of their retreat.



This show of pursuit was not, however, continued beyond Albocazer, where he was overtaken by an express from Barcelona. He had been promised very considerable reinforcements from that quarter ; but now found, on the contrary, that even those which were on their march to join him, and had already almost reached Tortosa, had been countermanded. The letters to Peterborough from the Court informed him, in the most desponding tone, that Berwick had been recalled from the Portuguese frontier, and was preparing to burst into Catalonia ; that the Prince of Serclaes had four or five thousand men advancing on the side of Lerida, and that the Duke of Noailles and a body of French troops, from Roussillon, had already entered the province ; so that it was threatened with invasion by no less than three armies. No explicit directions were, however, given to Peterborough as to his movements, and he “ had nothing to comfort him,” observes one of his attendants, “ but a strong reinforcement of compliments and authorities instead of troops. By these, his Lordship was only made liable to be accused, either of losing the kingdom of Valencia, if he repassed the Ebro, or the King’s person, if he did not return to the defence of Catalonia, exposed to such imminent danger. And, at this time, his foot were marching in the stony mountains, and in a winter season, without clothes or shoes ; and his few dragoons were upon horses that could hardly go on. In these circumstances, his Lordship advised

CHAP. "with his officers."\* A council of war held  
IV. at Albocazer, on the 12th of January, unani-  
1706. mously declared that any further offensive opera-  
tions would be the height of rashness, and that the  
protection of Catalonia and the safety of the King's  
person were now the only objects for consideration.  
The General, on the other hand, still continued  
bent upon securing the possession of the kingdom  
of Valencia. He so far complied with the decision  
of the council of war, as to send his infantry across  
the mountains to the sea-port of Vinaroz; from  
whence the shortest notice and the most easy  
communication might carry them back to Bar-  
celona, should it really be threatened with such  
pressing danger; but he determined that his two  
hundred cavalry should still continue to follow and  
harass the retreating army of Las Torres. He  
himself undertook the command of this forlorn  
hope, "if, indeed," says Captain Carleton, "his  
" whole force, under such circumstances, did not  
" properly deserve that name."

The first exploit of this small but heroic band was,  
to cut to pieces a detachment of the enemy at Alcala  
de Chivant. In their further progress, they made  
use of every expedient that could be afforded by ra-  
pidity of movement, and the spreading of detach-  
ments, to conceal their inferiority of numbers, and  
keep up the terror of the enemy. Las Torres, ac-  
cordingly, continued to retreat before them. The

\* Freind's Account, p. 223. See also Carleton's Memoirs,  
p. 167.

irritation and disappointment of his troops was cruelly wreaked upon the little town of Villareal, which lay upon their line of march, and which had shown itself friendly to the Austrian cause. The greatest excesses were there committed by the Spanish soldiery, and nearly the whole population put to the sword. The next town on their retreat, Nules, was, on the contrary, remarkable for its zeal for the House of Bourbon; and, as it had a garrison of a thousand of its citizens in arms, and better walls than any other town in the kingdom of Valencia, Las Torres hoped that it might, even after his departure, afford a barrier to the pursuing English, and cause a cessation of pursuit. To summon a place so well provided for defence was a bold attempt, but not too bold for Lord Peterborough. Riding up to the gate, and disregarding a volley of musketry, with which he was at first received, he peremptorily demanded to speak with the chief magistrate, or a priest. Some of the latter soon made their appearance; when Peterborough told them, in a haughty tone, that he felt strongly inclined to revenge upon them the blood shed at Villareal the day before; that he would allow them only six minutes' time to resolve upon a surrender; and that, else, as soon as his artillery (he had none) should come up, he would begin the assault, and give no quarter. Dismayed at this confident manner, at the personal appearance of the General-in-Chief, with what they conceived to be only his body-guard, and at the dreadful example set by their own party at

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CHAP. Villareal, the townspeople consented to surrender,  
IV. and Lord Peterborough became master of the place  
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Meanwhile the Court of Madrid had sent into the province the Duke of Arcos, in the place of the Conde de Las Torres ; and one of the first measures of the new general was to order a body of ten thousand men to advance, and begin the investment of Valencia. The magistrates of that city, struck with dismay at the impending danger, more especially as their late defection from Philip left them no hope of mercy in case of his success, sent messenger after messenger to Lord Peterborough, imploring his assistance. He, on his part, perceived the necessity, both in policy and in compassion, to comply with their request. He found, also, that the storm which had been represented as ready to burst on Catalonia, would be much slower in gathering than was at first supposed. In this situation, therefore, he did not hesitate to send to Barcelona a peremptory request, that the body of thirteen hundred Spaniards, which had been originally promised as his reinforcements, and which had already advanced to Tortosa, might be permitted to join him ; and he threatened, in case of refusal, to call from Lerida, on his own authority, a detachment of English under Colonel Wills. There is even reason to believe, from a comparison of dates, that Peterborough did not await the effect of these remonstrances at the Court of Charles, but found means, by a direct order to the troops at

Tortosa, to set them in movement without further delay.

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With the same view of collecting as large a force as possible, to make head against the Duke of Arcos, and force a passage to Valencia, the English General also sent orders to his infantry at Vinaroz to rejoin his standard. He himself fell back from Nules as far as Oropesa, in order to meet them. It was no less his object to render his little force as effective as possible, and thus endeavour to counterbalance the enemy's superiority in numbers. Now, since for his usual system of rapid movement and partisan warfare, cavalry was much more useful than infantry, he was anxious to convert some of the latter into the former; more especially as amongst his foot soldiers were many dismounted dragoons. He had collected two hundred horses at Nules, and six hundred others in his rapid excursions throughout the country, which he bought up at very moderate prices, in the name of Queen Anne. His mode of effecting the transmutation he intended may probably, amongst my readers, be blamed by the men as theatrical, and admired by the ladies as romantic. He had sent to him, by sea, the necessary number of saddles and accoutrements; and he had the eight hundred horses fully equipped and secretly drawn out, near Oropesa, on one side of a hill, while he, on the other side, was reviewing his regiment of foot. On ending the review, he expressed his wish that he could see this body of gallant men mounted on good horses;

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a wish in which all the officers cordially joined, without the slightest idea of its accomplishment. They were greatly surprised when the Earl's secretary then put into the hands of each of them his commission, prepared as a cavalry officer; and their astonishment knew no bounds, when, being ordered to march forward, and turning the edge of the hill, they suddenly saw eight bodies of horse, drawn up separately, and all ready accoutred. The field-officers were allowed the choice of their troops; the captains drew lots for theirs; and both officers and men, vaulting into their saddles, rode off to their quarters with the highest exultation.

Lord Peterborough stationed his troops in the neighbourhood of Castillon de la Plana; and, becoming daily more impatient for the expected succours from Tortosa, set off alone, with his usual indefatigable activity, for the purpose of hurrying their movements. On his way, however, he fell in with them on their advance, and also with a body of insurgent Valencian militia; and he hastened to lead both to his head-quarters at Castillon. Even then the whole united force scarcely exceeded three thousand men, and the enemy had seven or eight. Yet Peterborough's troops set forward on the 1st of February, in high spirits, and fully relying on the genius of their general. One of the surest marks of a great mind is the confidence with which it knows how to inspire others.

During this time, the Duke of Arcos had fixed his head-quarters at the village of Torrente; where

he could intercept the supplies of water, and stop the mills of the city of Valencia.\* To secure his own position, and stop Peterborough's progress, he depended mainly on a strong body of horse, under Brigadier Mahoni, at the pass of Murviedro. This place is built at the foot of the mountain, formerly crowned by the city, and now by the ruins of Saguntum, which have given the name (MUROS VIEJOS, old walls,) to the modern town. A river which flows in front was commanded by strong works and a numerous artillery; while beyond was a plain of above two leagues in extent, and scarcely to be passed without a superiority in cavalry. The regular force was also assisted by eight hundred armed townsmen; and the skill of Mahoni had made the best use of his excellent position. Peterborough perceived that he must again, as at San Mateo, have recourse to stratagem; but the one which he employed on this occasion seems by no means worthy of an honourable enemy.

His first measure was to despatch a flag of truce, and request a conference with General Mahoni, who was of Irish extraction, and related to the second Countess of Peterborough.† The meeting took place as he desired; each general riding to an appointed spot, with only a few horsemen as their escort. In their conversation Peterborough made every ex-

\* See in Freind's Account (p. 249.) a letter to Lord Peterborough from the Jurats, Racional and Syndic of Valencia, dated Jan. 26. 1706.

† Freind's Account, p. 259., and Collins's Peerage, vol. iii. p. 318., ed. 1812.

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ertion to gain over his adversary to the cause of Charles ; offering him high rank, and every other advantage in the Austrian or the English service. Failing in his attempt, he determined to impute the treachery which he could not produce. In the interview, he had so far misused the open-hearted confidence of the honest Irishman, as to draw from him an avowal of his intention to advise Arcos to march across the plain to his assistance ; and he also found means, by pretending an equal frankness, and a kinsman's regard, to impress Mahoni with the conviction that an overwhelming force, both in men and in artillery, lay before him. Peterborough then made choice of two dragoons, who, upon the promise of promotion, undertook to go over to Arcos as pretended deserters. Being admitted to the Duke's presence, they reported that, while drinking wine together behind a rock, they had witnessed the conference between Peterborough and Mahoni ; had seen the former hand over to the latter a bag of five thousand pistoles ; and had heard him promise Mahoni the rank of major-general on the English establishment, and the command of ten thousand Irish Catholics to be raised for the service of Charles. On the other hand, they declared that Mahoni had undertaken not only to betray his post at Murviedro, but to induce the Duke of Arcos to march across the plain, and thus entrap him into a position where the English army might find it easy to overpower him. The Duke was confounded at this intelli-



gence, and still doubted its truth ; but, shortly afterwards, he saw Mahoni's aide-de-camp arrive with the very proposal of which the spies had forewarned him, and of which Lord Peterborough had become apprised by his enemy's incautious frankness. No doubt could now remain in the mind of Arcos as to Mahoni's treason : he had him immediately arrested, and sent off a prisoner to Madrid ; while, so far from marching across the plain as Mahoni had suggested, and as good policy required, he broke up his camp, and retreated with precipitation to the mountains. Making use of his flight, and of the confusion and distrust of the Spanish detachment at Murviedro, Peterborough could now effect the passage of the river without difficulty ; and, next day, the 4th of February, arrived in triumph at Valencia. It is gratifying, however, to be able to add, that the innocence of Mahoni was discovered and acknowledged at Madrid, and that he was reinstated in his rank and employments. Arcos, on the other hand, was punished for his credulity ; being superseded by his predecessor, Las Torres.

Lord Peterborough had now gloriously attained the aim of his expedition, and was supposed to be just beginning to rest from his fatigues, when he learnt that a body of four thousand men was on its march to reinforce the Spanish forces, and had advanced as far as Fuente la Higuera. He immediately took his measures with his usual secrecy and skill. A body of eight hundred foot and four

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hundred cavalry was directed to set out from Valencia at night ; he caused it to pass the River Xucar without discovery, and pushing, by a forced march, upon the enemy's encampment, it took them completely by surprise. The Spaniards were easily overpowered ; six hundred of them made prisoners, and the rest dispersed ; and by this well-timed attack, the province was almost entirely cleared of the Castilians. With equal success Lord Peterborough intercepted, by sea, sixteen pieces of artillery which had been embarked at Alicant. After such achievements, he continued to take up his quarters at Valencia ; where his affable manners greatly endeared him to the people ; “and where,” says Carleton, “he maintained such a good correspondence with the priests and with the ladies, that he never failed of the best and most early intelligence.”

## CHAPTER V.

THE news of the taking of Barcelona, and of the Catalan and Valencian insurrections, struck the Court of Madrid with dismay. The wide difference that separates a courtier from a statesman was now apparent in the ministers of Philip; and he alone whom prosperity had found timid, irresolute, and helpless, seemed to be raised and dignified by evil fortune. With great promptitude and firmness he determined to lead in person an army for the recovery of Barcelona; and his letter, announcing this resolution to his grandfather, did not, as formerly, request his advice, but only implored his assistance. Nor did Louis, though himself threatened with invasion, and pressed on every side by increasing enemies, remain deaf to this appeal. He promised that a French fleet should invest Barcelona by sea, and that a diversion by land should be made on the side of Roussillon. Every exertion also was made by both monarchs to collect a numerous army at Zaragoza. The greater part of the troops on the Portuguese frontier was recalled to this more important service; and, in order to repair the absence of so many men by the genius of one, the command on that frontier was again committed to the Duke of Berwick. It

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was settled that the Queen should remain at Madrid, with the title of regent, and under the guidance of Amelot and Princess Orsini,—a plan which was not adopted without much of the cabal and intrigue grown usual at this Court.\*

But the great and leading defect of the whole arrangement was, to appoint the weak and unsoldierlike Marshal Tessé as chief of the army under Philip. He reached Zaragoza in January; and, within a few days after his arrival, ingeniously found means to embroil himself with the high-spirited inhabitants. Disgusted at an attempt he had made to withdraw several Spanish culprits from their own courts of justice, and subject them to military law, they raised some difficulties as to the admission of a new French regiment into the city. The Marshal immediately ordered it to force its way with fixed bayonets; and a tumult ensued, which was not quelled without bloodshed. He then proposed (incredible as it may seem) that all the other troops should advance and sack the city; but, being restrained by the leading men about him, the affray led, at that time, to no further consequences. He thought proper, however, soon afterwards to remove his head-quarters to Pino, further down the Ebro, where he was again guilty of the same barbarous impolicy. Some French troops, stationed at Gurrea, having found one of their lieutenants murdered in his bed, razed the

\* *Mém. de Noailles*, vol. iii. p. 317.

house, plundered the town, and killed several of the neighbouring peasantry; and their conduct was openly approved by Tessé.\* Every part of his proceedings, in short, displayed the same belief on which his government had lately acted with their Calvinists at home,—that havoc and cruelty are sure to overbear all opposition, and must finally prevail.† At the same time, his boldness against an unarmed population was remarkably contrasted with his timidity in the prosecution of the war. All his letters to Versailles or to Madrid were filled with doubts and misgivings: he exaggerated the force of the enemy; he disparaged his own; he spoke of the difficulties of the march, of the doubtful arrival of supplies, of the fatal results of a failure. According to him, an army in each province would hardly suffice to maintain the wavering loyalty of the Spaniards; according to him, the siege of Barcelona ought not to be thought of, unless Valencia, Lerida, and Gerona were first subdued. From every thing he foreboded defeat and disaster; and, in short, he adopted throughout the prudent policy of objecting to every plan proposed by others, and proposing none himself. Philip, however, continuing firm in his purpose, set out from Madrid, joined Tessé at Alcaniz, on

\* *Mém. de Tessé*, vol. ii. p. 210.

† This belief is strongly shown in the pages of St. Simon. After telling us that Las Torres had put a party of insurgents to the sword in Aragon, and refused all quarter; “*mais cela*,” he adds with surprise, “*n’arrêta pas la révolte!*” (*Mém.* vol. v. p. 3. ed. 1829.)

CHAP. the 8th of March, and entered Catalonia at the  
V. head of more than twenty thousand men.

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Lord Peterborough, meanwhile, made every exertion to withstand the coming storm. His chief hopes lay in England; where the Queen and Parliament had received the tidings of General Stanhope with the highest exultation; and lent a favourable ear to his request for reinforcements. An additional supply of 250,000*l.* was voted for the service of Charles\*; General Stanhope was appointed the English envoy extraordinary at that Court; and was, moreover, directed to lead to Barcelona the fresh troops sent for its relief. As, from this period, we shall find him taking a principal part in the war, his life and character, like those of its other leading personages, may perhaps seem to require some detail. He was grandson of the first Earl of Chesterfield and son of Mr. A. Stanhope, whom I have already had occasion to mention as ambassador to Spain in the days of its Charles the Second. Having passed his youth at his father's house in Madrid, he was well acquainted with the Spanish language, manners, and feelings; and thus peculiarly fitted to conduct any public business in that country. For his military studies he had found opportunity in Flanders, and a master in Marlborough. His diplomatic talent was tried by this most difficult mission to Charles the Third at Barcelona. In both departments of war

\* Parl. Hist. vol. vi. p. 477.

and state affairs, he was considered by his contemporaries as well skilled ; and they saw him at successive periods attain the highest pinnacle of each, —being at one time Commander-in-Chief in Spain, and afterwards First Lord of the Treasury in England. In both he is admitted to have shown very great disinterestedness as to personal profit and enrichment. Thus, for instance, when directed by his government to conclude, if possible, a commercial treaty with King Charles, and having at the same time rendered that prince important military services, he was offered, as a recompence for these, a grandeeship and estate in Spain, but refused them ; and only requested that, if any gratitude were felt towards him, it might be displayed in a readiness to adjust and concede the disputed articles of the treaty. Many men accordingly have left a more ample fortune, but few a more blameless character, behind them. Even now, his high qualities are recorded by tradition in the country where they were most conspicuously shown : his name yet lives in the honourable recollection of the Spanish peasantry ; and two of his great-grandchildren, who fought (and one fell) in the late Peninsular campaigns, met with frequent enquiries, whether they were any wise related to “ Don “ Diego Estanop,” the great English general in the War of the Succession.

The promised reinforcements under Stanhope, being much wanted, were eagerly expected at Barcelona. As they could not, however, be looked

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for in time for the siege nor be relied on for sustaining it, Lord Peterborough, in their place, devised a most adventurous scheme, which he proposed to Charles, in a letter from Valencia, of the 13th of March.\* “I confess, Sir,” he says, “that I would have your Majesty, in the present “conjuncture, take a resolution as extraordinary “as that which brought you before Barcelona. I “would have your Majesty embark in some ships “I have prepared for that purpose, and with a “fair wind endeavour to gain the first land you “can in Portugal, and then put yourself at the “head of our twenty-five thousand men (in good “condition), on the borders of the kingdom. The “enemy have now but five thousand men in arms “on that side of Spain; and with this change of “affairs in our favour, I doubt not but your Majesty will soon arrive at Madrid. Sir, at first “this has an extraordinary appearance; but the “voyage from Denia to that part of Portugal may “be performed in a week, without hazard; no vessels of France being upon this coast. I see “nothing so great or so secure for your Majesty. “But, Sir, the utmost secrecy is necessary; and I “would have nobody trusted but the Portuguese “ambassador, whose vanity would, perhaps, be “touched to see the finishing blow from his own “country. Meanwhile, I would undertake to “maintain Catalonia and Valencia, and possibly

\* Printed in Freind's Account, p. 118. I have abridged it.



“ open the way to Madrid. This, Sir, were per-  
 “ haps the finest stroke in politics that any age has  
 “ produced, as also the least expected; and it  
 “ might even give the quickest relief to Catalonia,  
 “ which would not be so vigorously attacked if  
 “ your Majesty were in person elsewhere.”

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This splendid idea, whatever might be its other merits, had one great disadvantage,—it required for its execution a bold and active man, and Charles was neither; but, in place of these qualities, he had a high degree of passive courage and insensibility to danger. Thus, though on the one hand, he did not venture on Lord Peterborough's scheme, he, on the other, firmly withstood his German ministers; who, disguising their own cowardice under the convenient mask of loyalty, earnestly besought him to secure his precious person by flight. He determined to remain at Barcelona, and share the fortune of the Catalans, who had hazarded theirs in his cause. Nor could he, at first, be induced to think the siege so imminent as keener eyes discerned it to be; and when Peterborough sent pressing orders for some of the troops in Lerida to march out, and reinforce those at Barcelona, the young Prince, believing that Lerida would be first attacked, was presumptuous enough to countermand them. Thus, the garrison, which, in any case must have been very inadequate, hardly mustered two thousand regular soldiers, and was by no means well provided with military stores. Some time for preparation was, however, afforded them

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by the valour of the Miquelets, who harassed the march and delayed the arrival of Tessé; defended every pass where the advantage of the ground might atone for that of numbers; and, whenever they retreated, wasted the country, drove away the cattle, and poisoned the springs behind them.

In spite of these repeated obstacles, the French army arrived, in the beginning of April, before Barcelona, where it was joined by the Duke of Noailles with some troops from Roussillon, and by a squadron of thirty ships under the Comte de Toulouse. The city was immediately invested both by sea and land, and with every prospect of success. In this emergency, Charles appealed — and not in vain — to the religious enthusiasm of the Catalans. Declaring that he would consult the Holy Virgin, and be guided by her judgment, he prostrated himself before one of her images with a chaplet in his hand, and exhorted all the crowd around him to do the same. Shortly afterwards he rose from his devotions with an air of joy; and announced, in an inspired tone, that she had graciously manifested herself to him, attended by two angels; had promised that his faithful Catalans should never forsake him; and had commanded him to remain amongst them.\* The cry of “a miracle” was now raised with great effect; and the monks and the women were, as might be expected, the most eager in promoting it. The

\* Mém. de Noailles, vol. iii. p. 348.

former even flew to arms, and served as soldiers, especially the Capuchins, who preserved their religious dress, but tied their long beards with ribands of their party colour.\* The women, too, were formed into companies: some working as pioneers; some guarding posts as sentinels; and others employed, more suitably to their sex, in attendance on the wounded. An irresistible enthusiasm, in short, seemed to pervade all classes, to raise them above their natural level, and to make them capable of actions which, in calmer times, they would have trembled even to contemplate.

Meanwhile Lord Peterborough was hastening, by forced marches, from Valencia, at the head of all the forces he could muster, but which amounted only to two thousand foot and six hundred cavalry. With these, and a large irregular body of Miquelets under Cifuentes, he took post in the mountains round Barcelona, a few miles in the rear of the French encampment, and began what has since been termed in that country a GUERRILLA warfare. It was particularly suited to the tastes and talents of that enterprising general, who was able to boast that in two whole campaigns he had scarcely ever sent a party of thirty horse upon any action without heading them in person.† He harassed the French army with perpetual alarms and frequent attacks; cut off stragglers, intercepted communications, and kept them almost be-

\* San Phelipe, Coment. vol. i. p. 191.

† Freind's Account, p. 278.

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sieged within their lines. All this time he himself was tormented with absurd and capricious orders from the Court of Barcelona, desiring him to force his way into the city, and join the garrison. But though he refused to make this desperate attempt, he contrived—which the other officers had thought impracticable—to introduce some succours both of men and of provisions.

Marshal Tessé first turned his arms against Montjuich, whose late breaches had been but ill repaired; yet, instead of reducing it, as Lord Peterborough had so unexpectedly done, in a few hours, he did not succeed till the twenty-third day, when its brave commander, Lord Donegal, was killed, and its garrison compelled to withdraw into the city. Batteries were then opened against Barcelona itself, and played with great effect upon its walls. A general assault was soon expected; and Peterborough, finding his army far too weak either to raise the siege or do more than molest the besiegers, looked forward with the most anxious impatience for the arrival of Stanhope's reinforcements. Unfortunately, the authority of that general, during his voyage, was controlled by that of Sir John Leake, Admiral of the fleet which conveyed him. An express from him reached Lord Peterborough, stating that the fleet was then off the Spanish coast; that he had used all possible endeavours to prevail upon the Admiral to make the best of his way to Barcelona; but that Leake persisted in a positive resolution not to approach

the French fleet until the English (though already more than equal to it) had been joined by some more ships, which were daily expected from Ireland, under Admiral Byng. Stanhope added, that he would use every exertion to let Lord Peterborough have timely intelligence of the junction, and to urge despatch upon the Admirals. Lest, however, the communication should be stopped by the enemy, he stated, that if the Earl should at any time receive a cover, without either address or enclosure beyond a blank page cut in the middle, he might consider this as a certain announcement that the two squadrons had met, and were proceeding together towards Barcelona. This precaution proved very fortunate, as it was afterwards found impossible, on account of the French cruisers or outposts, to send letters to shore from the fleet in the former manner; but a Spaniard was easily persuaded by Stanhope that he ran no hazard in conveying a piece of blank paper. Accordingly, he passed without suspicion, and himself not at all aware of the tidings he carried; and reached Lord Peterborough at the time when the danger of Barcelona seemed at its height, and when his desire to avert it might soon have hurried him to some fatal enterprise. Never, probably, did a mere sheet of blank paper produce so strange and sudden an effect. The troops were instantly ordered to arms, and marched that very night to Sitges, a small town on the sea-shore, where Peterborough gave orders for seizing and collecting all the fishing-

CHAP. boats, and other small craft that could be found.  
V. On the second evening, he himself, to the amaze-  
1706. ment and concern of all his officers, embarked  
alone with a single aide-de-camp in an open felucca,  
and put out to sea. He was apprehensive—and the  
sequel proved how justly—that Admiral Leake  
would make his appearance before Barcelona with  
his whole fleet at once ; and that his very far supe-  
rior number of ships would naturally deter the Comte  
de Toulouse from engaging, and induce him to cut  
his cables, and steer away for France. If, on the  
contrary, a part of the English fleet should keep  
astern, or, rather, should sail beforehand to the  
eastward of Barcelona, the superiority would  
appear, at first, on the side of the French, and a  
battle no longer be declined. And what could  
that battle prove, but a most secure and splendid  
triumph, when the enemy, thus tempted to engage,  
should find their retreat cut off, and themselves en-  
compassed with a fleet almost double of their own ?

To attain this glorious object, however, Lord  
Peterborough's personal presence in the fleet was  
absolutely necessary ; since the Queen's commission  
for his full command by sea was limited to the  
occasions “ whenever he thought fit to go on  
“ board.” He had therefore determined to brave  
the danger of the French cruisers, and attempt,  
under cover of the darkness, to reach the English  
fleet. During the first night, he rowed about in  
his boat, without success, and was obliged to return  
to Sitges ; but, on the second, he at length fell in

with one of the men of war. “When day dawned,” says Carleton, “it was astonishing to the whole fleet to see the Union flag waving at the main-top-mast head of this ship. Nobody at first could trust his eyes, or guess at the meaning.” Yet, notwithstanding all his exertions, Peterborough had arrived too late to prevent the disclosure he feared. The fleet had already come within sight of the French, and its strength been reported to the Comte de Toulouse, who immediately raised the blockade, and put out to sea. Thus was lost the opportunity of a most decisive victory; but there still remained the pleasure and the pride of relieving Barcelona. Peterborough had previously left directions with his troops at Sitges to embark in the boats he had collected; and these, together with the English fleet, now entered the port of Barcelona, and poured forth fresh squadrons of soldiers to its rescue.

Their arrival might have been anticipated, had the French attempted to storm the city within the last few days; for the breaches had become practicable, and the soldiers clamorous for an assault. But the temper of Tessé was of that ill-omened kind which does not so much foresee disasters as produce them, and which imprints its own weakness on every object around it. He paused, and enumerated the difficulties and objections, until the entrance of Stanhope’s reinforcements settled his doubts as to an assault; and though Philip and several Spanish officers were still anxious to maintain their ground, they were over-ruled, as before,

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by the timidity of Tessé. Next night they raised the siege; and, that they might not have to fight their way once more through an insurgent population, they determined, instead of retracing their steps to Zaragoza, to march northwards into Roussillon. Here they arrived, after a hasty and harassed retreat, and here Philip found himself almost an exile from his own dominions—almost a suppliant in his grandfather's. Their heavy cannon and their sick and wounded were ignominiously left behind; and they were still further disheartened, on the very first morning of their flight (the 11th of May), by the gloom of a total eclipse. The sun had been formerly chosen as the device of the House of Bourbon\*; and its dimness in the heavens at this critical period was generally thought to forebode the decline of that haughty family on earth. As the French withdrew, the first care of Peterborough was directed to their sick and wounded; and his generous treatment has been recorded by their gratitude. His next orders were for recasting all the brass cannon which the enemy had spiked; and each new one was marked with the figure of a sun eclipsed, together with the modest motto, *MAGNA PARVIS OBSCURANTUR*.

The events before Barcelona, which forced King Philip out of Spain, and shook his power to its foundation, did not come singly: some blows, still more heavy, were struck from other quarters

\* This emblem was invented for Louis the Fourteenth by one L'Ouvrier, about 1662. See Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, chap. 24.



at his throne. In Flanders, the Duke of Marlborough gained a victory over Marshal Villeroy at Ramillies, so splendid and so complete, that, if we wish to find a parallel to it in that age, we can only turn to his own former achievements at Blenheim. Antwerp, Brussels, and many other cities, immediately opened their gates; and, within a few weeks, nearly the whole Spanish Netherlands acknowledged Charles the Third for their sovereign, and Marlborough for their governor. In Italy, the campaign of the French, from which they had expected great successes, was closed by the disastrous battle of Turin, in which their brave leader, Marsin, and their ambitious hopes, fell together. They were driven in confusion beyond the Alps; and the victorious party took possession of the Milanese, as of the Netherlands, in the name of Charles. On the side of Portugal, the military operations were not less important; and these—a part of my subject—must not be so lightly passed over. The Spanish force on this frontier had been reduced to five thousand men; whilst Galway and Das Minas were at the head of more than twenty. The two latter were, however, embroiled by a discussion of military punctilio. According to the treaty with Portugal, the troops of that crown were to have the right in their own country; and now they positively refused to move one step into Spain, unless the same honour were allowed them there. Sooner than lose their co-operation, the English General com-

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plied; yet his conduct, though justified by the exigency of the service, was afterwards voted, in the House of Lords, “contrary to the honour of “the imperial crown of Great Britain.”

On the part of the Spaniards, the Duke of Berwick assumed the chief command at the end of March; but could only look on whilst the Allies besieged and took Alcantara, into which he had thrown his best infantry, and then advanced along the Tagus. He gave way before them, till they reached the bridge of Almaraz, nearly half way between the frontier and Toledo, and within a few marches of Madrid. Here, however, they halted, because, having received no intelligence of the state of things at Barcelona, they were apprehensive lest Philip, after reducing that city, should turn round and encompass them with his victorious army. Galway wished, nevertheless, to push forwards; but the Portuguese officers thought it imprudent to proceed beyond Almaraz, and useless to remain there; and at last they determined, whilst awaiting the news from Barcelona, to reduce some fortress on the frontier.\* Accordingly, they began their retreat on the 11th of May, — the very time when Philip was beginning his from Barcelona, — and, marching to the northward, invested Ciudad Rodrigo. It held out for seven days; and, the Allies having soon afterwards been apprised of Lord Peterborough’s great success, took heart, and pushed for-

\* See Lord Galway’s Narrative, Parl. Hist., vol. vi. p. 943.

ward to Salamanca, which Berwick left on their approach. They then, after some further delay\*, began their march upon Madrid. Berwick perceived that, with his handful of men, it would be quite impracticable to withstand them; and he therefore most earnestly besought the King, in his despatches, not to return from Perpignan to his capital, which he could only maintain for a few days, and must then forsake as a fugitive; but rather to fix his station at once in Burgos, formerly the chief city in Castille, where he might be joined by his council and his Court. But Philip showed himself regardless of this advice, as of Tessé's, who wished him to retire from Perpignan to Paris; —the object of the French being, it is supposed, to have him more completely at their disposal, in case of negotiations for a peace†; and we might admire the bravery of the young monarch in rushing so eagerly to what was represented to him as the post of danger, did not History disclose his real motive, —an uncontrollable impatience to rejoin his Queen.‡ Making his way through Pamplona, and

\* This delay is severely animadverted upon in Lord Peterborough's letters to General Stanhope. "You told me once "you wondered at my temper at the retreat of the Portuguese " (from Almaraz). Though it may seem strange to retire when "there is no enemy, I think it more extraordinary not to advance "towards a crown." Valencia, July 13, 1706. MS.

† San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 196. Louis wrote to his grandson, advising him to proceed to Pamplona, and no further; but this letter was not dated till the 29th of May, and Philip received it at Madrid.

‡ Mém. de Berwick, vol. i. p. 210.

**CHAP.** travelling with the utmost haste, he arrived at  
**V.** Madrid early in June, and found almost his first  
1706. business there to be the preparations for quitting it again. Money above all was wanted, the treasury being utterly exhausted. The grandees were called upon for a free gift; and many of them declared their loyalty in words, but contributed so sparingly, that they clearly showed their intention of keeping well, if possible, with both sides; and, according to the witty remark of a Spanish lady at that time, resembled that wary devotee, who offered one wax candle to St. Michael, and another to the devil.\* The Queen went in person to the Ayuntamiento or town-hall, and made an appeal to the magistrates; but could only wring from them six thousand pistoles. In fact, it will be found that new demands or taxes imposed by a government in moments of extraordinary peril, are almost always unproductive, and serve rather to betray its weakness than to augment its resources.

The councils of state and public tribunals now set out on their journey to Burgos, where it had been determined to fix the royal residence. The Queen, too, proceeded to that city. “After a “journey of eighteen days,” she wrote to Madame de Maintenon †, “I arrived at Burgos yesterday “evening, much fatigued with rising before day- “break, overpowered with the heat, almost stifled “with the dust, and having rested only in the most

\* Mém. de Noailles, vol. iii. p. 359.

† Letter in the Mém. de Noailles, dated July 6, 1706.

“wretched and ruinous hovels. In one instance,  
“a wall fell down, and put many people to great  
“danger. From this you may judge of the rest. We  
“hoped, on arriving here, to be more comfortably  
“lodged, but have hitherto been greatly disap-  
“pointed. Notwithstanding these hardships, we  
“shall not complain, so that the King can but pre-  
“vail over his enemies. Unhappily, however,  
“scarcely a day passes without bringing us the news  
“of some fresh disaster.” Philip himself remained  
at his capital a few days longer, and then joined the  
force of Berwick at Sopetran, on the ridge of the  
Guadarrama mountains. He was attended by nearly  
all the nobles able to bear arms; even by those whose  
fidelity had lately seemed the most precarious; and  
yet a decree had been published, permitting all such  
as held no public office to stay at Madrid if they  
pleased. But some men are so fond of bustle and  
agitation, or so proud of trust, that their Prince can  
more surely rely upon them, in the most dangerous  
crisis, than in his fulness of power and prosperity.  
Madrid was now left open to the allied army,  
which had, without opposition, crossed the high  
mountains which line that city on the north, and  
divide the two Castilles. Their light troops were  
already hovering before it; and, on the 25th of  
June, the advanced guard of cavalry, under the  
Marquis of Villaverde, took possession of it. Gal-  
way and Das Minas made their triumphal entry  
two days afterwards; but their reception by the  
inhabitants was cold and sullen. To the Por-

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tuguese, especially, it was a glorious hour,—that they who but seventy years ago were the subjects and vassals of Spain, should now not only assert their independence, but enter, as conquerors, the very capital of their haughty tyrant! Unfortunately for them, their elation at this honour, together with the incapacity of Lord Galway, prevented them from pushing forward and securing their success. It was evidently their part to give Philip no respite; to pursue, overtake, and crush his scanty forces; and then, if they pleased, sit down and enjoy their laurels at leisure. Instead of this, the Generals took up their own quarters at ease in the palace of the Pardo, encamped their troops along the Manzanares, had King Charles the Third proclaimed in the streets, attempted to re-organize the public tribunals; and, in short, wasted a whole month in inaction; “a halt,” says Lord Peterborough, in one of his letters, “as fatal as Hannibal’s at Capua.”\*

The evil consequences of their delay did not, however, by any means, appear at first. Several men of rank and influence declared in their favour, and the discontent of the people was as yet only silently fermenting. The Conde de Oropesa, who had been twice prime minister under Charles the Second, together with his son-in-law, the Conde

\* To General Stanhope, Aug. 1, 1706. MS. This is also Berwick’s opinion:—“Si, au lieu de s’amuser à Madrid, ils eussent marché tout de suite après moi, ils m’auroient infalliblement chassé au de-là de l’Ebre.” (Mém. vol. i. p. 222 )

de Haro, allowed themselves to be captured and carried off from Guadalaxara; whilst a few others, such as the Conde de Lemos, and the Patriarch of the Indies, who had remained at Madrid, openly espoused the cause of Charles. Amongst these was the Marquis of Rivas, late secretary to the **DESPACHO**; and it deserves to be recorded to his honour, that, in spite of the most eager solicitations, and the highest promises, he would never swerve from his statement with respect to Charles the Second's will, nor impeach its authenticity according to the wish of the Allies. But it was from Toledo that they received their most important accession of weight, if not of numbers. Toledo had for some time been the retreat of the Queen-dowager and of Cardinal Portocarrero, those two turbulent spirits, who, in the late reign, had stood at the head of opposite and angry parties. In their exile and retirement, however, their ancient rivalry ceased, and they became united together by one of the strongest of all human bonds — a common hatred. The Queen had always been in heart, as in kindred, a German; and Portocarrero, since his disgrace, had loudly inveighed against the tyranny of the French agents and the ingratitude of Philip. He forgot that, in thus giving way to passion, he was demolishing the structure which his own hands had chiefly raised, and, by counter-acting the great aim and object of his political life, must destroy its reputation with posterity. Every consideration yielded to his thirst for vengeance.

CHAP. No sooner, therefore, did Das Minas send out  
V. towards Toledo a squadron of horse, under the  
1706. Conde de Atalaya, than they were eagerly welcomed by the Cardinal and the Queen. The latter cast aside the perpetual sables to which etiquette condemns the widowed Queens of Spain, and, together with all her household, appeared in festival attire. She wrote a warm letter of congratulation to her nephew Charles, whilst a still more solid proof of her regard was conveyed in a present of jewels. On his part, Portocarrero, after performing a solemn TE DEUM in the Cathedral, blessed the Austrian standards in person ; and at night the archiepiscopal palace blazed with a joyful illumination, and spread forth a costly banquet in honour of the day. Thus might Charles number amongst his partisans the powerful primate of Spain, and the last link from the long chain of Austrian princes.

June. A defection in another quarter obtained for Charles the best arsenal of Spain, and the last remnant of its fleets. Oran being then closely pressed by the Moors, the Conde de Santa Cruz, who commanded for Philip in Carthagená, had been ordered to proceed thither with two galleys, conveying a supply of provisions, and above fifty thousand dollars in money. But Santa Cruz, already won over by the Austrian party, seized this opportunity of betraying his trust, and steered to Barcelona with the treasure. Through his persuasion the English were induced to send some ships against



Carthagenæ, and the French garrison to surrender it without a blow. Soon afterwards, Oran, deprived of its expected supplies, yielded to the Moors. Thus was lost to both parties of the Spaniards, a fortress, which they had gained by the genius of Cardinal Ximenes, and which was endeared to them by his memory.\* On another side, Zaragoza, and indeed, all Aragon, mindful of Tessé's misconduct, threw off their allegiance to Philip, with so much unanimity and quiet, as to afford hardly any particulars to history.

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The Spanish monarchy seemed now within the grasp of Charles, although he was very far from seizing his advantages with sufficient energy and quickness. It appeared as if his late heavy blow on the French before Barcelona had been struck upon a torpedo, and bereaved not them, but himself, of sense and motion. It was found as difficult to make him leave Barcelona, now that it had become the seat of indolence, as whilst it had been the post of danger; yet his continued residence there was evidently useless, if not injurious, to his service. At first, indeed, there was some report of an intended siege of Gerona by the Duke de Noailles; and Stanhope was sent to secure what he himself truly called "the barrier and key

\* Mariana, Hist. Hisp. lib. xxix. c. 18. In his account of Oran I am surprised to find this great historian undervaluing the *gens Maurica ædificandi minime curiosa*. Had he never heard of the Alhambra?

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“ of this country\* ;” but the enemy had no such design, and Stanhope hastened back to his diplomatic and military duties. On the retreat of Philip, Peterborough had urged the policy of an immediate advance upon Madrid, whilst it yet lay open and defenceless ; and he strongly recommended the route of Valencia, because that province, being already in possession of the Allies, could present no difficulties, and cause no delay. A council of war, held on the 18th of May, had agreed to this project ; and it had been determined that Peterborough and the infantry should proceed by sea, and the cavalry by land, to Valencia ; that Charles, with his escort, should transfer his head-quarters to Tortosa ; remain there till the road to Madrid was opened to him by Peterborough ; and then, joining that general, advance with him to the capital. In pursuance of this plan, Peterborough shortly afterwards embarked, and sailed to Valencia. On his arrival, the Spaniards, who had been making some attempts upon the fortress of Xativa, hastily withdrew ; but the conduct of the Governor-General Basset y Ramos, together with his apology for it, are mentioned by the Earl with his usual biting irony : — “ The English came in “ good time : Basset had already two officers of Las “ Torres in the place ; to be sure, it was only to “ let them know how vigorously he would defend

\* Letter to Secretary Sir Charles Hedges, May 31, 1706. MS.

“ it.”\* The English general next sent a detachment to reduce Requena, the frontier town on the road to Madrid, and almost the only obstacle to reaching it. Requena surrendered, after a short resistance; but all this while Peterborough was harassed with absurd and fluctuating instructions from the Court of Barcelona, — “ a fate,” he afterwards observed, “ never to be avoided in this “ service, of which I am more weary than a galley “ slave of his oar.”† On the other hand, it cannot, in truth, be denied that his own fiery and fretful temper gave others infinite trouble, and raised against himself a host of personal resentments. In his own words, he “ would be commanded by no “ body, and had as little mind to command.”‡ Want of money, too, added to the difficulties of his situation, and to the impatience of his temper. “ I “ see no remedy,” he writes to Stanhope, “ unless “ I can find some way, upon my own credit, to “ procure money for the King. I am sure he shall “ change his note before I make the experiment, “ and not use me with such foolish ill-breeding. I “ desire you will make him sensible of his usage to “ me upon this head.”§ Soon afterwards, however, we find his public spirit predominant. “ I “ am resolved to make one effort more, to see if “ any thing can touch a German heart. I have

\* Letter to General Stanhope, June 1706. MS.

† To Do. July 24, 1706. MS.

‡ To Do. Aug. 1, 1706. MS.

§ To Do. May 30, 1706. MS.

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“received a good sum of my own: the King and  
“his troops shall have every farthing of it, and I  
“will send it in gold with all expedition.”\*

Peterborough was now in constant expectation of being joined by Charles; but the insurrection of Zaragoza had given a new turn to that prince, or rather to his German advisers, who determined to proceed to Madrid, not through Valencia, but through Aragon. General Stanhope and the Portuguese ambassador “represented in the strongest  
“manner we could,” says the former†, “the  
“certain delay this must occasion, at a time when  
“the Portuguese army, and all that wished his  
“Majesty well in Castille, were in the utmost im-  
“patience for his arrival at Madrid; besides the  
“danger there might be for his Majesty, with so  
“small a force, to march three hundred miles  
“through a country which had not declared they  
“were ready to receive him, and the enemy having  
“still a great body of horse in Castille.” Lord Peterborough wrote to the same effect, but with as little success: Charles persisted in his scheme; and from the delay of the land journey, superadded to that which had already taken place, did not

\* Letter from Valencia, of July 8, 1706. MS. In another letter of July 2, he says, “I think our business done, and to  
“some purpose,—to put one King out and another in within the  
“year! I want only to relieve the Duke of Savoy, and then  
“to Wills’s Coffee-house in winter!” MS.

† Letter to the Lord Treasurer Godolphin, July 3, 1706. MS.

make his public entry into Zaragoza till the 18th of July. He ought to have been, nearly a month before, not at Zaragoza, but at Madrid. So strange, indeed, did his absence from thence appear at such a crisis, that it gave rise to a report of his having died suddenly; and there were even some persons in Castille ready to make oath of his being already embalmed and interred!\* It is much to be wished that men were as careful and cautious in swearing as they usually are in betting on a fact! Charles excused his delay to Stanhope by alleging that his equipage was not ready to enter the capital with becoming state. "Sir," replied the General, with great animation, "our William the Third entered London in a hackney with a cloak-bag behind it, and was made King not many weeks after."† On the other hand, Lord Peterborough also seems by no means free from blame for remaining so much longer at Valencia, when he knew the English army to be already at Madrid. We afterwards, it is true, find him asserting that he had received no regular and direct communication to that effect from Galway or Das Minas; but it can scarcely be doubted that a man so distinguished for his early and sure intelligence must have very soon known the occupation of the

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\* Somerville's *Queen Anne*, p. 141. The prevalence of this report is mentioned by Lord Peterborough, in a letter to General Stanhope, of July 20, 1706. MS.

† Letter from Mr. Walpole to Mr. Robert Walpole, June 23, 1706.

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V. July, a Spanish officer, despatched by Lord Gal-  
way, passed through Valencia on his way to Bar-  
celona, — without, indeed, any letters to Lord  
1706. Peterborough, but announcing, by word of mouth,  
the taking of Madrid.\* However much, therefore,  
Galway's silence might give ground for sub-  
sequent accusation, it hardly warranted Peter-  
borough's inactivity and affectation of ignorance,  
at such a crisis, nor ought he to have permitted  
personal slights to overcome his sense of public  
duty.

These errors, however, would have weighed but lightly in the scale, had not a new and unconquerable spirit of loyalty burst forth in Castille. Throughout all history there are few national movements more beautiful and striking than the manner in which a prince, by no means popular when firmly seated on the throne, rallied round him the hearts of his subjects by that very evil fortune which would commonly have lost them. The Spaniards are, indeed, imbued more, perhaps, than any other nation, with that romantic generosity which makes them naturally incline to the weak and fallen, and prefer him who must beseech, to him who can bestow protection. Their reverence towards the man, once acknowledged as their King, is also of a higher and more sacred

\* See Freind's Account, p. 104; Lord Peterborough's answers, in the Parliamentary History, vol. vi. p. 949.; and Mr. Furly's Journal. MS.

nature than ours. The same title, "His Majesty," is applied by the Spaniards to their God, as to their sovereign\* : their feeling towards the former, is a sort of loyalty ; their feeling towards the latter, a sort of devotion ; and both are inseparably mingled in their minds. In addition to these causes, there was amongst the Castillians (as the Admiral of Castille had foreseen there would be), a great aversion to any monarch who came to them, either from the Catalans, or the Valencians. The former they hated, as fierce, and frequent in rebellion ; and as to the latter, their delicious climate and enervating luxuries only excited their contempt. It had even become proverbial amongst them to say, in a sort of couplet, that at Valencia the meat is grass, and the grass water ; the men are women, and the women — nothing. " The

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\* Doblado's (Mr. White's) Letters from Spain, p. 11. The loyalty of Spanish poets also takes extraordinary flights. When I was in Spain, I saw in the official *Gaceta de Madrid* (of Nov. 6, 1827), an ode commemorating the recent visit of King Ferdinand VII. to Valencia, and declaring that it would be remembered even when Marathon and Salamis should be forgotten !

. . . . . " de Salamina

Maraton y Platea,  
Los destructores heroes celebrados,  
Que hoy la fama pregona,  
Al fin succumbiran, y en el olvido  
Yaceran sepultados ;  
Y en tanto con aplauso repetido,  
Por siempre sonara de gente en gente  
El nombre de FERNANDO esclarecido !"

† San Phelipe, *Comentarios*, vol. i. p. 169.

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“continent of Spain,” observed General Stanhope\*,  
“is now divided into the parties, as formerly into  
“the crowns, of Castille and Aragon. All the  
“latter we are possessed off; and, I believe, the  
“provinces which compose it would be very well  
“pleased to continue thus separated. But this is  
“the thing in the world we ought to fear most;  
“since such a division would render Spain per-  
“fectly insignificant in the balance of Europe.”  
Lord Peterborough’s testimony is equally strong.  
“Assure yourself,” he writes at the same time†,  
“that in Castille there is a most violent spirit  
“against us, which appears to a degree that could  
“not be believed.” Every town and every village  
rose in arms. The English and Portuguese were  
masters of no more ground than their armies stood  
upon, and even there had to fear the nightly thrusts  
of the knife. At Salamanca, the Allies had no  
sooner left the town, than the inhabitants dis-  
claimed their authority, and levied a body of  
light troops, which hovered on the frontier, and  
cut off their communication with Portugal. At  
Toledo, the people rose in insurrection against  
Portocarrero and the Queen-dowager; tore down  
the Austrian standard, which the latter had hoisted  
on her palace, placed guards at her door, and  
treated her as a prisoner of state. The Andalusians,  
according to the expression of Berwick, did mi-

\* Letter to Lord Treasurer Godolphin, Aug. 11, 1706. MS.

† Letter to General Stanhope, Aug. 1, 1706. MS.



racles for the cause\*, raising on this sudden emergency, and entirely by their own exertions, fourteen thousand regular foot, and four thousand cavalry. Poor as were the provinces, they all vied with each other in offering supplies of money : the spirit, in short, was general; but two more particular instances of it may, perhaps, be allowed me. A brother of the Conde de Santa Cruz, an arch-deacon of Cordova, had no sooner heard the betrayal of the Spanish galleys and treasure to the enemy, than he hastened to the baptismal register of the city, and tore out the leaf which contained his brother's name, indignantly exclaiming, " May  
" no record of so vile a wretch remain amongst  
" men."† At the Court of Philip a country priest obtained an audience of the Queen, and offered her one hundred and twenty pistoles from a small village with only the same number of houses. " My flock," he added, " are ashamed at not being able to send  
" a larger sum; but they entreat your Majesty  
" to believe that in the same purse are one hundred and twenty hearts faithful even to death."  
" The good man wept as he said it," observes Princess Orsini, who relates the occurrence, " and  
" truly, we wept also as we heard him."‡ New

\* *Mém.* vol. i. p. 218.

† San Phelipe, *Comentarios*, vol. i. p. 212. *Dict. des Sièges et Bat.*, 1809, vol. v. p. 103.

‡ Letter to Madame de Maintenon, dated Aug. 12, 1706, in the notes to the old edition (1791) of *St. Simon's Memoirs*, vol. iii. p. 239.

CHAP. levies thronged on every side to the standards of  
V. Philip and Berwick, near Xadraque, which were,  
1706. moreover, joined by the troops of Las Torres from Valencia, and those which had retreated into Roussillon. Philip himself shook off, for the time, that torpor which usually benumbed his natural talents : he addressed the troops with much spirit and effect ; denied the reports of his intending to leave Spain ; and pledged his royal word to die at the head of the last squadron that remained faithful to his service. To please the Spaniards, also, Orry, who had been despatched to Paris, with the crown jewels to raise money, was ordered to remain there, instead of assuming, once more, that most unpopular character—a French minister of the Spanish finances.

On the other hand, the allied army had been rapidly thinning at Madrid. The hospitals were crowded with above six thousand sick ; for the soldiers had given way to great excesses, in which they were actively assisted by a part of the female population, entirely, as the Spanish historians assert, out of loyalty and public spirit.\* Seeing their troops thus wasting away, and being impatient to join the Archduke, Galway, and Das Minas at length sallied forth to meet him. But that prince found it no easy matter to proceed from Zaragoza ; all the country beyond that city being in open

\* See some curious details in San Phelipe, Coment., vol. i. p. 211.

insurrection. At length he began his march by Daroca and Molina; sending orders to Peterborough, to begin his at the same time from Valencia, so that they might mutually protect each other, and effect their junction on the way. The English general obeyed, with many severe reflections on the absurd delays which had already taken place. "It is hard," he observed, "I should be thought mad amongst the rest. After the taking of Requena, twenty horse might have gone to Madrid, and all the places were offering to acknowledge the King, upon condition I would protect them from Miquelets, and the thieves and rogues bred up under Basset; but now, many thousand men were in arms to oppose our passing the river Xucar; and they broke down all the bridges, and flung up earth and stoccaded many passes, and have given us the most warm and foolish marks of ill-will, and would have made it very uneasy for us to pass, but for the drought, which had made many places fordable. . . . That the King must go to Madrid is certain; and as certain, that now, he will be received with nothing but noise. His friends there have become persuaded the deciding stroke is at hand, and will, therefore, expect the event of a battle."\* Even the compliments of Lord Peterborough, at this period of exasperation, have a tinge of bitterness. Thus, on the 2d of August,

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\* Letters to General Stanhope, July 13, and Aug. 1, 1706. MSS.

CHAP. he again writes to Stanhope — “ I can only tell  
 V. “ you, that all the comfort I have, when I draw  
 1706. “ near your Court, is yourself. I wonder that in  
 “ none of your letters you take notice of having  
 “ received the money. I suppose you only wrote  
 “ to get some, and never thought more of it when  
 “ received.”

No sooner had the Allies left Madrid, than Berwick despatched a squadron of horse, under Don Antonio del Valle, to take possession of that capital. Arriving before its gates on the 4th of August, the very day which had been fixed for the triumphal entry of the Archduke, they found themselves encountered by no opposition; but, on the contrary, received with the most enthusiastic joy. The people could not be withheld from pillaging the houses of the chief Austrian partisans; but all the furniture and other property seized there was publicly burnt by themselves in the streets, to show that their object was to punish traitors, and not to profit by their spoils.\* The standards, and the portrait of the Archduke, were likewise burnt in triumph at the Puerta del Sol; and a few hundred Portuguese, who had taken post at the royal palace, were compelled, by want of provisions, to surrender in two days. On the same 4th of August, Charles and Peterborough, marching, the one from Zaragoza, and the other

\* *Mém. de Noailles*, vol. iii. p. 365., and *Lettres Inédites de Mad. de Maintenon et de la Princesse des Ursins*, 1826, vol. iii. p. 326.

from Valencia, met at Pastrana; and next day joined the forces of Galway and Das Minas at Guadalaxara. But, even then, the whole united army could muster no more than eighteen thousand really effective men; while that of Berwick had increased to near twenty-two thousand\*: and this disadvantage was of course considerably heightened by the hostile disposition of the people. Such, indeed, seemed to be their unconquerable spirit, that Lord Peterborough from this moment began to forebode some great disaster, and, struck with a nobleness of mind so much in accordance with his own, declared, that all the force of Europe would not be sufficient to subdue Castille.

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Besides the small number of soldiers, the allied army had, perhaps, a still more heavy disadvantage, — the great number of generals. Galway, Peterborough, and Das Minas, (to say nothing of the Germans,) might each be looked upon as candidates for the chief command. This, it may be observed, was precisely the fault which the English government again committed in the late Peninsular war; when the very same cause led to the convention of Cintra, and withered the laurels of Vimeiro. Galway was the senior officer; and the instructions from England seemed to point him out as the intended generalissimo. Nevertheless he waited on Peterborough, and offered to serve under his orders until his own letter of

\* Despatch from General Stanhope to Secretary Sir Charles Hedges, Aug. 10, 1706. MS.

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recall, which he had already solicited from England, should arrive; but Das Minas refused to join in the proposal, and in like manner to surrender his pretensions.\* The generals, therefore, only became still more embittered against each other: and discordant deliberations on the future were mingled with angry recriminations on the past. Lord Peterborough perceived, also, that he had forfeited the regard and confidence of Charles, who had been greatly incensed at his bitter expostulations from Valencia. All the instances of his peevish and untoward temper had, moreover, been urged against him in his absence by the German favourites, and other mean retainers of the Court,—even by those who had no personal resentments against him to indulge, —for the frailties of great men form the comfort and delight of fools. He found himself treated with disdainful coldness and studied slights, and all his proposals, more especially one for the recovery of Madrid, were over-ruled. It became apparent, that his continued presence in the Spanish army would tend as little to the public service as to his own honour and satisfaction. He, therefore, availed himself of a clause in his instructions, directing him to proceed, whenever it might appear practicable, to the assistance of the Duke of Savoy; and as the subject had been again earnestly pressed upon him in his last despatches†, and Turin

\* See Lord Galway's Narrative, in the Parl. Hist. vol. vi. p. 945.

† See Sir Charles Hedges's despatch, dated June 19, in Dr. Freind's Account, p. 133.

was then closely besieged, he suddenly declared his determination of hastening to its relief.

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A council of war, to deliberate on this communication, was held on the 9th of August, in the royal palace of Guadalaxara. It is not improbable that, in announcing his intention, Lord Peterborough wished only to enhance his importance, — that he expected eager and universal remonstrances against his departure, and a promise of cordial co-operation if he stayed. But the late altercations had made his presence to be considered by all the other officers as a burden, rather than a benefit; and even those who respected his superior talent the most justly, felt that, in such a state of mutual distrust and irritation, it could not be usefully employed. His intention was, accordingly, acceded to, with a degree of readiness and alacrity that must have severely wounded Lord Peterborough's vanity. To confirm him in his design, Charles intrusted him with a commission to raise, at Genoa, a loan of 100,000*l.*; and with the power to mortgage, for that purpose, any royal domains of the Spanish monarchy. He also pointed out to him the island of Minorca, as a most desirable conquest to attempt on his return from Italy; and gave him, for that or any other enterprise, full authority over the fleet. Not a word was dropped, however, of his return being expected at head-quarters; and it rather seemed to be desired, on the contrary, to supply him with sufficient employment elsewhere.

CHAP. Seldom, even in republics, have great services been  
V. more ungraciously acknowledged.

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On the 11th of August, Lord Peterborough set out for Valencia, with an escort of only eighty dragoons. He had not proceeded far on his journey when he received the unwelcome intelligence that all his baggage, which was following him to Guadalaxara, and which comprised plate and other valuables to the amount of above 8,000*l.*, had been surprised and plundered at Huete.\* On further enquiry, there appeared every reason to believe that the people of that town had connived at, if not concerted, the design. Full of indignation, Peterborough immediately directed his march towards Huete, with a resolution to burn it to the ground. When, however, the clergy and magistrates of the place implored his clemency, and undertook to make good his losses, he was persuaded to relent from his purpose, and accept their compensation ; but though he exacted the full value of the stolen property, his noble spirit disdained to receive any portion of it for himself. He desired that they would send him the amount in corn, instead of money, which they most gladly complied with ; it being much easier for them to

\* Of this misfortune he says himself, “ I bear all other losses  
“ patiently, besides my barbs and my cheese. My Lord Gal-  
“ way and you had your share. I had eight waggons with  
“ good eatables and drink, which I told you I would send you ;  
“ but good management can lose meat and drink, barbs, and  
“ kingdoms.” To General Stanhope, Aug. 16, 1706, MS.



collect the one than the other. The corn thus acquired would, he knew, be most useful to Charles's army, which he had left very scantily supplied; and he took measures to have it forwarded in cars, furnished for that purpose, to the royal commissaries at the camp. "I am apt to think," says Captain Carleton, "that the last century can hardly produce a parallel instance of generosity and true public spirit;" nor will it appear less praiseworthy when we recollect that the very generals to whom Peterborough sent such seasonable succour, were those whom he had so lately quitted in disgust, and of whom he conceived that he had so much reason to complain. It may serve as a proof that, in many instances at least, his personal feelings, however strong, were subordinate to his public duty.

Engaged in this affair, and perhaps also in some others not of a public nature \*, the Earl remained

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\* "While we stayed at Huete, there was a little incident in life which gave me great diversion. The Earl, who had always maintained a good correspondence with the fair sex, bearing from one of the priests of the place, that, on the alarm of burning the town, one of the finest ladies in all Spain had taken refuge in the nunnery, was desirous to speak with her. The nunnery stood upon a small rising hill within the town; and to obtain the view the Earl had presently in his head this stratagem: He sends for me, as engineer, to have my advice how to raise a proper fortification upon that hill out of the nunnery. I waited upon his Lordship to the place, where, declaring the intent of our coming, and giving plausible reasons for it, the train took, and immediately the Lady Abbess and the fair lady came out to make intercession that his

CHAP. several days at Huete. On resuming his journey  
V. to Valencia with his small party of horsemen, he  
1706. took up his quarters, for one night, at the little town of Campilio, where he received information of a most savage act of cruelty committed the same day at a neighbouring village. It appeared that a detachment of soldiers, just released from the hospitals, and marching, under an English captain, to rejoin the main army, had been treacherously attacked, and made prisoners. Several of them were then deliberately put to death; while the rest, with a still greater refinement of barbarity, were cast headlong, one by one, into a pit, and dashed to pieces. At these tidings, Lord Peterborough immediately gave orders to sound to horse; and his soldiers, starting from repose, set off with the utmost alacrity to avenge the butchery of their comrades: but the murderers, either from their own conscious guilt, or from some rumours of Peterborough's pursuit, had already escaped, and disappeared. The clothes of the dead soldiers were found hidden in the church; but only one man—the sacristan—could be convicted of having taken part in the outrage. By Peterborough's orders, he was hanged to the knocker of his own door, and the village burned to the ground. “After this

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“Lordship would be pleased to lay aside that design. The  
“divine oratory of one, and the beautiful charms of the other,  
“prevailed; so his Lordship left the fortification to be the work  
“of some future generation.” (Carleton's Memoirs, p. 225.)

“ piece of military justice,” says Carleton, who was present, “ we were led up to the fatal pit, or hole, down which many had been cast headlong. There we found one poor soldier alive, who, upon his throwing in, had caught fast hold of some impending bushes, and saved himself on a little jutty within the concavity. On hearing us talk English, he cried out ; and ropes being let down, in a little time he was drawn up, when he gave us an ample detail of the whole villany. Among other particulars, I remember, he told me of a very narrow escape he had in that obscure recess. A poor woman, one of the wives of the soldiers, who was thrown down after him, struggled and roared so much that they could not, with all their force, throw her cleverly in the middle ; by which means, falling near the side in her fall, she almost beat him from his place of security.”

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On his journey, Lord Peterborough wrote several times to Stanhope, pointing out what he considered the best course for the Allies to follow, under present circumstances ; and adding, “ I see no one but yourself that can support this business.”\* His own feelings of mortification are strongly shown in another letter to the Duchess of Marlborough, declaring that “ the most disagreeable country in the world is Spain ; their officers the greatest robbers, and their soldiers the

\* To General Stanhope, Aug. 18, 1706. MS.

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“ greatest cowards : the only tolerable thing you  
“ sex, and that attended with the greatest dan-  
“ gers.”\* Two days after the affair of Campilio he  
arrived in Valencia, where he spent a few days in  
the gaieties of balls, bull-fights, and other enter-  
tainments, as if anxious to conceal from all around  
him, and perhaps even from himself, the feelings of  
mortification that were evidently swelling in his  
breast. He was now on the point of embarking  
for Italy ; but, before he sailed, had an opportu-  
nity of performing another public service. Alicant  
had been closely invested by some English troops  
under General Gorge, and some ships under Ad-  
miral Leake. The town had already surrendered ;  
but the castle still held out, being most gallantly  
defended by Brigadier Mahoni. Peterborough now  
proceeded to Alicant, and by his presence and  
exertions hastened the capitulation of his ancient  
adversary. He next took into consideration the  
proposed attack on Minorca ; but found, to his  
additional mortification, that a new distribution  
had been made of the fleet ; and that, in spite of  
his own entreaties and Charles’s letters, one half of  
it was under orders to sail for the West Indies.  
The naval officers, also, jealous of a landsman’s  
authority over them, were most unwilling to con-  
cur with him in any enterprise.† It was therefore

\* This letter is dated in Alicant Road, Sept. 4, 1706, and printed in Coxe’s Life of Marlborough.

† On this business he observes :—“ I have done all I could,  
“ and will do all I can ; but it is very doubtful if with success.

necessary for Peterborough to forego, or at least to suspend his views upon Minorca; and he might also, perhaps, have relinquished his voyage to Italy, as the siege of Turin was now already raised. But remembering the penniless state of Charles's army, and the little weight which would attach to his counsels were he again to return to it, he determined to proceed, as before intended, to Genoa, and make his great military genius stoop to the negotiation of a loan. Accordingly, he sailed from Alicant in September; and with him seemed to depart the good genius of the Austrian cause.

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We must now return from Peterborough's active movements to the position of the allied generals at Guadalaxara. Since his departure they had to struggle daily with increasing difficulties. At the desire of Das Minas, an attempt was made to retreat on the side of Portugal, and the army moved downwards to Chinchon, a village to the north-east of Aranjuez; but Berwick, who was now skilfully resuming the offensive, interposed between them and Toledo. The southern bank of the Tagus was lined with large masses of armed peasants from La Mancha; the country to be passed was mountainous and rugged; and it seemed impossible to overcome such obstacles in the face of an enemy.

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“What can resist the desires of going home, when there is no prospect of plunder, but of winter cruising and service? I sent a ship home with the utmost and most pressing arguments for the stopping the West India squadron.” To General Stanhope, Genoa, Oct. 7, 1706. MS.

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so active and vigilant as Berwick. A retreat upon Valencia was their only remaining resource; but though its necessity was apparent to the allied generals, they remained for some time longer in Chinchon, wavering and procrastinating, without taking any measures to effect it. One of the most common weaknesses of men is, to hesitate on the necessary means, when they have already determined on the end. They were often pinched for want of provisions from the unfriendliness of the country; and, owing to the same cause, hardly a straggler or small party could leave their camp without being seized or murdered. At length they began their march from Chinchon, and crossed the Tagus at Fuente Dueña, pursued by the troops of Berwick, and harassed by frequent skirmishes. In one of these, some portable copper ovens which had belonged to the Emperor Charles the Fifth, but been lost in the next century by Don John of Austria in battle against the Portuguese, fell again into the hands of the Castillians, and were considered as a trophy. The Allies could make no stand in Castille; they crossed the bordering mountains of Valencia, and took up their winter quarters; but Berwick, before he followed their example, besieged and reduced, after a short resistance, the important fortresses of Cuenca, Orihuela, and Carthagená. In all these operations he derived no little aid from the talents of Don Juan de Zerezedá, whom he represents as, perhaps, the best partisan officer in Europe, and one whose

advice he had never slighted without afterwards repenting of it. “ Thus,” he observes\*, “ ended this campaign ; one of the most singular on record, from its rapid changes of fortune. Its commencement threatened us with total ruin, but its close was no less useful than glorious to the arms of the two crowns. The enemy masters of Madrid—no troops to check them—the King compelled to raise the siege of Barcelona, and hurry back to France ; — all this seemed decisive of the fate of Spain ; and, no doubt, had the enemy known how to profit by their success, and pushed their point, the Archduke must have been King, without a hope of return for his Catholic Majesty. But the glaring faults of their generals, together with the unparalleled fidelity of the Castillians, gave us time and means for regaining the upper hand, and driving them back again. The two armies made (if I may use the expression) a tour round Spain. They began the campaign near Badajos, and, after traversing both the Castilles, closed it in the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia, at the distance of an hundred and fifty leagues. We occupied eighty-five camps ; and though no general battle took place, we obtained the same advantage from our marches as from a victory ; making altogether ten thousand prisoners.”

From the borders of Valencia, Philip himself

\* Mém., vol. i. p. 238 and 249.

CHAP. returned (as also his Queen from Burgos) to  
V. Madrid, where his reception by the people was  
1706. as warm as might have been expected from their  
late devotion to his cause. The council of Castille  
had already begun to institute proceedings against  
those who had taken any principal part in behalf  
of the Archduke; and the conduct of Philip on  
this occasion (towards the powerful at least) was  
marked by moderation. A short imprisonment  
was allowed to expiate the fault of the Conde de  
Lemos, and other influential grandees. Portocar-  
rero was forgiven at once; not so much, perhaps,  
from his great age and services, as from the diffi-  
culty of dealing with a Cardinal and Primate in  
such a country as Spain. The Queen-dowager was  
respectfully advised to withdraw from a scene of  
so much danger and disturbance; and was accord-  
ingly conveyed to Bayonne, where she lived for  
above thirty years in a very equivocal state, be-  
tween a sovereign and a state-prisoner; and being  
then permitted to return to Spain, died at Guada-  
laxara. Her uneasiness, during the greater part of  
her exile, was embittered by comparing it with the  
power and prosperity of her nephew Charles (then  
Emperor), for whose cause she was banished. With  
some persons it may be doubted, whether they  
suffer most pain from their own adversity, or from  
their relations' good fortune.



## CHAPTER VI.

WHILE the Court of Philip was returning to Madrid, that of his rival at Valencia was torn by internal factions. Charles had always been mainly guided by a few Germans, of great arrogance, and no military knowledge; alternately bursting with presumption, or benumbed with fear; and, according to an attentive observer, “understanding no argument but ready money.”\* The worst of all these was Zinzerling; and Charles having resolved about this time to send a confidential agent to England, General Stanhope congratulated himself on having directed his choice to this person; “thinking,” he says, “it would have been of the greatest service to have Zinzerling employed where he could do the least hurt.”† The place of Zinzerling in the favour of Charles, was, however, speedily and as unworthily filled by Count Noyelles, a man of great family‡, and some talents for war, but with no other spring of action than a low and unprincipled ambition. His great object at

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\* General Stanhope to Lord Treasurer Godolphin, March 8. 1707. MS.

† Letter to the Lord Treasurer, Oct. 5. 1706. MS.

‡ I find the name honourably mentioned as of note in 1429. See Barante, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, vol. vi. p. 58.

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this time was to obtain an independent military command; and for this purpose he unceasingly urged the division of the army, well knowing that he should never be appointed to direct the whole. Disgusted at these and many other cabals, and but little able to check them, Lord Galway gradually withdrew from interference, and regretted that he had not left the business in Peterborough's hands. General Stanhope earnestly requested to be recalled; and advised that Prince Eugene should, if possible, be sent to command in Spain, as the only man whose authority could control this host of private interests and jarring pretensions. This the English Government could or would not do; but they despatched to Spain a fresh fleet, under Sir Cloudesley Shovel, and some thousand men of reinforcements, headed by Lord Rivers.

On the other side, the King of France also determined to send considerable supplies of men and money into Spain. Berwick was still to command the forces; but as it seemed desirable that they should be animated by the presence of some Prince of the House of Bourbon; and as Philip was detained at Madrid by tenderness to his Queen, who was now pregnant for the first time, Louis allowed the Duke of Orleans to set out for Spain, with the title of General. This Prince (afterwards Regent of France, in the minority of Louis the Fifteenth,) having shared in the defeat of Turin last year, was eager to efface the

stain and repair the loss of that battle. But, since the last campaign had annihilated one French army in Italy and another in Flanders, Louis found it necessary, while supporting Spain, to limit very much his exertions in both these quarters, and keep entirely on the defensive. In the course of February, he concluded a treaty with the Emperor, by which all the fortresses of Lombardy, still held by the French or Spanish troops, were to be given up to the Austrians, and the garrisons allowed to return to France. Through this means his armies were recruited by twenty thousand veterans; but, on the other hand, the Allies were left undisputed masters of Northern Italy, and enabled this summer to attempt two objects they had very much at heart, the siege of Toulon and the conquest of Naples. In the former, the difficulties of the ground, and the brave resistance of the French, obliged Prince Eugene, as formerly the Emperor Charles the Fifth, to retire with considerable loss. But the latter was effected with great ease by General Count Daun, at the head of only ten regiments. They were received by the Neapolitans with their usual instinct of submission, and ineffectually opposed by the Spanish Viceroy, the Duke of Escalona, who could only, with some trusty troops, throw himself into the fortress of Gaeta. The whole kingdom was then reduced without a blow; nor was the capitulation of Gaeta very long delayed. Orbitello, a Spanish strong-

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CHAP. hold on the coast of Tuscany\*, which had been  
 VI. drained of soldiers for the defence of Naples, sur-  
 1707. rendered also in the course of the autumn; and  
 Majorca had previously declared for Charles, partly  
 from an internal insurrection, and partly from  
 the appearance of Admiral Leake with a squadron  
 on its coast. Thus, of all the possessions of the  
 Spanish monarchy in Europe, none but Sicily,  
 Sardinia, and Minorca still acknowledged the  
 authority of Philip.

Meanwhile Lord Peterborough, in Italy, had  
 entered into a fresh field of plans and negotiations  
 with the Duke of Savoy, and had succeeded in  
 raising at Genoa the expected loan. With this he  
 now reimarked for Spain. He appeared, how-  
 ever, at Valencia without any public character;  
 and though in the last year he had filled the  
 triple office of Commander in Chief, Joint High  
 Admiral, and special Ambassador, he was now  
 only, he said, a volunteer in Spain. By this time,  
 too, the ministers in England, worn out with his  
 perpetual complaints of ill-usage, and the many  
 proofs of his fretful and vexatious temper, began  
 to doubt whether these did not overbalance his  
 great and manifold abilities. They not only pro-  
 tested the Treasury Bills he had drawn at Genoa,  
 on the plea that they were contracted on exorbitant

\* Archdeacon Coxe makes a strange mistake in geography, when he speaks of "the capture of Susa and Orbitello, two fortresses which closed the passage of the Alps!" (*Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings*, vol. i. p. 404. 8vo ed.)

terms, but required him to return to England, and answer for several parts of his conduct, more especially for leaving the army at Guadalaxara. To this was most unjustly and unreasonably ascribed the subsequent disastrous retreat upon Valencia: for, when any two events, however unconnected, take place in close succession, men are very prone to look upon the one as the consequence of the other.

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Having anchored at Barcelona on the 27th of December, Peterborough proceeded to Valencia by land. His letters at this period are full of bitterness. “Being,” he says to Stanhope, “incommoded in my foot, I am now travelling the pace of a Spaniard — I mean, of one that is not going to rob, nor flying from the enemy.” And again: “—I have had a short account of affairs, in a letter from you; but I expected that things could not but go *DE MIEUX EN MIEUX*, when once so disagreeable and useless a person as myself was out of the way.” \* He reached Valencia on the 10th of January, and found himself greeted by a warm and cordial reception from the Court. In his absence the want of his abilities had been felt, and the petulance of his temper been forgotten, by Charles. Count Noyelles, too, anxious to secure his good word in England, and hoping to engage him in factious opposition to Lord Galway’s regular au-

\* Letters to General Stanhope, Jan. 6 and 9, 1707, MS. He adds, “I intend to mortify you with the account of my happy days in Italy; of the nights we will say nothing.”

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thority, paid him the most devoted attentions. He took part in several councils of war at Valencia, especially one, on the 15th of January, when all the general officers gave their opinions in writing. That of Peterborough was entirely for the defensive. Considering the spirit of the Castillians, the great preparations of the French, and the superiority of the enemy, more especially in cavalry, he strongly deprecated any direct march upon Madrid — a city which, if recovered, could hardly be retained, — and a march which would probably lead to an unequal and disastrous battle on the way. He thought it quite sufficient for the Allies, at that time, to hold their ground in Aragon and Valencia; whilst the enemy's cavalry would waste away for want of forage, or be recalled to repel the invasions of Provence and Artois, and whilst new faults in the government would cool the Castillian zeal in its behalf. This advice deserved particular attention, from the daring and adventurous character which Lord Peterborough had so often shown, and which would not incline him to propose defensive measures, did he not see their necessity, and understand (how few Generals do both!) the proper season for caution as well as the proper season for boldness. A counter-plan was, however, proposed by General Stanhope. He said, that the Queen had not sent over such considerable forces to pine away as garrisons, or hide themselves behind entrenchments; and that, as her Majesty's envoy, he must protest against their employment, or rather their non-employment, in this manner.

Such timid counsels would not only damp their present zeal, and prevent their future exertions, but would lose them the affections of the Aragonese, the Valencians, and the Catalans, and induce these to join their brother Spaniards. How could they defend the long line from the Pyrenees to Murcia, without great division of forces ; or how could this division be made, without exposing them to be beaten in detail ? But if, on the other hand, they should attack Berwick as soon as they received their expected reinforcements, and before the arrival of his, they might probably defeat him. They might then push forward to Madrid, establish the King with such an army as should be able to maintain him there, try the effect on the public mind of his personal appearance in his capital, and be joined by the Portuguese from the Estremaduran frontier. In the opinion thus given, Stanhope was supported by the wishes of the people in England, who were all at this time crying out for offensive operations, and also by the wishes of the Government, as afterwards expressed in both the Cabinet and Privy Councils. Lord Peterborough, at a subsequent period, inveighed, with some severity, against both of these. “ I have heard a distinction,” he observed, “ between the Cabinet Council and the “ Privy Council : that the Privy Counsellors were “ such as were thought to know every thing, and “ knew nothing, and those of the Cabinet thought “ nobody knew any thing but themselves.” \* On

\* Parl. Hist., vol. vi. p. 974.

CHAP. his part, he might urge, in favour of his defensive  
 VI. system, not only the personal inclination of Charles,  
 1707. but the much more weighty opinion of Prince Eugene, with whom he had conferred upon the subject in Italy. The opposite arguments, however, prevailed with the Marquis Das Minas, Lord Galway, and nearly all the others at the councils of war ; so that Stanhope's plan, after some further discussions, was finally resolved upon. The debates on this occasion (always eager, and sometimes angry,) between Stanhope and Peterborough, led to an entire dissolution of their former friendship, and they became from this time, personal as well as political enemies.\* Lord Peterborough continued manfully and ably to struggle against the intended scheme, but did not remain at Valencia long enough to behold its execution. Having received, at this time, his letters of recall, he embarked, on the 14th of March, on board the Milford man of war (commanded by one of Stanhope's brothers), and, touching in his way at Barcelona, landed again in Italy.† From thence he took his route through Germany ; travelling leisurely, and visiting the camp of the King

\* In a letter to the Duke of Marlborough, printed in Coxe's Life, vol. iii. p. 229, 8vo ed., 1820, and dated July 22, 1707, Lord Peterborough imputes to Stanhope the whole responsibility of the councils of war, as having been the chief to urge offensive operations. " I cannot," he says, " but think Mr. Stanhope's politics have proved very fatal, having produced our misfortunes, and prevented the greatest successes."

† Mr. Furly's Journal, MS. Lord Peterborough's letter of recall was dated Jan. 14, probably O. S.



of Sweden in Saxony, and not reaching England till the autumn. “ I have overcome,” he said, “ all my enemies but lies ; and these I have papers enough with me to defeat.” No public enquiry on his conduct took place at that time ; but some years afterwards, when the losses at Brihuega and Villa Viciosa had excited a great clamour in the country, it was brought before the House of Lords, and thoroughly examined. After long enquiry and discussion, the House resolved, — “ That the Earl of Peterborough, during the time he had the honour of commanding the army in Spain, did perform many great and eminent services ; and if the opinion he gave in the council of war at Valencia had been followed, it might very probably have prevented the misfortunes that have happened since in Spain.” Undoubtedly, Lord Peterborough most fully deserved all public praise and honour for his bold achievements, his generous disinterestedness, and his honest counsels. Yet it must not be concealed, that the vote of the House of Lords, on this occasion, may be traced, in some degree, to party feeling, as well as to public gratitude ; and was intended as a slur upon the Duke of Marlborough, to whom a similar expression of thanks had been previously refused. Such votes are always most specious in outward show ; they never fail to bear the stamp of deliberative wisdom : but it is the part of the historian to strip these proceedings of their smooth and glossy

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CHAP. surface, and to lay bare the secret sinews by which  
VI. the body politic is really moved.

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But whether the decision of the council of war at Valencia be thought wise or unwise, a resolution was now taken by Charles, which would have been quite sufficient to mar the most skilful combinations. At the moment when a battle was likely to be risked, requiring not only the personal presence of the sovereign, but the assemblage of as many troops as could well be directed to one point,—at this moment Charles determined to set off for Barcelona, and take with him several thousand Dutch and Spanish soldiers. His pretext was the necessity of maintaining the Catalans in order; his motive, disgust to find himself debarred from controlling and directing the military movements. All the foreign generals, as well as his own ministers, remonstrated, in the strongest and most unanimous manner, against this senseless freak, except Count Noyelles; who, because he was disappointed in the command of the army, seemed determined, said Stanhope, that no other general should have any army to command. But representations and entreaties proved alike unavailing. In fact, the most absurd projects or opinions are always the most difficult to counteract; for, being only founded on caprice, and upheld by obstinacy, every argument falls powerless upon them. All that could be drawn from Charles was a sort of vague promise to return and put himself at the head of the army, as

soon as it should be on the point of marching to Madrid. His departure for Barcelona obliged Stanhope, as the British minister, to follow him, and remain pent up with him in that fortress, instead of taking, as he had intended, an active share in the campaign.

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Another unfavourable circumstance was the slowness of Lord Galway. The reinforcements of Rivers had landed at Alicant early in February; yet, instead of joining them at once, and attacking Berwick before any of his had reached him, it was not till the beginning of April that Galway and Das Minas took the field. After destroying the enemy's magazines at Yecla and Caudete, they laid siege to the castle of Villena; but finding that Berwick was close at hand, and not aware that most of the troops from France had already arrived, they determined to give him battle. For this purpose they marched down to the *VEGA* or plain of Almanza, where they found Berwick encamped. The Duke of Orleans was not there: he had, indeed, left Paris some time before: but, instead of following the disinterested advice of Berwick, and proceeding straight to the army, he had made a circuit through Madrid, to see the King and Queen. His absence, however, did not make the Marshal less willing to engage; and it had mainly tended to mislead the allied generals as to the enemy's force,—they supposing that the reinforcements would be headed by the royal Duke in person.

The Allies arrived in front of Berwick on the

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memorable 25th of April: their own soldiers, wearied with a long and early march that morning, and the French, on the contrary, fresh and ready for action. Both parties speedily drew out their lines in battle array. It was thought remarkable that neither of the princes for whose crown they were contending, though both in the prime of manhood, and both in Spain, should be present at this battle; and it seemed a still greater singularity that the French army should be commanded by an English and the English by a French general. Through the secession of Charles to Catalonia, there was not, under Galway and Das Minas, a single Spanish division\*: they had also suffered considerable losses from sickness and desertion; and their whole effective force did not amount to twelve thousand foot and five thousand cavalry. Of the French army the precise strength is more difficult to ascertain; being but loosely stated, by its number of squadrons of horse and battalions of infantry, and these being by no means always uniform; but as they altogether amounted to one hundred and twenty-eight†, I think that we cannot possibly compute it at less than twenty-five thou-

\* Earl of Galway's Reply. Parl. Hist., vol. vi. p. 986.

† Fifty-two battalions and seventy-six squadrons. See Quincy (Hist. Mil. vol. v. p. 400), who gives also the names and order of battle. A Spanish historian of the same party (San Phelipe) speaks of the army of Berwick, very shortly after the battle, as thirty thousand strong. (Comentarios, vol. i. p. 239.) For the English and Portuguese numbers, we have in some degree official details.

sand men. Its great superiority in cavalry is admitted on all sides ; but the French, with their too frequent national exaggeration, represent the infantry as equal. Berwick ranged his army in a double line : the French cavalry to the left, under Count d'Avarey ; the Spanish (partly royal guards) to the right, under the Duke of Popoli ; and himself, commanding the joint infantry, in the centre. By this distribution he expected to make the most of his superiority of cavalry on the bare and open plain, where the battle would be fought. He left the town of Almanza on his rear ; and obtained for each of his wings the advantage of a little rising ground, the right being, moreover, protected by a small ravine. On the other side, the allied generals, to supply their want of cavalry, placed on the wings battalions of foot alternately with squadrons of horse. Das Minas commanded the centre of infantry ; and the right was committed to the Conde de Atalaya, another Portuguese. Galway took up his station on the left ; but, wishing to leave himself more scope for his movements against the enemy, did not assume its particular command, and gave it to Lord Tyrrawley. His own character — a brave soldier, but a feeble general — made him always feel more at home in battle than in council ; and the active spirit of Das Minas, so long repressed by the sluggishness of his colleague and of his own Portuguese officers, now burst forth with all its natural fire.

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The battle began, about three in the afternoon, by a bold attack from Lord Galway on the Spanish right. He succeeded in dislodging them from the height in their front, which they had fortified with a battery ; but a desperate charge of the Spanish horse regained possession of the ground and drove back the assailants in disorder. They were protected, however, by the timely interposition of some English infantry ; and, rallying, prepared for a second onset. Meanwhile, in the centre, victory seemed to declare for the Allies. Das Minas made the greatest personal exertions, such as are seldom to be seen in a man of his advanced age or high military rank : he was here — there — every where — almost at once. His mistress, who had followed him in this campaign, and wore a soldier's dress, was killed fighting by his side. Through his spirited example, and the more steady courage of the Dutch and English infantry, the first line of the Spaniards was broken ; the second already wavered ; and two English battalions, piercing through it, reached the very walls of Almanza. But, at this critical moment, the genius and the firmness of Berwick were displayed. He re-formed his broken ranks ; once more presented a firm front to the enemy ; and despatched the Chevalier D'Asfeld with a fresh brigade to succour the right wing, and repel Lord Galway's second charge. With this aid, the Spanish right not only withstood the attack, but returned it, and became the assailants themselves. In this fight, Galway

received two sabre cuts on the face, above the eyes, which for some time disabled him from commanding, and exerted an unfavourable influence on the fortune of the day. His body of horse was compelled to give way, and Popoli, improving this advantage, pursued them with great slaughter. On the other wing, D'Avarey had been but feebly encountered by the Portuguese cavalry ; and having succeeded in putting them to flight, he immediately turned against the centre, whose flank was thus entirely exposed. Its left flank, at the same time, was laid bare by the repulse of Lord Galway : Berwick pressed it in front ; and it was, therefore, on almost every side, hemmed in and beset with enemies. The usual firmness of English soldiers did not here forsake them ; they fought with unabated resolution : but at length, the Marquis Das Minas being severely wounded, and obliged to leave the van, the defeat became irretrievable. On that wide and naked plain, and against such a force of cavalry, it was almost impossible for infantry either to rally with success, or retreat with safety. Count Dohna, one of their generals, cut his way through the enemy with thirteen battalions, and took post on the neighbouring heights of Caudete ; but was compelled, by want of provisions, to lay down his arms the next day. Nearly all the rest of the foot were either taken prisoners or put to the sword, hardly eight hundred of them making good their retreat. The cavalry, (part of which had not fought as gallantly,) suffered far less from the unfavourable na-

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ture of the ground ; and about three thousand five hundred of them kept to the standards of Das Minas and Galway, and escaped from the fatal plain. Retreating with headlong speed, they did not think themselves safe till they had reached the Ebro, and found themselves behind the ramparts of Tortosa. They left above four thousand men dead upon the field, and twice as many prisoners ; while the loss of the Spaniards scarcely amounted to two thousand. The victory was most complete : all the baggage and artillery (twenty-four cannon) was taken, together with one hundred and twenty standards, bearing the arms of almost every nation leagued against France and Spain, besides those of the insurgent provinces of Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia. So large was the booty, that for some days after the battle, a horse might be purchased in the camp of Berwick for one dollar, a coat for fifteen French pence, and a musket for five.

Such was the famous battle of Almanza, one of the most decisive and disastrous ever fought. In England it raised up a storm of indignation against Galway ; his military incapacity was alternately reviled and ridiculed ; and, in allusion to his birth and to that of Berwick, it became usual to propose an ironical health at table to the brave English general who had defeated the French.\* At the Court of Charles, in Barcelona, it will hardly be believed that feelings of gratified pique rose

\* Hist. of Europe for 1707, p. 184.



uppermost at the first news of the defeat. “ At  
 “ the beginning,” writes General Stanhope\*, “ be-  
 “ fore the greatness of our loss was thoroughly  
 “ known or believed, those who have most power  
 “ at Court seemed rather to be pleased than other-  
 “ wise. Since they know the greatness of it, and  
 “ have been made apprehensive of its consequences,  
 “ they are stunned, and have been in a profound  
 “ lethargy.” At Madrid, on the other hand, Philip  
 sent in triumph to the church of Atocha the stand-  
 ards taken from the enemy ; and further celebrated  
 the event by the grant of especial privileges to the  
 town of Almanza, and by the construction on the  
 field of a very small pyramid, still remaining, an  
 unworthy monument of so great a victory. To  
 his successful general he showed his gratitude  
 by creating him Duke of Liria, and a grandee of  
 Spain ; dignities which Berwick afterwards trans-  
 ferred to his second son. It may not be unde-  
 serving of mention, that, in the year 1719, this son  
 found himself a general officer in the Spanish  
 army, and opposed to his father, who commanded  
 the French ; the two nations being then at war.  
 With his true and characteristic sense of honour,  
 Berwick wrote an earnest letter to Liria, exhorting  
 him to do his duty against himself.

The Duke of Orleans reached the Spanish  
 camp the day after the battle ; deeply grieved at  
 not arriving in time to direct its operations and

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\* Letter to Lord Galway, May 9, 1707. MS.

CHAP. share in its glory. Nothing now was left him but  
VI. to gather the easy fruits of success. The whole  
1707. kingdom of Valencia was lying prostrate at his  
feet; the broken troops of Galway and Das Minas  
having retreated to the Ebro. The Dukes of  
Orleans and Berwick marched by Buñol, straight  
to the city of Valencia, and were met on their route  
by its magistrates, bearing its keys, and the submis-  
sion of its inhabitants. It was accordingly entered  
without resistance, by their vanguard, under Don  
Antonio Del Valle, the same who had retaken  
Madrid. Seeing that there were no further diffi-  
culties to overcome in this quarter, the Duke of  
Orleans left Berwick to complete the conquest,  
and hastened back to Madrid, and from thence to  
Tudela, to invade and subdue likewise the kingdom  
of Aragon. Only three places of note in Valen-  
cia still continued to hold out,—the fortresses of  
Denia, Alicant, and Xativa. The two former  
might be succoured by sea; but the latter, being  
inland, was closely invested on all sides by a large  
force which Berwick sent against it, and intrusted  
to the command of Asfeld. It was a city of great  
antiquity, with a Moorish castle, whose strength  
had been tried in frequent sieges, and the birth-  
place of that celebrated painter, known to the  
Spaniards by his real name of Ribera, and to us by  
the strange corruption of Spagnoletto. On this  
occasion it was defended by the disciplined valour  
of six hundred English, and the enthusiastic reso-  
lution of the people. The numbers of the French

were overwhelming: they soon made breaches in the outer walls, and effected a lodgement in the town, in spite of the most obstinate resistance; but the inhabitants then threw up across the streets fresh entrenchments, against which it was again necessary to bring cannon. “These mad-  
“men” (so Berwick calls them) continued to fight from street to street, and from house to house, without a hope of success, but with a fixed determination not to yield. They disdained repeated offers of capitulation, and, in praising their “un-  
“valled bravery and firmness,” I do no more than quote the very words of their angry but admiring enemies.\* At length, fifteen days from the first investment, and eight from the entry of the French into the town, the remaining houses were carried sword in hand. A dreadful (perhaps an unavoidable) carnage ensued, without distinction of sex or age; and the priests, who had shared in the defence, shared also in the bloodshed which concluded it. The people, indeed, made no attempt to shun their fate, and never asked for mercy. The survivors retreated to the outer inclosure of the castle; but this too was speedily forced; and the English soldiers, shut up in the inner works, were reduced by the slow but sure progress of blockade. They surrendered, on the express condition of being conveyed to Catalonia;—a condition which was shamefully violated. The fate of the town itself

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\* Mém. de Berwick, vol. i. p. 258.

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shall be told in the words of him who inflicted it. "To strike the minds of the people with terror," says Berwick, "and prevent similar obstinacy by "a severe example, I gave orders to have Xativa "totally razed to the ground; leaving nothing "whatever standing but the principal church; "and I sent all the inhabitants into Castille, with "strict injunctions never to return into their native "country."\* Such rigour may be considered an additional proof, not only of the harsh personal character of Berwick, but of the barbarous policy of the Court of Versailles; the same which had once so coolly commanded the whole Palatinate to be laid waste with sword and fire. A fitting instrument for the severity of Berwick was found in Asfeld: he showed himself as relentless in peace, as brave in war; and, according to the emphatic expression of a writer of his own party, there seemed scarcely trees enough in the province to hang the victims of his vengeance.† The very name of Xativa was destroyed; for when, some time afterwards, the King of Spain granted leave to rebuild the town, he imposed on it the appellation of his patron saint, San Felipe; and it is called so to the present day.

Meanwhile, the Duke of Orleans was invading

\* *Mém. de Berwick*, vol. i. p. 258. From the present appearance of Xativa (*Inglis's Spain*, vol. ii. p. 320.), there is some reason to doubt whether the orders of Berwick, for razing the town, were completely executed.

† *San Phelipe*, *Comentarios*, vol. i. p. 266.

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the kingdom of Aragon ; which, like that of Valencia, was overrun without a blow. The Conde de Puebla, the Viceroy, together with all the foreign or native troops, withdrew at his approach ; and so easy was his progress, that it hardly admits of details. One circumstance, however, connected with the surrender of Zaragoza, seems so strange and improbable, that, though recorded by a man of such undoubted veracity as Berwick, and though he assures us that he learnt it from all the chief magistrates of Zaragoza, I cannot persuade myself of its reality.\* He tells us, that Puebla had convinced the people of Zaragoza, that the reports of a new army marching against them were utterly unfounded ; and that, when this army actually came in sight, he led them to believe that it was a mere apparition raised by magic. The priests even went in procession to the walls, and performed the office of exorcism according to the most approved and effectual form. A few hours, however, undeceived the credulous multitude, when next morning (exactly one month after the battle of Almanza) the Duke of Orleans and his troops entered the city unopposed. After a short stay, he pushed forward to Candanos, where he joined his forces with those of Berwick ; who, as soon as Xativa was taken, had marched northwards towards Tortosa, forced the Allies to destroy

May 25.

June 14.

\* Mém. de Berwick, vol. i. p. 256.

CHAP. their bridge of communication with the right bank,  
 VI. and at Caspe crossed the Ebro himself.

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Thus, in little more than a month from the battle of Almanza, the arms of Philip had recovered both the kingdoms of Valencia and Aragon. The satisfaction of the Court of Madrid at this great success, did not, however, at all divert it from the long expected pleasure of punishing the rebels. In fact, prosperity, which might be expected to soothe the tempers and open the hearts of men, has commonly the very opposite effects. Eager to wreak vengeance, not only on guilty individuals, but on the whole population, it was proposed in the Spanish Council to abolish altogether their *FUEROS*, or provincial privileges,—rights nearly coeval with the monarchy itself; and, though invaded, not annulled, even by Philip the Second.\* Several Spanish statesmen pleaded zealously in behalf of their brave countrymen; but the influence of Amelot and Princess Orsini prevailed, and sent forth a royal decree, abolishing the *Fueros*; first, by the supreme authority of the Crown, and, secondly, by the right of conquest derived from the late rebellion. It ordered that Aragon and Valencia should henceforth be governed by the same laws and customs as Castille; their *AUDIENCIAS*, or tribunals, be altered according to the model of Valladolid, and their local immu-

\* Watson's Life, vol. ii. p. 329. ed. 1777. See a summary of the privileges of Aragon, by Antonio Perez, in the trad. de St. Phil. vol. iv. p. 237.

nities be set aside.\* Some exceptions were afterwards granted in favour of those persons or places whose fidelity to Philip had stood firm amidst the late rebellion; but the greater part of the decree was strictly enforced. And thus, disputed succession and contending parties, which to most nations have given a dawn of liberty, in this ill-fated country only added to the darkness, and, instead of augmenting and confirming the popular power, overthrew the frail remnants of its past authority!

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No further military operations (except, indeed, an unsuccessful siege of Denia by Asfeld) were undertaken this summer. The army, wearied by hard service, and sickly from the excessive heats, was put into quarters†, and Berwick recalled to assist in the defence of Toulon; but in this interval of quiet, an event which took place at Madrid tended, as much, perhaps, as a great victory, to establish the Bourbons firmly on the throne. The Queen Aug. 25. was safely delivered of a son, who received the usual title of Prince of Asturias, and the name of Louis, partly in honour of his great-grandfather, and partly as being born on the festival of St. Louis, King of France. His birth was greeted with heartfelt rejoicings on the part of the people;

\* “Ce fut,” says St. Simon, “un grand et utile coup, frappé bien à propos, et qui mit toutes ces provinces au désespoir et en furie.” (Vol. v. p. 343. ed. 1829.) How completely the latter half of his sentence disproves the first!

† Letter from General Stanhope to the Earl of Sunderland, July 23, 1707. MS.

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while, on that of the government, many state prisoners were released, many exiles recalled; and the prospect of a future sovereign, born in Spain, contributed, in the greatest possible degree, to allay the violence of Spanish parties, and make them rally round the cradle of the heir. So strong, indeed, was this effect, that it suggested to the Austrian Court the expediency of concluding a marriage for Charles, with a view to the same advantage for himself. Accordingly, this very year he was betrothed to a young princess of Brunswick, and she joined him at Barcelona a few months afterwards.\*

Early in the autumn military operations were resumed, both on the Portuguese and Catalonian frontiers. On the former, the Spanish troops had been for some time commanded by the Marquis of Bay: by birth, the son of a tavern-keeper in Franche-Comté†; by merit, a general officer in the Spanish service; who now retook Ciudad Rodrigo, and gained other petty advantages. In Catalonia, the Duke of Berwick, having returned from France, combined with the Duke of Orleans to invest Lerida, a town of considerable strength, remarkable for the victory of Cæsar and the repulse of Condé. The recollection of the latter (it was but

\* This princess is described by Sir Nathaniel Wraxall as afflicted with the dropsy, and obliged, "whenever she entered the drawing-room, to place napkins under her feet, to receive the water that ran from them." (Mem. vol. ii. p. 292.) But this was many years after her marriage.

† St. Simon, Mém. vol. vi. p. 57. ed. 1829.



sixty years before) raised not a little emulation in its present besiegers. On the other hand, Lord Galway, well aware of its importance, determined to make every effort for its preservation; and hastened to encamp at Tarraga, with all the troops he could collect. General Stanhope joined his standards from Barcelona, and also earnestly pressed for the junction of Count Noyelles, who had put himself at the head of two or three thousand men, on the frontier of Roussillon. There was then little to apprehend in that quarter; but Noyelles was so attached to his favourite object,—a separate command,—that he persisted in maintaining a useless post, and withholding important assistance. The cavalry of Lord Galway had increased to five thousand men; but he had hardly any infantry, and the whole assemblage at Tarraga is contemptuously mentioned by Berwick as only “a sort of army.”\* On the 8th of July Stanhope writes as follows to Lord Godolphin:—“As for the  
 “carrying on this war, it will require a new army,  
 “which we hope may be spared from Italy, and  
 “with it Prince Eugene. I shall look upon his  
 “person as equivalent to an army. . . . It is abso-  
 “lutely necessary Count Noyelles be recalled, for  
 “we have sufficient experience that he will hinder  
 “any general from succeeding with whom he  
 “shall have any competition. The King (Charles)

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\* Mém. vol. i. p. 265.

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“ is desirous he should command the whole, and  
 “ I believe would rather have him than Prince  
 “ Eugene, because he thinks he will be more  
 “ master of him, and there is no man living more  
 “ jealous of his authority than his Majesty. Per-  
 “ haps if he had the chief command he might do  
 “ well ; for it is impossible that any general  
 “ officer who shall be under him can give him  
 “ so much uneasiness as he knows how to give  
 “ to those above him. I must, therefore, repeat  
 “ to your Lordship, that it is absolutely necessary  
 “ that he either command in chief, or be re-  
 “ called.” Under these circumstances no effectual  
 succour could be given to Lerida. Its garrison  
 consisted of two thousand men, headed by a  
 brother of the Prince of Darmstadt, killed at  
 Montjuich ; and many of its inhabitants (including  
 priests and monks) had taken up arms in its de-  
 fence. “ And who can tell,” observes a Roman  
 Catholic historian, “ whether this militant clergy  
 “ — this infringement of our holy ecclesiastical  
 “ laws, may not have drawn down the loss of the  
 “ fortress as a judgment?”\* It is somewhat un-  
 fortunate, however, for this theory, that, at the  
 siege of Barcelona, the year before, the same cir-  
 cumstance should have been attended with di-  
 rectly opposite results. The garrison, in spite of  
 a very brave and bloody resistance, found itself

Nov.

\* Ottieri, Istoria, vol. iv. p. 492.

compelled to capitulate; but obtained very advantageous terms, being allowed to march to Barcelona.

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The reduction of Lerida closed the military transactions of the year. Both the Dukes of Orleans and of Berwick returned to France; but the former only for a winter visit, while the latter received an intimation from Louis, that, in the next campaign, his acknowledged talents would be employed elsewhere. His recall may be attributed not only to the intrigues of Princess Orsini, but to the wish of the Duke of Orleans to command alone; and his services were found so useful in protecting the French monarchy from invasion, that he was not sent back to Spain for several years. On the part of the Allies, also, there took place a change of generals, which seemed quite requisite after such a battle as Almanza. Das Minas was recalled by his Court; but Galway, without any avowed disgrace, was sent to command the few English troops on the frontiers of Portugal, and invested with the rank of ambassador to that country. The command of the English army in Catalonia was given, in his place, to General Stanhope, who, moreover, still continued the British minister to Charles.

Before, however, his appointment had been finally ratified, and there being then neither political nor military movements in Catalonia, Stanhope came over to England, partly on account of the recent death of his father, and consequent

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private business ; partly to defend the ministers in parliament\* ; and partly to concert measures with them for the prosecution of the war. His knowledge of the Court of Charles had shown him the extreme difficulty of contending with all its factious rivalries and private interests ; and he had therefore strongly advised the appointment of Prince Eugene, as the only man with sufficient experience to guide or authority to quell them. The ministers, who had at first neglected, afterwards adopted this idea : it was also popular in England ; and, on the 2d of January, both Houses of Parliament agreed to an address, entreating “ her Majesty to use the most pressing instances to the Emperor, that he would, with all expedition, send powerful succours to his brother, the King of Spain, under the conduct of that great and successful general.”† Several motives, however, withheld Joseph from complying with this request. Intent upon Italy and Flanders, he was chiefly anxious to secure these conquests, and to make a powerful impression on the hereditary provinces of France ; and for these objects, what other general could supply Eugene ? His talents for diplomacy, likewise,—hardly less conspicuous than his talents for war,—were essential in the negotiations with the princes of the empire, and the other members

\* General Stanhope had been M. P. for Cockermouth since 1702. (Parl. Hist. vol. vi.) That borough was then, I believe, under the influence of the Duke of Somerset.

† Parl. Hist. vol. vi. p. 609.

of the Grand Alliance. As President of the Aulic Council, he had introduced great order and regularity in the financial arrangements for the army : these he could still direct, from the Rhine or the Po ; but must relinquish, if once embarked for Spain. The Emperor, therefore, retained Prince Eugene for more domestic operations ; and despatched, in his place, to Catalonia, Marshal Guido Staremborg, a veteran of considerable reputation. His character was the very reverse of that of the Duke of Orleans — the leader whom he came to oppose. The French prince all fire and impetuosity, with many remarkable natural endowments, and a neglected education ; Staremborg, on the other hand, slow and phlegmatic, — not marked by nature, but trained by study, for a general. Bred up in the most scrupulous observance of military rules, he never swerved from them, under any circumstances : he could never seize a happy accident ; and as it has been said of some old-fashioned physicians, that they would rather kill their patient according to established rule than save him by any innovation, so it may be doubted whether Staremborg would not have preferred a strictly strategical defeat to a victory won by irregular manœuvres. In activity and enterprise, the Duke of Orleans may be compared to several of the French revolutionary generals ; whilst Staremborg closely resembled most of their Austrian contemporaries, — the Beaulieus, the Melases, the Wurmsers ; veterans always promoted by seniority rather than merit,

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CHAP. and so rapidly overthrown by Napoleon in his  
VI. splendid Italian campaigns.

1708. Staremborg and Stanhope were thus the new generals in Catalonia, and reached their destination by way of Italy, — the first at the beginning, and the second at the end, of May. On their arrival they learnt that Count Noyelles had lately died, — and his death was certainly any thing but a misfortune to the public cause \* — but on the other hand they found very insufficient forces to command. Some additional troops had, indeed, arrived during the winter; and it had been agreed by the English government to take into their pay, for Catalonia, four or five thousand Imperial soldiers; but these, with the usual Austrian slowness, had not yet been embarked in Italy. After providing for the garrisons, and sending a body of four thousand men to withstand the Duke of Noailles, who was again threatening the northern frontier, no more than ten thousand remained.† Thus, so far from being able to accomplish the object which Stanhope had earnestly pressed in England, and continued to press in his letters, — “to get out of Catalonia, and enlarge our bounds,” — the two Allied

\* “Between ourselves,” writes the Duke of Marlborough to General Stanhope, when expressing his satisfaction at the good understanding between him and Marshal Staremborg, “I fear, “if Count Noyelles were living, matters would not go so easy.” June 26, 1708. MS.

† Letters from General Stanhope to Lord Sunderland, June 3, and to Lord Galway, June 19, 1708. MS.

Generals were reduced to a strictly defensive system. The army of the Duke of Orleans, on the other hand, amounted to more than twenty thousand men ; besides five thousand under Asfeld in Valencia, and a still greater force under Noailles in Roussillon. With such superior numbers, the Duke, on his return from France, entertained the highest hopes of the campaign : to begin it by the siege of Tortosa, and the subsequent junction of the three armies ; and to close it by the reduction of Barcelona, and the total expulsion of the Allies from Spain. Several circumstances, however, tended to mar his designs. His quarrel with Princess Orsini (of which I shall afterwards give some account) prevented all harmony between the French and Spanish counsels ; and a contemporary writer does not scruple to charge her with having purposely thwarted the military movements, for the gratification of her personal pique.\* Want of money, too, was severely felt. “ Our greatest “ enemies in Spain,” said the Duke of Orleans from the first, “ are poverty and famine† ;” and no contributions could be raised with success from an exhausted country, or with safety from a dissatisfied people. A plan to obtain a donative from the clergy was baffled by the jealousy of the Court of Rome ; and seventeen galleons from South

\* San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 287.

† He had said so the year before, in writing to M. Chamillart. See the Mém. de Noailles, vol. iii. p. 385.

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1708. America, very richly laden, and anxiously expected, were, at this juncture, taken or destroyed off Carthagená by a British squadron under Admiral Wager.

Through these and similar difficulties, the troops of the Duke of Orleans were not set in motion from Lerida till the middle of May, and their march to Tortosa was, moreover, much delayed by their transport of provisions and artillery through a mountainous and almost pathless country. On their arrival before Tortosa, they invested that city to the north; while Asfeld, coming from Valencia, completed its circumvallation on the southern bank of the Ebro. Its fortifications were in a very good state, having been visited last year by Stanhope, and repaired and strengthened according to his directions; and its garrison consisted of four thousand soldiers, of tried discipline and courage. To second their exertions, Staremburg and Stanhope approached with all the forces they could muster, first to Valls and then to Ruidoms, but were too weak to afford any effectual relief; and the capture of a French convoy by the English fleet\* served rather to distress than to delay the besiegers. After a stubborn resistance, the garrison capitulated on the 15th of July, at the time when the enemy was reduced to only two days' allowance of provisions. It was agreed that they should be sent back to

\* Campbell's *Lives of the Admirals*, vol. iv. p. 74.



Barcelona, but more than half of them, either from choice or compulsion (the last is alleged by the English) enlisted with the Spaniards.

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After the reduction of Tortosa, the Duke of Orleans, having first garrisoned his conquest, fell back to Lerida, in order to form his intended junction with Noailles. But the best troops of that commander had meanwhile been recalled from Roussillon, to assist in repelling an apprehended invasion of Dauphiné by the Duke of Savoy; and, on the other hand, the five thousand Imperial soldiers, so long expected, had at length arrived at Barcelona. With this twofold advantage, Staremberg and Stanhope were enabled, while occupying a strong position at Cervera, to keep the enemy in check, and compel them, after several weeks of skilful but desultory manœuvres, to withdraw into quarters.

The retreat of the French army was followed by several enterprises on the part of the English fleet. An expedition against Sardinia was undertaken by Admiral Leake, together with the Conde de Cifuentes, who went on board as appointed Viceroy of the island in the name of Charles. The actual Viceroy for Philip was then the Marquis of Jamaica, the descendant and heir of Columbus. He had no troops for defence; the population was disaffected; and an extensive conspiracy on the point of breaking out: so that no sooner had the English fleet appeared off Cagliari than he quietly surrendered, and allowed Cifuentes to

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be installed as his successor. Some attempt at resistance was made in the northern part of the island by Don Vicente Bacallar, a native officer; but he too was obliged to take to flight without a blow, and the only effect of his zeal was his own reward some time afterwards by King Philip. He was created Marquis of San Phelipe (in allusion to the name of his sovereign), and envoy to the republic of Genoa; and it is to his able, though often diffuse and partial pen, that we owe the best original record of this war.\*

The expedition against Minorca was one of less facility, and also, as it proved, of much greater importance, both to England and to Spain. This island, though destitute of those romantic beauties with which the imagination of a French Cardinal has so liberally decked it†, is very fertile, and

\* His valuable work was printed at Genoa, and is but little known in Spain. His title should be San Felipe, not Phelipe; but I follow his own orthography.

† See the Cardinal de Retz's description of Port Mahon. (Mém. vol. iii. p. 416. ed. 1817.) "Une grande montagne, qui l'environne de tous les côtés, fait un théâtre qui par la multitude et la hauteur des arbres dont elle est couverte, et par les ruisseaux qu'elle jette avec une abondance prodigieuse, ouvre mille et mille scènes qui sont sans exagération plus surprenantes que celles de l'opéra. Cette même montagne, ces arbres, ces rochers couvrent le port de tous les vents, et dans les plus grandes tempêtes il est toujours aussi calme qu'un bassin de fontaine et aussi uni qu'une glace." Now for the plain truth. "The harbour is not surrounded by a mountain, though the land is high in some places; there are no high trees, nor scarcely any trees near it, nor is it probable there ever were many; no stream of water falls into it; and boats are frequently overset

would be very productive in the hands of a more industrious people. The inhabitants (about twenty-seven thousand) had, for several centuries, shared the political fate of the crown of Aragon, and also used nearly the same language and manners, but were sunk still lower in ignorance and superstition; and thus, for instance, the Minorquins never ventured to prune a fruit tree, thinking it impious to presume to direct its growth, and amend the works of Providence.\* But the chief value of the island lay in its admirable harbour, which is supposed to have received its name of Mahon from Mago, the brother of Hannibal, and which has long been renowned for its convenience and security. A quaint old Spanish proverb declares, that the three best ports in the Mediterranean are June, July, and Port Mahon. It was defended by a fortress of considerable strength, called St. Philip's Castle, which is said to have been built by Charles the Fifth, repaired by Philip the Second, and enlarged by Philip the Fourth. From the very outset of the war in Catalonia, all the generals had been most anxious that the English squadrons, which came out to assist them during a campaign, should not leave them at its close, but winter in the Mediterranean. This we find constantly urged in the letters of

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"here by sudden flurries of wind." (Armstrong's Minorca, p. 37.) Yet De Retz had seen the place himself!

\* Armstrong's Minorca, p. 191. This scruple was in full force in 1740, when the English had possessed the island more than thirty years.

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Stanhope and the other leading men ; but it was as constantly met by the objections of the Admirals as to keeping the sea in the stormy months, and the want of a proper harbour. The island of Minorca had, therefore, long ago been thought of as a desirable conquest by the Allies ; and, for the same reason, been well garrisoned, as an important possession, by the Spaniards. Lord Peterborough, as already mentioned, had set out from Guadalaxara, with an intention of attempting its reduction, but had afterwards been baffled in his views. The same project was now pressed upon General Stanhope, in letters from the Duke of Marlborough and the English ministers. “ I am so entirely convinced,” wrote the former, “ that nothing can be done “ effectually without the fleet, that I conjure you, “ if possible, to take Port Mahon.”\* These instructions were received by General Stanhope, when yet encamped with Marshal Staremberg, near Cervera, at the close of the campaign ; and he immediately set out for Barcelona, to attempt their execution. Not more than a very few hundred men could be spared from Catalonia for this enterprise. Over Admiral Leake and the fleet, which was still off the coast of Sardinia, Stanhope possessed no regular authority, and he could only urge his object in letters and remonstrances. The

\* Letter, July 15, 1708. MS. Other writers, such as Tindal, are therefore mistaken, when they ascribe to Stanhope the first projection or chief merit of the design. (Tindal's History, vol. v. p. 74.)

difficulties of the undertaking were, however, thought so great,—so far greater than they were really found to be,—that only two of the captains (one of them Stanhope's brother) could be brought to approve of it; and the decision of a naval council of war would most certainly have been in the negative. But Stanhope, foreseeing their refusal, had already, at Barcelona, embarked in some transports, with a small detachment of troops, and wrote word that he would await the requested reinforcements off Majorca; and thus the sea-captains perceiving that the expedition was settled and unavoidable, and that the only question was, whether it should be prosecuted with greater or smaller chances of success, waved their objections, and consented to bear their part in it. They joined General Stanhope's vessels, and proceeded together to Minorca, which they reached on the 14th of September. The whole force, including the marines, who served on shore, did not exceed two thousand six hundred men, about one half of them being English; and the artillery from the ships consisted of forty-two great guns and fifteen mortars. These Stanhope began to disembark, about two miles to the south-west of St. Philip's Castle; but so rugged and rocky was the country, and so few the beasts of burden for transport, that he could not bring the cannon to bear, nor commence the attack for twelve days. Meanwhile, he despatched two of the ships to attack the castle of Fornelles, situated in another part of the island, and

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commanding a harbour of much extent and security, but little celebrated for either, on account of its neighbourhood to Mahon. It surrendered after a gallant defence; and its fall served not a little to spread dismay at St. Philip's. The garrison there consisted of one thousand soldiers, partly French and partly Spanish, who had lately employed themselves in strengthening the fortifications, having constructed a new line-wall across the whole neck of land in front of the other works, and connected several ancient towers in its range. On the 28th, at daybreak, Stanhope opened a battery against this new bulwark, and effected several breaches in it. Some grenadiers, in their eagerness, pushed into the enclosure, without waiting for orders; which the General perceiving, advanced, with all the men he could collect, to support them. After a sharp attack, he drove the enemy out of the front towers, and effected a lodgement, before night, at the foot of the inner glacis. Next morning he was preparing for a second attack, when the enemy beat the chamade, and commenced a parley, which ended in their capitulation the same afternoon; so that Stanhope took possession of the place on the 30th of the same month. He found in the fortress about one hundred pieces of cannon, three thousand barrels of powder, and all things necessary for a good defence; and having been instructed by the Queen to take reprisals on the first opportunity, for the violation of the terms granted by Asfeld to the English garrison of

Xativa, he detained the French soldiers as prisoners of war. The loss of the Allies in the attack was inconsiderable, — less than fifty men ; but it fell heavily on the General, as including his brother Philip, the captain of the Milford, who had determined to head his own marines on shore. “ This conquest,” wrote Stanhope, “ has cost me very dear ; but since he died in doing service to her Majesty and his country, I shall think his life well bestowed, as I should my own.” \*

On the reduction of this island, General Stanhope, considering the excellence of its harbour, and its many advantages to secure a footing in the Mediterranean, of which the English already possessed the key in Gibraltar, was very desirous to retain it, as a sort of mortgage for the large subsidies advanced to Charles, or as a compensation for them. This project he submitted to the English ministry ; advising, with that view, that none but British soldiers should be admitted into the fortress, and that he should be empowered to enter into a negotiation on the subject with the Court of Barcelona.† His views were approved of, and adopted at home : Port Mahon was garrisoned with British troops, and its fortifications strengthened by new works, according to the plans of Stanhope, who foretold

\* Letters to the Duke of Marlborough and Lord Sunderland, Sept. 30, 1708, MS.; and one to M. d’Asfeld, printed in the *Hist. of Europe*, 1708, p. 314.

† Letter to Lord Sunderland, Nov. 9, 1708, MS., and Lord Sunderland’s answer.

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that “it will be to France in the Mediterranean “ what Dunkirk has been to us in the Channel.” \* At the peace of Utrecht, it was formally recognised as a British possession ; and so it continued till 1756, when it was surprised by a sudden and well-concerted attack of the Duke de Richelieu and a French squadron ; but it was restored to England at the peace, seven years afterwards. Another war with England, in 1782, led to another siege by the French and Spaniards under De Crillon ; when the Governor-General, Murray, made a most brave and resolute defence, and did not yield until the besieged were reduced to six hundred soldiers ; while the besiegers had twelve thousand.† A peace ensued next year ; but, unlike the former, left the island, as it still remains, in possession of the Spaniards. Their gratitude rewarded Crillon with a grandeeship, and the title of Duke of Mahon‡ ; and their prudence, foreseeing that the best means to secure the prize would be to diminish its value, razed all its fortifications and bulwarks to the ground, and thus rendered it easy, indeed, for an enemy to conquer, but most difficult for him to maintain. To the English its place has since been supplied by the acquisition of Malta ; but Port

\* To Lord Sunderland, June 15, 1709, MS. The money laid out there by General Stanhope's orders was about 60,000*l*.

† Coxe's *Memoirs*, vol. v. p. 107.

‡ This was, I believe, the father of the Viceroy of Navarre for Joseph Napoleon, mentioned by Southey, *Penins. War*, vol. iii. p. 514. 8vo ed.



Mahon has still continued an object of French jealousy ; and so lately as December 1813, we find Napoleon, when he negotiated with his captive, Ferdinand the Seventh, expressly guarding against an apprehended cession of this long-contested island.\*

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From Port Mahon General Stanhope had intended to sail to the relief of Denia. That fortress was then besieged by Asfeld ; who, after the fall of Tortosa, had again marched to the southward, and was bent upon completing the conquest of Valencia. But the design of Stanhope was baffled by the appearance of some French men of war ; and he found it necessary to return to Barcelona, and leave Denia to its fate. The garrison, accordingly, surrendered soon afterwards as prisoners of war ; and amongst them was Captain Carleton, on whose plain and honest memoirs I have hitherto so often relied. He was sent to San Clemente, in La Mancha, where he lived at large on his parole during the remainder of the war.

\* Supplément à Martens, Collect. vol. v. p. 655.

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IN his two Spanish campaigns, the Duke of Orleans had not achieved much public good, nor obtained much personal glory. But had even his success been as great as his wishes were aspiring, it could scarcely have counterbalanced the mischief of the dissension which arose between him and Princess Orsini. His lively and headlong temper was ill fitted to bear control—especially the control of a woman—and too readily imputed to her secret ill-will deficiencies, which were often inherent to the difficulties of the time, or the nature of the country. She, on the other hand, supreme at the Spanish Court, not only exerted the authority, but assumed the tone, of a prime minister, and expected a confidential communication of the military plans and movements. Such causes of jealousy, which secretly grew up in the Duke's first campaign, openly burst forth in the second, and were rendered irreconcilable by a gross and public jest which he levelled at her person and her power.\* Under such circumstances, it was impossible that they should cordially co-operate for the public service; Madame de Main-

\* See St. Simon, *Mém.* vol. vi. p. 241. ed. 1829.

tenon interfered to protect her favourite at Madrid, and it was determined that the Duke should not be sent again to Spain.

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But during his stay in that country, he had not confined himself to military operations or female bickerings ; but had formed a bold and able scheme for his personal aggrandisement. The exhausted state of France, which, in the words of Lord Bolingbroke, “ went on, indeed, but staggered and reeled “ under the burdens of the war,” afforded but little prospect of her being able to bear them much longer ; and, on the other hand, it seemed certain that the Allies would never permit Philip to retain the throne. They might not, however, feel the same objection against the Duke of Orleans, who, in right of his grandmother, Anne of Austria, had some hereditary title to the succession, and whose elevation might be looked upon as a compromise between the claims of Philip and of Charles. Such a result might also, perhaps, be the best and most desirable for Spain, considering the violent and long-continued civil war by which its provinces were rent asunder ; because then neither the Castilians nor the Catalans would obtain any decided triumph above the others, nor have to fear oppression, as former rebels, from the sway of an irritated conqueror. These views appear to have been entertained not only by the Duke of Orleans himself, but by many of the leading men of Spain, and even by the Court of Versailles ; and there seems every reason to believe that the project, from the

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very first, was made with the secret concert and concurrence of the latter.\*

General Stanhope was the person with whom the Duke determined to open his negotiations. He and Stanhope had, in early youth, been friends and companions; and now, when opposed to each other in the field, had taken every opportunity of showing their regard by mutual compliments and courtesies. On the return of the General from the conquest of Minorca, he accordingly received a confidential overture, and afterwards several secret visits from M. Flotte, one of the Duke's aides-de-camp, and hastened to communicate this important transaction to the Cabinet in England. It would be as repugnant, said Stanhope, to the honour as to the interest of the Queen, to supplant her ally, and enter into a private negotiation for that purpose, at the very time when she was publicly supporting him. He therefore proposed to turn this scheme of the enemy against themselves, to detach the Duke of Orleans from their cause, and to obtain his co-operation by offering him, not, indeed, the kingdom of Spain, but

\* "I entirely agree with your sentiments on that matter," says the Duke of Marlborough, writing to General Stanhope, Jan. 26, 1709, MS. "I am persuaded that the Duke of Orleans would never venture so far without directions from his Court." St. Simon, who knew only what the Duke of Orleans told him of this affair, is doubtful:—"Je n'ai jamais bien démêlé jusqu'où l'affaire en était, moins encore jusqu'où le Roi en savait."—*Mém.* vol. vii. p. 807. ed. 1829.

the province of Navarre, together with a part of Southern France, which had so lately risen in rebellion against its persecuting sovereign, and might be well inclined to any change. “When a man,” he observed, “has a crown in his head, it is no hard matter to engage him; and considering the dispositions of the people in Languedoc, we might very easily, from Navarre, extend ourselves as far as the Rhone; and if the Duke has any party in the army he commands (which one must suppose), by putting a trusty garrison into Pamplona, he makes himself master of Navarre in a week, and cuts off all communication from France to Spain.” As a man of honour, however, Stanhope at once resolved to take no step in this proposal without the knowledge and sanction of Charles; and, having obtained the last with some difficulty, he requested a similar sanction from his Government at home. “Having thus prevailed,” he goes on to say, “with the Catholic King, I cannot but be persuaded that what I shall do in this matter will be approved in England; and, therefore, if I see a disposition or likelihood to engage the Duke on these terms, I will venture to offer him from England, that we will stand by him, since it is certainly in his power to put an end to the war of Spain in a few months.”\*

\* Letter to Lord Sunderland, in cipher, Nov. 11, 1708, MS. See also Tindal’s History, vol. iv. p. 412. ed. 1762: but he mistakes the year.

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This scheme was adopted by Lord Sunderland and the other English ministers: General Stanhope was consequently empowered to make the offer of Navarre and Languedoc as he proposed \*; and he continued the negotiation the more readily, as perceiving that, if even it should lead to no political result, it had already exerted a useful influence on the military operations.† There may be some doubt whether the Duke, on his part, persevered in it with the view of ultimately bringing over the English to his first scheme of supplanting Charles, or whether he was dazzled at the prospect of the small but independent state which they held out to him; but in justice I am bound to say that there is no proof whatever of the latter. At all events, he did not relinquish the negotiation; and, having set off for France, entrusted its prosecution to his two confidential agents, Flotte and Rénault.

But the vengeful, and therefore doubly vigilant eyes of Princess Orsini were now fixed upon him. She had already discovered the visits of Flotte to the quarters of General Stanhope, and the cabals

\* Letter from Lord Sunderland to General Stanhope, Dec. 10, 1708, MS.

† “Your Lordship may be assured that this negotiation has  
“very much abated the edge of the Duke of Orleans this last  
“campaign, who might certainly have made much better use of  
“his superiority; and, so long as it shall depend, it will continue  
“to have the same effect, if they send him again to command  
“here.”—Letter from General Stanhope to Lord Sunderland,  
Dec. 20, 1708, MS.

of Rénault at Madrid with many of the principal Spaniards: she watched every secret movement; she caught every unguarded word; and, above all, gave herself full time to complete and mature her proofs, well knowing that in political affairs it is almost incredible how much time may be lost by hurry and precipitation. At length, having awaited the favourable opportunity, and obtained (an easy matter) the authorisation of Philip, she gave orders for arresting, first Rénault at Madrid, and afterwards Flotte, at the Spanish camp in Aragon. Their papers were seized, and found to contain several writings in an unknown cipher, and parts of the correspondence between the Duke of Orleans and Stanhope. Supported by these documents she made, or rather caused the King and Queen to make, a public and violent complaint to Louis on the intrigues of his nephew. To give a still more hateful colouring to these charges, she spread another rumour, quite destitute, it seems, of foundation, that the Duke had intended to divorce his wife, a natural daughter of Louis, and to marry, in her place, the Queen Dowager of Spain, with the view of gaining over her Spanish adherents and German relations. Louis was placed, by these communications, in a very painful situation; or at least, in one that would have been so to any prince less accustomed to trifle with his word. He found it necessary to disavow all knowledge of or participation in these overtures; and at the same time endeavoured to clear the Duke of Orleans from

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having ever really made them; “though imprudent agents,” he said, “might have sullied the character, by exceeding the instructions, of their master.” But neither Philip nor Maria Louisa would listen to the Duke’s vindication: the revenge of Princess Orsini was gratified; and the affair soon became the subject of public conversation, and of vague but credited reports.\*

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Though Louis disclaimed all the late negotiations in Spain, he did not and could not conceal from Philip the necessity to which he must soon be reduced of withdrawing his assistance from that country. His own kingdom, after so many gallant struggles, was now borne down and bleeding from the war. In the last campaign, he had strained its resources to the utmost to send into the Netherlands an army of nearly one hundred thousand men, which was directed by the skill of the Duke of Vendome, and dignified by the presence of the Duke of Burgundy, the heir apparent of the crown. But this mighty force had been totally defeated at Oudenarde, by the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene; and the campaign had closed by the reduction of Lille: thus stripping Louis of his first and most important conquest in Flanders, and laying bare his own frontier to invasion. The internal state of the kingdom was yet more disheartening. The public faith, and therefore the public

\* Compare St. Simon, vol. vii. pp. 290—316. and vol. xii. p. 119. ed. 1829. Mém. de Noailles, vol. iv. pp. 72—80. San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. pp. 340—343.



finances, were ruined ; and the sufferings of the nation, great as they were before, rose to actual famine, from the severity of the winter which ensued. The young crops were nipped and destroyed by the late and excessive frosts, and the vines and olive trees blighted ; while the war prevented supplies of foreign corn : and this universal distress of the people wrung from them an universal cry for peace. A powerful party at Court, comprising some of the royal family, joined in the same demand ; for though Louis as the grandfather, and the Dauphin as the father of Philip, were willing to continue great sacrifices to his cause, his elder brother, the Duke of Burgundy, looked rather to the welfare of the kingdom of France, than to the exaltation of the House of Bourbon. Guided by this patriotic motive (if, indeed, it was not fraternal jealousy), and supported by the Duke of Beauvilliers, the Chancellor Pontchartrain, and other leading statesmen, he urged the necessity of peace on the reluctant mind of the King, and obliged him to take some measures for that object.

As his agent on this occasion, Louis selected the President Rouillé, a very able and accomplished diplomatist. His first endeavour was to draw the Dutch into a separate peace, by tempting their separate interests, and exciting their commercial jealousy of England. A treaty of trade between Spain and England had been negociated at Barcelona by General Stanhope, which afforded great advantage to the British. It was kept secret ; but

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its bearer from Barcelona had, for the sake of expedition, embarked in a very small vessel for Genoa, and been captured by a French frigate. The messenger, as is usual in such cases, threw his mail overboard; but the French captain, promising a considerable reward in case it could be recovered, it was dived for and brought up by a negro slave. It was immediately transmitted to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Marquis de Torcy, who took care to send a copy to the Hague, where it made a great impression; though the States thought fit to dissemble their resentment, and reject the ensnaring overtures of Louis.\*

Under such circumstances, Rouillé found it necessary to open a general negotiation with the Allies; which was chiefly conducted, on their part by the Dutch deputies Buys and Vanderdussen. Many and various were the proposals of the French agent. In the name of Philip, he offered to cede to Charles, first, all the Italian states; next, to add a barrier in the Netherlands; then the whole Netherlands; and at last, to yield Spain and the Indies, reserving Naples and Sicily for Philip. The Allies, on the other hand, took up high ground, and required, that, as Louis had, in violation of the most solemn engagements, placed his grandson on the Spanish throne, he should now either persuade or compel him to relinquish that throne and all its dependent provinces. It was in vain that Torcy

\* Campbell's *Lives of the Admirals*, vol. iv. p. 38. Lamberty, vol. iv. p. 598.

himself repaired to the Hague, in the hopes of obtaining more favourable terms: the Allies remained immoveable, under the firm direction of Marlborough, Eugene, and the Pensionary Heinsius; and Louis, in this extremity of his affairs, at length accepted the proposed condition. He declared, however, that he could not be answerable for the acquiescence of either Philip or the Spanish nation; and that he could only undertake to withdraw from them his auxiliary troops, and leave them unprotected to their own resources.

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But the treachery of the Court of Versailles had been so often felt, and was so fully known to the Allies, that they determined not to leave Louis the smallest loop-hole for evasion; and justly suspected him of only seeking to gain time, and turn their arms to the Peninsula from his own frontier in the Netherlands. Their distrust was still further augmented when they found him refusing to place in their hands those fortresses in Spain occupied by his own troops. Under this impression they drew up preliminaries as the basis of a final treaty; stipulating the acknowledgment of the Archduke as King of Spain, and granting to Louis a suspension of arms for only two months, to put him in full possession of the throne. In case Philip should refuse to give way, Louis was not only to withhold all succour from him, but to join the Allies in concerting proper measures to obtain his acquiescence. It has been said by a most profound historian, whose remarks apply to all times and all countries, that

CHAP. VII. justice is seldom allowed to prevail in negotiations,  
 1709. except when both parties are equal in strength\* ;  
 but, in this case, the Allies can hardly be considered to have taken any unfair advantage of their past victories and present superiority : they made no inroad on French interests ; they asked nothing from France that was anciently or rightfully hers ; and were rigorous only in guarding against fraud or evasion.

There was, however, an apparent harshness in requiring Louis to take up arms, if necessary, against his own grandson ; and of this he availed himself to break off the negotiations on plausible grounds, and rouse the energy of his people. “ If “ I must wage war,” said he in full council, “ I “ would rather wage it against my enemies than  
 June 12. “ against my children.” For the first time in his reign, he appealed to his subjects in a public manifesto, declaring his anxiety for peace, the endeavours he had made to obtain it, and the degrading terms which were sought to be imposed upon him. Nor was this appeal made in vain. The French, with that high courage and strong national feeling for which they have ever been distinguished, at once rallied round their aged sovereign ; the cry for peace was hushed ; all private sufferings were forgotten ; and all ranks united in their efforts for the next campaign. As a further sacrifice to public opinion, Chamillart, under whose feeble hands the

\* Thucyd. lib. v. c. 89.

finances had fallen into the most deplorable disorder, was dismissed from office. He was a man of good intentions, and skilful in the management of his own affairs; but experience shows that economy in private fortune is a very doubtful recommendation to administer the State's.

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Although the various proposals to the Allies, in the name of Philip, had been made, not only without the sanction, but without the knowledge, of that monarch, it could not be concealed from him that there were serious intentions on the part of Louis to give him no further succour. Instructions were even sent to Amelot to prepare him for relinquishing Spain; but the young monarch, whose character always appears as lofty in distress as it was low and little in prosperity, spurned any such idea. “My resolution,” he wrote to Louis\*, “has long been taken. God has placed the crown of Spain on my head, and I will maintain it as long as a drop of blood flows in my veins. Were I capable of meanly yielding it, you would, I am convinced, disown me for your grandson. Rather let me perish in Spain, fighting the ground foot by foot, than betray the love of my subjects, or tarnish the honour of my House!” In this high-spirited resolution he was upheld by his Queen and Princess Orsini, both fondly attached to the power and the pomp of royalty; and, under their guidance, he threw himself upon his people,

\* Letter of April 17, 1709, in the *Mém. de Noailles*.

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whose loyalty, like his character, always rose highest in adversity. As a public pledge of his intention never to forsake them, he convoked the registry Cortes of Castille and Aragon, that they might acknowledge his infant son as Prince of Asturias and heir to the Spanish throne. This ceremony was performed at the church of San Geronymo del Prado, with great splendour, and amidst the loudest acclamations. Very shortly afterwards, he assembled a council of all the principal statesmen and grandees; stated to them, in an affecting speech, his determination to die rather than to yield; appealed to their loyalty; and expressed his wish and intention to be guided by their judgment. A deep, but not an indifferent, silence ensued; till Cardinal Portocarrero rose. His long retirement from office, and his venerable age, added fresh weight to the words of a man long accustomed to lead the minds of others. His exhortations, and, still more, his example — for mankind are swayed much more by examples than by arguments — wrought the whole assembly to the highest pitch of enthusiasm; and they professed themselves as much led by affection as bound in duty to support Philip on the throne. With a just national feeling, they exclaimed against the arrogant pretensions of England and Holland to parcel out their monarchy; and declared that, if the King of France were obliged to withdraw his assistance, all Spaniards, without distinction of age, rank, or profession, should rise as one man, and stand forward to defend their King, their

country, and their honour. The exclusion of the French ambassador from the Despacho, and the formation of a purely Spanish ministry, were at the same time unanimously recommended. Nor was this advice rejected by Philip. His chief counsellor, Princess Orsini, considering some such popular measures unavoidable, skilfully took the lead in urging and promoting them ; thereby securing a special exception in her own favour, and continuing her reign (for so it may be called) almost without interruption. The Duke of Medina Celi was placed nominally at the head of the new administration ; and the French ambassador, whose high pretensions and overbearing tone had latterly rendered him unpopular, was persuaded to solicit his own recall. The King of France, on his part, agreed to the return of Amelot, and to the exclusion of his successor from the Spanish council, without displeasure, seeing the necessity of an apparent, if not a real, alienation between the Courts of Versailles and Madrid. For the same reason, and also from the danger of his own dominions, he directed all his troops to march home from Spain ; but the earnest and pathetic entreaties of the Queen, then on the point of delivery, overcame all other considerations, and induced him to leave (though only, he declared, for a few months longer,) his garrisons in the fortresses, and twenty-five battalions on the Catalonian frontier.\*

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\* Mém. de Noailles, vol. iv. p. 65. Targe, vol. v. p. 358.  
"On jugea avec raison," says the latter, a most zealous par-

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The impressive speech of Cardinal Portocarrero to the Spanish Council was the last public act in his life. He died on the 14th of September in this year, very suddenly, having been in apparent good health, and conversing cheerfully with his nephew, the Conde de Palma, till twelve o'clock, the night before; but he was above eighty years of age.\* His tomb and epitaph (both according to his own directions) still remain in the Cathedral of Toledo; and when I trod upon a plain slab inserted in the pavement, and inscribed with only the striking words, "HIC JACET PULVIS CINIS ET NIHIL," I was informed that I was treading on the grave of Portocarrero.

The progress of the diplomatic conferences in the early part of this year, and afterwards the prospect of their resumption, tended not a little to slacken military operations in Spain, since the Allies hoped to obtain possession of that country without a blow, and were chiefly anxious to make an impression on the side of Flanders. Few succours, therefore, were sent out to Catalonia. Very little could there be attempted, and still less achieved. A surprise of Tortosa, the chief fruit of the previous campaign of the French, was, indeed, planned by Staremborg

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tisan of Louis, "que jamais il n'avait eu réellement dessein  
" d'abandonner Philippe V., mais seulement d'amuser ses en-  
" nemis." The same admission (para engañar a los enemigos)  
is made by San Phelipe (Coment. vol. i. p. 317).

\* Lettres Inédites de Mad. de Maintenon et de la Princesse  
des Ursins, 1826, vol. iv. p. 332.



and Stanhope with considerable judgment and secrecy. Marching by night from their camp at Tarragona, they arrived unperceived under the walls of Tortosa, and attempted to scale the ramparts in three separate divisions. To a certain extent, all three succeeded; but the unexpected height of several rows of palisades, the want of hatchets or a petard to break open a gate, and other petty obstacles, allowed time for the day to dawn, and for the garrison to beat to arms. It proved, says Stanhope, a “Cremona business;” alluding to the similar capture and recapture of Cremona, under Prince Eugene. The French Governor, and about two hundred of the garrison, were killed, and some prisoners carried off; but the allied troops were repulsed, and this important fortress still remained in possession of the Spaniards.\*

Meanwhile Alicant, the last remnant of the English conquests in the kingdom of Valencia, was besieged by Asfeld, at the head of twelve thousand men. Having made himself master of the town, he next blockaded the castle, which was securely nestled on the summit of an inaccessible crag, but which had no communication with the sea; and could not, therefore, be relieved without difficulty. During the winter, Asfeld busily employed his troops in constructing at its base an enormous mine, which he filled with fifteen hundred barrels of gunpowder. On its completion, he displayed a

\* Letters from General Stanhope to Lord Galway, Jan. 3, 1709; to Lord Sunderland, Dec. 19, 1708, MS.

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degree of humanity and consideration for his adversaries very different from his former conduct at Xativa. He communicated his plan to the Governor, General Richards, an English Catholic, in the service of Charles, and gave him leave (which was readily accepted) to send two of his officers to view the real state of the mine. These Asfeld accompanied to the spot; and, pointing out to them his formidable preparations, declared that he could not bear to let so many brave men perish under the ruins of a place which they had so gallantly defended; and offered them a free and honourable passage to Barcelona, and twenty-four hours for deliberation. But the two officers, who saw only the opening of the well-filled mine, were unconvinced of its extent, and suspected a stratagem; and General Richards, relying on their report, as well as on the natural strength of the rock, still refused to capitulate. So great, indeed, was his personal intrepidity, that he determined to abide the issue at the post of the greatest danger, the Parade, just above the chamber of the mine; and accordingly, as soon as he perceived the appointed signal (it was at daybreak of the 4th of March,) he hastened to the fatal spot, attended by his principal officers. After a few moments of silent expectation, the mine was sprung, with an effect rather resembling a convulsion of the elements than a contrivance of human skill. The whole rock heaved, and shook as with an earthquake; the Parade was violently rent asunder; and the ill-

fated English officers upon it were all either buried in the chasm, or blown to pieces in the air.

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The effect of the explosion was, however, less than had been expected and designed ; for, taking a transverse direction, it had blown up but a small portion of the rock, and rather increased than diminished the steepness of the rest. The garrison still remained undaunted. Even during the blast, at a moment of such horror and probable destruction, a cry of “ Long live the Queen ! ” had been cheerfully raised by the British soldiers, and rung amidst the ruins.\* Headed by Colonel Dalbon, on whom the command devolved by the loss of all the senior officers, they continued to hold out, with the hope of succour from Catalonia. For this purpose, great exertions were made by General Stanhope : he went to Port Mahon to hasten the fleet ; he returned to Barcelona to hasten the troops ; and at length set sail from the former with eleven ships of war, and about four thousand soldiers on board. His principal chance of success depended on promptitude and secrecy, and these were prevented by tempests and contrary winds, which forced him to anchor at Denia, and remain there for several days. Thus the enemy had time for preparation ; and when, on the 16th of April, the expedi-

\* Vincent Peyton, Journal of the Siege of Alicant, MS. With military details, this officer intersperses poetical effusions, of which I am inclined to think two lines will be quite enough to satisfy the reader :—

“ Horror and mischief in each cloud appears,

“ And mountains fall together by the ears.”

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tion appeared off Alicant, it found the shore lined with batteries, and manned with a very superior force. The English ships, however, commenced a cannonade; and the troops were preparing to land when the weather again became so stormy as not to admit of boats; and, under such circumstances, it was, in a council of war, unanimously judged impracticable to relieve the castle. All that remained for Stanhope was to obtain favourable terms for the gallant garrison, which was now reduced to very scanty supplies,—to water for eighteen days, and in numbers to six hundred men. Having succeeded in his negotiation, Stanhope, accordingly, embarked them in his ships, and steered back to Barcelona.

On his arrival, he and Staremburg applied themselves to preparations for the ensuing campaign; but their prospect was not encouraging. Hardly any reinforcements had been sent out to them; and, far from making conquests, they could only hope to maintain their ground. “The enemy,” says Stanhope, “have above double the number of forces in Valencia, Aragon, and Roussillon, that we have here, and the country which we still remain in is so ruined and exhausted, that we can only support ourselves by dint of money and supplies of corn by sea.”\* In reference to the last

\* To Lord Treasurer Godolphin, Aug. 7, 1709. MS. In a letter to the Duke of Marlborough, of March 29, he observes, “We expect with great impatience a supply of corn from England, without which we cannot draw ten thousand men together, though our all should depend upon it.”

point, it is remarkable that General Stanhope and the Duke of Orleans should each employ the very same expression when writing of their respective armies, and declare, that “the greatest enemy we have to fear is famine.”\* This coincidence serves not a little to confirm the remark of Henry the Fourth of France,—that Spain is truly an unconquerable country, which would beat a small and starve a large invading army. The difficulties of the war were also, as usual, aggravated by Charles’s weak and obstinate courtiers. “The ministers think of nothing but confiscations; entire new-modelling of Spain; suppressing the order of the grandees; changing their habits, which is already begun at Court, where the Spanish ladies are ordered to dress after the German fashion; and I believe they would abolish even the Spanish language, if it could be agreed between them whether High Dutch or Neapolitan should be spoken instead of it. . . . The Marshal (Staremberg) does all he can, and all that can be done; but has not the good fortune to please this Court better than his predecessors.”†

\* These are Stanhope’s words, in writing to Lord Godolphin, March 5, 1709. The Duke of Orleans says, in a letter to Chamillart, already quoted, “Nos ennemis les plus redoutables sont la faim et la misère.” (May 8, 1707.) The same thing was found in the late war. “The supplies were at all times a source of infinite difficulty on both sides,” says Colonel Napier, vol. iii. p. 268.

† Letters from General Stanhope to the Duke of Marlborough, June 30, and to Lord Galway, January 3, 1709, MS.

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Fortunately for the English, the enemy's troops, at this time, were commanded by Count Bezons ; a French Mareschal, but no general, who had been sent into Spain in the place of Berwick ; and who seemed as unwilling, as Staremborg and Stanhope were unable, to attack. He was, moreover, on bad terms with the Spanish chief, the Conde de Aguilar, and almost in daily expectation of receiving orders to lead back his own troops to France. Under such circumstances, each party maintained the opposite banks of the Segre, and contented themselves with a few insignificant marches and manœuvres. A project was, indeed, formed and proposed by Stanhope, to clear Spain of the French troops. In the present situation of the Allies, they had the advantage of a central post in compensation of their inferior numbers ; for, while the army opposed to them was divided into several bodies, surrounding Catalonia, from Roussillon to Valencia, they, on the contrary, were enabled to act in one mass, and direct an united attack against any side they pleased. Stanhope, therefore, suggested a sudden invasion of Roussillon, which would drive before them the Duke of Noailles, and the French troops in that quarter, which might very probably raise the Cevennes in another insurrection ; and which, at all events, could scarcely fail, in the doubts of the Court of Versailles as to maintaining any French force in Spain, to turn the scale in the negative, and cause Bezons to be recalled to the defence of their own dominions. These he could only

reach by a circuitous and rugged, and therefore a tardy, route ; and when once removed, and unable to return very speedily, Aragon would be open to the Allies, as soon as they should receive their reinforcements ; and Castile be disheartened at this seeming relinquishment. By this expedition, the Allies would leave the drained and exhausted frontier of Aragon, and find a plentiful country for subsistence, besides being assisted by the English fleet ; an advantage altogether lost to them by inland warfare. This scheme was agreed to by Staremberg ; but he wished to abide the issue of the negotiations for peace ; and, meanwhile, the two armies had come to such close quarters on the Segre, and so narrowly watched each other's movements, that the proper opportunity for this enterprise (to the subsequent regret of Staremberg himself) gradually glided away.\*

From the dull and dilatory operations of this year in Catalonia, we may turn, for a moment, to some a little less languid in Portugal. The two last campaigns on that frontier had been far too insignificant for notice : they consisted chiefly of a few marches and reviews, and never soared above the sacking of a village, or the capture of a convoy. But this spring was marked by a battle between the Spanish and Portuguese troops : the former headed by the Marquis of Bay, and without any French allies ; the latter strengthened by several

\* San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 330. Letters of General Stanhope to Lord Galway, June 28, and to General Carpenter, August 10, 1709, MS.

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English regiments, and shared in command between the Marquis of Fronteira and Lord Galway. The armies were encamped upon the Caya, near Campo Mayor; and the Spaniards having, on the 7th of May, made a movement to forage the adjacent country, brought on, as they intended, an immediate engagement. The Portuguese general, contrary to Lord Galway's opinion, passed the river, with most of the forces, and drew them out on the plain of La Gudiña, which has given its name to the battle. The onset was begun by the Spaniards, who were three times bravely repulsed by the English and Portuguese foot in the centre. But the Marquis of Bay, in person, then made a charge upon the right of the Allies, which consisted entirely of some raw Portuguese cavalry, and which, after a very slight resistance, was routed. The Portuguese cannon fell into the hands of the enemy; their cavalry, on the left, also gave way; and Lord Galway, rashly advancing at this juncture to recover the cannon, with two or three English battalions, displayed, as usual, far more personal courage than military skill. His detachment was intercepted, and, for the greater part, obliged to surrender, with Lord Barrymore, General Pearse, and his other principal officers; and, as to himself, his horse was shot under him, and he had great difficulty in effecting his escape. The remaining English, however, supported by the Portuguese foot, but forsaken by all the Portuguese cavalry, still continued firm, presented an unbroken front,



and made an orderly retreat ; so that, as far as the English were concerned, the battle of La Gudiña reflected no disgrace upon them. The loss of the Allies is computed by the enemy, no doubt, with much exaggeration, at seventeen hundred men left dead upon the field.\* The victory of the Spaniards was certainly most complete ; but, as will presently be seen, they were prevented from improving it,—first by the apprehension, and afterwards by the approach of a force from another quarter.

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The news of the battle of La Gudiña roused the English ministers, and turned their thoughts to the means of averting its consequences. Long experience had shown them the difficulty of acting with the Portuguese Court ; and proved that, the more it was helped from England, the more unwilling it became to help itself. Instead, therefore, of sending a reinforcement to join the Portuguese, they resolved to give them, if possible, an opportunity to rally and recruit themselves, by a diversion in Andalusia. They directed some troops to embark in a squadron under Admiral Baker, and to sail to Gibraltar ; at the same time sending orders to General Stanhope to join these with some troops from Catalonia, to assume their command, and to make a combined attempt upon Cadiz. This project, which had been thought of several times before, was founded on much false intelligence, and two mistaken premises : first,

\* San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 315.

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that they should find Cadiz unprovided for defence ; and, secondly, that the city and neighbourhood were well affected to Charles, and only wanted an opportunity to declare themselves ; whereas, in fact, from the pillage and misconduct of the first armament against them, there was no part of Spain where his name and that of the Allies were more thoroughly, or, I may add, more justly hated. Now, the forces assembled for this undertaking would not exceed five thousand effective men, and would be quite inadequate to it, unless assisted by the good-will of the inhabitants. Under such circumstances, Stanhope, when preparing to obey his instructions, and embark on this enterprise, had hardly any hope of its success.\* That he might not drain the army of Staremberg, with such superior forces before it, he took with him only one English regiment of foot, and about five hundred dismounted Spanish cavalry, and with these reached Gibraltar, on the 31st of August. Here he found no squadron from England yet arrived ; but “ here” (he writes to Lord Sunderland) “ we met with letters from Lord Galway and Brigadier Wade, with accounts of the state of Cadiz, and of the enemy’s

\* “ Si, comme je crois, l’affaire en question se trouve impraticable” . . . . are his words to Marshal Staremberg, August 20, 1709. MS. The Duke of Marlborough, when consulted, discouraged this enterprise. In a letter to Lord Godolphin, dated June 14, 1708, and printed in Coxe’s Life, vol. iv. p. 114, ed. 1820, he observes, “ There can be no doubt that Cadiz would be of great use. But I beg you to consider how impossible it will be to have any success, unless it be done by surprise.”

“ troops in and about that place, which are confirmed by all the advices we could get on this coast. All these make it evident that Cadiz cannot be thought of at this time, even though we had treble the force.” The Spaniards, at Cadiz, moreover, daily grew in numbers; for detachments from the Estremaduran army continued to pour in; while Admiral Baker was delayed several weeks by contrary winds; and, on his arrival, there was nothing left for Stanhope but to turn back with him to Catalonia. “ But though,” he said \*, “ the end for which I left Catalonia cannot be accomplished, yet I am glad to learn, by all hands from Portugal, that our expedition has not been useless; since, by keeping in suspense all the enemy’s troops on this coast, it has amused and diverted them from taking advantage of the miserable condition of Portugal.”

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Meanwhile Staremborg, emboldened by the supineness of Bezons, had crossed the Segre, and reduced the little town of Balaguer, with its garrison of six hundred men. This exploit, however trifling in itself, yet shone out from amidst the obscurity of this campaign, and greatly irritated the Court of Madrid against the French Marshal; in-somuch that Philip, thinking it necessary to assert the honour of his arms, set off in person for the camp, on the 2d of September. On his arrival, Bezons pleaded orders from the King of France

\* Letter to Lord Sunderland, September 26, 1709. MS.

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for avoiding an engagement at that time ; and succeeded not only in appeasing the resentment of Philip, but in obtaining from him an offer of the Golden Fleece. As to military operations, however, the presence of the King infused no new vigour into them. Staremborg occupied a strong position, which it was thought imprudent to attack. No conflict whatever took place, even between detachments ; no siege or expedition was undertaken ; and, after three weeks of insignificant marches and demonstrations, Philip returned to Madrid, and Bezons, with a part of his troops, to France. Thus, Stanhope, on landing at Barcelona, found both armies withdrawn to winter quarters, and availed himself of this opportunity to return by Italy to England, where he earnestly urged the necessity of taking more active measures, and despatching a larger force into Spain. “ I doubt ” (such was his frequent remark) “ that a lingering “ war in Spain will do no good, and cost three times “ as much as one vigorous effort the first year.” \*

On the side of Flanders, where both parties made their chief exertions, this summer was marked by another bloody overthrow of the French. The battle of Malplaquet, won by Marlborough over  
Sept. 11. Marshal Villars, cost them fifteen thousand soldiers, and the great fortress of Mons ; and the disasters of this campaign made Louis still more unwilling to run the hazard of another. He, there-

\* Letter to Lord Godolphin ; Gibraltar, September 27, 1709. MS.

fore, left no art untried to renew the negotiations for peace, with better prospect of success. That he might appear to forsake entirely the cause of Philip, and escape any renewed demand of yielding the Spanish fortresses, he withdrew his garrisons from them, and recalled Bezons with his troops from Aragon. But at the very same time the Walloon regiments in the Netherlands were sent back, on the plea of their being Spanish subjects; and, moreover, French soldiers were encouraged to desert to the Spanish service in such numbers as to form several separate regiments. Thus, the same assistance was afforded in another shape; and the troops of Bezons, joining those of Noailles in Roussillon, still hung over Catalonia as before, and only from another side. Such was the usual crooked policy of Louis. All little minds are naturally prone to artifice and falsehood, just as the weaker animals are endowed with instinctive faculties for concealment or escape.

The next stratagem of Louis was directed for his own private interest against his grandson. He despatched a trusty agent, named Iberville, to Madrid, with the view of obtaining the cession of the Spanish Netherlands to the Dutch, as a bribe which might probably induce them to forsake the Grand Alliance, and conclude a separate peace. This demand was cloaked with the name of the Elector of Bavaria, with the terms of a former agreement with him, and with the justice of some

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compensation to that suffering ally. But the new Spanish ministry, headed by the Duke of Medina-Celi, discerned the snare, and looking, as they were bound to do, to the interests of Spain, and not of France, stood so firm in opposing the proposal, that Philip could not venture to comply with it.\* Iberville was sent back, with many compliments, but no cession; and the plans of Louis were still more clearly anticipated, and more completely baffled, by the conclusion of the celebrated Barrier Treaty between England and Holland; intended as a permanent security against any further aggressions of France. It stipulated that the Dutch should have the right of garrison in the principal frontier fortresses; such as Lille, Charleroy, and Namur: and in some other central ones, as points of communication with their own territory; and it gratified them with several commercial advantages; especially with provisions for the closing of the Scheldt, and with the promise of sharing in all the privileges which the traders of any other nation should enjoy in Spain. Thus it seemed that the Dutch would obtain nearly as much by continuing on good terms with their Allies, as by listening to the separate overtures of their enemy: and when there is so little to be gained by treachery, men will

\* Compare the *Mém. de Noailles*, vol. iv. p. 106., and *Tindal*, vol. v. p. 212., with *San Phelipe, Comentarios*, vol. ii. p. 4. On this point the latter is by far the best authority; but in the Dutch negotiations he is very superficial: and in his “*el Mi-lord Fouveskendem*,” it is not easy to discover Lord Townshend.

always claim the praise of being faithful and firm in their engagements.

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Under such circumstances, Louis, who had always kept open a channel of communication at the Hague, through M. Petkum, the envoy from Holstein, saw no other expedient than renewing the general negotiations. He, therefore, signified his acceptance of the preliminary articles lately tendered to him, excepting only the thirty-seventh, which provided for the establishment of the Archduke on the Spanish throne, and which he declared to be impracticable within the period it prescribed; but he expressed his willingness to enter into the discussion of an expedient or equivalent. The Allies, hereupon, granted passports to the French ambassadors, the Mareschal d'Huxelles and the Abbé de Polignac; and appointed as their own the deputies Buys and Vanderdussen. The small and secluded town of Gertruydenberg was selected as the place where the conferences should be held, to afford as little scope as possible for the ensnaring manœuvres of the French Ministers, and the factious cabals of their foreign partisans. Here the first conference was held, on the 9th of March. But even at the first, it appeared that the French, instead of admitting the principle of the preliminaries, as they had bound themselves to do, and merely discussing the thirty-seventh article, brought forward fresh proposals for the partition of the Spanish monarchy. A small circumstance, which occurred at Versailles at the

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same time, showed still more plainly how far the promised dethronement of Philip was from the thoughts of Louis. He gave the ducal title of Anjou to the infant son (afterwards Louis the Fifteenth) of the Duke of Burgundy, although that very title must have been borne by Philip in France, had the preliminaries been complied with. The Allies, on their part, rejected with just indignation the demand, first of the Italian States, and then of Aragon; but afterwards intimated, that, rather than again appeal to the sword, they were willing to yield to Philip the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. The great point at issue, however, was the execution of the treaty, — the security to be given for its regular fulfilment. On this subject the declarations of Louis were most vague and various. When requested to surrender the Spanish fortresses, he stated, that his troops had already left them; when solicited to place Bayonne and Perpignan in the hands of the Allies, as a temporary deposit, and as a pledge of his intention to send no further succours into Spain, he replied, that he could not intrust other powers with the keys of his kingdom. Adopting the very phrase in the preliminaries against which he had most loudly inveighed, he expressed himself ready to enter into “a concert of measures” with the Allies; and endeavoured to lure them by the offer of a monthly subsidy. On the whole, the more closely we look at the details of these transactions, the more plain and glaring becomes the insincerity of Louis; and the



more we must feel surprise that even the very extremity of party spirit should have formerly raised up in England advocates of his honour and integrity. But in the present century, when there is no longer any such factious interest to serve, it will scarcely be denied that, though Louis was at that time sincerely desirous of peace, he would agree to none that did not leave him some means of afterwards evading its unfavourable terms.

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In this state of things, it became evident to the Allies that the continuance of the negotiation could answer no other end than to sow dissensions amongst themselves, and maintain the spirit of the French nation. They, therefore, after many skilful delays from the other party, broke off the conferences, on the 10th of July; and the French plenipotentiaries took their departure a few days afterwards. This result produced no little satisfaction at Madrid; and a letter from the Queen to Louis, at this juncture, is not more expressive of her joy than of his duplicity, when it speaks of the “late pretended disunion” between the two Courts; and exults that such a pretence should have ceased to be advisable.\* Already had the French influence at Madrid — often most powerful when least perceived — overthrown the new Spanish administration. The Duke of Medina Celi, so lately placed at its head, was suddenly arrested, and sent off a prisoner to the castle of Segovia. He was a April 15.

\* Letter from the Queen of Spain to the King of France, August 1, 1710, in the *Mém. de Noailles*, vol. iv. p. 118.

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man of talent, honour, and great moderation ; but it is the peculiar curse of monarchies in troubled times, and of republics in all times, that moderation, far from being respected, loved, and imitated, seldom fails to be hooted down as treachery or weakness. As to the vague charge of secret correspondence with the enemy, which was loosely thrown out against him, I cannot discover the slightest foundation for it in any one circumstance of proof, or even probability ; and I believe that his high-minded opposition to French counsellors, and especially to Princess Orsini, was the true and only reason of his fall. The short interval which usually extends between the dungeon and the grave of eminent state prisoners, (the Duke died next year in captivity,) was not in this case employed in any open enquiry, or even open declaration, as to his imputed crimes ; and the whole transaction still continues veiled in considerable mystery.

## CHAPTER VIII.

**O**F all the Spanish campaigns in the War of the Succession, we have now come to the one most fruitful of important events and unforeseen vicissitudes. During the eight preceding years, there had been but two general actions, those of Almanza and La Gudiña: in this single year we shall find no less than three. Never yet had the two competitors for the crown encountered each other in the field; but now, at length, we find both meet at the head of their respective armies. The preceding operations had been indecisive of the final result; but the next month of December may be truly said to have sealed the fate of Spain.

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General Stanhope, during his last visit to England, had succeeded in persuading the ministers to make greater exertions in the Peninsula, and strike one vigorous blow, instead of so many feeble flourishes. Accordingly, he obtained considerable reinforcements of men and supplies of money, with which he was appointed to return to his command in Catalonia. Learning, however, at Genoa, that the enemy were already in the field, he would not await the arrival of all the expected succours, but sailed, on the 16th of May, with only one thousand recruits, and left orders for the rest

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to follow him. On the 26th, he reached Marshal Staremburg, at the camp near Agramont, and was pleased to find the English troops in such good order and condition, “insomuch,” he observes, “that though we have, at some time during “this war, had more troops in Spain, yet we never “had so good an army. This I attribute chiefly “to their having been landed in a proper season, “and having had a winter in quarters to accustom “them to the climate; whereas we have found, “by the experience of all this war, that the men “who have been landed in the spring or summer, “and have immediately been put upon service, “have mouldered away to nothing by sickness. “If this war were to last, I would have it laid “down as a general rule, never to have any Eng- “lishman sent into Spain at any other season “than the beginning of winter.” It had long been the opinion of Stanhope that the personal appearance of Charles in the field would be highly advantageous; and he looked upon his hasty departure from Valencia, in 1707, as one of the principal causes of the disaster at Almanza. We therefore find, in his letters at this juncture, that, “during the four days I passed at Barcelona, I “gave it as my opinion to the King, that he should “go to the army, to which I found his Majesty “very well disposed; and he agreed, that, when- “ever the Marshal and I should tell him it was “proper, he would immediately come and put “himself at the head of us. Accordingly, in two

“ or three days after I came to the army, we both  
 “ did write to him, and his Majesty did, the next  
 “ day, set out from Barcelona, with a very light  
 “ equipage, and very suitable to his present cir-  
 “ cumstances, and joined the army on the 7th of  
 “ June.”\*

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Philip, on his part, was already in the field, having left Madrid on the 3d of May, and confided the administration to the Queen as Regent. His army had now no longer any French auxiliaries in its ranks; but it was increased by the French deserters, by the Walloon regiments, and, above all, by his having withdrawn a part of the troops from the Portuguese frontier, and made large levies throughout the kingdom. The choice of a general—for it was well understood that Philip might attend, but could not direct, the military movements—was a matter of great deliberation. From the wish of showing that union still subsisted between the Courts of Madrid and Versailles, the former was not a little desirous to obtain a French general to command in Spain; and it well knew, moreover, that the French, at this period, possessed by far the greater number of able leaders, and that the appointment of a foreigner would prevent all that personal jealousy and imperfect obedience, which must result from

\* Letters to the Duke of Marlborough, May 14.; and to Lord Sunderland, June 22, 1710, MS.; and a MS. journal, believed to be by Mr. Lenoir, who was for some time General Stanhope's secretary.

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selecting any one from the line of native officers. The Duke of Vendome, one of the most distinguished of the French Marshals, who was then overpowered by his enemies at Court, after having so often defeated those upon the frontiers, and who was languishing in the retirement of his country seat, perceived the favourable opportunity, and secretly used his influence with Princess Orsini, that he might be chosen by Philip, and be solicited from Louis to command the Spanish army. At her intercession, both Philip and Maria Louisa made earnest entreaties for this object; but the displeasure of Louis, which had removed Vendome from active service, had not yet sufficiently cooled to admit of any such appointment.\* It was, besides, as we have already seen, essential to his interests at that period, that he should forsake, or at least, profess and appear to forsake, the cause of his grandson. Thus disappointed of a French general, Philip looked round amongst his own, and selected the Marquis of Villadarias,—as the ablest and most trusty.† This veteran, who, after the siege of Gibraltar, had withdrawn in disgust, as an injured man, to his Andalusian estates, was now called forth from his retreat, and placed at the head of the army; whilst the cavalry was specially intrusted, under him, to Don Antonio.

\* St. Simon, *Mém.*, vol. vii. p. 171. ed. 1829.

† The high character borne by Villadarias may be seen in St. Simon, vol. ix. p. 13. ed. 1829; and Targe, vol. v. p. 416.

Amezaga, who had formerly distinguished himself against Lord Peterborough, in Valencia.\*

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Neither the Spanish nor the Allied army had as yet received their expected reinforcements; but the former being the stronger at this juncture, an able plan was formed by Villadarias to surprise the latter in their quarters, and defeat them before their succours should come up. For this purpose he led the troops and Philip across the Segre. But that river, suddenly swollen by the melting of the mountain snows, overflowed its banks, and swept away its bridges; thus intercepting all his communications with the right bank, and reducing him to great distress for provisions; besides which, the skilful manœuvres of Staremborg, and the activity of the English officers, who marched day and night to reach the scene of action, tended to mar this enterprise. After scouring a part of the country with Amezaga's cavalry, and dispersing some Miquelets, Villadarias found it necessary to return to his former quarters. On the 11th of June, however, having been joined by his reinforcements, whilst the Allies were still expecting theirs, he resumed the offensive, and, again crossing the Segre, at the head of about twenty thousand foot and six thousand cavalry, offered battle near Balaguer. But Staremborg and Stanhope,

May.

\* San Phelipe, vol. i. p. 182. This Don Antonio must not be confounded with another Amezaga (Don Joseph), who was remarked for his good conduct at the battles of Almanza (Berwick, Mém., vol. i. p. 253), of Zaragoza (San Phelipe, vol. ii. p. 23), and of Villa Viciosa (Ib. p. 56.)

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knowing their inferiority, had taken up a very strong position, with their right to the bridge of Balaguer, and their left on a rising ground which overlooked all the plain. On the 13th, the Spaniards again showed their readiness for battle, and came up within less than half cannon-shot, for the purpose of attacking the left wing; but they were received with a brisk and effective cannonade, which, together with the strength of the ground, induced them to forego their intention, and withdraw. In leaving the field, they lost several hundred men, from a charge of General Stanhope, who fell upon their rear at the head of his cavalry.\* Nor was this all: the allied generals seized what they thought this favourable opportunity for raising the Aragonese in rebellion, crossed the Segre the same evening, and marched to the Noguera, the river which divides Catalonia from Aragon, and which the enemy, in expectation of a battle, had, for the first time, left unguarded. They accordingly effected their passage next day without difficulty, and encamped on the Aragon side; whilst, on his part, Villadarias, instead of following them, pushed forward in Catalonia; and thus—a singular situation!—each army was moving in the other's territory, the Catalan army in Aragon, and the Aragonese in Catalonia. “We expected,” writes Stanhope, some days afterwards, “an insurrection in Aragon, “and that the enemies would have followed us,

\* Tindal's History, vol. v. p. 287; and Mr. Lenoir's Journal, MS. General Stanhope's horse was twice wounded under him.



“ and marched out of our country ; but neither  
 “ happening, and, on the contrary, the enemies  
 “ applying their thoughts to intercept our convoys,  
 “ we have been obliged to return, and are in a  
 “ strong camp at Balaguer, and expect a reinforce-  
 “ ment of ten battalions, and as many squadrons,  
 “ which will arrive at the end of this month. The  
 “ enemies will even then outnumber us in horse.\*  
 “ . . . I am sorry to say that we have very few de-  
 “ serters, and of those few hardly any Spaniards ;  
 “ and, from all that we can learn, we have good  
 “ reason to be persuaded that the Castillians in  
 “ general, and this army more particularly, are so  
 “ firmly riveted in the Duke of Anjou’s interests,  
 “ that nothing but force can dispossess him.” †

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Meanwhile the result of the Spanish expedition into Catalonia proved equally abortive. At first, indeed, they spread great alarm, by pushing parties as far as Cervera and Calaf, and intercepting several convoys ; but early in July they themselves began to suffer from the scarcity which they were endeavouring to cause. A trifling descent of the Allies at Cette, in Languedoc, though unsuccessful, deprived the Spaniards, at this juncture, of any co-operation from the Duke of Noailles. They could not venture further into Catalonia, with Staremburg and Stanhope in their rear ; and when they learned that the succours of the Allies had actually landed, and their force thus brought to a level with their

\* Letter to Lord Raby, July 4, 1710, MS.

† To Lord Sunderland, July 23, 1710, MS.

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own, they immediately fell back upon Lerida. The approach of these succours (nearly six thousand men) made Stanhope earnestly press upon Staremburg the expediency of venturing a general battle. The Marshal, on the other hand, recommended a strictly defensive system; and his views were approved by Charles, who, like him, was naturally cold and cautious in temper, and more afraid of failure than ambitious of success. As Stanhope, however, did not desist from his remonstrances, the question was referred to a council of war, where the majority declared decidedly against a timid policy, which would tie them down to the limits of an exhausted and murmuring province; which would render useless all the succours they had so long requested, and at length received; and place the crown of Charles farther than ever from his grasp. “In spite, however, of this agreement in the council, I cannot yet determine,” observes Stanhope, on the 23d of July, “whether the King and Marshal will be for hazarding the whole, as they call it; though, in my poor opinion, the whole will certainly be lost, without any chance of winning, if we lose this opportunity. We shall now be very near, if not quite, as strong as the enemies in foot; in horse, I doubt, they will still exceed us twelve or fifteen squadrons; but, considering that every day may bring them reinforcements from the side of Portugal, and that a small reinforcement sent by the French into Roussillon would put us under a necessity to detach, insomuch that every day

“ must make our enemies stronger and us weaker,  
 “ I think it most advisable to try our fortune, now  
 “ that we are nearer to an equality than, I fear, we  
 “ shall ever be again. Besides, one half of the  
 “ enemies’ army is composed of new troops, who  
 “ will grow every day better, and be easily kept  
 “ full; whilst we moulder away by sickness and  
 “ desertion.” \*

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The retreat of the Spanish army upon Lerida  
 seemed to offer an excellent opportunity to cut  
 them off from that fortress; but disinclination to  
 a battle still prevailed, both with Staremberg and  
 Charles; and they could not be persuaded to a for-  
 ward movement, till the enemy had got beyond the  
 Segre and Noguera. They then agreed to follow  
 across those rivers, and to secure, if possible, their  
 own passage without opposition. For this purpose,  
 Stanhope marched, at midnight, with eight squa-  
 drons of dragoons, and a thousand grenadiers, and  
 took post on the Aragon side of the Noguera, at  
 six in the morning of the 27th. The enemy had  
 detached a much larger body to prevent his pas-  
 sage; but, although they had less way to march, the  
 negligence of their commanding officer, the Duke  
 of Sarno, delayed them till too late. They did not  
 arrive till three hours after Stanhope; and then,  
 instead of attacking him, drew up on some high  
 ground, near the village of Almenara. The armies  
 on both sides gradually came up in the course of

July.

\* Letter to Lord Sunderland, July 23, 1710, MS.

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the morning; and Stanhope was very urgent to attack the enemy's horse, which was marching at a great distance from the foot, and must, therefore, have been deprived of its assistance. The Archduke and Marshal still refused; but, about six in the evening, the Spaniards, having brought up all their cavalry, sent as a bravado several squadrons down the hill before them; upon which the whole English army cried out "Shame!" and the English general assumed a higher tone, and said aloud, in presence of Charles and Staremberg, that if they let slip so fair an opportunity, he had orders—which he would obey—to withdraw his troops, and leave the country. This threat at length, wrung from them a reluctant consent; but it wanted now only half an hour of sunset: there was little time to gain, and none to improve, a victory. Stanhope formed his cavalry in two lines, with ten squadrons in the first, and twelve in the second; the ground before him not admitting of a larger front. "Keep very close," he cried to the men; "and do not break yourselves,—the only danger; for I am sure that you will be as firm as rocks, and that all the enemy's squadrons will not be able to break you." So saying, he led them forward against the enemy. On the other part, the advanced squadrons of the Spaniards no sooner saw the English move, than they retired up the hill to rejoin the main body of cavalry, which Stanhope found drawn up in two lines; the first of twenty-two squadrons, and the second of twenty, with a

battalion between them, and a brigade of foot on their right. They were headed by General Ame-  
zaga, and comprized the flower of the Spanish  
army, more especially the royal guards. Finding  
their number so large, and the ground wider than  
that from which he had set out, the English Gene-  
ral, after ascending the hill, halted for a few mi-  
nutes, to bring up six squadrons from the second  
line ; so that his first now consisted of sixteen in  
all : four Dutch, six English, and as many Ger-  
man. As soon as these were formed, the order to  
charge was given, and most gallantly obeyed. In  
the onset, Stanhope's and Amezaga's horses closed,  
and the two Generals engaged in single conflict ; an  
event between opposite commanders not often seen  
in any age, but almost without a parallel in modern  
times. Stanhope killed the Spaniard with a stroke  
of his sword ; and the troops, animated by this  
example, fought with spirit as well as steadiness ;  
soon retrieved, by their united valour, a first  
repulse of the German cavalry, pushed the first  
line of the enemy upon the second, and at length  
completely routed them. Great bravery, however,  
was shown on both sides, as is sufficiently evident  
from the number of the killed and wounded.  
Amongst the English, both the first and second in  
command, Generals Stanhope and Carpenter, were  
slightly wounded ; and the army had to deplore  
the loss of several excellent officers, especially  
Count Nassau and the young Earl of Rochford,—  
the same already honourably mentioned as Lord  
Tunbridge at the capture of Vigo. The total

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number of killed and wounded on this side was about four hundred ; whilst the Spaniards lost above fifteen hundred, amongst whom were the Duke of Sarno, the Marquis of Gironella, and other distinguished officers. A great part of their baggage (including some of Philip's plate) was taken, together with all their tents, and several pieces of cannon. The night gave them an opportunity to retire under the ramparts of Lerida ; " but if," says Stanhope, " we had had but two hours more of " daylight, you may be assured that not one foot " soldier of their army could have escaped." \* Philip himself was present at the battle, and had nearly been taken prisoner ; but was rescued from the danger by the intrepidity of the Marquis of Villadarias and Don Joseph Vallejo, who put themselves at the head of some light cavalry. Several of the soldiers also, with true Castilian spirit, sacrificed their lives for his, by throwing themselves upon the English horsemen, and obtaining by their own deaths some moments of delay in the pursuit ; and I regret that we have no record of the names of such gallant subalterns, which seem to me not

\* Letter to Mr. Walpole, July 31, 1710, printed in Somerville, p. 636. " Si le Seigneur," says a MS. account, written in bad French, by a Spanish officer in Charles's service, " nous " eût fait la même grace qu'il fit à Josué, d'arrêter le soleil de " deux ou trois heures, il n'aurait rien échappé de l'infanterie, et " fort peu de la cavalerie." For the account of the battle of Almenara, I have also consulted Tindal, vol. v. p. 287 ; Targe, vol. v. p. 422 ; San Phelipe, vol. ii. p. 19 ; a letter from General Carpenter, printed in the History of Europe for 1710, p. 550, and one from General Stanhope to Lord Sunderland, July 31, 1710, MS.

less worthy of a place in history than those of the most successful generals.

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The battle of Almenara, though not very important in itself, was attended with important results. Amongst the Allies, it gave a decided preponderance to warlike and aggressive counsels : it altogether dismayed and confounded the new Spanish levies, which before had neither dreaded the Allied generals, nor distrusted their own. The King partook in no small degree of their discouragement, and renewed his entreaties with the Court of Versailles that Vendome, or some other French general, might be sent to Spain ; a request which — the negotiations for peace being now broken off — was no longer refused by Louis. Meanwhile Philip deprived Villadarias of the command, in spite of the personal safety which he owed to the exertions of that gallant veteran, and appointed, in his place, the leader of the Estremaduran army, the Marquis of Bay. But it required some time before the Marquis could obey this summons ; and, in the interval, the extreme hesitation of Philip showed that a narrow escape from danger — which always makes us either much more courageous or much more timid than before — on him produced the latter effect. On the other part, the Allies were not inactive : they took the towns and castles of Balbastro, Monzon, and Estadilla ; and on the 5th of August General Stanhope, marching off at night with two thousand horse, surprised and routed two regiments at Sarineña. He and Staremberg then

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directed their march towards Fraga, showing an evident intention of cutting off the Spanish army from the central provinces, and enclosing it in Lerida. Roused by this danger, Philip suddenly started from his lethargy; and, crossing the Cinca with his army, retreated, by forced marches, upon Zaragoza. He was followed by the Allies, who suffered great hardships from the excessive heats and want of water (besides want of bread for four days), and were not able to bring him to another battle on favourable terms. On the 15th of August, however, some of their cavalry came up with his rear-guard in the defile of Peñalba, and took three hundred prisoners, but were checked in their pursuit. Two days afterwards, the Spanish army reached the capital of Aragon, where their force was increased by some few succours, and their command assumed by the Marquis of Bay.

Zaragoza — a name which has since become synonymous with heroism, and dear to every friend of freedom — is built upon the right bank of the Ebro, and connected by a stone bridge to a suburb on the left. It is neither defended by natural strength nor by fortified skill; being situated on a plain, and its old brick wall being, in many places, joined by houses which continue the enclosure. Two small rivers join the Ebro immediately below the city: from the south, the Guerbera, which cuts through and deeply indents the plain; from the north, the Gallego, which flows through low and



marshy ground.\* The height nearest to the city begins within a mile to the south-east, and is called the Monte Torrero, from its rugged and broken surface.† Thus, then, the Ebro still separated the army of Charles from Zaragoza, and must be passed before any other effective movement could be made. But Charles and Staremberg were both as unwilling as ever to hazard an engagement; and preferred trusting to the affections of the Zaragozans, or to the chance of favourable accidents, rather than to their own exertions. Even the victory of Almenara was turned against its promoters, from the danger of losing the advantage there acquired. With such wavering minds, the best means to prevail is not so much to point out the benefit of any particular line of conduct, as to persuade them that the first step in it will not positively pledge them, that it is not quite final, and still leaves room for future deliberation. On this principle, Stanhope applied himself at first solely to move the army beyond the Ebro; and, having extorted Charles's consent, he went out with two thousand cavalry, and forded that river at Pino, in the night of the 17th. Two days afterwards, a bridge being constructed, the whole army passed, and took up

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\* See a plan of Zaragoza in Colonel Napier's history (vol. ii. p. 48); a local description (vol. i. p. 65); and another in Mr. Southey's account of the sieges in 1808 and 1809 (vol. ii. p. 3. 8vo ed.); one of the most masterly and beautiful narratives in the English language.

† "El campo era desigual y cortado, levantado a trechos y por eso lo llaman Monte Torrero." (San Phelipe, vol. ii. p. 24.)

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its position on the right bank ; and Stanhope even pushed as far as the Carthusian convent, within a league of Zaragoza. On their part, the enemy having marched over the bridge of that city, drew up at a short distance from it ; their left supported on its walls, and their right on the Monte Torrero. The two armies were divided only by a deep ravine : which in old times had been marked by a bloody overthrow of the Moors, and still retained the name of BARRANCA DE LOS MUERTOS, the ditch of the dead.\* Thus arrayed in presence of each other, the impatience of the soldiers seconded the arguments of Stanhope, and over-ruled the colder counsels of Staremborg and Charles. They prepared for a general battle on the next day, the 20th of August ; and it is only doing justice to Staremborg to observe, that, however averse to a battle at first, it had no sooner been resolved upon, than he made every exertion of zeal, judgment, and courage, to bring it to a happy issue. The numbers of the troops on each side are very differently stated by different writers, but the official orders of battle in my possession enable me to speak with certainty instead of conjecture. According to these faithful records the Allied force consisted of thirty-seven battalions and forty-three squadrons ; the Spanish of thirty-eight battalions and fifty-four squadrons ; and I may, therefore, compute the former at about

\* I am informed by my illustrious friend, General Alava, that the ravine is still commonly known by that name.

twenty-three, and the latter at about twenty-five thousand men.\*

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The next morning had hardly dawned before the cannon began to play on both sides ; during which time the generals employed themselves in drawing up and disposing their lines. The Marquis of Bay, who had already shown want of alertness in quietly allowing the passage of the Ebro by the English, by no means retained the confidence of his soldiers ; and, if even he had skill, had not, what is perhaps still more important to a general, the reputation of skill. He took his own station in the centre, intrusted the best veteran Spanish regiments to Generals Mahoni and Joseph Amezaga, and placed them on his right wing, as being the most open to attack. On the part of the Allies, Staremborg commanded their centre, the Conde de Atalaya their right wing, and Stanhope the left ; having under him Generals Carpenter, Belcastel, the Dutch commander, and several others. Neither of the rival sovereigns

\* San Phelipe makes the number of the Allies twenty-five thousand, but reduces his own side to nineteen thousand (vol. ii. p. 24.) ; and Targe, though professing to be guided by him, improves these numbers into thirty thousand on one side, and eighteen thousand on the other (vol. v. p. 431.) On the other hand, the statements of the Allied Generals perfectly agree with the official accounts. General Stanhope, writing to Lord Dartmouth, on the evening of the battle, says of the enemy, " They were in foot at least equal to us, and in horse considerably superior." In a letter of General Carpenter's, printed in Somerville's *Queen Anne*, p. 638., we also find that " they were equal in foot, and very much superior in horse."

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took any further part in the battle than riding through their own lines, and encouraging the troops. That feat being achieved, Charles remained at the Carthusian convent in the rear; and though it is disputed whether Philip took his post on the right or on the left bank of the Ebro, yet that very uncertainty serves at least to show how much his person was concealed from his troops, and how little it served to cheer them. Meanwhile the people of Zaragoza crowded the walls of the city and the roofs of the houses, to behold the great game of war which was to be played so near them, and of whose stake they themselves formed a part. At noon, the firing of two royal grenades into the air gave the allied army the signal for the attack, which was begun by General Stanhope on the left. The expected convoys of bread had miscarried that morning, and the English soldiers were pinched with hunger; but neither privations nor perils could subdue their gallant spirit.\* Their intrepid attack was met with equal valour by the veteran Spaniards and Walloons opposed to them. The conflict was fierce and obstinate. At first the Spaniards seemed to obtain the advantage; having defeated the furthest body on the left of the Allies, consisting of Portuguese

\* General Foy has a disparaging remark on this point, in his *Guerre de la Péninsule* (vol. i. p. 280.):—"Les Anglais sont  
"braves toutes les fois qu'ils ont dormi, bu, et mangé. Leur  
"courage, plus physique que moral, a besoin d'être soutenu par  
"un traitement substantiel." The battle of Zaragoza is one proof amongst a thousand to the contrary.

horse, they chased them from the field; and some even carried the pursuit so far as to threaten the Carthusian convent, where the Archduke, with only fifty horsemen, was awaiting the issue of the day. But this very ardour of pursuit left a gap in their lines, and gave Stanhope an opportunity, of which he eagerly availed himself, for piercing them. Bringing up his reserve, he pushed their first line upon the second, broke them through, and then, with his troops still further animated by their first success, threw them into utter confusion. They fought no longer for victory, but for retreat; and their regular battalions gradually melted into one shapeless mass of fugitives. On the right wing the Spaniards had commenced the onset, but were repulsed with loss; several of their new levies throwing down their arms and dispersing: and in the centre, the Allies, plunging down into the steep Baranca de los Muertos, now again deserving of its name, ascended the opposite bank, amidst the hottest fire of the enemy. The Spaniards here fought with great bravery, but were at last thrown into disorder; and the defeat of their right wing decided theirs. In less than three hours of fighting, the victory was not only certain, but complete. The veterans on the Spanish right, however, though defeated, had no thought of flight: they retreated to the heights beyond the Guerba, continued their resistance against Stanhope's cavalry for some time longer, and did not surrender till reduced to one-fifth of their original number. And now was at length attained the wish which had been nearest

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to Stanhope's heart for three years, and which we find frequently expressed in his letters of "a day  
" to retrieve Almanza."\* All the Spanish cannon (twenty pieces), all their colours (sixty-three standards), were taken, together with nearly four thousand prisoners; and they left above five thousand men dead or disabled on the field. From their dispersion, more especially as regarded their new recruits, they underwent a still further diminution; insomuch that the Marquis of Bay, in his hasty flight to Soria, could muster no more than seven thousand men beneath his banner. As to the Allies, this victory cost them fifteen hundred men. The first care of their generals, after the conflict, was directed to the maimed and suffering soldiers on the field, without any distinction as to the Spanish or their own. "Among the wounded," Stanhope used to say, "there are never any enemies."

Charles himself made his entry into Zaragoza the same evening, amidst the loudest acclamations of the people; and gratified them that very night by the abolition of their new Castillian form of government, and the restoration of all their ancient and peculiar rights. Here the army continued several days; the soldiers in repose, and the generals in deliberation. Staremborg and the Germans, still attached to their cautious policy, and dissuading a march upon Madrid, wished Charles to fix his head-quarters at Zaragoza, and from

\* Letter to Sir Thomas Dilkes, November 6, 1707, MS.; and several others.

thence endeavour to reduce Valencia on the one side, and Navarre on the other. The former province had already shown itself well affected to his cause ; the latter commanded all the passes into France, and, if secured, would stop either the retreat of Philip, or the reinforcements of Louis. “ Conquests,” they said, “ should be made step by step, and not by springs and bounds.”\* Stanhope, on the other hand, as warmly pressed an immediate advance upon the capital. He urged, that as the counsels of Staremburg, a few days before, would, if followed, have lost them the victories of Almenara and Zaragoza, so that at present they were equally inimical to further success. The effect of Charles’s personal presence at Madrid had never yet been tried, and might fairly be presumed as great and effectual : its occupation would give the Allies a most important preponderance in the negotiations for peace ; it would enable them to join the army from Portugal, and thus cut off all communication between the northern and southern provinces of Spain ; it would bereave Philip of his best resources for raising another army, and tend to daunt and disperse the remains of the last. In favour of this scheme, Stanhope might also have alleged the authority of the Duke of Marlborough : for we find that great general, in a letter to Lord Godolphin, stating his own idea for the Spanish war to be, “ collecting an efficient force on both sides of the Peninsula, to advance into the heart

\* San Phelipe, Coment. vol. ii. p. 29.

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“ of Spain, and take possession of Madrid.”\* The same view was taken by the Portuguese officers, by the Conde de Cifuentes, and the other Spanish nobles in the interest of Charles, who talked loudly of their own influence in Castille; and Charles himself, though decidedly most inclined to the other plan, was dazzled by the lustre of the late battles, and awed by the high tone which Stanhope now assumed, declaring that bold measures were insisted upon in his instructions from his Court; that they were weary of maintaining such costly and indecisive warfare, and must have it either vigorously prosecuted or totally abandoned. His plans were accordingly adopted; and he wrote to Lord Galway to prevail upon the Portuguese army to enter Castille with the least possible delay. The allied army then began their march to Madrid, taking their route through Calatayud, Siguenza, and Guadalaxara, and encountering no impediment except from the want of supplies, and rugged nature of the country. “ If,” wrote Charles to his Archduchess at Barcelona, “ this plan of the English should succeed, all the glory will be theirs: if it fail, all the loss will be mine.”

Meanwhile Philip, from the battle-field of Zaragoza, had hurried back to his capital. His reception was very different from that usually given to a defeated and fugitive prince; and the attachment of his subjects, like his own character, seemed to be

\* Letter from the Duke of Marlborough to Lord Godolphin, August 26, 1709, in Coxe's Life, vol. v. p. 93.



raised and strengthened by adversity. The people were only incited to enthusiasm by what might have been expected to dismay them—the royal decree removing the public offices and tribunals to Valladolid; the permission given to the grandees to remain at Madrid, if they pleased; the preparations for departure of the King and Queen and young prince of Asturias; the terrified hurry and bustle of the courtiers; and the ill-concealed exultation of the few Austrian partisans. The same loyal flame seemed to burn in every breast. With very few exceptions, all the nobles clung to what seemed the falling cause, and escorted the King and Queen; the other classes caught their spirit; and nearly thirty thousand persons are said to have crowded the road to Valladolid. Even ladies of high rank were seen to follow on foot, rather than not follow at all; and the people who remained attended the emigrants to the gates with tears and prayers.\*

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It was under such ill-omened circumstances that, on the 21st of September, General Stanhope and a thousand horse—the vanguard of the allied army,—appeared in sight, and took possession of

\* Archdeacon Coxe says, that Philip was only two days at Madrid (Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 81); but he arrived on the 24th of August, and left it on the 9th of September, (Hist. of Europe for 1710, p. 586; and Letter from General Stanhope to Lord Dartmouth, October 4, 1710, MS.) Dr. Somerville makes a much more surprising mistake on the Archduke (Queen Anne, p. 401.) “King Charles,” he says, “entered the metropolis “of Spain a second time.” When was he ever there before?

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Madrid. They found most of the shops, the manufactories, and the private houses closed ; the streets nearly empty, and the few spectators silent.\* Charles himself made his public entry a few days afterwards, with all military pomp ; some of his best cavalry before, and his household and guards behind him. A pious or politic motive led him, in the first place, to visit the church of Atocha, much renowned throughout Spain for its sanctity, and decked with all the standards lost by the Allies at Almanza ; he then entered the city, along with the street of the same name : but neither curiosity to behold the prince who, during the last five years, had claimed the Crown and shared the dominions of Spain,—neither that love of show and splendour so common amongst the starers of a capital,—nor the proneness of all men to bow down before the rising sun,—could tempt the loyal inhabitants. Shut up at home, they left the deserted streets to silence and gloom. A few children who, when money was thrown amongst them, raised a faint and

\* San Phelipe, vol. ii. p. 35. See also a letter from Mr. Lenoir to Mr. Furly, September 25, 1710, MS. “ The 21st, in the morning, Mr. Stanhope was sent with a thousand horse towards this town, and we came within half a mile, about noon, before the magistrates of the town met us, to acknowledge their obedience to King Charles. There were four of them, and two coaches ; who, after a small conference with the General, proceeded to Alcala to the King, except one of the principal of them, that came back with us hither. The people of the town expressed more signs of astonishment at our arrival than any thing else.” There must certainly, however, be a mistake as to this astonishment.

doubtful *VIVA!* were the only welcomers of Charles — their cry the only acclamations. Deeply mortified at a reception so contrary to his hopes, the Archduke soon stopped short, refused to continue his progress to the palace, and indignantly exclaiming, “ This city is a desert ! ” again left Madrid by the gate of Alcala. For a time, he took up his quarters at a country house of the Conde de Aguilar, and attempted to gain the favour of the Castilians by various popular measures, — opening the public prisons ; making promises (they cost nothing) of future gifts and largesses ; filling up the vacant offices ; and splendidly rewarding his ancient adherents, as the best means of attracting new. Nothing, however, could shake the stubborn loyalty of the people ; and very few men of rank and influence espoused his cause. The Marquis of Mancera — that high-minded statesman, of whom the French, even when he was actively opposed to them, were obliged to own that he had no other guide than his duty\*, and now oppressed in strength, but not in spirit, by the weight of a hundred years — had been kept at Madrid by his infirmities. Charles being naturally anxious to obtain the acknowledgment, which this venerable nobleman persisted in withholding, despatched Stanhope to press and persuade him. “ Sir,” replied Mancera, “ I have “ but one God, and but one King ; and during my “ short remnant of life, I am determined to be

\* See the *Mém. de Noailles*, vol. ii. p. 104.

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“ faithful to both.” The few who pursued a different course soon began to undergo the slights and contempt of the very party they had joined; and Staremborg used sarcastically to call them “ the new Christians;” \* a term formerly applied, in Spain, to the converted Jews or Morescoes.

Some extracts from General Stanhope’s letters will show the prospects of the Allies at this period. “ We have despatched several messengers to our friends in Portugal, pressing them to join us, since they have no enemy left on their frontier; and on the success of these instances, which we have repeated to them, will depend the fate of our campaign. They have, in a condition to march, thirty battalions of foot, and above three thousand horse. If they will join us, we shall try to have another battle, which, in all probability, will be decisive: if they do not, we shall have some difficulty in making a retreat to Aragon; for the Duke of Anjou will have above double our number of horse, and be equal at least to us in foot. The country is our enemy; and we are not masters, in Castille, of more ground than we encamp on.” † To a private friend he observes, “ Few men, I believe, have taken so much pains as I am doing to get a Viceroy over himself; that is, to get my Lord Portmore, whom we suppose to be in Portugal, and who (as the senior General) must command all the English, if we do meet, to

\* San Phelipe, Coment. vol. ii. p. 36.

† To Lord Dartmouth, October 4, 1710, MS.

“ join us. I have sent five expresses to press  
 “ them; and have kept our army here from re-  
 “ turning backwards, — too long, it may be, — in  
 “ expectation to hear from them.” \* But the  
 Portuguese army was by no means ready to seize  
 this favourable opportunity, and advance into Cas-  
 tille. Lord Galway had been recalled to England:  
 his successor, Lord Portmore, had not yet arrived;  
 and the command had devolved upon the Conde de  
 Villa Verde, a sluggish and ignorant grandee. The  
 Duke of Cadaval, the chief person at Court, was  
 entirely in the French interest. In vain did Mr.  
 Le Fevre, the English resident, at last lower his  
 demand to a body of only three thousand foot and  
 one thousand horse; in vain did he propose to pay  
 all its expenses; in vain did the Ministers of all the  
 allied powers join in the request; in vain did the  
 Marquis Das Minas, with his characteristic ardour,  
 offer to take the command, and again advance upon  
 Madrid: the Court of Lisbon, looking rather to its  
 own peculiar interests than to the general good of  
 the cause, was chiefly bent upon the reduction of  
 some petty frontier towns; and, besides, could  
 scarcely be roused, for any object, from the torpor  
 which benumbed it.† Thus, the Allies at Madrid had

\* To Mr. Craggs, October 4, 1710, MS.

† “ I believe our best reasons for opening the communication  
 “ were the Duke of Cadaval’s best reasons to oppose us: he  
 “ governs this Court. . . . Count Villa Verde pretends he  
 “ never gave any encouragement to join you. I will allow him  
 “ any thing, provided he will act better another time; but if this  
 “ Court find they must do something, I know they design to

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little to rely on but their own exertions. “ During  
“ our long stay here,” writes General Stanhope, at  
the beginning of November, “ two things have  
“ been proposed to be done: the one, to march  
“ against the Duke of Anjou at Valladolid, before  
“ he could join or be joined by his forces from Es-  
“ tremadura, and so drive him over the Ebro. To  
“ this it was objected, that he might, indeed, be  
“ obliged to throw his foot into the mountains of  
“ Gallicia or Biscay; but that his horse would still  
“ keep the field, and hover about us, to prevent our  
“ getting in subsistence from the country; that, the  
“ minute we should march to execute this resolu-  
“ tion, we should abandon Madrid, and all that we  
“ had got; that moving towards the Ebro, though  
“ it were to follow the enemy, would look like a re-  
“ treat, especially since the army of Estremadura  
“ was entire, and might, without much hazard, fol-  
“ low us; and that, having no place of strength,  
“ where we could leave a sick man, we should lose  
“ all such as could not keep up, and march with  
“ the army; so that probably we should waste  
“ ourselves in the pursuit of an enemy who would  
“ never have stayed for us, secure to ourselves no  
“ steady footing, but, in all likelihood, be obliged  
“ to return to Aragon to winter quarters. The  
“ other thing proposed to be done was, that, consi-

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“ send the Marquis das Minas. If Villa Verde continues, you  
“ may judge they mean to be neuter.” Mr. Le Fevre to General  
Stanhope, October 6, 1710, MS. See also Coxe’s Life of Marl-  
borough, vol. v. p. 380.

“ dering the uncertainty of the Portuguese army’s  
 “ making any advance towards joining us, we  
 “ should secure the said junction by marching on  
 “ to the bridge of Almaraz, or further, if we found  
 “ it necessary. To this it was objected, that our  
 “ communication with Aragon and Catalonia  
 “ would be entirely lost; that Aragon would be  
 “ left open either to the Duke of Anjou’s forces,  
 “ or to what might be sent from France; and  
 “ that, if the Duke of Anjou, reinforced from  
 “ France, should once possess himself of the Ebro  
 “ and Cinca, Catalonia and the Queen would be  
 “ exposed to the utmost danger. I confess these  
 “ objections did not weigh with me; for I was of  
 “ opinion that a communication with Portugal  
 “ would more than compensate for the loss of that  
 “ with Aragon; that succours from France would  
 “ hardly get into Spain before winter; that without  
 “ succours from France, the force which the Duke  
 “ of Anjou had at Valladolid was not sufficient to  
 “ over-run Aragon and Catalonia, where we had  
 “ left, as I thought, too many forces; and that,  
 “ when once the Portugal army should have joined  
 “ ours, we should be able to drive every thing be-  
 “ fore us.”\* This scheme was several times very  
 earnestly pressed by Stanhope upon Staremburg  
 and Charles, but always in vain. Like all cautious

\* To Lord Dartmouth, November 6, 1710, MS. The French were, it seems, particularly anxious that the Allies might not adopt this plan, nor march forwards. See the *Mém. de Noailles*, vol. iv. p. 152.

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men, when persuaded into any daring step, they wished to atone for their reluctant advance to Madrid by still further reserve in their subsequent operations ; as if, on the contrary, one bold measure did not require others of the same character to carry it through.

During this time Philip had been joined, at Valladolid, by his long-expected general, the Duke of Vendome, on whom all the hopes of his party were now centred. Vendome was grandson of Henry the Fourth, by one of his mistresses ; and bore, in character, the same sort of resemblance to that great man as a caricature to a portrait, or a satire to a history. He had similar defects and similar virtues ; but the former much heightened, and the latter far less splendid. Like Henry, he was addicted to pleasure ; but it was pleasure of the most infamous kind : like Henry, he had both bravery and skill in war ; but the edge of these qualities was blunted by his indolence. “ It seemed,” says Voltaire, “ not a little astonishing to see a general-  
“ in-chief often keeping his bed till four in the  
“ afternoon ; and a prince, sprung from the blood  
“ royal, sunk into such foul and filthy neglect of his  
“ person as would have disgraced the meanest pea-  
“ sant.”\* In moments of pressing emergency, however, he knew how to cast off such slothful habits ; and still more frequently atoned for them

\* Siècle de Louis XIV. ch. 17. St. Simon gives many disgusting details (Mém. vol. v. p. 39, ed. 1829) ; but all that he says is coloured by his rancour as a bitter personal enemy.



by presence of mind and great personal exposure. The manners of Vendome displayed a singular contrast. Whilst to the soldiers he was in the highest degree kind and affable, men of rank and influence complained of his overbearing harshness; and it is not improbable that, in both cases, he acted upon deliberate system, as knowing that troops will fight with double alacrity under a favourite leader; and that at Courts there is no delusion more common than to mistake a morose and dissatisfied temper for honesty and frankness. Few men have ever shown themselves less amiable in private, or more able in public life. He had been early trained to arms, and had several opportunities of most highly distinguishing himself; having, for example, directed the siege of Barcelona twelve years before, and succeeded in wresting that important city from the Spaniards.

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Vendome had set out from Versailles on the very day of the battle of Zaragoza, and received intelligence of that disaster on his way.\* Instead of hastening forward on that account, as most generals would have done, he determined to remain for some time longer at Bayonne, on the pretence of illness; and to hold several conferences on the state of affairs with the Duke of Noailles, who had proceeded from Roussillon to meet him. In moments of danger and difficulty, it is often most prudent to remain inactive, to watch the progress of events, or await the clearing of the storm; but

Aug. 20.

\* St. Simon, Mém. vol. ix. p. 17, ed. 1829.

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no truth is so difficult to impress upon little minds, which always look upon repose as ruin, and think that to act injudiciously is far better than not to act at all.

The object of Vendome was, no doubt, that his first appearance in Spain should be signalised by vigorous measures; and should, therefore, be delayed till it was possible to take them. He arrived just at the favourable moment, when the dismay struck by the battles of Almenara and Zaragoza had subsided, and when the general enthusiasm of the people was not only restoring them to confidence, but rousing them to action. A corresponding spirit was shown by Philip and his Queen: they disdainfully rejected some overtures of the Duke of Noailles for relinquishing the Spanish crown, and accepting the Italian dominions in its stead; and they declared, that, even if driven from Spain, they would embark for Mexico or Peru, and found another Spanish monarchy beyond the Atlantic.\* One of the first measures of Vendome was to display, and at the same time to confirm, the good disposition of the grandees, by inducing them to sign a public declaration of their allegiance to Philip; and a little incident, which occurred on this occasion, is far too characteristic of the old Spanish pride to be passed over. When the grandees signed this declaration, most of them added to their names the words "Noble as the King."

\* *Mém. de Torcy*, vol. iii. p. 2. The negotiation of Noailles is most minutely detailed in his *Memoirs*, vol. iv. pp. 135—158.

Vendome, seeing the necessity of conciliation; bore this with patience for some time; but when one of them, besides these words, wrote down “and a little more,” he could no longer restrain his anger. “Heavens!” he exclaimed, “dare you call in question the nobility of the House of Bourbon, — the most ancient in Europe!” “True,” replied the Spaniard; “but remember, my Lord Duke, that, after all, King Philip the Fifth is a Frenchman, and that I am a Castilian!”\*

Such feelings of pride, however, were entwined with as strong feelings of loyalty, honour, and self-sacrifice; and, far from overshadowing, supported, the throne of Philip. The attachment shown and the exertions made by every rank, on this occasion, so closely resembled those of 1706, that I could scarcely detail them without repeating my former narrative. They struck with surprise all those who had watched the long decline, and apparent helplessness of Spain. But in states, as in sick men; languor is frequently mistaken for weakness; and an attack begun in expectation of the latter serves as a remedy to rouse them from the former. Men, money, arms, provisions,—all these had at first been wanting; but all were quickly found by the zeal of the Castilians, and applied to the best advantage by the skill of Vendome. In a very

\* This anecdote — curious and but little known — may be found in Mr. Butler's *Revolutions of the Germanic Empire*, p. 275.

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short time a new army had sprung up, fresh and ready for action. The chief fear of the French general was, now, lest the Allies at Madrid should effect their junction with the Portuguese; and, to guard against this danger, he marched at the earliest possible moment, and with all the force he could collect, from Valladolid to Salamanca, and thence across the Sierra de Guadarrama to the bridge of Almaraz upon the Tagus. Here he and Philip found themselves at the head of four-and-twenty thousand men; an army superior to those either at Madrid or on the Portuguese frontier, and, both by its position and its numbers, preventing any further idea of junction between them. Easily disheartened, the Portuguese immediately withdrew into winter quarters; and, under such circumstances, Vendome triumphantly predicted, that not even fifty thousand men would enable the Allies to maintain themselves at Madrid.\*

Their situation, indeed, was daily becoming more embarrassing, and their conviction stronger, that Castille—a country of open plains, but resolute inhabitants—may soon be over-run, but never be subdued. It is a morsel easy to swallow, but hard to digest; which, instead of nourishing, oppresses, its devourer. Having to cope with the disaffection of the people,—straitened for want of supplies,—debarred from all communication with Aragon or the sea,—they were, moreover, surrounded and pent in by irregular bodies of cavalry,

\* *Mém de Noailles*, vol. iv. p. 159.

under Don Feliciano Bracamonte and Don Joseph Vallejo ; skilful partisans, who pushed their incursions to the very gates of Madrid, and were once on the point of carrying off the Archduke, when hunting in the Pardo. The rejection of Stanhope's proposal for marching to Almaraz, and the subsequent seizure of that position by Vendome, had lost the Allies every chance of junction with the Portuguese ; yet, notwithstanding these gloomy circumstances, they formed the bold resolution of wintering in Castille, taking Toledo as their headquarters and central point of operations. Accordingly, they prepared to repair and increase its means of defence. Built as it is on the crest of a craggy mountain, and surrounded on three sides by the Tagus, it must always be a position of strength and importance ; but, in its present ruinous streets and listless inhabitants, it is not easy to recognise a city once so universally renowned for its superiority of workmanship, that — to give one instance — the golden ornaments for the great mosque at Mecca were manufactured there, and conveyed upon mules through Africa\* ; a city once proverbial in Spain for the refinement and politeness of its people† ; a city once the seat of arms, of arts, and of learning.

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The project of the Allies to winter at Toledo, though skilfully planned and firmly resolved upon,

\* Burckhardt's Travels in the Hedjaz, p. 166.

† See Don Quixote (part ii. ch. xix. vol. v. p. 305, ed. Paris, 1814).

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was marred before it had time to ripen. Two things had been agreed upon at Valladolid, during the negotiations of the Duke of Noailles; first, that the Spanish Queen and tribunals should, for greater security, remove to Vittoria; and secondly, that Noailles himself should, if possible, as a diversion, invade Catalonia from Roussillon. In pursuance of the latter resolution, he hastened to Perpignan; prepared a large train of artillery for sieges, and advanced close upon the Spanish frontier with a considerable force, to the great alarm of the Archduchess and the Government at Barcelona. Their regular channel of communication with Charles was then cut off; but one of her letters reached him by means of a deserter, and warned him of the impending attack. This intelligence brought matters to a crisis; and Charles determined that he, at all events, would return to Catalonia. The army, as had been already settled on the former plan, marched first to Ciempozuelos, a village between Madrid and Toledo, bearing with them, as the reward of their exertions, and trophy of their valour, the standards which had been lost at Almanza, and deposited in the church of Atocha. But scarcely had Charles left the capital, before the ill-suppressed hatred of its inhabitants burst forth, and he could hear upon his march the unwelcome sounds of a general and joyful ringing of the bells.\* From the camp of Ciempozuelos he

Nov. 9.

Nov. 18.

\* San Phelipe, Coment. vol. ii. p. 44. The sound of acclamations is only to be found in the French translation. As to the

set out for Catalonia, with an escort of two thousand horse. Thus the cavalry of the Allies — of course the most important force in such an open country — was greatly diminished at this critical moment, and the confidence of the officers and soldiers as much lessened by the retreat of their sovereign. Still, however, they might perhaps have held their ground in Castille ; but, with the single exception of Stanhope, all the members of the council of war were of opinion that the army should retreat also. “ We shall, therefore,” wrote the English General\*, “ abandon Toledo, and seek for quarters nearer Aragon. I was very unwilling to consent to this alteration ; but such and so many dangers and difficulties were alleged and urged by every one in the Councils of War, that my dissenting would not have signified any thing : nor would I continue to insist, because, in truth, the experiment would have been hazardous ; and though I believe the thing to be possible, yet there is no answering for events. However, I have insisted and prevailed thus far, as to delay this resolution for some time ; in which I had principally the following consideration in view : — It is probable there will be on foot negotiations of peace at the

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story about the proposed destruction of Madrid by the Archduke, and the intercession of Staremberg and Stanhope to save the city, I look upon it as a mere party fiction, circulated at the time, to blacken the character of Charles.

\* To Lord Dartmouth, Nov. 18, 1710, MS.

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“ time the Parliament shall begin, and that our  
“ being, at such a time, considered as masters of  
“ Toledo and the greatest part of Castille, or as  
“ withdrawn to the borders of Aragon, might be  
“ very much to our advantage or disadvantage in  
“ a treaty ; and I will, for this reason, continue to  
“ gain time as long as it shall be possible.”

With these views, Stanhope deferred the retreat of the Allies till the close of November. But on the 28th, he marched from Ciempozuelos, with two thousand men, to bring off the garrison of Toledo ; whilst the head-quarters of the army were transferred to Chinchon. The governor of Toledo for the Allies was the Portuguese Conde de Atalaya. He had begun to fortify the city with palisadoes and entrenchments ; and, considering the lofty Alcazar as the citadel, had filled it with his stores. These, it being impossible to remove for want of carriage, he determined to destroy ; and set fire to them, but so carelessly, or so malignantly, as to do considerable damage to the building. This splendid structure — raised on the ruins of the ancient Moorish palace by Charles the Fifth, and decked on every side with his imperial eagle and proud motto, PLUS OULTRE — bears to this day most grievous marks of the devastation ; and I found the belief universally held and asserted in Toledo, that the national animosity of the Portuguese troops had seized this opportunity to wreak itself on one of the noblest fabrics of Castille. This charge seems to be countenanced by the authority of San



Phelipe \*, but may, not improbably, spring only from that very national rancour which it is so ready to impute. The allied troops at Chinchon were rejoined by Stanhope on the 30th of November, and continued stationary till the 3d of next month, when they commenced their retreat to Aragon. They foresaw great distress for provisions; having no magazines of corn, nor carriage to transport it, had there even been any. Such was the poverty of the country, and the unfriendliness of the people, and such the consequent want of bread amongst the troops, that of late they had only been able to subsist by being quartered in villages at a great distance from each other, and left to provide for themselves. It was therefore unavoidable in their retreat to march in small and separate bodies, so as to spread over a great extent of country, and glean its scanty supplies. The English, under Stanhope, took the left; the Germans, under Staremburg, the centre; and the Spaniards and Portuguese, under Atalaya, the right. It was arranged that the English should proceed, in three marches, to Brihuega; the Germans, in four, to Cifuentes (two small towns about five hours march asunder), and there halt, to bake fresh supplies of bread, and settle the order of march for their future retreat.

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Meanwhile, the army of Philip had advanced from Almaraz to Talavera de la Reyna, where he

\* Comentarios, vol. ii. p. 45.

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was met by deputies from his capital, entreating his speedy return, and offering a contribution of money, which — impoverished as they were by the enemy — they had cheerfully raised for his service. Leaving the troops to push forward along the Tagus, the King, accompanied by Vendome, hastened to Madrid, which he entered in triumph on the very day that the allied army was breaking up from Chinchon. He was received with something better than pomp or pageant — the loud, repeated, and affectionate acclamations of his people. Eager to behold him, their throngs encumbered his carriage, and delayed his progress; and the city, which all day resounded with their loyal greetings, at night blazed forth in general illumination. On his part, Philip gave every token of his gratitude and attachment to his brave Castillians; and learning that the infirmities of the Marquis of Mancera still confined him to his room, went from the palace to see and to thank him. “This was, I believe, the only occasion,” says St. Simon, — whose authority on all points of ceremonial is supreme, — “when any King of Spain had ever paid a visit to a subject since that of Philip the Second to the death-bed of the ill-requited Duke of Alva; who, seeing the King approach, exclaimed, ‘It is too late!’ turned aside, and never spoke again.”\* But the moments were now too pre-

\* St. Simon, *Mém.* vol. ix. p. 27, ed. 1829. It may be observed, that the descendant of the Duke of Berwick now possesses the title of Alva, and also that of another celebrated

eious for delay. While the Spanish troops were pressing forward, night and day, along the Tagus, with a speed almost unparalleled in such rugged country, Philip and Vendome set out again from Madrid to rejoin them, on the third day after their arrival. Coming up to the river Henares, they found it — so scanty a rill in summer — swollen to a torrent by the winter rains; but the infantry marched over the bridge at Guadalaxara; and Vendome, plunging into the stream with his cavalry, swam across. Such impetuosity soon brought them up with the nearest body of the Allies, which, from its position on the left, was Stanhope's. He had, according to the previous arrangement, arrived at Brihuega on the night of the 6th, having seen no enemy on his way, except some twelve hundred of Vallejo's cavalry, with which he had skirmished the day before. The troops under his command were about five thousand five hundred, all British, except one battalion of Portuguese, commanded by British officers. He had no suspicion whatever that any enemy besides Vallejo's partisan horsemen was within several marches; and relying for information on the great rewards he had promised the peasants who should bring any, he did not place on the neighbouring heights any outposts or advanced guards, which might have given notice of Vendome's approach. Nor does this omission appear to me at all negligent or blameable in Stan-

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Spanish statesman (Olivares), by female succession. (Guia de Grandeza, 1824, p. 206.)

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hope, since, with a body of twelve hundred partisan cavalry hovering around him, he could scarcely in any case have stationed such outposts with advantage or with safety; if stationed near the town they would see little or nothing to report; if at a distance they would be attacked and cut off by Vallejo.

Brihuega is a small town on the river Tajuna, begirt with an old Moorish wall, and closely surrounded on all sides but one with high hills. On the 7th of December it was searched by the troops for corn and barley, and they succeeded in finding some; whilst Stanhope sent to Staremburg an account of his progress and position. “On the 8th, “at about eleven o’clock,” — I use his own words to Lord Dartmouth,—“there appeared some horse “upon the hills near the town; upon which, I “ordered out a party to reconnoitre; but the “enemies thickening, we thought it to no purpose “to send it, because we knew they might have the “same twelve hundred horse which had observed “us, and we could not send out half their number. “About three in the afternoon, they began to show “some foot; till which time nobody with me, nor, “I believe, did the Marshal imagine, that they had “any foot within some days’ march of us. And “our misfortune is owing to the incredible diligence which their army made; for, having as “we since learnt, decamped from Talavera the 1st “of December, they arrived before Brihuega the “8th, which is forty-five long leagues; and such

“ was the disposition of the country,—so favourable  
 “ to themselves, and so adverse to us,—that, during  
 “ the eight days they marched, no manner of ad-  
 “ vice came to us of it.” At five o’clock, the  
 Spaniards could already muster six thousand ca-  
 valry and three thousand foot ; and the rest of their  
 army was every moment coming up in detach-  
 ments. One body, under the Marquis of Valde-  
 cañas, passing the Tajuna, took possession of its  
 bridge (two gunshots from the town), and thus  
 interposed between Staremburg and Stanhope, so  
 as to prevent the latter’s retreat.

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Before the town was thus completely invested, Stanhope had with some difficulty sent out Captain Cosby, one of his aides-de-camp, to apprise Marshal Staremburg of his danger, and request immediate assistance. Though with no artillery, and but scanty ammunition, and surrounded by a force at least fourfold of his own, he was fully determined on the most obstinate resistance ; returned a becoming answer to a summons of surrender from Vendome, and passed the night in preparing the dispositions of the troops and the defences of the town. Its old brick wall was nowhere flanked, and in very few places broad enough to allow of men standing upon it. But Stanhope strongly barricaded the gates, made entrenchments in the streets, and loopholes for musketry in the houses ; and his preparations, notwithstanding the shortness of the time and the want of tools, were so extensive and so complete, that, even according to the enemy’s confession, they seemed rather to betoken

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the labour of several weeks than of a single night.\* The Spaniards, on their part, having brought up their artillery, were as busily employed all night in raising batteries; and these began to play at day-break. Besides their battering cannon, they could also — the town being so closely surrounded and overtopped by hills — command most of the streets by field-pieces on the heights; so that there was hardly any place where the garrison was not exposed. The fire lasted all the morning. The Spaniards having then made two considerable breaches in the walls, and found a second summons to surrender treated like the first, moved all their troops within musket-shot on every side of the town, and began a general assault with all their grenadiers, supported by no less than thirty-two battalions. At the same time that they were storming the breaches, they sprung a mine under one of the gates, which they blew up, with part of the wall, and then poured in a torrent of troops. Some of them had also found means to break passages from the wall into some houses which joined it, and which they occupied in considerable numbers, before they were perceived. But the English fought with the most determined intrepidity; and, in spite of the presence and exhortations of Vendome, repulsed and beat out again the enemy at every point. So close and constant was the fire of their musketry from all the streets and houses, that the assailants could compare it to a conflagration. Even when, after

\* Targe, Hist. vol. v. p. 467.

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two or three hours' fighting, their ammunition was exhausted, their courage was not : even with their bayonets they more than once forced back the Spaniards, and when no other resource was left, the town was preserved for some time by setting fire to the houses in which the enemies had taken post, and in which many of them now perished by the flames. " I must do that justice," says Stanhope, " to all the officers and men, that all was done by them which could be done ; the horse and dragoons having taken their share of the business on foot. Should I ever, after this misfortune, be again intrusted with troops, I never desire to serve with better men than all showed themselves to be ; and whatever other things I may have failed in through ignorance, I am truly conscious to myself, that, in the condition we were reduced to, I could not do a better service to the Queen, than endeavour to preserve them by the only way that was left." Accordingly, at seven in the evening, there not being then five hundred men who had any ammunition left, Stanhope beat the chamade, and obtained from Vendome a capitulation, highly honourable, at such an extremity, to the courage of the besieged.\* It ad-

\* The original of the Capitulation of Brihuega, signed by the Duke of Vendome, is amongst General Stanhope's papers. Its articles are as follows : —

1. Que la garnison de Briguega sera prisonnière de guerre, et qu'elle sortira demain, dixième Décembre.

2. Que les officiers, tant généraux qu'autres, et cavaliers, dragons et soldats, et autres personnes appartenantes à la dite



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mitted that they should remain prisoners of war ; but amongst other stipulations, it expressly provided in its third article, that the officers and soldiers of each regiment should not in their captivity be se-

garnison, ou domestiques, sortiront avec tout leur bagage, sans qu'il soit permis, sous quelque pretexte que ce puisse être, d'enlever ou fouiller la moindre partie des dits équipages, ou de dépouiller aucun officier, soldat, ou autre personne, ni pendant la sortie, ni pendant tout le temps qu'ils resteront prisonniers.

3. Que S. A. Monseigneur le Duc de Vendôme promet que, pendant tout le temps que la dite garnison sera prisonnière, les officiers et soldats de chaque régiment ne seront point séparés les uns des autres.

4. Que la dite garnison sera conduite, en tout, ou en partie, par le droit chemin à quelques villes d'Espagne, voisines de la mer, pour y rester jusqu'à ce que l'on convienne d'un échange, et que la dite garnison, ni aucune partie d'elle, sera contrainte de marcher plus de trois lieues par jour.

5. Que Monseigneur le Duc de Vendôme s'oblige de garantir la dite garnison, et toute partie d'elle, contre toute insulte des paysans ou des autres pendant le temps qu'elle continuera prisonnière.

6. Que Monseigneur le Duc de Vendôme fera fournir le pain régulièrement aux cavaliers, dragons, et fantassins de la dite garnison.

7. Qu'on laissera à Briguega tous les malades et blessés, tant officiers que soldats, auxquels on fournira pareillement le pain ; et on espère que Monseigneur le Duc de Vendôme donnera ordre qu'on leur donne toute l'assistance dont ils pourront avoir besoin.

Accordé à condition que l'on nous donnera, dès à présent, la porte près du château, et que la garnison entrera tout-à-l'heure dans le château ou dans les églises où M. le Comte d'Aguilar leur marquera, et leurs chevaux (leurs quartiers ?) dans le château.

Fait au camp sous Oirouga, (Brihuega ?) à neuf heures du soir.

LOUIS DE VENDÔME.



parated from each other. Thus this brave body of men, which had fought with so much gallantry, during the whole of this chequered campaign, laid down the arms they had used so well, before the enemy they had so lately overthrown. Their loss in killed and wounded exceeded six hundred, and that of the Spaniards was admitted to be more than double.

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Such was the capitulation of Brihuega ; of which I can sincerely say, that the most minute researches, and most impartial intentions, have not enabled me to discover any error or neglect in General Stanhope, unless it be his failing at first to place outposts on the neighbouring hills ; and this, for the reason I have stated, I believe to have been a necessary and unavoidable omission. In all the rest, he clearly appears to me unfortunate, not blamable. Any further fault of his I may have wanted the judgment to discern, but not, I hope, the candour to avow.\*

\* For the affair of Brihuega, I have consulted—first, the detailed official account of General Stanhope, in a letter to Lord Dartmouth, dated Jan. 2, 1711, MS.; the correspondence between him and Marshal Staremberg, Dec. 6, 7, 8, 1710, MS.; a letter from Marshal Staremberg to Charles, printed in the History of Europe for 1710, p. 617; Tindal's History, vol. v. pp. 297—300; Targe, vol. v. pp. 463—468; and San Phelipe, Coment. vol. ii. pp. 48—52. There is also a letter from Brigadier Pepper to the Duke of Marlborough, dated March 29, 1711, and printed in Coxe's Life of Marlborough (vol. v. p. 384, 8vo. ed.); the only evidence, as far as I know, which does otherwise than praise Stanhope's obstinate defence. But I may be allowed to observe that, First, Brigadier Pepper

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The prisoners were marched off from Brihuega early next day, for fear of a rescue; and Stanhope and most of his officers were taken to Valladolid. But the capitulation was shamefully violated: the soldiers being dispersed in villages, and none of their officers allowed to accompany them; besides their being in some places chained like galley slaves, and made to pay for the very water they drank.\*

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had a personal animosity against Stanhope, having received some rebukes from him before the battle of Zaragoza. So early as August 4, 1708, Stanhope says in a letter to the Duke of Marlborough, MS.—“I should be very unwilling to leave any troops under Mr. Pepper’s care.” Secondly, It appears from the opening phrase of Brigadier Pepper’s letter—“As your Grace never condemns any one unheard;” and his hope of “your Grace’s favourable opinion,” that he thought his own character at stake. Thirdly, On some points, such as saying he fought for half an hour after the chamade was beat, he is certainly wrong, and cannot, therefore, safely be trusted in other assertions. Fourthly, Archdeacon Coxe himself, who prints the letter, attaches no credit to it, since he extols Stanhope’s “desperate resistance.”

\* Letter from General Stanhope to the Duke of Vendome, Jan. 28 and Feb. 11; to the Conde de Aguilar, Feb. 11; and an answer from the Duke of Vendome, Feb. 11, 1711, MS. “Les prisons de Valladolid,” says the Duke, in excuse, “ne sçauraient contenir un si grand nombre de soldats.” As my last extract from General Stanhope’s papers, the reader may not, perhaps, be displeased to see one of his private letters to his friends during his captivity. “I did every thing I thought for the best: fortune hath crushed me, and I know no remedy but patience. I am sensible how I shall be arraigned in England; but I assure you that thought is not half so mortifying to me as the consequences to the public. I don’t know when I may expect to see you: and, what is worse, they are so particularly jealous of my corresponding any where that I don’t know whether even this letter will come to you.

Stanhope did not fail to make the most energetic remonstrances, and received in return much civility, and some little redress. During the whole of this year, and part of the next, negotiations were on foot for an exchange of prisoners; but so many were the delays and difficulties to thwart it, that it was not concluded till a few months before the peace. General Stanhope was exchanged for the Duke of Escalona, the late Viceroy of Naples, but only returned to England in August 1712.

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The capitulation of Brihuega, far from satisfying the ambition of Vendome, seemed only a spur to further exploits; and, hoping to bring the diminished troops of the Allies to a general battle, he next morning drew up his army to meet them, upon a gentle height, in the plain of Villa Viciosa. Staremborg, on his part, was marching to Stanhope's relief, certainly with less despatch than the exigency of the case required, although possibly with as much as the difficulties of the country and of his own position would allow. He was only five

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“ If I continue long a prisoner, which is not unlikely, I shall  
 “ grow a philosopher, having no other comfort but books, yet  
 “ even those are not to be found here; and to give you a  
 “ taste of the literature of this country, I must tell you what  
 “ happened to me two days since with the Jesuits. I desired  
 “ some books out of their library, which they had courteously  
 “ offered, amongst others a Demosthenes. They sent me the  
 “ next day a book well bound, and on the back ‘ Demosthenes,’  
 “ writ in gilt letters; I opened it, and found it to be Tully;  
 “ it might have been the Alcoran for aught they knew.” To  
 Sir John Cropley, Feb. 21, 1711, MS.

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hours' march from Brihuega, and had been apprised of its investment, by Captain Cosby, in the night of the 8th; and yet it was not till late in the morning of the 10th that the vanguard of his troops came in sight.\* They fired several cannon-shots, as a signal to Stanhope; and though fearing, from the silence that prevailed, that he must already have surrendered, they continued to advance. Their force was, by the loss of the English, brought down to thirteen thousand men, while the enemy had at least twenty thousand; but these were weakened and worn out by their fierce conflict the day before, after so many forced marches.

Marshal Staremberg, perceiving the great superiority of the enemy, rendered still more striking from their extended lines, halted his army; and, after some deliberation, resolved, if possible, to avoid an engagement. As, however, in his advanced position, it would be in the enemy's power to force it, he commenced a slight cannonade, with the view of amusing them, and concealing his purpose, until night should cover his retreat. But Vendome, discerning his intention, determined to

\* See Tindal, vol. v. p. 299. The Marshal waited patiently three hours for one regiment (Du Bourgay's). This and two other English regiments (Lepel's and Richards's), having been in advance, near Staremberg's division, were not enclosed in Brihuega, nor included in the capitulation. According to Bishop Burnet, "it was conjectured Staremberg envied the glory Stanhope had got, and was not sorry to see it eclipsed, and therefore made not that haste he might and ought to have done." Hist. of his own Times, vol. ii. p. 556. fol. ed.

mar it by a vigorous onset. He induced Philip to put himself at the head of his guards on the right wing (really commanded by the Marquis of Valdecañas); the left he intrusted to the Conde de Aguilar, and the centre to the Conde de Las Torres. As for himself, he assumed no particular station, and was ready to rush towards any quarter which might require his presence. On the part of the Allies, Staremborg, seeing the preparations of the enemy, lost no time in making his own. Though, as usual, too cautious and doubtful in his previous movements, he could not be exceeded in the skill with which he chose his position, nor in the courage with which he maintained it. He strengthened his left by placing it behind a rugged ravine, and his right, by judiciously interlining squadrons of cavalry with the foot; and here, as at the most difficult and important station, he himself remained. The command of the infantry in the centre was given to Don Antonio de Villaroel, one of the few who had lately espoused the cause of Charles, and now serving his new master with great military talent, and the usual zeal of a convert. The attack was begun, about three in the afternoon, on the Spanish right, where the presence of the King had wrought the troops to the highest pitch of ardour. Eager to deserve his praises, the whole body rushed down the ravine before it, and charged the left of the Allies, with so much spirit and success, that it drove off their cavalry from the field, and threw their foot into confusion. In vain did

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their best officers throw themselves forward : their rout continued, their cannon was captured, the two Generals Belcastel and St. Amant fell dead, and the soldiers every where gave way. But the Spaniards, partly in pursuit of the retreating cavalry, and partly in plunder of the undefended baggage, now pushed forward so far, as entirely to separate from the main part of their army, and leave it open to attack. This opportunity was speedily seen, and as speedily seized, by Staremborg. The battle had become general along the lines, when suddenly the Spaniards perceived the right wing of their adversaries form for a charge, draw closer their ranks, push forward with irresistible ardour—in another moment they felt them—their soldiers confident as under a tried and trusted leader, and evidently guided by the coolest head and most undaunted heart—Staremborg was there!

The onset of the allied right was seconded by Villaroel in the centre ; and both, notwithstanding their inferiority of numbers, were successful. The first line of the Spaniards was broken, and the second driven back. Vendome himself, and King Philip, who, with a part of his cavalry, had returned from the right to the main body, were wrapt in the crowd of fugitives, and hurried along with them. The German Marshal not only retook his own cannon, but captured theirs. The day seemed utterly lost ; and Vendome had already given orders for a retreat towards Torrija, when the Marquis of Valdecañas, bringing up the victorious

right, together with the reserves, fell upon the flank of the Allies, and once more turned the fortune of the day. The Spaniards in front, animated by the intrepid example of Vendome, from fugitives became pursuers. Still, however, Staremborg kept them gallantly at bay, when, fortunately for his inferior forces, night put an end to the conflict, and left him in full possession of the field of battle. The enemy had lost all their cannon, he several of his standards. Their killed and wounded amounted to four thousand: his own, though less, were very considerable; and, under such circumstances, the honour of the day, which was confidently claimed on both sides, seems rather due to his. At all events, his very enemies joined in admiring the conduct, courage, and presence of mind, which he displayed on this trying occasion, and which atoned for his previous errors in the course of the campaign.\* He passed the night on the well-fought field, and the Spaniards on the neighbouring heights. It is said, that the royal baggage not being yet come up, and Philip not provided with a bed: "You shall have the most glorious bed," cried Vendome, "that ever monarch slept on!" and so saying, he ordered the standards taken in

\* "Nunca tuvo General alguno de exercito mas presencia de animo en accion tan sangrienta," &c. (San Phelipe, Coment. vol. ii. p. 59.) There are two interesting letters on this battle, one from Brigadier Lepel to Lord Dartmouth, dated Zaragoza, Dec. 21, 1710, and printed in Tindal, vol. v. p. 303; and the other from Philip to Louis XIV., printed in the appendix to the second volume of the Mémoires de Berwick, p. 361.

CHAP. the battle to be brought together, and spread upon  
 VIII. the ground for a couch.

1710. But though Staremburg might, perhaps, claim  
 Dec. 11. all the honours of a victory, there is no doubt that  
 he suffered all the disadvantages of defeat. His  
 heavy loss in men, and the impossibility of main-  
 taining his ground in Castille, induced him to begin  
 his retreat before daybreak ; spiking all his cannon,  
 for want of means to transport it, and proceeding  
 by forced marches to Aragon. In his retreat he  
 was continually harassed, and lost many hundred  
 men by the activity of Vallejo and his partisan  
 cavalry : he found himself quite unable to defend  
 1711. Zaragoza ; and, continuing his disastrous march to  
 Feb. Barcelona, arrived there with a wretched remnant  
 of less than seven thousand men. Philip, on his  
 part, entered without opposition the capital of  
 Aragon, where he was joined by his Queen, and  
 established his Court for some time, partly to be  
 nearer the scene of operations, and partly in hopes  
 of reclaiming the affections of the people.

Meanwhile, the Duke of Noailles, having in-  
 vaded Catalonia from Roussillon, had besieged and  
 Jan. 25. taken the important city of Gerona. Balaguer fell  
 before the advancing troops of Philip ; and these  
 even pushed as far as Calaf, and overspread the  
 plain of Vich ; so that Charles, who so lately seemed  
 triumphant sovereign of Spain, found his posses-  
 sions in it scarcely extend beyond the two sea  
 fortresses of Tarragona and Barcelona.



## CHAPTER IX.

THE days of the 9th and 10th of December, in the preceding year, — Brihuega and Villa Viciosa — were decisive of the fate of Spain. They had not only stripped Charles of nearly all his hard-won conquests, but had convinced the Allies that, from the rooted and unconquerable animosity of the Castillians, any further efforts in his favour would be fruitless. In the course of the spring, moreover, an event occurred to render any such efforts less desirable. On the 17th of April died the Emperor, Joseph the First, leaving Charles, the only surviving male of the Austrian lineage, the undoubted possessor of all its hereditary kingdoms, and the chief candidate for its Imperial crown. As far, therefore, as regarded the balance of power and the security of Europe, it seemed just as important to guard against the union of the Spanish dominions with those of Austria as with those of France.

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Still, however, France was now so much weakened, and so nearly overwhelmed, by the contest, that it seemed not only possible, but easy, to reduce her overgrown possessions. Her fortresses taken — her frontiers laid bare — her armies almost annihilated — her generals disheartened and distrusted

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—her finances exhausted—her people starving, could no longer have defended the successive usurpations heaped up during the last half century; and a barrier against their recurrence might now have been concerted, established, and maintained. It only remained for the Allies to crown a glorious war by a triumphant peace. But all this fair prospect was overcast and darkened by a change in the government, and therefore in the policy, of England. Queen Anne, since the deaths of her only child and of her husband, had nourished a secret leaning to her exiled family, and maintained the Duke of Marlborough and his party more from their successes than her inclinations. The Duchess of Marlborough had, indeed, great influence over her Majesty, and ruled her by the strong chains of habit; but gradually lost her ascendancy by her own violent and overbearing temper, and especially her haughty jealousy of Mrs. Masham, a dependant cousin, whom she had placed about the Queen as a bedchamber woman, and whom she unexpectedly found distinguished by several marks of royal regard. A glass of water, thrown by the Duchess on the gown of Mrs. Masham, changed the destinies of Europe. An humble relation was transformed into an aspiring rival; and the Queen, quite estranged from her former favourite, carried her fondness from the person to the politics of her new one. Thus she fell into the hands of the Tories, then guided mainly by the subtle cabals of Harley and the splendid genius of St. John. They did

1710.

not venture to assail at once the recent services and deeply-rooted reputation of Marlborough, and thought it safer to undermine than overthrow. He was induced to retain the command of the army; and the existing administration was broken only by degrees. In June fell the Earl of Sunderland the Foreign Secretary; in August the Lord Treasurer Godolphin; and the rest followed in succession. By some the seals of office were resigned, from others they were wrested; and before the close of the year, the Tories were completely and triumphantly installed in the place of the Whigs. I cannot but pause for one moment, to observe how much the course of a century has inverted the meaning of these party nicknames, — how much a modern Tory resembles a Whig of Queen Anne's reign, and a Tory of Queen Anne's reign a modern Whig.

One of the first measures of the new administration was to dissolve the parliament, in hopes of obtaining another more favourable to their views. Nor were they disappointed. Victories, however splendid, can never give unmixed satisfaction to those by whose blood and treasure they are gained; and there will always be found many opponents to even the most just and necessary war. Thus, the cry of peace, originally raised by Harley and his friends for party purposes, and levelled only at the Duke of Marlborough, was re-echoed by a considerable part of the nation. A new ministry, besides, seldom fails to be popular at first, from the

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fair professions with which it always sets out, and from the usual proneness of the people to confound the two ideas of alteration and amendment. From these and other causes the Tories gained a majority at the elections; and, thus secure of domestic support, plunged boldly into foreign negotiations. Their first overtures were conveyed to Paris by a Catholic priest, formerly a French spy, of the name of Gaultier; who, having obtained an audience of Monsieur de Torcy, opened the business by abruptly asking him whether he wished to make peace. "Such a question," says Torcy, "put to us at our utmost need, was like asking a sick man whether he wishes to recover." \* Louis and his ministers, however, took care not to betray too much satisfaction or surprise. In his answer he endeavoured to create a division between the two maritime powers, by complaining of the stubborn and selfish policy of the Dutch in the late negotiation; declaring his reluctance to open another directly with them, and earnestly requesting the mediation of England. Some hints, artfully thrown out at the same time, of special protection and privileges to the trade of England, were intended to entangle that country in a separate negotiation. Such a course was in direct opposition to the terms of the Grand Alliance, to the principles of policy, and to the feelings of honour. Yet the British ministers, full of that sort of stupid cunning

\* Mém. de Torcy, vol. iii. p. 21.

by which men so often overreach themselves, grasped at the prospect of peculiar commercial advantages; and, instead of awaiting a public and general conference, secretly urged their separate arrangements with France. Prior was sent as the English agent to Paris\*, and Menager as the French to London; whilst the English government lulled the suspicions of the Dutch by assurances of unabated confidence and ready co-operation.

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In all these transactions Louis took the interests of Spain entirely in his own charge and management, and dealt with her dominions precisely as with his own; except, indeed, in the far greater liberality of his concessions. Thus, while France was to yield little or nothing of importance, he thought it not unreasonable that the Spanish monarchy should be stripped of the Netherlands, Naples, and Milan, for the Austrians; besides Minorca and Gibraltar for the English. The *ASIENTO* (the trade of African negroes for the Spanish colonies) was at that moment in the hands of a French company; and the possession of that infamous traffic was then as much the object of British ambition, as its abolition has been since.† Louis not only agreed that Spain should make over the

\* Prior's Letters from Paris to Lord Bolingbroke are extremely confidential and interesting. His laughable signature to one of them has in it at least as much of justice as of jest. "Animal peregrine missum ad mentiendum R. P. causâ." (Bolingbroke's Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 90. ed. 1798.)

† *Asiento* is the Spanish word for any treaty, but is applied *par excellence* to this—the most infamous of all.

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Asiento to England by treaty; but, finding the English ministers claim some cautionary places in America, he even outstripped their demands, and offered, as a security, the leave to garrison Cadiz with Swiss troops. The very idea, however, raised up, in the highest degree, the indignation of Philip and his Queen: they declared that no circumstances should ever make them stoop to such a permission; and it was fortunate for the success of the negotiation that the Court of London itself showed no taste for the proposal.\* Philip was not less displeased at hearing that, at the approaching conferences, no ministers from Spain—his title to the monarchy being still unacknowledged—would be admitted. “What will my subjects think,” he exclaimed to Bonnac, the French ambassador, “if they find their interests confided entirely to the plenipotentiaries of France?”—“They will think,” answered the ambassador, “that, as your Majesty relied on the King your grandfather for the support of the war, you may also rely on him for the conclusion of the peace.”† Yet this retort was misapplied; since the retreat of the Allies from Madrid, and the days of Brihuega and Villa Viciosa, which had raised the cause of Philip from the lowest point of depression, had been prepared altogether from Spanish resources, and won altogether by Spanish soldiers. The recollection of these recent advantages animated the spirit of both

\* Compare Torcy, vol. iii. p. 58. with Noailles, vol. iv. p. 249.

† Mém. de Noailles, vol. iv. p. 263.

the King and Queen ; and they were, moreover, supported in their opposition to the will of Louis by the counsels and authority of Count Bergueick, lately Governor of the Netherlands under the Elector of Bavaria, and now one of the chief ministers, as always one of the ablest statesmen, of Spain. So difficult was it found, at Versailles, to subdue this national spirit, that recourse was speedily had to the agency of Princess Orsini. This aspiring favourite, having now exhausted all the honours of a subject, had fixed her heart upon a small independent sovereignty, to be formed for her from some districts of Luxemburg, or Limburg ; and, the King of France pledging himself to insert them amongst the other stipulations of the peace, she immediately became most zealous and useful in promoting it.

In spite of all delays and difficulties, the special preliminaries between France and England were at length brought to a conclusion, and signed on the 8th of October. They stipulated the acknowledgment of Queen Anne and the Protestant succession ; the rasure of the fortifications of Dunkirk ; the cession of Gibraltar, Minorca, and St. Christopher's to the English ; the transfer of the Asiento to them for thirty years ; an establishment on the Rio de la Plata for the convenience of that commerce ; an exemption from certain duties at Cadiz on British merchandize ; and the same privileges of trade in Spain as should be enjoyed by French subjects. At the same time were signed seven

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articles of general preliminaries, these being the terms of peace offered by France to the Allied Powers. In them the Spanish succession — that long-contested point, which had given rise, and still gives the name, to the war — was not, indeed, expressly mentioned ; but the acknowledgment of Philip was implied by the vague declaration, that the King of France would “ take all just and reasonable measures for hindering that the crowns “ of France and Spain may ever be united on the “ head of the same Prince.” The other expressions in these articles were still more vague and unsatisfactory : they named no particular towns or fortresses, but spoke of a barrier in the Netherlands for the Dutch ; another, “ secure and convenient,” for the Empire ; and summed up the whole with loose promises of “ satisfaction to all the Princes “ and States engaged in the present war.” Conferences, for this purpose, were to be opened at Utrecht early in the ensuing January.

Sept.

Meanwhile, the extreme eagerness of the new British ministry for peace had been attended with a corresponding relaxation of their military efforts. In the Netherlands, Marlborough, thwarted by his own government, and afraid of venturing against the national enemies, with so many enemies at home eager to watch, and ready to impute, a failure, did little more, in the whole campaign, than reduce the petty town of Bouchain. In Catalonia, the operations on both sides were, if possible, still more insignificant. Vendome had, indeed,



early in the year, proposed the immediate siege of Barcelona; but the want of supplies, — the relaxation which, in Spain, always follows success, — and, above all, the change in British counsels, — induced Louis rather to adopt the cautious advice of Noailles, and reduce the war in this campaign to one of posts and detachments. On the other hand, the English government, in this as in other instances, played the enemy's game. They sent out, indeed, some small reinforcements to the relics of Brihuega, and the Duke of Argyle to supply the place of General Stanhope; but left the troops so totally destitute and unprovided, that the Duke was compelled, for present subsistence, to drain his own personal credit. Disgust, combining with illness, soon induced him to re-embark; and in September the Austrian party received a still more heavy blow from the departure of Charles himself. The necessity that he should take possession of his hereditary states, together with his expected election to the Imperial dignity, would not allow him to continue any longer uselessly pent up in Barcelona. It was not, however, without many real pangs to himself, and still more to his faithful Catalans, that he could determine to forsake a country whose crown, during the last seven years, he had always so anxiously contested, and had twice so nearly conquered. He left behind him his Queen, as nominal regent; and in the affectionate address in which he took leave of his Spanish partisans, mentioned her as the most precious trust which he could commit to their

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fidelity, and the surest pledge he could give them of his speedy return. Staremburg remained, as before, commander of the army; but Vendôme was so much emboldened by the embarkation of the rival sovereign, that, notwithstanding the instructions from his own, he attempted to resume the offensive. He laid siege to the castle of Cardona, defended by its brave garrison and precipitous height. A blockade reduced the place to great extremities; but the Austrian Marshal, unable to cope with the enemy in the open field, despatched to its relief a body of five hundred grenadiers, and a large convoy of provisions. These their commander, Colonel Edward Stanhope (a brother of the General's) succeeded in safely introducing, though mortally wounded in the service; and the besiegers, disappointed in their hopes, and harassed by the Miquelets, speedily withdrew to winter quarters.\*

During this time Charles had landed near Genoa, and proceeded to Milan, where he made a triumphal entry, and received the first tidings of his elevation to the Imperial throne by the votes of all the Electors except those of Bavaria and Cologne. In his further journey through Inspruck to Frankfort, the new Emperor was most joyfully hailed; on the 22d of December he was solemnly crowned at Frankfort, and from thence speedily repaired to Vienna. His earliest and most important

\* Compare Tindal, vol. v. p. 384.; San Phelipe, vol. ii. p. 73.; and the Mém. de Noailles, vol. iv. p. 280.

Object was to concert measures with the States of Holland, for maintaining the principles of the Grand Alliance, and counteracting the new policy of England. The publication of the general preliminaries, signed at London, had raised the greatest dissatisfaction at Vienna and the Hague: nor was it diminished by the subsequent dismissal of the Imperial Ambassador, Count Gallas, on the plea of his intriguing with the Whigs. Both the States and the Emperor made every endeavour to open the eyes of Queen Anne, and sent on special missions to her, the former, the Pensionary Buys, and the latter, Prince Eugene. Buys had often shown himself a man of ready argument and persuasive powers; the name of Eugene was well known and highly honoured in England; and the weight which his words derived from his exploits and his character, supplied the place of eloquence. But all their complaints and representations were in vain. They found Mrs. Masham still supreme, and governing the Queen by that most artful of all flatteries, a pretended proneness to the same follies and frailties as herself. So secure, indeed, did the Ministers feel, from their back-stairs influence at Court, and unflinching majority in the House of Commons, that they now began to cast aside all sense of shame or moderation. The House of Lords having shown symptoms of spirit, and defeated a ministerial project, by a majority of sixty two to fifty-four, was immediately overpowered by a creation of twelve new Peers; the only instance recorded in our annals, of this unconstitutional

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CHAP. and ruinous stretch of the royal prerogative. The  
 IX. Duke of Marlborough, spared hitherto from pri-  
 1712. vate fear, not public gratitude, was now assailed  
 by an unworthy charge of peculation, was ignomi-  
 niously dismissed from all his employments, and at  
 last compelled to withdraw, as an exile, from the  
 country he had so gloriously served, and even  
 saved. Well might the national enemy consider  
 such ministers his tried and trusty friends!\*

Jan. 29. Under such ill-omened circumstances for the  
 Allied cause were opened the conferences at  
 Utrecht. It soon appeared that there was a far  
 wider difference between the Allies themselves than  
 between some of them and the opposite party.  
 While the English proposed their late preliminary  
 articles, the Austrians claimed those of Gertruy-  
 denbergh, and the French seized every opportunity  
 to blow the flame of discord, and awaken slumber-  
 ing jealousies. Such a state of feeling would, no  
 doubt, have speedily ended in a separate peace be-  
 tween France and England, had not an unexpected  
 obstacle delayed it. A strange illness, and suspi-

\* “Véritablement la Reine de la Grande Bretagne n’était plus  
 “regardée comme ennemie, mais comme une amie discrète, pru-  
 “dente, sure, à qui l’on pouvoit s’ouvrir sans crainte.” (Torcy  
 Mém. vol. iii. p. 125.) A retort of Prince Eugene’s is men-  
 tioned at this time, as honourable to him by its good feeling as  
 by its ready wit. He was one day dining with the Lord Trea-  
 surer Oxford; who, amongst other compliments, called him  
 “the greatest captain of the age.”—“If I am so,” replied the  
 Prince, “I am obliged to your Lordship for it,” alluding to  
 Oxford’s having just caused the Duke of Marlborough’s dis-  
 grace, and thus removed him from military competition.—Tin-  
 dal’s History, vol. v. p. 446.

cious death had, within a few months, snatched away the Dauphin, his eldest son, the Duke of Burgundy, and his eldest grandson, the Duke of Britany; leaving no other bar between Philip and the throne of France, than the little Duke of Anjou, afterwards Louis the Fifteenth, then a sickly child, less than two years old. It therefore became of great and pressing importance to guard against what, from a possible had grown a probable event — the union of the French and Spanish crowns. The point seemed to be secured by the late preliminaries; and no English ministers, however daring and unscrupulous, could venture altogether to neglect it. Accordingly, in conformity with the second of the general articles, Gaultier was despatched from London to Versailles, to demand a solemn and public renunciation on the part of Philip. But the answer of Louis was most unsatisfactory. He declared that the regular succession to the throne of France was a question of divine right and fundamental law; that no human decrees could abrogate or alter it; and that any renunciations made to the contrary would be a mere empty delusion resting upon sand.\* Such were precisely the principles against which the Grand Alliance had been so justly and wisely formed, when the Castillians might have received, without reluctance, a Prince of Austria or of Savoy, and had not yet grown attached to Philip, by the very

\* *Mém. de Torcy*, vol. iii. p. 180; and *Bolingbroke's Correspondence*, vol. i. p. 436, ed 1798.

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sacrifices which they themselves had made in his behalf.

Harley and his colleagues, hopeless of ever driving Philip from Spain, and determined not to forego their expected advantages from a peace, now devised a fresh scheme, according to which Philip was to yield the Spanish monarchy to the Duke of Savoy, receive in return Savoy and Piedmont, and, in case of the death of the young Duke of Anjou, annex them, and succeed himself, to the crown of France. This project was far from being unwelcome to Louis; but, as might have been foreseen, was promptly and peremptorily rejected by Philip. The English ministers were therefore compelled to recur, for their security, to renunciations, which the very party that was to make them had just declared to be mere worthless forms. Even these forms, however, could not be wrung from Louis and his grandson, without the greatest difficulty, after the suspension of the conferences at Utrecht, the despatch of English reinforcements to the Netherlands, and other such symptoms of determination. Louis then yielded, made the renunciation in his own name, and promised that, if Philip should not ratify it, he would extort his acquiescence by any measures which the Queen of Great Britain might approve — even force, if necessary.\* This offer freely made, affords the best answer to the loud and indignant outcry, raised by himself and his foreign

\* Bolingbroke's Correspondence, vol. i. p. 470, ed. 1798.

partisans, at the very same proposal when tendered by the Allies at Gertruydenberg: so inconsistent do men become in their words and actions, from their very consistency to their own veering self-interest!

Under such circumstances, the British ministers no longer delayed or dissembled their defection from the Grand Alliance. Dunkirk was given up by them as a cautionary fortress; and the Duke of Ormond, who had been appointed Marlborough's successor in the Netherlands, and had at first been restrained from acting by secret orders from England, was now directed to withdraw his troops from the field, according to an open armistice with France. The consequences were speedy and disastrous. Prince Eugene, keeping the field with a diminished army, was no longer an overmatch for the French. On the 24th of July, his lines, at Denain, were forced by Marshal Villars, and his troops defeated, in a partial engagement, which cost him above four thousand men, and compelled him to view, without preventing, the successive recaptures of Douay, Le Quesnoy, and Bouchain.

At the same time that Ormond was directed to quit the field in Flanders, an order was sent to the British troops to embark from Catalonia. Both parties in that province were then, as in the former year, almost entirely inactive. The force under Staremberg's command was far too small for any operation of importance, and could only commence a long and ineffectual blockade of Gerona. As to the

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Spaniards, they were not only withheld by the expectation of a speedy peace, but by the loss of their General, the Duke of Vendome, at the very outset of the campaign. Being extremely attached to the pleasures of the table, he had gone to Vinaros, — a small town on the coast, — to revel for a few days on sea-fish ; but died, on the 10th of June, a victim to his excess in that favourite food.\* The splendour of his funeral might have been worthy of a more heroic death : he was conveyed in state to the Pantheon of the Escorial, where none but Princes of the royal blood are usually interred, but where Vendome now lies, side by side, with those whose monarchy he had so successfully defended and retrieved.

The order of departure to the British troops excited great and general indignation amongst the Catalans ; and they loudly complained of the selfish policy of England, first to kindle and blow the flame of civil war, and then coolly leave them to be devoured by it. So violent, indeed, was the public outcry, that the Empress found it necessary to send four commissaries of rank and influence to assist the British troops in their preparations for departure, and enable them to effect it unmolested. They, on their part, were no less moved by feelings of sorrow and sympathy for their brave allies ; but their orders were peremptory ; and, after encamping for a short time on the very spot where Charles had

\* *Mém. de St. Simon*, vol. x. p. 315, ed. 1829.



first landed, they embarked in an English squadron, and sailed to Port Mahon.\* Such, in this war, was the final departure of the British troops from Spain.

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During this time, new difficulties had been delaying the progress of the negotiations between the French and British cabinets. The latter wished to reward the useful alliance of the Duke of Savoy, by allotting to him the island of Sicily and the title of King; and they also insisted, as an additional security against the future union of the French and Spanish crowns, that Philip, in renouncing the former, should acknowledge as his rightful successors to the latter, on the failure of his own issue, not the family of his brother the Duke of Berry, nor of his uncle the Duke of Orleans, but the House of Savoy. Louis, on his part, was not less anxious to secure Sicily as a compensation for the Elector of Bavaria, should he, in a peace with the Emperor, be stripped of his hereditary states; and he raised so many objections, that St. John himself (now Lord Bolingbroke) set off for Paris to obtain the required concession. The King of France was far too judicious to forego a peace so advantageous, nay, so necessary to himself, for any lesser points: he considered, besides, the declining health of Queen Anne, and the uncertain tenure of her ministers; and it was soon agreed that Spain should yield Sicily to the Duke of Savoy,—that the suspension of arms between France and England

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\* Tindal's History, vol. vi. p. 29.

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should be prolonged for four months,—that the conferences of Utrecht should be resumed,—and that the promised renunciations should immediately be made by the French Princes and by Philip. To witness the latter, and give them additional importance and solemnity, Lord Lexington was sent, on the part of England, to Madrid. There, on the 5th of November, Philip having first signed and sworn to his renunciation before his Court and council, proceeded to open the Cortes, which he had convened for this express purpose. In his speech he enlarged upon the great sacrifice he had made of his pretensions in France to the peace and prosperity of his Spanish subjects; and a deputy from the city of Burgos, speaking in the name of the rest, returned him their grateful thanks. It may be observed, that the Cortes, assembled for this object, could not lawfully deliberate or decide on any other; and were, in fact, a mere court of registration for royal edicts. They ratified Philip's renunciation,—which was also proclaimed in the streets,—and passed a law, by which, in failure of his issue, the succession was entailed on the Duke of Savoy.\*

Another change which Philip determined to carry through these Cortes was, to annul the ancient Spanish regulation, which made no distinction be-

\* Letter from the Queen of Spain to Madame de Maintenon, dated Nov. 6, 1712, and printed in the *Mémoires de Noailles*, vol. iv. p. 385; and *San Phelipe*, Coment. vol. ii. p. 88.

tween males and females in the royal succession, and to establish for his issue a sort of Salic law ; according to which the most distant male kinsman would be called to the throne in preference to the nearest female. The idea was supported on popular grounds, as it would probably select a Prince born and bred in Spain, instead of an Infanta's foreign husband ; yet it proved most unwelcome to the Spaniards. The old law was endeared to them by all their historical recollections : it had formed the union of Castille and Aragon ; it had given to Philip himself his right to the crown : and he was blamed for attempting to hurl down the very ladder by which he had climbed. The Council of Castille, when consulted on this proposed innovation, though usually the mere organ of the royal will, boldly spoke the public feeling, and passed a decision, which, considering the state of Spain at that period, cannot be more highly praised than by saying, that it was immediately burnt by order of the King. As a means of obtaining a more ready compliance with his views, he then desired every member to give in his separate opinion signed and sealed. This expedient was effectual : those who had been brave as a body shrunk singly into cowardice ; and displayed the true picture of counsellors under a despotic monarch, — afraid to speak, lest their words should displease him, — afraid to say nothing, lest he should think their silence sullen ! The acquiescence thus extorted was embodied in a royal decree, and ratified by the Cortes ; and it continued

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in force till 1830, when repealed by Ferdinand the Seventh.

The renunciation of Philip was registered in a solemn sitting of the Parliament of Paris, in presence of the Duke of Shrewsbury, as British ambassador; and Louis, at the same time, revoked the letters patent which he had formerly issued, reserving to Philip his right to the French crown. The Dukes of Berry and Orleans also gave in their renunciations to the Spanish succession; but, either from neglect or design, failed to confirm, as Philip had done, their renunciations by an oath: and the English cabinet, though it observed the omission, was too friendly for remonstrance or complaint.\* On this point they were careless of the national safety; but on another, the Catalan FUEROS, or provincial rights, they were careless of the national honour. During Lord Peterborough's command, the Queen had several times pledged her royal word for the preservation of these privileges; the Catalans had, in consequence, begun and maintained an insurrection; and yet, in the negotiations for peace, we find the British plenipotentiaries stipulating in their behalf only for an amnesty, that is, for personal pardon, but not political rights. Some faint remonstrances, afterwards made by Lord Lexington, were deservedly treated by Philip as mere forms, to preserve appearances. "Peace," he said to that ambassador, "is as necessary for

\* Letter from Lord Bolingbroke to the Duke of Shrewsbury, March 24, 1713. — Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 312, ed. 1798.

“ you as for us : you will not break it off for a  
 “ trifle !” and, in fact, we find Bolingbroke, at that  
 very time, employing his usual sophistry, in one of  
 his private despatches, to prove that “ it is not for  
 “ the interest of England to preserve the Catalan  
 “ liberties !” \*

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The negotiations, meanwhile, had been proceeding at Utrecht. The Emperor, indignant at the conduct of England, refused to take any share in the treaty, or to relinquish his pretensions on Spain, and determined to continue the war against both Louis and Philip. He prevailed on the States of the Empire to support him in another campaign. But the Dutch, borne down and exhausted by the weight of subsidies, and dreading lest England should conclude a separate peace, and leave them to be overwhelmed by France, thought it best, however reluctantly, to confide their interests to the former power. Under the charge of such statesmen as Bolingbroke and Oxford, the French interests were sure to prevail. The commercial advantages, admitted in the gross to lull opposition, were artfully defeated in details ; and the barrier in the Netherlands, agreed upon in the last English administration, dwindled and fell away. Louis excluded the towns of Lierre, Nieuport, and Halle, necessary for the Dutch to secure their communication ; and recovered not only Maubeuge, Aire, Béthune, St. Venant, but also Lille, the key of

\* Case of the Catalans represented, in the Report of the Committee of Secrecy. — Tindal, vol. vi. p. 257, &c.

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Flanders, and the conquest on which Marlborough prided himself most.\* Without giving more than the outline of negotiations which do not belong to my exclusively Spanish subject, and on which it can give no Englishman pleasure to dwell, it may be sufficient to state, that on the 11th of April was signed a general peace between France and all the members of the Grand Alliance, except the Emperor and Empire. Philip being then acknowledged as King of Spain and the Indies, his plenipotentiaries, the Duke of Ossuna, and the Marquis of Monteleon, were admitted into the congress, and concluded his treaties with England and Savoy. Those of Philip with Holland and Portugal were delayed somewhat longer; the former, chiefly through the selfish obstinacy of Princess Orsini, in struggling for an independent sovereignty in the Netherlands; but as their chief articles were already fixed and determined, it will be more convenient to consider all the treaties and their several stipulations at one view.† I need say nothing of the promises of an universal and

\* Coxe's Life of Marlborough, vol. vi. p. 238. The English Ministers were not a little angry with the Emperor for continuing the war; and Bolingbroke speaks with peculiar bitterness of "the truly Austrian resolution which His Imperial Majesty seems to have taken, of continuing a war, when he has neither allies, magazines, money, nor troops." To Lord Orrery, May 13, 1713.—Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 382, ed. 1798.

† The treaty of Spain with Holland was not formally signed till June 26, 1714; nor that with Portugal till Feb. 6, 1715. Lamberty, vol. viii. p. 581, and vol. ix. p. 124.

perpetual peace, of sincere and steady friendship and mutual forgiveness of injuries, with which they all set out. The stipulations of France with England were in accordance with the late preliminaries signed at London : those with the Dutch clipped and curtailed their promised barrier in the manner already mentioned. Philip renewed his renunciation of the French crown, and declared the Duke of Savoy successor to the Spanish on the failure of his own issue ; and to the Duke he also yielded the island of Sicily with the title of King. In consequence, the Duke immediately assumed this new denomination and dominion, which he retained till 1720, when they were exchanged for what his descendant still possesses—the island and royal title of Sardinia. To the English, Philip ceded Gibraltar and Minorca, together with the Asiento, for thirty years. He promised to restore to them the same commercial advantages which they had enjoyed under his predecessor, Charles the Second ; and acknowledged Queen Anne and the Protestant succession of the House of Hanover. He engaged never to alienate to any nation, and least of all to the French, any territory in America. The limits of the Portuguese in Europe were to continue as before ; but in South America they were to receive the colony of Sacramento. It was agreed that Philip should cede to the Emperor the Netherlands, Naples, the Duchy of Milan, and the island of Sardinia,—nearly half the Spanish monarchy in Europe ! Finally, at the intercession

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of the Queen of England, he stipulated to grant a general amnesty to the Catalans, and the same rights and privileges as were possessed by their fellow subjects of Castille.

Such, in a very few words, is the substance of the celebrated peace of Utrecht, which has always been considered a blot on the bright annals of England ; and which one of her greatest statesmen, Lord Chatham, has pronounced, “the indelible reproach of the last generation.”\* We may, however, be allowed to think, that whilst the glory of the war belongs to the whole people,—whilst Blenheim and Ramillies were prepared by British treasure, and won by British skill and British bravery, the disgrace of the peace, that low and unworthy result of such great achievements, should rest on only a small knot of factious partisans. Let it rest above all on Lord Bolingbroke ; whose genius, splendid as it was, seldom worked but for evil either in philosophy or politics.

As far as regards the case between France and Spain, the peace of Utrecht was most disadvantageous to the latter, and by no means honourable to the former. Both were embarked in the same cause, and joined in strict alliance ; yet, whilst France escaped with the loss of some few frontier towns and petty districts, Spain was stripped of

\* See his despatch to Sir Benjamin Keene, dated Aug. 23, 1757, and printed in Coxe's *Memoirs of the Bourbon Kings*, vol. iv. p. 190. Count Algarotti used to say of the English, that they made war like lions, and peace like lambs.



half her European dominions, and lowered in the scale of European states. Still, however, as the treaty with the Emperor was not yet concluded, the amount of these cessions might be concealed from the Spaniards; and, exhausted as they were by civil as well as foreign arms, they hailed with pleasure the first news of peace. The peace with England, especially, was received in the country towns with great joy, and loud cries of “PAZ CON “YNGLATERRA, CON TODO MUNDO GUERRA\*!” which are said to have been the dying words of Philip the Second†, and which have since become proverbial throughout Spain.

There was, however, one province of Spain where the tidings of the peace, far from being tidings of joy, came fraught with grief, indignation, and despair. The ill-fated Catalans found themselves given up by England and Holland to the vengeful hands of the Castillians. The Emperor, too, unable to carry on an active warfare at once in every quarter, had determined to concentrate his whole force for a vigorous effort on the Rhine; and, with this

\* Peace with England, war with all the world besides! Carleton's Memoirs, p. 392.

† See a note to the *Mémoires de Sully*, vol. i. p. 578. ed. 1747. The common people in Spain are, or were, very confused in their ideas of England: they supposed London to be something separate and distant from it. See the proverbial lines in Altisidora's song (*Don Quixote*, ch. lvii. vol. vii. p. 143. ed. Paris, 1814):—

“ Desde Sevilla a Marchena,  
“ Desde Granada hasta Loja,  
“ De Londres a Ynglaterra.”

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view, found it necessary to conclude a treaty for the neutrality of Italy, and the evacuation of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands.\* By this agreement, which was signed even before the final and formal conclusion of the peace of Utrecht, Charles engaged to withdraw his troops, and give no further aid to the Catalans; and at the commencement of the truce to surrender to the Spaniards either Tarragona or Barcelona, at his option. He did not fail, at the same time, to negotiate for the pardon and protection of this faithful province: he wrung from both France and England a solemn promise, which was inserted in the treaty, to use their good offices at the ensuing peace for the maintenance of its ancient constitution, and meanwhile obtained for it from Philip a general amnesty. Under all the circumstances, he can scarcely be blamed for a relinquishment which, however harsh and cruel, was not prompted by inclination, but forced upon him by necessity. Still, however, there can scarcely be conceived a more mournful and affecting sacrifice than to see a brave people, who had only, as they conceived, shown forth their loyalty to their rightful King, and fulfilled their public duty, forsaken by the very troops which had urged their exertion and profited by it, and sheltered merely by a vague amnesty from the vengeance of a lately defeated, and therefore still implacable, enemy.

But when the moment of execution actually

\* Lamberty, vol. viii. pp. 49—53.

came, — when, on the 19th of March, the Catalans saw the Empress, the Court, and the first division of the troops embarking from their shores, and quitting them for ever, they could scarcely suppress their grief and resentment ; and the same feeling was displayed by some in loud complaints, by others in indignant silence. The English squadron which conveyed the Empress and these troops was, after landing them at Genoa, to return for the rest. During the interval, all the prudence and address of their commander, Staremberg, were required to lull the popular indignation, and prevent its bursting forth against himself and his soldiers. He amused the chiefs by offers to assist in the defence of Barcelona ; concerted his plans with them ; and, through this cruel stratagem, enabled his troops to quit their separate posts in silence, gather into one formidable body, and embark unmolested. The Catalans were thus left to themselves ; defenceless, but not dismayed. With a heroism that deserved a better fate, they determined to reject the proffered amnesty of Philip, unless accompanied by a confirmation of their ancient Fueros. The clause in the treaty of Utrecht which stipulated that they should enjoy the same rights as the Castilians, in fact declared the abolition of their own, and they valued no others but these. Nor were they less strongly animated by their hatred of the other Spaniards, which had naturally grown under constant misrule and frequent rebellions. Even a century of internal peace from

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that time has not been sufficient to subdue this deeply-rooted animosity: it has not yielded altogether, even to their combined efforts with their Spanish brethren in the War of Independence. Even now, its traces may be discovered; and a highly accomplished English traveller lately found their insurgent guerrillas disavow the name of Spaniards, and apply it to the national troops, as distinguished from the native Catalans.\* Philip, on his part, might, no doubt, when they were thus forsaken by the Imperial forces, have disarmed their hostility by the maintenance of their ancient constitution; but, on the contrary, he eagerly seized this opportunity of abolishing such inconvenient limitations of his prerogative, and acted under the common but fatal delusion, that to punish rebels is to crush rebellion. His Castilian subjects, too, were anxious to avenge upon the Catalans their own danger and alarm three years before: so long does the hatred born of fear survive its origin, and continue when the fear itself has ceased!

The Catalans now made every preparation for an obstinate defence; and, forsaken as they were by all their Christian allies, applied, in their despair, to the Turkish Sultan for assistance. This singular negotiation was conducted by their agents at Vienna; but found the Divan unwilling to un-

\* Lord Porchester, *Notes to the Moor*, 4th Canto, p. 325. This volume, both in its prose and poetry, might go far to answer the question of Claudian —

“ Quid dignum memorare tuis, Hispania, terris,  
“ Vox humana valet?”

undertake such a distant expedition with so little prospect of advantage.\* Meanwhile a regency, composed of the Catalan deputies, and thence called "the Deputation," was established at Barcelona, and wielded the government with extraordinary vigour. Don Antonio Villaroel was named commander-in-chief; and the other principal leaders appear to have been Don Raphael Nebot, Don Juan Basset, Don Sebastian Dalmau, and Don Juan Llinas: but, in these moments of popular excitement, it is by no means easy for the historian to distinguish pretension from desert; and those men who run, who shout, who push, who bustle, are often thought to do the business, though merely hindrances and stumbling-blocks in the path of the really active. War was publicly proclaimed, in the name of the single province of Catalonia, against the two monarchies of France and Spain. A handful of brave men, headed by Nebot, secretly marched to seize Tarragona, when surrendered by the officers of Charles to those of Philip, in fulfilment of the treaty; and though foiled in their attempt, on finding the gates closed by the citizens themselves, their offer of double pay, and the connivance of Staremberg, induced nearly the whole garrison, and many other veteran soldiers, to renounce the Austrian service, and engage in theirs. In this manner they obtained an addition of above four thousand excellent

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\* Such an application seems highly improbable, yet it rests on the positive and detailed assertion of San Phelipe (Coment. vol. ii. p. 92.)

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troops: they had, moreover, at Barcelona a garrison of six thousand men, and with these forces prepared to withstand the Duke of Popoli, who, at the head of the Spanish army, had gradually reduced the outposts and open towns of the province, and at last encompassed Barcelona, and commenced its blockade. Against the Miquelets, who still continued in arms, he despatched the active partisans, Zerezedá, Vallejo, and Bracamonte, who have been so often mentioned in the course of this war, and who succeeded in completely routing these irregular bands. Many of them, however, still remained securely nestled in the fastnesses of their rugged and almost inaccessible mountains, from whence they frequently poured down, when least expected, on any weak party or unguarded position of the enemy.\*

The result, meanwhile, of the campaign in Alsace had convinced the Emperor of his inability to cope with France single-handed. Not even the genius of Prince Eugene could prevent the French commander, Marshal Villars, from taking Spire, Worms, and Kaiserslautern; reducing Landau, after a most obstinate siege; and carrying his victorious arms beyond the Rhine to Friburg. The states of the Empire, moreover, grew clamorous

\* For the defence of Barcelona, we may consult two interesting statements: the first, "the Case of the Catalans, as re-  
presented in the report of the Committee of Secrecy, June  
"1715," inserted in Tindal's History, vol. vi. pp. 252 — 267);  
the other, "Histoire de la dernière Révolte des Catalans,"  
Lyon, chez Amaury, 1714 — very circumstantial and minute.

for peace; and, under such circumstances, the haughty spirit of Charles was compelled to yield. Conferences for peace were opened, first at Rastadt, and afterwards at Baden in Switzerland; and conducted, on both sides, by the late generals of the armies, Villars and Eugene. Still, however, Charles refused to relinquish his pretensions to the throne of Spain, or to enter into any terms with Philip; and separate treaties were therefore concluded by him, and by the Empire, with France alone. Some difficulty occurred respecting the sovereignty in the Netherlands promised to Princess Orsini; which, though at first represented as inconsiderable, comprised no less than the whole duchy of Limburg. The Emperor was determined not to yield this important territory to a dependant upon France and Spain; and Louis, having no great personal interest in the cession, — little at stake besides his own royal word, — was very soon induced, first to relax, and then to withdraw, his support of her pretensions. It was stipulated that the French should retain Landau, but restore to the Emperor Friburg, Kehl, and Old Brisach; and admit his possession of Milan, Naples, Sardinia, and the Netherlands, — the last subject to the engagements for the Dutch barrier. The Italian Princes were to be maintained in their dominions, and the Electors of Cologne and of Bavaria reinstated in theirs.\* Thus, of all the many powers

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\* Lamberty, vol. viii. pp. 594—605. and pp. 621—634.

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which had been roused into war by the disputed succession of Spain, none but the two rivals for its throne still remained in arms.

By this pacification, Louis was therefore enabled to comply with the solicitations of his grandson, and send a large force, and a skilful general, to assist in the reduction of Barcelona. During several months, the Duke of Popoli had not been able to make much progress in the siege: he had suffered severely from the intrepid sallies of the garrison in front, while harassed by the Miquelets in his rear; and it had become evident that the city could not be taken without some such aid from

1714. France. Accordingly, Louis, having first used the promise of his support to cut short the lingering negotiations between Philip and Holland, and procure the signature of a definitive treaty, prepared to send twenty thousand men, and Marshal Berwick, across the Pyrenees. Philip himself was prevented from joining the army, as he would

Feb. 14. otherwise have done, by the death of his Queen, which had happened shortly before, and plunged him into the deepest affliction. So confident were he and Louis in the subservience of the British ministers, that they actually made an application for a British fleet to co-operate in the blockade of Barcelona. It will scarcely be believed that, after the repeated promises by which the Queen of England had bound herself to the maintenance of the Catalan privileges, she should take any steps for their overthrow and abolition; yet some ships,



under Admiral Sir James Wishart, were sent out for that very purpose! His instructions were to straiten the supplies of Barcelona and Majorca, to induce the people to accept the terms that should be offered them; “and in case of refusal to employ his squadron in countenancing and assisting all attempts which may be made for reducing them to a due obedience.”\* Some degree of change, or at least of concealment, in this nefarious policy, was effected by an address of the House of Lords to the Queen, on the 3d of April, in behalf of the Catalans and their promised privileges. The ministers, somewhat alarmed, made Her Majesty, in her answer, express her unabated zeal in this cause, and sent out some modification to the instructions of Admiral Wishart.

During this time the Deputation of Barcelona had been actively employed in training their levies and repairing their fortifications. Determined as they were to fight their city inch by inch, loopholes were made in every house, entrenchments raised in every street.† They took possession of every vessel in the harbour, to obtain the provisions and other resources they afforded, but scrupulously paid the full value of the cargoes. Their stores of provisions were already much diminished, and they could only subsist by curtailment of the daily rations, and occasional supplies which were sent them from Italy or Majorca, but most commonly

\* Case of the Catalans, in Tindal, vol. vi. p. 262.

† San Phelipe, Coment., vol. ii. p. 106.

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intercepted by the Spanish fleet. With a forbearance seldom shown by uneducated men; they reserved their wine for the exclusive use of the sick and wounded. They had no longer any wood or fuel to cook their food; but, under the direction of the government, they pulled down their houses, and broke up their boats for the purpose.\* A great many of the former had been already ruined by bombardment; for the Duke of Popoli, anxious to obtain the glory of reducing Barcelona before the arrival of Berwick, and also to avenge the insult offered to the Duchess in this city eight years before, poured a destructive fire upon it, and opened trenches on the 7th of May. Before the 16th of June, it was computed that eleven thousand seven hundred bombs had been thrown into the city, and that more than one third of it lay in ruins†, and great numbers of the people were obliged to take shelter in tents along the shore. Nothing however could daunt their gallant spirit; and, without entering into the minute details of all their sallies, it may be sufficient to state that, even by the confession of their enemies, they showed the most heroic courage; several times drove the assailants from their works; threw them into disorder; and would have completely routed them, but for the seasonable arrival of some French reinforcements. During these conflicts, medals of gold were struck by order of the Deputation, bearing on one side

\* Révolte des Catalans, p. 84.

† Ibid. pp. 117 and 129.

the city arms, and on the other the effigy of its patroness, St. Eulalia; and these, bestowed on several as the rewards of valour, still further excited it in every rank, age, or sex. Even women flew to arms. Priests and monks, joining in the general enthusiasm, mounted guard, and fought in the ranks like common soldiers. This general enthusiasm, however, was by no means free from the fanaticism for which the Catalans have always been remarkable, and by which, in adversity, even the strongest minds are easily swayed. While some fanatics foretold that the city should, indeed, undergo great hardships, but at its utmost need should be relieved by a legion of angels; some others promised that the bombs of the besiegers should be miraculously turned round in the air, and hurled back on those who fired them. Others, again, still less excusable, lamenting the havoc of war, and the decrease in a population so loyal and courageous, urged it as a most sacred duty upon their female congregation to replenish, by any means, these failing numbers; and, at such a crisis, to soar above the ordinary rules of religion and morality!\*

It is lamentable, for the sake of human nature, that even its brightest and most heroic achievements, such as this struggle of the Catalans for freedom, should have their dark side; nor must it be con-

\* See the *Révolte des Catalans*, p. 126. It is positively asserted that nearly five hundred young ladies obeyed the injunctions of "ces sermons si charnels!"

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cealed that the Catalans are also chargeable with cruelty. An undisciplined multitude, roused to national defence, always shows greater eagerness to punish traitors than to repel the enemy, and is more prompt to murder than to fight. During this siege any person suspected of corresponding with the enemy, or even of not going the full length of the popular leaders, was either cut down at once, or led out to execution after the form of military trial. A sort of summary tribunal, called the "Court of Conscience," was established for this purpose, and its decrees enforced by a disciplined body of ruffians, under the appropriate name of MATADORES (killers). Their number extended to three hundred, their authority over all classes; insomuch that they were even commanded to enter the churches, and should they, in hearing the sermons, think any preacher a "Philippine," (that term was then in use,) to shoot him on the spot. Compassion was considered as a crime; and those who ventured to intercede for the victims of the popular fury, ran a great risk of sharing their fate. Unsuccessful or unpopular officers were exposed to the same danger. In short, this defence of Barcelona bears a close analogy to that of Zaragoza, a century afterwards, in its cruelty as well as in its courage. Some part of the blame should, perhaps, in both cases, be imputed to the necessity of upholding a purely democratic government — and such was, in fact, that of both cities in the sieges — by frequent and severe examples. It will be found that, with the exception

of North America—an experiment still incomplete—every democracy, from the first historical records to the present time, has been obliged to use blood as the cement of its social edifice, and when that cement has been withheld, the edifice has crumbled down.

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From the repulse of the Spaniards in May, the siege was again reduced to a blockade, till the arrival of the Duke of Berwick and the French forces: when Popoli immediately gave up the command into his hands, and returned to Madrid. The French and Spanish army then amounted to more than forty thousand men, provided with eighty-seven pieces of large artillery, thirty-three mortars, and all other requisites for sieges, in abundance.\* Trenches were opened against the city on the 12th of July, and made rapid progress, under the skilful direction of French engineers. Several sallies of the besieged, attempted in different quarters, and fought with the most desperate courage, were repulsed; and some of their leaders, having been taken prisoners, were immediately hanged without trial.† On the 25th the French batteries, having first, by orders of Berwick, been solemnly blessed by a priest, began to fire, and on the 30th a lodgement was effected in the covered way. During this time the Catalans, far from finding sympathy

July 7.

\* Mém. de Berwick, vol. ii. p. 111, ed. 1778. It is no small pleasure to be again able to refer to this accurate and trusty record.

† Révolte des Catalans, p. 157.

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or succour in the English, received a threatening letter from Sir James Wishart, to complain of their having disturbed the commerce of the Queen's subjects, and presumed to seize several of their ships. In answer, the Deputation pleaded the excuse of necessity; referred to their full payment of the cargoes; and promised any further redress. The extremity of their affairs also urged them to address themselves to the Admiral's justice and compassion; representing once more the solemn engagements of England,—declaring, “that they  
“had for seven years together endeavoured to  
“serve the English nation, by every thing it was  
“possible for them to do,—by contributing troops  
“and considerable sums of money, without in-  
“terest,”—describing the terrible havoc by the enemy in Catalonia, “the effusion that has already  
“been made of innocent blood, without distinction  
“of sex or age,” and the still greater calamities impending over them—and most earnestly entreating his mediation for a suspension of arms. But so far was this from having any effect upon the Admiral, that, in order to enable the Spanish fleet to continue their blockade with undiminished forces, he despatched three of his own ships to convoy the *FLOTA* expected from the West Indies.\* Thus shamefully betrayed, and despairing of human succour, the Catalans, as a public appeal to Heaven, deposited on the high altar of the Ca-

\* Case of the Catalans, in Tindal, vol. vi. p. 266. See also p. 302.

thedral, a copy of the Queen's solemn promise to protect them. At this very crisis, however, they derived some new gleams of hope from the news of her death, — which would, indeed, have afforded them relief, by the total change it introduced into the counsels and conduct of England. But it occurred too late. The new King was beset with faction, and threatened with rebellion at home: he could not plunge again into hostilities; and his urgent application to France, in behalf of the Catalans, was civilly eluded.

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The people of Barcelona were equally unfortunate with respect to the Miquelets. Of these, the Marquis del Poal had collected as many as twelve thousand in the mountains, with a view of attempting some relief of the city; but he was completely routed by a detachment of the French army, and his body of men dispersed in all directions.\* On the 12th of August, large breaches having been made in two bastions, those of Santa Clara and of the Porta Nueva, and mines prepared under them, Berwick sent a considerable force to storm them before daybreak. By the explosion of the mines the French effected their first lodgment; but the besieged, who, in token of their resolution,

\* “ L'on trouva dans les poches des prisonniers des cordes  
 “ que leur barbare commandant avait eu la précaution de leur  
 “ faire prendre pour dépêcher tous les prisonniers qu'ils feraient.  
 “ La précaution ne fut pas inutile; ces cordes servirent pour  
 “ eux, et, par un visible jugement de Dieu, ces malheureux se  
 “ chargèrent eux-mêmes des instrumens de leur supplice.”  
 — Révolte des Catalans, p. 242.

**CHAP.** had planted in the breach a black flag with a  
**IX.** death's head upon it, returned to the charge with  
**1714.** so much fury, that they drove back the enemy in confusion to his lines. Next day, at eight o'clock in the evening, Berwick renewed the attack; and, by dint of numbers, again succeeded in gaining the two bastions. During that night, however, the Catalans made no less than four charges to recover them; they made four more the next morning; and at length, their ninth, about noon, was so fierce and well sustained, as to carry every thing before it. The most desperate fighting continued for three hours, and Berwick sent into the action all his reserves; yet, in spite of their courage and his skill, the French were again compelled to give way, with the loss of a thousand men, and the brave Catalans stood triumphant on the summit of their shattered walls.

These failures, and the heavy loss they occasioned, made Berwick determine to forbear from any further assaults, and confine himself to the safer but slower task of battering the ramparts by his cannon, and sapping them by his mines. At length, having effected several breaches, so large and accessible, that, in his own phrase, an army might march through them in battle-order, he had thus, in any military point of view, the city completely in his power. Experience, however, had taught him, that it was defended by something still more formidable than military skill — popular enthusiasm; and, partly with the view of sparing



the besieged, but, probably, much more in order to spare his own troops, he sent the former another offer of capitulation. Even at this extremity the Deputation refused to treat, unless their liberties were secured to them. “The obstinacy of these people,” says Berwick, “was the more astonishing, as there were seven breaches in the body of the place, no possibility of succour, and their provisions at length totally exhausted. They attempted to send out all the women from the city; but I refused to let them approach, and even gave orders to have them fired upon!”\*

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At last, all the preparations of Berwick being completed, and all his proposals refused, he gave orders for a general assault, at day-break, on the 11th of September. It was begun by fifty companies of grenadiers, supported by forty more; the French troops attacking the bastion of the Levant, and the Spanish those of the Puerta Nueva and Santa Clara. A contemporary writer has described, in glowing terms, all the bravery of the resistance, all the horrors of the carnage.† No mines could play on either side, the late heavy rains having soaked the powder; but cannon, loaded with grape-shot, swept away whole ranks at once, and the

\* Mém. de Berwick, vol. ii. p. 118. In the *Révolte des Catalans*, it is added, that these women were “*toutes mourantes de faim.*” (p. 248.)

† San Phelipe, Coment. vol. ii. p. 116—119. His account may be compared with the more brief narrative of Berwick, Mém. vol. ii. p. 119., and with the *Révolte des Catalans*, p. 262—284.

**CHAP.** assailants perished by hundreds, without gaining a  
**IX.** single step. Even when the contested bastions  
**1714.** and all the city wall were in possession of the French and Spaniards, the conflict seemed only to begin. Every street appeared bristled with intrenchments; every window and loophole poured forth an incessant fire. By dint of numbers and of bravery, however, the assailants overcame every obstacle, forced the barricades, filled up the ditches, and pushed forward on every side. No quarter was given to the Catalans, and none asked. When at length they were driven into the Plaza Mayor, the French and Spaniards thought the conflict decided, and began to disperse for pillage. But the Catalans, seizing this favourable opportunity, and animated by the most unconquerable courage, renewed the charge, threw the enemy into disorder, and drove them back in different directions to the breaches. Here they were rallied by the exertions of their officers, and here the battle raged afresh with redoubled fury. The bastion of San Pedro, from whence the Catalans poured their principal fire, was taken and retaken no less than eleven times in the course of the day. One of the Walloon regiments, so great was the slaughter, was observed to be commanded at last by an ensign, all its superior officers having fallen. Women and priests were amongst the foremost of the combatants. No other instance is to be found, in the history of this age, of a besieged city so persevering and so desperate in its resist-

ance; and, to point out any parallel to it, we can only refer to the forefathers, or to the descendants, of the same heroic people, — we can only look back to Numantia and Saguntum, or forwards to Zaragoza and Gerona.

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Additional artillery was now brought up to the breaches by the French Marshal, and the cannon of the Catalans turned against themselves. At this crisis, Villaroel heading another desperate charge, fell, severely wounded; and the Catalans, disheartened by his loss, and exhausted by twelve hours of incessant fighting, began to give way before the fresh succession of assailing troops. The women fled towards the convents for protection, yet neither they nor the men deigned as yet to ask for quarter; and the French, in their rage, cut down both without distinction. A white flag was now hoisted from the town-house; and Berwick ordered his troops to stop the massacre, and keep to their posts, till he had heard the offers of capitulation which were denoted by this signal. The soldiers made a short pause; but a voice (whose is doubtful) suddenly raising the cry of *MATA Y QUEMA!* (Kill and burn!) stirred up all their former fury, and the streets were again deluged with blood. It was some time before the approach of night, and the authority of the Marshal, could once more put a period to the slaughter. Meanwhile, some Deputies had come out to parley with Berwick; but even then demanded, as their condition of surrender, the maintenance of their ancient privileges. Ber-

**CHAP.** wick received this proposal with a smile of contempt,  
**IX.** and desired them to tell their colleagues, that if  
 1714. they did not surrender before daybreak, they should  
 all be put to the sword without mercy. A dreadful  
 night ensued; the Catalans still keeping up  
 their musketry from their houses; and the French  
 Marshal removing his dead and wounded, main-  
 taining his troops under arms, and making pre-  
 parations to burn the city to the ground. Day  
 broke, and found the Catalans still bent upon  
 resistance. Berwick allowed them a further respite  
 of six hours, and, finding them obstinate, deter-  
 mined to destroy them and their city together;  
 and with this view set the houses next his troops  
 on fire. Apprised of his intention by the bursting  
 of the flames, the Catalans again hoisted a white  
 flag: the fire was then extinguished by his orders,  
 Sept. 12. and a verbal capitulation agreed upon. It stipu-  
 lated, on his part, that the lives of all the inhabit-  
 ants should be spared, and that the city should  
 not be given up to pillage; and that, on the other  
 hand, the Catalans should surrender immediately,  
 not only Barcelona and Montjuich, but also the  
 castle of Cardona, which was still held for them in  
 the mountains.

Thus ended this memorable siege. The loss of  
 the French and Spaniards, in the course of it,  
 amounted, by Berwick's own avowal, to no less than  
 ten thousand men; and that of the Catalans, though  
 computed at only six thousand, was in all proba-  
 bility much greater. So much resentment did this

desperate defence occasion at the court of Philip, that several of his counsellors advised him to raze the city to the ground, and on its site erect a column in commemoration of its punishment.\* But Berwick, a man of strict honour, though not of much humanity, most faithfully observed the terms he had granted in the capitulation. He had promised the besieged their lives, and not one was taken : he had not promised them their liberties ; and, accordingly, he consigned to perpetual imprisonment in the castle of Alicant, Villaroel, Nebot, Armengol, and the other principal chiefs, to the number of twenty ; while the Bishop of Albarracin, with two hundred priests, were banished to Italy. The inferior officers and common soldiers were dismissed on taking the oath of allegiance ; and all the Catalans below the rank of noble were enjoined in a special decree to deliver up their arms. The liberties of the province were abolished, and the laws of Castille established in their place ; its standards were publicly burnt, and the Prince of Serclaes appointed as its new Captain-General.

With this capitulation, attended as it was by the surrender of Montjuich and Cardona, and speedily followed by that of Majorca, ends also the War of the Spanish Succession. Hostilities, indeed, continued for six years longer between Philip and Charles ; but it was no longer a struggle in the

\* San Phelipe, Coment. vol. ii. p. 119. The column has grown to a pyramid in the French translation, and in Coxe's Memoirs.

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dominions or for the monarchy of Spain. It is honourable to the character of Charles, that to the last he manifested the sincerest sympathy for the unhappy Catalans ; considering himself as the innocent cause of their ruin, and most reluctantly compelled, by his want of any naval force, to leave them to their fate. Only three days before the fall of Barcelona, a letter, written in his own hand to General Stanhope, shows how deeply he deplored their calamities, and his own inability to relieve them. After some expressions of personal esteem and regard, the letter thus proceeds : — “ Knowing  
“ as I do your goodness of heart, I am persuaded  
“ that you and your friends will compassionate the  
“ fidelity, firmness, and misfortune of my poor  
“ Catalans, whose attachment to me is without  
“ example. No difficulties, no dangers, no tempt-  
“ ations, could shake their generous loyalty. All  
“ this pierces my heart. I leave you to judge, —  
“ you who can best judge, — whether it is in my  
“ power to aid them without a naval force ; whe-  
“ ther, on the contrary, my exertions would not  
“ merely aggravate their ruin. On you and on  
“ your friends I place my firm reliance ; and  
“ doubt not that you will consider the dreadful  
“ state to which they have been reduced by the  
“ evil-minded of your countrymen, contrary to  
“ the most solemn and repeated engagements.”

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In concluding this narrative of a very remarkable war, I shall only detain the reader by one of the many observations it might raise. It exhibits, in the strongest point of view, the contrast between the French and the Spaniards, as to the relative importance of their capitals. Paris is every thing to France; Madrid is but little to Spain. Experience has shown, that any foreign invader, attempting an approach to Paris, will indeed be met by the most spirited resistance: he must cut his way through many brave battalions, and wade very deep in blood; but let him once succeed in reaching that city, and all resistance immediately ceases, and any new government there established gives the law to the submissive departments. In civil discord, likewise, that ruler who can gain or overawe the mob of Paris, who can either buy its cheers or disarm its enmity, is readily acknowledged and obeyed throughout the kingdom. Any ruler, on the other hand, who has not discovered that true secret of French government, and sets Paris at defiance, were it even for the benefit of the provinces, will infallibly lose the latter in losing the former. Never was there any slavery more complete or more unjust than this blind obedience of so many worthy, and reflecting, and religious countrymen, to the veering dictates of one giddy and unprincipled town-mob, — this prostration of sound intellect before capricious vanity, of the people of France before the populace of Paris! In Spain, on the contrary, it was shown

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**CHAP.** in the War of the Succession, as again, more lately,  
**IX** in our own times, that the possession of the chief  
**1714.** city is of scarcely any avail, either to the foreign  
enemy or to the native partisan. Twice did the  
Archduke Charles, three times did Joseph Bona-  
parte, advance in triumph towards Madrid ; and as  
often did they learn, that it is one thing to seize  
the Castillian capital, and another thing to subdue  
the Castillian people. Thus, what in France is  
the consummation of conquest, with the Spaniards  
is hardly its commencement ; and thus, under  
every possible disadvantage, from wretched armies,  
wretched generals, wretched laws, and wretched  
governments, they have maintained, and will con-  
tinue to maintain, their independence.



**WAR**  
**OF**  
**THE SUCCESSION IN SPAIN.**

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**APPENDIX.**



**IN compliance with the wish expressed to me by several persons whose judgment I respect, I have made some further selections from General Stanhope's letters and despatches, besides those already embodied in my History. I have endeavoured, as much as possible, to avoid repetitions, and omit matters of mere subordinate detail.**

**M.**

**Chevening,  
November, 1832.**

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## APPENDIX.

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TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

1706.

*Lisbon, March 21. 1706.*

I HAVE the Queen's commands to deliver a letter from her Majesty to the King of Portugal, and to represent, as fully as may be, to him, that her Majesty thinks nothing of so great consequence, for the good of the common cause, the prosecution of his Catholic Majesty's conquests,—nay, and the preservation of his person, on which so much depends,—as that this army should penetrate as soon as is possible into Spain, which it is conceived is more feasible at this time, when the enemies have drawn so great a part of their forces another way, than ever it can be hereafter, if this opportunity should not be improved. The whole contest for the Spanish monarchy seems to be brought to a crisis, and will depend upon this summer's operations in these parts. This, her Majesty's sense, I hope I shall have an opportunity of laying before the King, in an audience to-morrow; and that his Majesty, by giving the necessary orders, will enable your Excellency to execute what you have, with so much zeal and industry, been endeavouring after.

If it had been my good fortune to have seen your Lordship, I was directed by my Lord Marlborough and Lord Treasurer to have said a great deal to you upon the same subject; but as I know it is very needless to incite a man, who alone has been able to spur up and quicken this most sluggish people, I will only add, that our ministers fear nothing so much as that the time should be mis-spent in sieges. For though time be always precious in war, there are reasons which make it more so now than ever.

1706.

TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Lisbon, March 26.*

ON the 22d my Lord Ambassador carried me to Alcantara, where I had an audience of the King of Portugal of near half an hour. . . . . The King having given a very favourable attention to all I could say on this subject, expressed himself with great veneration for the Queen's person, for her great wisdom and generosity; and that he should always have the greatest deference for her opinion, even when his own sense might be different: but that on this occasion his own judgment did absolutely concur with that of her Majesty, and that he was only sorry that he was not able in person to execute what her Majesty so much desired; but that he would employ all the force of his kingdom, and give all the orders and powers to his generals, that should be necessary to bring matters to a happy period.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Lisbon, March 26.*

WE believe our army marched yesterday, and that ample powers and orders are sent to the generals to do what is right. We must hope they will be more unanimous in the execution of their orders than they were quick in advising, and all will go well.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Barcelona, May 9.*

I TOLD you that all the troops were landed the same evening that the fleet came in, and we passed great part of that night under arms, behind the breaches, the enemies having given out

they would venture to storm ; which, though we gave little credit to, yet it would be, perhaps, the safest method they could take ; for they will find it no very easy matter to get back either to Aragon or France, the whole country is so enraged with the barbarities they have committed.

1706.

This day there has been great skirmishing about their camp, and deserters tell us they have had 400 men killed and wounded.

They have removed all that part of the camp which lay to the east of this place, to the side of Montjuich, and their deserters tell us they are preparing to march. However, they still continue the siege, and keep firing their cannon, but mostly to do mischief in the town, and not as if they would improve their breaches. How their cannon will be got off I do not easily see. They are in great want of all provisions but bread ; their fleet having landed a great deal of flour : but from the country they get nothing. Orders are sent to all parts of the country they must pass through, to gather the *posse*, which, joining the few regular troops we have at Lerida and Tortosa, and the horse my Lord Peterborough has sent the same way, will have frequent occasions to harass them at the many narrow passes and rivers which are in their way ; so that we hope to prevent their sending any great force to oppose our friends in Portugal, who having begun so well encourage us to expect every thing.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Barcelona, May 12.*

SINCE my last letter of the 9th, the enemies have been preparing to march, which they did about one of the clock this morning, with such precipitation, that they have left behind them 150 or 160 brass guns, some thousands of barrels of powder, besides great quantities that they blew up, an immense quantity of corn and flour, and prodigious stores of shells, bullets, working tools, and about twenty-five mortar pieces. Few

1706.

of the guns and mortars were nailed up, and they were in such very great haste as not to stay the blowing up their powder, nor burning such stores as could be destroyed, as they intended. Their sick and wounded, which are in great numbers, they have recommended to my Lord Peterborough's protection. I suppose my Lord will send you copies of the letters he received on that score from Mareschal Tessé and the Duke of Noailles, which appear to us to be in a very humble and desponding style. We are pretty much surprised at their having landed provisions of the several kinds mentioned, in so much greater quantities than we see they could have occasion for (ordnance especially), at their having, by so shameful a flight, left us in possession of them; but above all, at the route they have taken, directing their march to the eastward, as if they intended for the frontiers of France. Their trumpeter, which brought the letters I mentioned, tells us another piece of extraordinary news, that the Duchess of Anjou is lately gone to Pamplona. All these steps of theirs incline us to believe they must have had some very bad accounts of the posture of their affairs in Spain, which we are not yet acquainted with, since all the force we can make in these parts is not so considerable as should strike so much terror into them; whereas, by all their working, it looks as if they were abandoning Spain, and were only solicitous to secure the Duke of Anjou's person.

I cannot omit mentioning, that this morning, a little after nine, when their rear-guard was about a random cannon shot distant from the town, there happened a very great eclipse of the sun, which our side were extremely pleased with, and have taken it as a happy omen, threatening ruin to him who takes the sun for his device. Whether the enemy have taken it for an evil presage I cannot tell; but they appeared, as long as within sight of us, in great confusion and disorder, though no troops followed them, except some Miquelets, who have kept all day skirmishing upon their rear and flanks. It is great pity we had no horse at hand to improve their disorder; for not imagining they would march that way, we had made a disposition to have received them on the other side.



TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

1706.  
*Barcelona, May 17.*

I AM sorry that I cannot confirm to you one particular of great importance mentioned in my former letter. I mean what Mareschal Tessé's trumpeter told us of the Duchess of Anjou's being lately gone to Pamplona; for we have this day intercepted a letter from her to her husband, bearing date the 8th instant, from Madrid. I hope to send you a copy of it; but, for fear I should be disappointed, the substance of it is, that the enemies—meaning the Portugal army—were the day before, which was the 7th instant, N. S., at Almaraz, a place on the river Tagus, near Placentia; that every body said they would blow up the bridge; and that their baggage was in motion; but that the Mareschal Berwick writ nothing of it. Whether by breaking the bridge, and their baggage being in motion, we are to understand they were pointing forwards or backwards, the letter does not explain. She then says all will go well, if Barcelona be taken; and that the people of Madrid had shown great demonstrations of joy upon the news of the Fort Montjuich's being surrendered. Whether since the arrival of our fleet the Duke of Anjou has sent orders for her removing to Pamplona, which might be known in the enemy's camp before the 12th, and may have given occasion to the trumpeter and to some other prisoners to tell us so, a little time will show.

The enemies continue their march towards Gerona, burning and destroying all in their way, and committing many great barbarities. They were yesterday at Hostalrich, about five leagues from Gerona; but we do not apprehend they can besiege that place till cannon be sent them from France, which is a work of some time. They carried from hence with them but twelve field pieces, of which they have lost three in their march. My Lord Peterborough is very pressing with this Court; and I am using my best endeavours to the same purpose, that we may improve this happy opportunity, and, leaving a sufficient garrison in Barcelona, may be moving towards Madrid. Our foot may be

1706.

transported by sea as far as Valencia, which is the better third of the way ; and being joined by the horse, which may march by land, and with what is there already, we may hope to make up a body at least equal to any thing that can be brought against us in any reasonable time. . . . . I hope some measures will be resolved upon very soon, since nothing can be worse for us than loitering here.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Barcelona, May 19.*

THE truth is, they (Charles and his ministers) have not a shilling, the siege having drained them of what little they had before ; and I doubt that is one reason of their delaying to get out of this place.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Barcelona, May 26.*

I TAKE the opportunity of a ship's going to Gibraltar, to acquaint you with the resolution we are come to since I writ last ; which is, to rendezvous as many forces as we can possibly spare from the garrisons in Catalonia about Valencia, and from thence endeavour to march to Madrid. The foot which is destined that way will all be embarked this day, and the fleet will sail with them to-morrow : the horse is marched by land, except 400, who are to stay to attend the King, and he will set out in ten days. The Conde de Las Torres commands a body of troops in Valencia, which has of late been troublesome to our friends there ; but we reckon we shall be stronger than he.

We have no advices from Madrid, nor indeed from any place, but by chance ; so are ignorant of the motions of our Portugal friends, and of what effects the Duke of Anjou's retreat has pro-

duced at Madrid and elsewhere. His army is near Figueras, on the extremities of Catalonia, next to Roussillon. It is said their intention is to march to Navarre, but that the Duke of Anjou is sick. . . . . Yesterday I delivered to the King my credential in a private audience, which was thought most proper, in our present unsettled state. His Majesty told me he thought to leave this place the 6th of next month: want of money has hitherto occasioned his delay, and I wish it may not continue to do so. 1706.

My Lord Peterborough will inform you of the many demands made on him for money, and all necessary for the service, if there were wherewithal to satisfy them. One great article is the carriage of a marching train, and of bread, which will cost much dearer here than in other countries. But it being no new thing to us in this country to be put to our shifts, we must do the best we can, not doubting but that all will be done at home for our support which is possible.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Barcelona, May 30.*

I CANNOT be positive yet as to the time of the King's setting out, which I never fail to press his Majesty to, as much as becomes me. I have in my former letters mentioned the great difficulty; though some of our zealous Catalans think there is another more insuperable, and that his ministers have no mind he should go to Madrid, foreseeing their ministry would not be long-lived there. But I believe they refine too much who will attribute any foresight to men who, I think, have never shown any, and who have used all possible means to alienate the affections of this people, to whom their master owes so much.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Barcelona, May 31.*

SINCE my last letter we have been alarmed for Gerona, which is the barrier and key of this country, the enemies having made a show of besieging it ; which if they had done, in the condition it was in, they must either have taken it immediately, or have made us delay our expedition into Spain. This advice gave occasion for a council of war, to consider whether any alteration was to be made in the resolution taken before ; and the result of it was, not to delay in the least our intended expedition, but to reinforce and supply Gerona in the best manner possible. Accordingly my Lord Peterborough sailed the 29th for Valencia, with the forces designed for that service, except 1000 Neapolitans, who were ordered to Gerona with 600 English marines, and some horse. My Lord left money with me to pay that garrison, and to repair the works, his Majesty having been pleased to offer me the charge of that place, which his own officers would not go to. But the 30th we were relieved of our apprehensions on that side, the enemies having made a march towards Roussillon ; so that we can now with safety introduce what is wanting to secure that town, which had been scandalously neglected, and which secured will leave us free from any apprehensions for Catalonia. We continue to be very ignorant what is doing any where ; but the unaccountable retreat, and the fear which the enemies continue to show, make us imagine that all goes well.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Barcelona, June 15.*

THE day after I writ my last to you, of the 31st of May, we were again alarmed for Gerona, and I was desired by his Majesty to repair immediately thither, which I did accordingly ; but found all very quiet ; the enemies having, for some days,

detached from Ampurdan, insensibly, one or two regiments at a time, which, in the night-time generally, marched towards Perpignan. They used this method partly to conceal their intention of abandoning this country, and partly to ease their own country by not overburthening it with numbers of men, as likewise to prevent the uneasiness which the Miquelets had given to their baggage when they marched in a body; for I should have told you, that with the several detachments they made, there always marched a great quantity of baggage. After I had given the best directions I could to leave that place in a good posture of defence, I returned hither. When I left that place there remained not above 4000 of the enemies in the country, and those are since marched into Roussillon; so that we know at present of no body of French in Spain, except the garrison of Rosas, where there are two battalions of them, besides two of Neapolitans, who daily desert to us; and that garrison is so sickly they bury nearly twenty men per day there. The accounts we have of the march of the troops which composed this army are very different, some saying that part of them are going to the Cevennes, which are again risen, and part of them to Italy; but the general report, and that to which most credit is given, is that they will go to Navarre, and re-enter Spain on that side. . . .

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Whilst I was at Gerona I received two letters from Mareschal Tessé about releasing prisoners, particularly two officers' wives and some foot soldiers, upon their returning some of our Miquelets, which I complied with; and the latter more willingly, because it is the first time they have condescended to treat the Miquelets as paid troops, and allowed of any exchange for them. The Mareschal did likewise very earnestly press our settling a chartell, about which he had before writ to my Lord Peterborough. If this Court and my Lord approve of it, I may observe to you, they will not wrangle about titles: for in the passports I gave, I having styled myself Commander for his Catholic Majesty on that frontier, Mareschal Tessé signed the same passports for the safe return of the drummers and guards I had sent.

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I was in hopes that, at my return hither, the King would either have begun his journey to Valencia, or at least have been upon his departure; but, to my very great surprise, instead of it, I found a new disposition on foot to attempt Aragon with the few forces that could be mustered up in this country, and that a letter had been writ to the Earl of Peterborough, requiring him to detach troops from Valencia, and to send money to support this project, which being directly contrary to what was unanimously resolved at two solemn councils of war, of which I sent copies to my Lord Treasurer by the last post; and a certain consequence of this alteration of measures being, that my Lord would be disabled from attempting his march to Madrid, I strenuously opposed, and the King has promised me that he will begin his journey towards Valencia the 21st of this month. The business of Aragon, however, is so much at heart, that 1500 of the foot designed for the guard of this province, and 400 of the horse destined for my Lord Peterborough, will be sent that way under Count Noyelles. If this detachment should have the success in Aragon which the inclination of that people encourage us to expect, it will be much better improved under Count Noyelles than if the Court went thither; for all their business in this principality has seemed to be squeezing for money by all manner of ways, and squandering it when they have got it as unaccountably. So that nothing but the veneration that is had for the King's person, who has shown an incomparable steadiness, and is very deservedly the darling of the people, could secure his ministers from their just resentments; and their principal view in endeavouring to get the King to Aragon is, that they may have the plundering of that country, which is said to have money.

I have, as I hope and have already told you, prevailed on his Majesty to stick to his first resolution of endeavouring, if it be possible, to go to Madrid. The only body of troops which is now between that and us, is that commanded by the Count de Las Torres, who is fled with great precipitation towards Castille, upon my Lord Peterborough's landing with

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the troops at Valencia. He has abandoned Alcira and Cullera, two strong places he had lately taken from us there. He has not with him above 1000 horse, which are said to be good, and above 2000 foot, which are not so. The only reinforcement he can receive is from the Duke of Berwick, whom we hope not to be able to spare any. From the enemy's army, which was before Barcelona, nothing can march in time to prevent us. They may, indeed, fall into Aragon by Navarre, and it is probable, they will, which is another strong argument why the King should not engage himself there. After all our good fortune here, we have the mortification to learn, that the Portuguese army was returned towards their own frontiers. They have, indeed, taken Ciudad Rodrigo, which is but a small equivalent for what they had in their power to do, and have not done; but we hope, so soon as they have heard of what has passed on this side, they will be for sharing the honour, and turn towards Madrid; or, at least, that they will hinder the Duke of Berwick from marching or detaching his horse against us. Nothing but his body, or a strong detachment of horse from it, can hinder us, if we will but attempt to march thither.

The Court do, indeed, want money extremely; and how able my Lord is to assist them, or how far he is empowered to do it, I cannot tell. But this is certain, that the great occasion of this misunderstanding which is between the Court and my Lord, and must be an eternal handle for quarrelling between the Court and whoever shall have the disposal of the Queen's money, is the want of particular directions from home (which directions should be notified to this Court), how far the Queen will be pleased to supply his Majesty, both as to his domestic expenses, as likewise towards the paying his troops, which have hitherto been paid in a very irregular manner. The King has often been pleased to touch this point to me, which I have, as well as I could, endeavoured to wave, as being ignorant of her Majesty's pleasure in the matter, and apprehensive that such discourse would always end in drawing an expense on her Majesty, which I think it my business to avoid as much as possible. But his Majesty has been so pressing with me since

1706.  my return from Gerona, that I could not avoid hearing what he would say, especially telling me, that he would write to the Queen, to my Lord Treasurer, and my Lord Marlborough, about it, and requiring of me, in the strongest manner, to do the like. The substance of his Majesty's discourse, after many insinuations, that neither himself nor his troops had been so liberally dealt with as he apprehended the Queen did intend, was to this purpose: that he insisted to know what the Queen would be pleased to appoint, till such time as this matter should come to an issue; that whatever it should be, he should most gratefully acknowledge it. At the same time, speaking of his troops, he was most pressing to know, with some certainty, what to promise them, or how many regiments to keep. He would desire 4000 foot and 1500 horse might be paid by her Majesty, which is within 1000 or 1500 men of all he has. As to the support of his own Court, his Majesty waved entering into particulars; but from other hands I was desired to propose, for one year, 150,000 crowns. The charge of troops in this country is about 12,000*l.* per annum for 1000 foot, and double that sum for the same number of horse.

Having thus laid this matter before her Majesty, to whose generosity I humbly submit it, I must only beg leave to repeat, that whatever her Majesty shall think fitting to do in it, it is of absolute necessity towards begetting a tolerable good correspondence between the Court and my Lord, (the want of which cannot but be highly prejudicial to her Majesty's service, and may render all those vast expenses which her Majesty is at of no effect,) that they do know what her Majesty is willing should be done, for till then they think that whatever is refused them is refused by my Lord, whom they apprehend to have both the means and the power from her Majesty to do much more than he really can. If her Majesty should think fitting to send any directions, or make any further provision, it would be much for her Majesty's service, that whatever she would be pleased to have paid to the troops should be issued by her Majesty's paymaster, upon the report of a commissary



to the officers commanding these troops, and not to go through the hands of these ministers.

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Before I leave this subject, I shall beg leave to offer one thing more to be considered, in case the Queen should be disposed farther to extend her generosity to this Prince. That is, that since at the making of the Portugal treaty, by which so large a sum is paid to that crown, one considerable motive and inducement for allowing it is said to have been the great charge that King would be put upon by the King of Spain's presence, though it be not expressly mentioned in the treaty; whether that reason subsisting no longer, but, on the contrary, that expense falling to her Majesty's share, it might not be reasonable, on that score, to make some defalcation.

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TO THE EARL OF PETERBOROUGH.

*Barcelona, June 18.*

OUR Court still promises to be moving Monday or Tuesday next; but there is still a mighty hankering after Aragon. I cease not to press the King to go to Valencia, which will engage him to bring more strength on that side, which we may now do very well; whereas, if those who would plunder Aragon should get his person that way, it is plain they will draw all they can to that side.

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TO THE EARL OF PETERBOROUGH.

*Tarragona, July 1.*

SINCE my last, of the 29th of June, we have received advices that Zaragoza has declared for the King. Part of the kingdom of Aragon is said to have done the like; and some letters give an account that Pamplona has done the same: but, for this last,

1706. I believe it wants confirmation. The account I sent your Lordship of what passed at Madrid is likewise confirmed by the letters from Zaragoza. Upon these advices, his Majesty called a junta this morning; and has determined to go immediately to Zaragoza. The Portugal ambassador and myself opposed this resolution all we could, insisting on the necessity that his Majesty should, as soon as possible, get to Madrid, which was now without any government at all: that Aragon would be as well, nay, better, secured to his Majesty without his presence than with it; because that, when his Majesty should proceed from thence to Madrid, it would be necessary, for the security of his march, to take with him some of the few troops which might be employed for the defence of it; and that if the Duke of Anjou, or the Duke of Berwick, should continue on the frontiers of Castille with their horse, it would be very hazardous, if not impracticable, for the King to pass that way, especially since we could not tell whether the Portuguese army would move farther than Madrid, which it was most probable they would not, but expect to receive his Majesty from the side of Valencia, according to what his Majesty had writ to them, and had, in two councils of war, resolved to do: that though these difficulties were removed, and that it were judged a thing very feasible and advisable for his Majesty to march, with 800 horse, above 200 miles, through a country which is as yet in the enemy's hands, yet the stay he must make at Zaragoza would necessarily delay his arrival at Madrid very considerably: that, on the other side, his Majesty would have a considerable body ready to attend him at Requena; and that it was not probable that the enemy's horse, who will still have an eye towards their retreat to Navarre, if the Portuguese continue about Madrid, would engage themselves between their army and your Lordship. A great deal more was said by us to the same purpose; but the King was determined.

The King and his ministers, both in this and the last council, and severally in particular with me, have made heavy complaints of want of money to subsist their family. I had referred them to your Lordship, when you should meet at Valencia; but now, that another route is resolved upon, they have renewed their

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instances with me to apply to your Lordship, which I promised to do. It is certain they are in the utmost straits. I must confess I have all along wished, and did endeavour when I was in England, as much for your Lordship's sake as theirs, that something certain might have been appointed for the King's domestic expenses; being persuaded that the want of such a regulation must be an eternal handle of discontent to men, who think they have a right to every thing, and that whatever is not given is refused by your Lordship. Since that has not been done, your Lordship will best judge what you have means, and are empowered, to do. I wish I could say that any endeavours to help and assist them would meet with a grateful return; but, since that is not to be expected, we must do as those few who serve another very ungrateful master, the public, — complain and serve on.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Tarragona, July 2.*

SINCE my last, of the 15th of June, we received from Italy certain accounts of my Lord Marlborough's glorious victory in Flanders. This great blow made itself soon be felt as far as these parts, and has been followed by, and much contributed to, very great successes in this country. On the 6th of last month the Duke of Anjou, having travelled post through Navarre, got to Madrid. On the 12th, the news from Flanders got thither after him; and, whatever his intention might have been before, it was then resolved the Duchess of Anjou should immediately be sent to Pamplona: nor do we doubt but that he intends to take the same road, though, to gain so much time as was necessary to rifle the palace, and carry from Madrid all the moveables they could save, he gave out he was going in person to head the body commanded by the Duke of Berwick. The Portuguese army was, on the 18th of June, got as far as

1706. the Escorial; and the same day the Duchess of Anjou left Madrid: we expect hourly to hear the Duke has followed her. He had ordered the president and two members of each of the several councils, and, in general, all his ministers, to repair to Guadalajara. He invited also the grandees to attend him into the field; but few of them showed any disposition to do it.

On the 25th of June, Zaragoza declared for his Majesty; and we receive accounts every hour of the other towns in Aragon following that example. Some in Navarre have done the same, and several letters say as much of Pamplona; but of this we must expect further confirmation, it seeming the less probable because it is a place of strength, and had a garrison of regular troops, part of them, if not most, French. Should this news prove true, the Duke and Duchess of Anjou must think of another retreat.

Part of the Queen's troops at Valencia were advanced to Requena, a frontier town in Castille, about thirty-five leagues distant from Madrid. There was in it a garrison of 600 men, who, to secure the booty Las Torres had got in the kingdom of Valencia, which was all lodged there, resolved to defend themselves. Lieutenant-General Wyndham was attacking it by our last letters, and had forced them into the castle, against which it was necessary to bring cannon. We expect by the first letters to hear it is ours. The fleet was gone to Carthagen, which expected only its appearance to surrender. Two Spanish gallees, one of which is their admiral, commanded by the Marquis Santa Cruz, which were sent out of the port to carry money to the garrison of Oran, are come to our fleet, and have declared for the King. It is said they have 60,000 pieces of eight on board.

The King, who was come as far as this place on his journey towards Valencia, according to what had been resolved, has, upon receiving these advices, altered his resolution, and is going at Zaragoza, which he was ever most inclined to do. This change of measures will certainly delay considerably his arrival at Madrid, and his junction with the Portuguese army, which seemed to be at this time our principal business, if it has not a worse consequence; for if the enemies, who have still a great

body of horse in Castille, are capable of attempting any thing, 1706.  
that may render it very difficult and hazardous for the King to  
proceed to Madrid, with the small force he carries with him.

Since writing what goes before, is arrived a Spaniard, despatched on the 19th of last month by my Lord Galway. It was not thought fit to venture any letter by him, he being to come through so great a tract of the enemy's country; but, by the tokens given him by my Lord Galway and the Marquis Das Minas, we cannot doubt but that he is sent by them. The account he gives agrees in every thing with what we heard before from thence, — only with this difference, that he left their army at Espinal, which is three leagues' distance from the Escorial.

The Duke of Berwick was, with about 8000 men (as he says), near Segovia. This man adds further, that the Duke of Anjou, being come out of Madrid only with his guards, lay the 21st of last month at a village near Alcala, within five leagues of Madrid: that the Duchess was fourteen leagues before him, on the road to Navarre. This man was ordered to acquaint his Catholic Majesty that the Portuguese army would proceed on; and to desire that his Majesty would, on his side, with all possible expedition, hasten to Madrid. The Marquis Das Minas and my Lord Galway had not been acquainted with the resolutions, which had been taken here of the King's marching with the greatest part of the forces by the kingdom of Valencia, but, supposing our main body would have gone by Aragon, ordered this man to go to Zaragoza, imagining the King would have been already got so far; and, indeed, they had reason to believe we should not have lost so much time at Barcelona, for if his Majesty had set out a month ago either way, as he was frequently pressed to do by the Portugal ambassador and myself, he would have been by this time at, or very near, Madrid; whereas the resolution now taken will rather increase than make amends for the time already mis-spent. But, upon the whole matter, we may reasonably hope that the same Providence which has preserved us hitherto, and given us successes to which ourselves have very little contributed, will bring matters to a happy conclusion this campaign.

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## TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Tarragona, July 3.*

YOUR Grace will see, by the enclosed copies of what I write to England, how soon your strokes are felt at so great a distance. I am sorry your Grace will find something in them which you would wish to be otherwise; but, so long as your Grace and my Lord Treasurer take care of us, I am persuaded we cannot ruin ourselves, though we would never so fain.

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## TO THE EARL OF PETERBOROUGH.

*Borjas, July 8.*

As to your Lordship's offer of coming post to confer with the King, his Majesty said, you might do as you pleased. What you will resolve upon it I don't know; but I dare venture to assure you, nothing you can say will signify any thing unless you should bring 10,000 pistoles in your cloak-bag.

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## TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Tamarit, July 10.*

I AM now fully persuaded of what I once hinted to your Lordship, that those of the King's ministers who have most influence dread nothing so much as going to Madrid; insomuch that one of them sticks not to maintain, the King ought to remove the seat of his empire to another place; that, especially while armies are about it, the King will have little or no authority, and talks of nothing but banishing, proscribing, and forfeiting the estates of all who have adhered to the Duke of Anjou;

and cannot help showing concern if he hears any grandee, with a great estate, is inclined to come to his master. With such maxims has this man, whose name is Zinzerling, supplanted the Prince of Lichtenstein; who is now, in a manner, quite out of business, and is called secretary of the Despacho Universal. The King has been influenced to take this tedious and hazardous way by the honour, he was told, there would be in reducing a new kingdom in person, where he should find money, and be independent; and those who have private ends to answer have to such a degree improved the misunderstanding that is between my Lord Peterborough and his Majesty, that he will venture the not going to Madrid at all, rather than be carried thither by my Lord.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Tamarit, July 10.*

WE have letters from Madrid of the 29th of last month, which give an account that, on the 24th, that town submitted to King Charles, and the generals of our army there press his Majesty to hasten to them. We are further told, that Seville and Toledo have done the like. Carthagena submitted to our fleet; and the garrison of Requena, after having made a very good defence, in which we lost, killed or wounded, 150 men, remains prisoners of war. The Duke of Anjou, by the last accounts we had of him, was, with about 8000, at Xadraque, sixteen leagues on this side of Madrid: he destroys the country he leaves. The King will make his entry in Zaragoza the 15th of this month, and from thence proceed towards Madrid.

Having spoken to the ministers here about the instructions I have relating to the West Indies, they think it will not be easy to find persons fitting to be sent thither till they come to Madrid, but think that such ships as may be destined by her Majesty for that service had best rendezvous at Gibraltar, from whence we hope there will be a free passage for letters to Madrid in a short time.

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## TO THE EARL OF PETERBOROUGH.

*Zaragoza, July 19.*

I AM too sensible of the truth of what your Lordship says of this administration; I daily wish to be discharged from having any thing more to do with it; and, if my friends in England have any credit at Court, I hope to get away this winter: for I am very sensible I spend the Queen's money here without doing her any service; and bare endeavours to serve without effect are generally, at Court, looked upon as faith without works.

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## TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Zaragoza, July 24.*

I RECEIVED, on the 17th instant, eight letters from you, of several dates, from the 30th of April to the 28th of May, which is the last. The latter ones contain the particulars of my Lord Duke of Marlborough's victory, and of the incredible rapidity with which he has pushed his conquests. We had in these parts felt the effects of this mighty success before we knew with truth the certainty of it. It were greatly to be wished we had been disposed to have improved in such a manner those advantages which Providence had given to us here; instead of which, we seem to have been seized with a lethargy ever since the relief of Barcelona, and the shameful retreat of the enemies. I told you in my last, of the 10th instant, that we were going to Zaragoza: accordingly, the 15th, we arrived hither, and his Majesty was received with all demonstrations of joy. The 20th, came to us Colonel Dubourgay, Quartermaster-General to my Lord Galway, in four days from his army. He told us they were encamped at Guadalaxara; and the enemies nine leagues from them, at Alionza. Our army consisted of 4000 horse and 10,000 foot: the enemies are superior in horse, and have sixteen battalions of foot, which makes their whole force



at present to be 9000 men; but they daily receive reinforcements from France, and a considerable body, which came from the siege of Barcelona, is said to be marched into Navarre to join them. Want of provisions makes it very difficult for our army to follow them; and the Portuguese, who never were so far from home, were very hardly persuaded to stay; so that my Lord Galway does, in the most earnest manner, press to be reinforced: it being firmly believed the enemies design to venture a battle, trusting to the number and goodness of their horse, so soon as they shall receive the reinforcement they expect. These advices have roused the Court; and the King has sent three battalions out of four which he brought hither to march with all expedition before him, and followed himself, with 800 horse, this day. 1706.

We shall be obliged to go within twelve leagues of the enemies' camp; but hope our army, upon the notice of his Majesty's coming, will make some motion or detachment to secure his march. If the Portuguese stay for us, and the enemies do not disturb us on our way, we shall join the army in eleven or twelve days at farthest. To these two contingencies is our junction, upon which all depends, exposed at this time: whereas it might have been made with the greatest ease and security imaginable a month ago, if the first resolution, of going without loss of time to the frontiers of Castille by Valencia, had been followed. Expresses have been sent to the Earl of Peterborough with these advices, pressing him to hasten the march of his troops; and we hope they are in motion towards Guadalupe, though we have yet no advice of it. We hear by this officer of my Lord Galway's that the siege of Turin is raised, so that we are eased of sending thither any forces, which, indeed, at the present juncture, would hardly have been advisable; though his Majesty has all along showed a great disposition to it, and, upon receiving the Queen's letter, did positively order it: but the truth is, till Colonel Dubourgay came, it was generally believed here that the Portuguese army was very much stronger than now we know it to be. We have reports of risings in Languedoc and the Cevennes: it is certain the enemies have not 1000 men

1706. left in Roussillon, and that a very infectious distemper rages in that province. The garrison of Rosas, which is on the edge of it, is very much weakened by it; and we are not without hopes that place, which is blocked up to the landward, may fall.

I delivered to the King her Majesty's congratulatory letter on the victory in the Low Countries, in which her Majesty also acquaints him with the new character with which she has been pleased to invest the Earl of Peterborough; to which letter of her Majesty's, Captain Vernon will carry back the King's answer.

Since writing what goes before, is come an express from my Lord Peterborough, with an account that 1300 horse and 3000 foot of his troops are in motion to join the Portuguese army. The remainder, which my Lord says are about 2000 foot and 600 horse, it has been judged necessary to leave about Carthage, and to cover Valencia, which would be exposed to be pillaged. The foot, which is there, may be afterwards put on board the fleet, to reduce Port Mahon; which the King extremely desires, in hopes it might engage us to have a squadron winter there, if Cadiz should not fall this summer.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Zaragoza, July 24.*

I WAS in hopes that the new character which my Lord Peterborough has from her Majesty (as ambassador) might have conduced to that good understanding which I have so long wished, and endeavoured to procure. But, to past grievances which they complained of, they now add apprehensions of disputes about command when the forces shall be joined; to obviate which, the King, as I am informed, will supersede the commission he had given my Lord, which would entitle him to the chief command; whereas my Lord Galway has constantly received orders from the Marquis Das Minas. And one reason of the King's readiness,

—which I have mentioned in my last to Mr. Secretary,—to part with troops to Italy, was the opinion he had that my Lord might have gone thither with the fleet. That expedient being now out of doors, I must confess I cannot but apprehend the breach must be widened. In what manner I shall behave myself best for her Majesty's honour and interest, between the King and the Queen's ambassador and general, I wish some angel would instruct me; for I own I am not wise enough to determine on this occasion. . . . . If my endeavours hereafter to promote the mutual good correspondence which is so absolutely necessary for carrying on the public service should prove as ineffectual as they have done hitherto, I would then humbly request of your Lordship, as well for the public as my own sake, that some abler person might be employed in the business, and that I might be discharged from a post where I should have the mortification to see the Queen's service suffer without being able to help it.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Daroca, July 27.*

WE are marching with the utmost diligence to join the Portugal army. We continue to receive advices that the enemies daily receive reinforcements; which makes us extremely solicitous lest the Portuguese should be forced either to give battle, or to move backwards, before they are joined either by us or the Earl of Peterborough, who was, the 22d instant, at Valencia. The King carries with him but three battalions of foot, and about 800 horse, with which we must march, without intermission, eight days through the enemies' country, and within seven leagues of one of the enemies' quarters. Thus we endeavour, by a very hazardous after-game, to repair our past fault. The Duchess of Anjou and that Court are at Burgos; the Duke is with the army, which is quartered in villages within ten leagues of our army, which is encamped at Sopetran, within two leagues

1706. of Guadalaxara. The greatest security of our march is the roughness of the country through which we propose to go ; and that a detachment of the enemies, which would stop us, is exposed to be intercepted from our army, if they look out well. But we find it very difficult to receive or give intelligence one to another, which makes it impracticable to concert measures with that exactness which would be necessary.

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TO THE EARL OF PETERBOROUGH.

*Molina, July 29.*

WE have received this day other letters, four days old, from the Portugal army, which gives spurs to us ; our delay having already lost us Toledo and Salamanca, which have returned voluntarily to the Duke of Anjou's obedience. They not only press for his Majesty's person, but that so great a reinforcement be brought them as is possible. The chief want will be horse ; for which reason, if it be possible for your Lordship to draw all your horse from Valencia and Murcia, I believe it may be of great service, it being still thought we shall have a battle this summer.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Camp at Guadalaxara, Aug. 10.*

MY last, of the 24th of July, from Zaragoza, gave you an account of the Court's leaving that place in order to join the confederate army ; which, after fourteen days' march, — the greatest part of it through a country very much disaffected to us, and through very difficult passes, — was done the 6th instant. The Earl of Peterborough met his Majesty the day before he came to

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this camp: he brought with him two regiments of English dragoons, and two regiments of the King of Spain's foot. This reinforcement, added to what the King brought himself, makes about 2500 foot and 1400 horse. The Portuguese army consisted, before our junction, of little more than 3000 horse, and under 10,000 foot. The enemies, a week before our junction, had received from France the succours so often mentioned, consisting of thirty or thirty-two battalions of foot, and twenty-five squadrons of horse: their horse very complete, and in good order, having been recruited with men in France, and met their horses at Pamplona; their battalions of foot very weak, and to be reckoned hardly more than 250 men each, one with another. They had before sixteen battalions, half of which, especially the Flemish and Spanish guards, very complete, and in good condition; so that we now reckon their whole force to be forty-eight battalions, making about 14,000 or 15,000 foot; and eighty squadrons, making between 6000 and 7000 horse. This great superiority had obliged our army to post themselves upon this high ground, with a river before them, until they should be joined by the forces from Aragon and Valencia. Three battalions of English foot, with 500 horse, are marching from the latter to join us; but want of provisions obliges us to decamp before they can join. When that shall be done, we reckon we shall be as strong in foot as the enemy, but 1000 or 1500 short of their number in horse. The enemies have cut off our communication with Portugal, from whence some troops and a great sum of money were on the way to join this army; but, upon the knowledge of our situation, are returned to Ciudad Rodrigo. Madrid has been forced to submit to the Duke of Anjou, as Toledo and Salamanca had done some time before. We are extremely straitened for provisions, the whole country about us being very much against us. This violent state of our affairs made my Lord Galway incline to give battle; but, besides that the situation of our camp, (which was very proper for a defensive action, being covered by a river and several defiles,) is thought to be equally advantageous to our enemies, who are encamped within cannon shot, on a rising ground, on the other side of the river, if we should attack

1706.  them, we have no certainty when the three battalions and the 500 horse, already mentioned, from Valencia, will come up; in the expectation of which, we have spent so much of our provision that we have only four days' bread left. So we shall march to-morrow, inclining towards the Tagus, and endeavour to subsist on this side of it, until such time as the reinforcement we expect shall have joined, and then offer battle to the enemy. If he decline it, we must in a few days be forced to pass the Tagus, to subsist, and keep a communication with Valencia; from whence alone we can be supplied with money, ammunition, clothes, &c.

My Lord Peterborough, in pursuance to the last orders he has received from England, is going on board the fleet. I hope his Lordship will be so happy as to secure some port in the Mediterranean where a squadron may winter. If this cannot be done, I do not see how this army can possibly subsist this winter; it seeming impracticable to recover a communication with Portugal by land, unless we fight and win a battle. I believe my Lord Galway will do all he can to bring the matter to a decision.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Camp at Guadalaxara, Aug. 11.*

NOTHING but the winning of a battle can repair the effects of our delay. If the enemies decline that, nothing but wintering a strong squadron in the Mediterranean can preserve this army from utter ruin. The Portuguese have not a shilling. My Lord Peterborough, at parting, has promised that all the money in his paymaster's hands shall be at my Lord Galway's disposal; and his Lordship will endeavour to get some from Italy. Some ships will be sent to Lisbon, with which place we can now correspond only by sea. The whole country of Castille, except a party in Madrid, is very disaffected to us. How patiently our Allies may endure the wintering from home under these difficulties, I cannot tell: they have hitherto behaved very well, and showed a great readiness to give battle.

TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

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*Camp at Chinchon, Aug. 22.*

SINCE my last, of the 11th instant, from Guadalaxara, we marched hither. The enemies, keeping always a river between them, are encamped near Aranjuez. We are equally distant from Madrid; but, it being thought impracticable to pass the Xarama before the enemies, we shall in a few days be forced to pass the Tagus, and shall endeavour to take quarters as near Madrid as will be possible, to secure the country which is on the other side of that river. Lieutenant-General Wyndham, with the four battalions, and the horse which was to have joined us, is ordered to remain there, and to gather together what provisions he can. The country of Castille is daily falling from us, and we can only reckon ourselves masters of the ground we encamp on.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Camp at Chinchon, Aug. 25.*

MY Lord Peterborough makes us hope he will secure either Port Mahon or Port Venere for a squadron to winter in, than which nothing can be of greater consequence to us in our present circumstances. In the mean time, we despatched to Lisbon to get money for the whole army, which is pennyless; clothes, shoes, boots, saddles, and recruits for the Portuguese foot. We hope to get horses to remount their cavalry in Valencia and Murcia. The diversion we would desire the Portuguese to make with the troops remaining in that kingdom, is to enter Estremadura, and either to block up or besiege Badajoz; which will either oblige the enemies to make a strong detachment against them, and give us ease that way; or, if the Portuguese should take Badajoz, it would be practicable then to get a communication with them by the Guadiana. Your Lordship being

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acquainted with the present situation of our affairs, I shall observe this, that though they are extremely altered for the worse within these six weeks, yet, if managed to the best advantage, they are still much better than if the Portuguese had been at liberty to return home; which would have left the enemy in a condition to have shut us up a second time in Barcelona: whereas we may now hope to secure winter quarters in Castille, and keep them eternally in apprehensions for Madrid, where there is still a party for us. In order to make the best use we can of all the troops which are now here, some things seem necessary to be done in England, in relation to the Portuguese, over whom our command has been hitherto very precarious, and among whom there is no manner of discipline; the want of which would prove very dangerous, if we should ever be obliged to retire into any of the provinces which are well affected to us.

This latter inconvenience might be easily remedied, if, instead of remitting the subsidy which the Queen and States give, to Lisbon,—where the ministers have so ordered it that the troops have received no pay all this summer, and are consequently forced to live with great licentiousness,—the money were sent to the Queen's general, and by him issued to their troops, the officers of their artillery, and their proveditors. If this alone could be obtained, it would not only reduce them to better discipline, but would make them much more dependent on her Majesty's general than they are at present: though I must confess I do not see why we should not go a little further in what relates to the command, of which they have hitherto been in possession, for which they plead the treaty. For by the treaty, which obliges us to pay 13,000 men, they ought to have fifteen more paid by themselves: whereas the whole number of their forces here falls short of the 13,000: and the Queen and States have in these kingdoms considerably more than by the treaty they are obliged to have. Since, therefore, this whole army consists of forces paid by the Queen and States, and that we are in the King of Spain's country, I do not see how they can reasonably insist on the command of all. If it be thought, in



England worth while to come to some new agreement with the Court of Portugal on this matter, it might, perhaps, be the best way for us to insist, that the war being made for the King of Spain, and in his country, his general should have the command. If that point were carried, there would be no difficulty in getting a commission from the King of Spain for her Majesty's general.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Valencia, Oct. 5.*

If I have been long silent, at a time when you have been probably very uneasy in England to hear from us, it is owing to the situation our army was in, since all the couriers that were sent from or to us miscarried. I acquainted you in my last from Chinchon, that our intention was to pass the Tagus; but to endeavour to take quarters in Castille as near that river as would be possible. Accordingly we decamped and passed the Tagus at Fuente-Dueña, the enemies not offering to give us any disturbance in our crossing it, but passed it themselves four leagues lower, and directed their march the same way as we did, generally keeping within one march of us. Their superiority in horse, the ill-will of the country, together with its barrenness in many places, reduced us to the greatest want of provisions; insomuch that we have been many days together without bread. These difficulties made it impracticable for us to stick to our first resolution of taking quarters in Castille, besides that the enemy seemed to endeavour to get between us and the sea, and Valencia, from whence alone we could be supplied. This obliged us to march for this country directly. The enemies seemed once resolved to attack us, having passed the river Xucar, and marched all night towards Villa Nueva de Lajara, where part of our foot was posted; but our army having decamped the same morning, we met 3000 of their horse in a

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large plain about eight in the morning. They followed us close to a little river by Iniesta, which we passed in very good order, and drew up in battle on the side of it. Their foot came up about five in the evening, and they made a show of attacking us. Whether they ever intended it or not, or whether our pitching our tents, and showing a disposition to wait for them, amused them, I cannot tell; but it is certain they had it in their power to have fought that day, and with great advantage, the ground being very favourable for horse, in which they very much outnumber us. The same evening we decamped, and gained the banks of the river Gabriel; and our whole army is since come into this kingdom, except a garrison which is left in Cuenca, and another in Requena: the only two places we have left in Castille. Our army is extremely diminished by the continual fatigues; especially our horse, which is reduced to less than half of what it was, having sometimes passed several days without any forage. How to get them recruited and remounted will be very difficult: since the enemies will probably secure Murcia, and cover Andalusia, where we might have helped ourselves. We shall likewise labour under great difficulties in getting subsistence this winter, this country being never able to feed itself in the best years. We have no money; and we are most of all concerned to hear the fleet will not winter here, which would have been of great help to us. My Lord Peterborough is gone to Genoa, where we hope he will get some money. The victory in Italy will probably make his endeavours for that purpose succeed. . . . . How far her Majesty will think fit to enable this King to maintain the Spanish troops he has, and likewise to contribute towards his domestic expences, which I have frequently touched upon, being most earnestly pressed so to do, is humbly submitted to her Majesty's great generosity. Upon which head I shall only say thus much, that what expense her Majesty may be at on that score will be more thankfully acknowledged than three times the same sum expended for this King's service any other way; the one being considered as reason of state, the other as a more personal obligation: and if a treaty of peace be at hand,

as the great successes of her Majesty's arms make it reasonable to expect, this Prince is of a temper to grant us more concessions in what we may desire for our trade, on account of such favours as he reckons done more immediately to himself, than on the account of so many millions expended for the cause.

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## TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Valencia, October 11.*


I CANNOT do better than refer your Grace to Count Lechearain for the state of our affairs here. I wish it were as easy to propose a proper remedy as it is to show the great want of one. We are at present in the greatest confusion; and I see more likelihood of its increasing than otherwise. If we had fewer generals and more troops, the game were sure. As it is, we are not without hopes of a happy conclusion, since your Grace is not of a temper to leave unfinished what you have so gloriously begun and carried on.

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## TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Valencia, October 11.*

THE King intends to hold the Cortes of Aragon and of Valencia this winter, which will probably give him some assistance, though I doubt very short of what is wanted, or even of what is expected by the Court, the country is so exhausted. There is on foot a project, which, in time, might come to something, — a confederacy between the provinces of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, which formerly composed the crown of Aragon, to support their independence of Castille, and to maintain

1706.  themselves separate from that kingdom. If the King's arms should not be so successful as to reduce it, the good of this association would be, that they would more cheerfully tax themselves and raise forces. The projectors talk of no less than 25,000 or 30,000 men ; but this league would be only defensive, and those who are most fond of it would be against our reducing of Castille. However, I think it deserves to be encouraged, since, besides the subsidies which it may engage them to give, it may oblige the Castillians to make reflections, and be apprehensive of a partition, much more disadvantageous to them than that they so much exclaimed against, since Naples, Sicily, and all the islands depend on the crown of Aragon, and that Flanders, by our late victories, is wrested from them. The Court will not be fond of it, because it would oblige them to grant many new privileges ; and the confederates would expect that such acquisitions and conquests as should be made should be annexed to the crown of Aragon, so that I much fear that the good-will of these provinces will not produce any considerable supplies, at least not so early as they will be wanted ; so that our only solid hopes are from England, and from Portugal by the intervention and pressing instances of England. The Queen's troops here are reduced at most to half their complement. The departure of the fleet, when the troops were in the field, has made it impracticable to send officers to recruit them, so that I can see no other way possible of doing it than sending over hither entire regiments, and breaking. . . . . I had forgot to acknowledge the receipt of her Majesty's instructions relating to the West Indies, and the squadron ordered thither. The disorder of our affairs here made it impracticable to comply with them, or to send from hence any officers to those parts. What could be done was to send avocatory letters and a declaration to Lisbon, where they will be printed and delivered to the commander of her Majesty's squadron. Directions and powers are likewise sent to this King's minister at Lisbon, to send any persons with commissions, that he may meet proper for that business at Lisbon, to America.

## TO THE LORD TREASURER.

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*Valencia, October 11.*

I HAVE already hinted to your Lordship the drift of Count Noyelles, to form two bodies against next spring, that he may command one of them, either alone or under the King. In pursuance of that scheme, the Court presses to separate the English troops, so that those of one establishment may be in Aragon, and the others in Murcia. My Lord Galway does what he can to keep them together, until my Lord Peterborough returns from Italy. If the Queen continues to have two generals here. it may seem proper to have two armies; but if our business be to beat the enemy, I believe we ought to have but one. It is, I think, evident beyond contradiction, that had our forces been joined this summer, the work had been finished. We are now extremely weakened, and the enemies grow stronger, in horse especially.

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## TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Valencia, October 24.*

THE enemies have besieged and taken Cuenca, and in it 2000 men, prisoners of war. The greatest part of the garrison were of the King of Spain's troops; only 600 men were a detachment of English, Portuguese, and Dutch. We have likewise had the misfortune to lose Brigadier Killigrew's regiment of dragoons, with some foot, near Alicant; and the enemies, who have drawn a great body of troops on that side, threaten Alicant, which we hear is not so well provided with provisions as it might have been since we became masters of it. Want of provision and forage occasioned our army to go early into quarters,

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and the same want makes it almost impracticable to draw together again. Carthagena is not judged tenable, and will, I believe, be abandoned. If it had been possible to put that place into condition, it would have been of great advantage, it being a very good harbour for men of war. Thus our summer conquests, the reduction of which employed a considerable force, which might have joined the main army, are in danger of being lost, with the cost of some more men. The enemy's great superiority in horse, and the want of shipping, will reduce us to very great straits for provisions, and give the enemies a great advantage, obliging us to keep asunder that we may subsist. The country about Carthagena and Alicant is the most plentiful in all Spain, and might have filled magazines, if measures had been taken in time; but instead of that, those places now send to ask provisions at Valencia. By good fortune, part of the corn which came from England was brought hither, which has stood us in great stead. These being our circumstances you will easily imagine that nothing but a powerful diversion can save this army from ruin, so far are we from being in a condition to act offensively. If the troops on board the fleet should land in Portugal, and march immediately to the frontier of Alcantara, it would give us ease, and by spring the two armies might march towards Toledo, which I look upon to be the most proper place for us to meet at; since from thence we might maintain our communication both with this kingdom and Portugal, the loss of which has been so fatal to us. I received not till yesterday her Majesty's commands relating to the West Indies, though I had copies sent me by Sir John Leake. I acquainted you in my last, that all that could be done in it was to send declarations to Lisbon, but I fear they will now have little effect. If the King had but been a week at Madrid, and had signed a despatch, we had had the West Indies. Unless we get thither once more, and carry him along with us, no good is to be expected there, which makes me wish the squadron ordered thither were countermanded, unless some other service be intended by it. The victory in Italy will probably give us ease on the side of Catalonia; on the frontiers of which great magazines were preparing, but

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we now hear those preparations are slackened. It is also probable, the French foot in Spain may not be recruited, but their Spanish cavalry will be remounted with great ease; whereas, I must confess, I do not see how we shall recruit either. The Queen has now here, and in Catalonia, nineteen battalions of foot, which are, I doubt, short of 300 men, one with another; the Portuguese have the same number of battalions, and of about the same strength. The Dutch have six battalions, scarce so strong. The horse of all nations is in a miserable condition. The King of Spain's foot was most in Cuenca and in Elche; what remains is very inconsiderable, both in quantity and quality.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Valencia, October 24.*

COUNT NOYELLES, who was, as I have learnt lately, the author of the expedition to Aragon, that he might have a separate command, has, ever since our junction with my Lord Galway, made it his business to find fault, and has so far insinuated himself into the King's favour, that he hears and is advised by him altogether. His drift, as I already hinted in my last, is to get a separate command on the side of Aragon, in order to which he would have troops left in Cuenca, which are lost. My Lord being very justly uneasy at this management, and tired with eternal struggling against wind and tide, talks and thinks of nothing but retiring, and avoids, as much as possible, coming near the Court. He is, besides, infirm, and the many vexations he has, what with the Court, and what with the management of the Portuguese, whom, I may venture to affirm, no man alive but himself could deal with; these things, I say, together, have made him less in love, and I know not whether I might not say, less fit for business than he used to be. Before these last letters he was fully resolved to resign the

1706. troops to my Lord Peterborough, when he should be come back from Italy. I heartily wish I may find him in another disposition when he comes hither. My poor endeavours shall not be wanting to animate him to undergo this drudgery a little longer; and, if it be possible for us, to gather together, and to show some signs of life and vigour. When this expedition is at an end, I will make it my most humble request to your Lordship, be the success what it will, to be discharged from a post in which I have so very little satisfaction. If I have not done so well as I ought, or might, I desire this business may be put into abler hands. If I am so happy as to have your Lordship's approbation of my endeavours to serve, I beg my discharge as a reward, and to prevent my undoing myself in supporting an expense which I am not able to bear.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Valencia, November 23.*

THE want of a squadron in these seas, amongst many other great inconveniences, does make our correspondence with you very precarious. Since my last, the enemies have taken Carthagen. They still keep the field; whether they will attempt Alicant is uncertain. We have had some little success in Aragon, having retaken Daroca and Molina, and defeated a body the enemies had on that frontier.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Valencia, November 24.*

I MAY, perhaps, be thought too little sanguine in this matter, but I cannot help repeating to your Lordship my apprehensions that we shall do very little good as we are at present governed.




The taking possession of the state of Milan in the name of 1706.  
 the Emperor alarms the Italians, and does not please the Spaniards. I have mentioned it to the King and his ministers, and pressed him to solicit the investiture, in pursuance of the renunciation of the whole monarchy made by his brother to him; but by the language of his ministers it appears to me, that either they do not know what the intentions of the Court of Vienna in that matter are, or that they are content the Emperor should remain possessed of it.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Valencia, December 14.*

SINCE my last of the 23d of November, my Lord Galway has been on the frontiers to observe the enemy, who were in motion, and are since marched into quarters which they have taken between the kingdoms of Murcia and Valencia, extending backwards within a few leagues of the Tagus. Our principal application is to get provisions and horses for the cavalry; but want of money and convoys make our endeavours as yet very ineffectual. If all the horsemen we have, together with those which are expected with my Lord Rivers, were mounted, which will not easily be compassed, the enemies will still outnumber us considerably in horse, to remedy which inconvenience it is proposed that the transport ships, which bring my Lord Rivers' horse, do immediately, after they shall have landed them here, go to Italy, and take on board 1000 horse of the Emperor's troops. The King writes to the Emperor and to Prince Eugene to prepare them; but though they should consent to part with such a number, there remains a great difficulty, which is the finding a fund to subsist them when they shall be here. The country, which this King is master of, are making some efforts to raise troops of their own, which we are made to hope

1706.  may produce 500 horse, besides recruiting what is already on foot, and 2000 foot by spring. The Catalans do besides undertake to form a militia of 10,000 men, which shall be clothed, and do the duty of regular troops in defence of their own country, which will be a great ease. It is therefore proposed that these 1000 horse be maintained six months by the Allies, who may deduct the charge either from the subsidy of the Portuguese, who will not be able to have the number of horse they ought, or by paying so much the fewer men in Italy. It is certain that, if another campaign is to be made, we cannot apply ourselves too much to get a strength in horse, at least equal to that of the enemies, since without it no good can be expected. My Lord Galway is also daily confirmed in his opinion, that another thing is necessary to make us succeed here,—one chief, whom every body will readily obey. The King promises he will use his endeavours to get Prince Eugene here, though I am satisfied that every one of his ministers is much against it. If the Queen can get it done, I look upon it as the greatest service that can be done, whether the war should last another year or not; for unless this government show some prudence and vigour soon, when the general peace is made, I very much fear there will be kindled a civil war here. What is to be expected from any of those who are now in play I need not say, and yet I fear we do not know all the hurt they are still capable of doing. If they have any maxim by which they govern themselves, and in which even those who hate one another do agree, it is to keep all men of any rank and figure, who are Spaniards, out of business. . . . .

I beg leave to offer to your consideration, whether it may deserve to be provided against, by any article in our future treaties with this crown, that all French commodities be prohibited in Spain, and no traders of that nation suffered to settle here. What makes me mention this is, that it is scarce to be believed what numbers of them were established here; and since the war, which has forced them out, there is hardly a piece of cloth, a hat, or any kind of woollen manufacture, to be found in these three kingdoms. They having, in all times, even during

the former wars, been supplied with these commodities from France. I have mentioned it here, and this Court will do in it whatever shall be thought fitting. Their trade in linens to the West Indies is too considerable, and too much known, to need my mentioning it. 1706.

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TO HIS FATHER (HONBLE A. STANHOPE).

*Valencia, December 14.*

I MAY venture to say to *you*, that I can do more with this King than I believe any stranger will in haste. When he writ against my Lord Peterborough, he would have asked the command of his troops for me, if I had not prevented it. My having maintained an interest with him is the more extraordinary, because it has almost always been my duty to oppose what he has been inclined to; whereas Count Noyelles has, by humouring at first his resentment against my Lord Peterborough, and since his piques against the Portuguese, ruined our affairs, but brought himself into great favour. He has improved the animosity against the Portuguese to such a point, that my Lord Galway, as being looked upon as linked with them, has not met with the treatment his zeal for the public deserves; and if any measures of decent management have been kept, I may say it is, in a great measure, owing to me. You may judge how easy a life it is to be employed to treat with people who so little know their own interest. I must confess I heartily wish what we are told of a peace be true; for I expect no good will be done on this side.

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TO SECRETARY SIR CHARLES HEDGES.

*Valencia, January 15. 1707.*

SINCE my last, of the 25th of December, we have received the ill news of the King of Portugal's death, and the loss of Alcantara. The same ships brought us letters from my Lord Rivers and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, acquainting us, they had taken the resolution of bringing the land forces to this kingdom. Upon these advices, and the arrival of the Earl of Peterborough from Italy, several conferences have been held on the operations of the next campaign. Enclosed I send you the opinions given by my Lord Galway, Sir Charles Hara, and myself, in writing, as the King had desired. What is mentioned therein, of taking Orihuela and Murcia, so soon as the forces shall land, is agreed to unanimously, as likewise to solicit either succours, or a powerful diversion, from Italy; and also to engage, if possible, a squadron to stay in this sea. I am sorry it is doubtful whether this latter can be compassed; Sir Cloudesley Shovel having writ word, that his ships will be obliged to return soon after the landing of the forces. And if the succours the French give out they are to have, of which my Lord Peterborough will inform you more particularly, are really marching, a squadron would be very necessary to hinder them from hurting us in Catalonia, which would otherwise require more troops for the defence of it than we can spare, and leave ourselves a sufficient force to go to Madrid. The main part of our votes, which relate to the design of the campaign, is not yet determined; there being many opinions that we should not think of Madrid, but act defensively, and in several bodies. I have in most of my letters, since I came hither, either to my Lord Treasurer or you, expressed my apprehension this would be aimed at; and therefore hope we shall soon be informed from you of her Majesty's pleasure in this particular. I have, perhaps, been guilty of a fault in supporting my opinion, which is the same with my Lord Galway's, too warmly, at some of these conferences;

having said, that her Majesty did not spend such vast sums, and send such number of forces, to garrison towns in Catalonia and Valencia, but to make King Charles master of the Spanish monarchy; and that, if it was insisted upon to divide our forces, and put ourselves on the defensive, I should, in her Majesty's name, protest against such measures. The fault I apprehend myself to have committed was using the expression, of protesting in her Majesty's name, in presence of my Lord Peterborough, who has characters from her Majesty so much superior to mine, and from whom it was my fortune to differ in opinion on this occasion. His Lordship will have communicated to you the projects he has concerted with the Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene; for the execution of which, a strong squadron is necessary. If the assistance of our fleet can engage those princes to march by land to Toulon, it may, on that condition, be worth our while to spare some foot from hence, for the execution of such a design as destroying their naval strength, though we should be reduced to act defensively here. For let us take never so good resolutions, I cannot help repeating my apprehensions to you, that we shall do no great matters while we have so many generals so little disposed to agree. Experience has so fully convinced me of my disability to procure that good understanding amongst ourselves, which is necessary for the Queen's service, that I do with the greatest earnestness renew my application to you, that I may be recalled from a station in which I am perfectly useless to her Majesty, and am ruining myself, being forced to live at a much greater expense than my allowances will bear.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

(The Earl of Sunderland succeeded Sir Charles Hedges as Secretary of State in December, 1706.)

*Valencia, February 23.*

At my return from Alicant, I have learnt that the King has writ a very obliging letter to the Earl of Peterborough, wherein

1707. he confirms to his Lordship the character he had formerly given to him of general of his troops, and so commends to his care and management his interests in Italy, and promises him a kind welcome when he shall return. My Lord has, as I understand from himself, let the King have 13,000 pistols of the money he brought from Italy. My Lord has expressed himself dissatisfied with me, for having writ formerly to the Secretary, that there was a misunderstanding betwixt the King and his Lordship. I have always thought it my duty to represent matters here as I apprehended them to be. Whether I was then mistaken or not in the account I gave, will probably have been seen by the letters the King and his Lordship writ to England. As I thought it my duty to give an account when it seemed to me there was a difference between them, so I think myself obliged to do the same when there is a seeming good understanding, without entering into the motives that either occasioned their difference or their reconciliation. His Lordship does likewise insist, that I should say what I know of his going from Guadalaxara, and from thence on board the fleet, and to Italy, which he hears has been disapproved of. What I am in justice obliged to say on this particular is, that it was at a council of war at Guadalaxara judged by every body to be for the service that his Lordship should leave the army; and according to the orders his Lordship said he had, go on board the fleet, and endeavour to secure a port for it to winter in, and to get money from Italy.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Valencia, March 8.*

SINCE my last to your Lordship of the 22d of February, many conferences have been held about the operations of the campaign, in all which the King has been dissuaded from making his journey to Catalonia, nor have I been able to pre-

serve the temper which I proposed to do on that subject. I shall not enumerate to your Lordship the reasons that have been offered by us to his Majesty against it, but may venture to say, that either by his own ministers or by us, all has been said that was possible to divert his resolution. Every one of his ministers and generals have in the strongest manner represented against it, except Count Noyelles, who in public has been silent, and is by every body looked upon as the author of it. Prince Lichtenstein has, I believe, lost the little remains of credit he had left by opposing it, which he did very heartily. When other arguments would not prevail, I have, both in private with his Majesty, and in his presence at the junta, represented to him, that the French offer terms of peace which might satisfy our particular interests in trade, but that her Majesty, with an unparalleled generosity, would hearken to no terms that might be to his or the Spanish nation's disreputation or disadvantage, depending that his Majesty would, on his side, do all that was possible to help himself in concert with the generals and ministers of his Allies; but that if it should come to be doubted that some about him could, out of private ends, obstruct the efforts which were expected on this side, it was to be feared England would grow weary of so vast an expense. All the fruit of these representations is, that he has promised, both in word and writing, that he will come to the army when it shall be ready to enter into Castille. I shall in a few days follow his Majesty to Catalonia, and press the Treaty of Commerce.

1707.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Valencia, March 19.*

THE backwardness of our provisions has occasioned some delay in our taking the field, which I hope will be done in a few days. The enemies draw on this side all the force they

1707. can make, and leave the frontiers on the Portugal side very naked. Their superiority in horse, and the difficulties of subsisting, make our game pretty difficult. And I must confess I have not yet any very clear prospect of our operations. If we move the nearest way, by the Mancha towards Madrid, we shall be embarrassed at the Tagus; to avoid which, if we go round by Aragon, as is generally thought of, we are in danger of losing this kingdom of Valencia, great part of which is not so well affected as could be wished; and from the frontier of Aragon to near Madrid is a desert that can furnish us with nothing. The best thing that can happen will be, to get, if possible, an opportunity of joining the enemies between this and the Tagus, if, trusting to their strength in horse, they will hazard a battle. I shall, to-morrow, go after the Court to Barcelona, where I will set on foot our Treaty of Commerce, and press the King to join the army whenever it shall act; for his presence may very much shorten our work, by the influence it may have on the Spanish troops on the other side. The King having been made to hope that some money would be allowed him for his own expenses, I cannot but repeat to your Lordship, what I have already said, that either to facilitate our treaty, or to engage him to join the army, which we all think absolutely necessary, no argument will be of weight but ready money. With that, nothing is impossible here.

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## TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Valencia, March 19.*

I AM now going to Barcelona, where I shall not fail to remind the King of his promises to join the army, when it shall be formed, and ready to enter upon action. If we can get Count Noyelles made Viceroy of Catalonia or Aragon, it is possible we may succeed. And it would be a double advantage to get the



King's person to the army without his general. After having so often complained of the conduct and ill management of this Court, it may seem inconsistent in me to solicit money for people that may be thought so little to deserve the much that has already been done for them ; but since it is our interest to make them succeed, and to secure to us for the future some advantageous conditions of trade, the most effectual means, and I believe the cheapest, are to buy what we would have with ready money.

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1707.

## TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Barcelona, April 3.*

I HAVE been here three days, and delivered the Queen's letter to the King. I expect little fruit from it ; and shall trouble his Majesty very little more on that subject, being satisfied that all that is said to him does only make him stiffer in his own sense. I shall chiefly apply myself to getting my treaty (of commerce), and seem ignorant of what passes here. They are gathering troops ; and design to form a camp, I believe, in Roussillon. They are likewise providing a train of artillery, but deny it all to me. Time alone can disabuse them ; and if your Lordship, as I hope, makes a prosperous beginning of the campaign, the King will come to you, especially if he be baffled in his attempt on Roussillon, which, I am fully persuaded, is intended, though all care is taken to conceal it from me.

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## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, April 27.*

AT our first coming hither, there was a strong report that an expedition was intended against Roussillon ; but we have hitherto

1707. been in a profound tranquillity, and I see no disposition of the Court's leaving this place in haste. Since the last Council of War, held at Valencia, in presence of his Majesty, when I did, in the strongest manner I could, protest against his coming hither, I have perceived a sensible change of his Majesty's carriage towards me; nor does the letter I delivered from her Majesty to him seem to have had that weight it reasonably ought. Count Noyelles is resolved not to be in an army which he does not command; and has, I believe, made the King hope that, with the few troops he has here, he would do great things on the side of Roussillon, where we shall certainly be baffled if we do attempt. And the least ill consequence that I expect from this conduct is, that four or five thousand men will remain unemployed.

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TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Barcelona, April 27.*

OUR army joined the 7th of this month, at Valencia, the troops of all nations in a very good condition. They marched from thence into the Mancha, the enemies retiring with precipitation, and abandoning some magazines they had at Yecla and Montalegre. They never appeared above 4000 horse, keeping their foot and baggage three days' march behind them, towards the Tagus. It being, therefore, thought impracticable to come up with any body of them on this side the Tagus, and it having been the general opinion at a Great Council, held in the King's presence at Valencia, not to pursue the enemy to the Tagus, where much time might be lost without passing that river at last, but, leaving the head of that river on our left, to march by Aragon; our army did, accordingly, the 18th, march back again, and will pursue that scheme, ruining the country on the frontiers of Valencia, that the enemies may not be able to subsist there to hurt that country when our army shall have left it.

1707.

The weather has been more severe since our troops have been out than it had been all the winter, there having fallen much snow, by which the troops have suffered considerably. To come to the frontiers of Castille by Aragon, as is proposed, is a march of about sixty leagues, and through very ill country great part of the way; so that I judge it may be towards the latter end of May before they will get thither. If the enemies, who have a shorter cut, should make an impression in Aragon before us, they may, by destroying the country, put us under some difficulties. There are here and at Gerona nine battalions of foot, and above 1000 horse. The city of Barcelona has, for its own defence, raised a body of militia of near 6000 men, who are as well clothed and armed as any of our troops. The enemies have very little force in Roussillon; so it was proposed by our generals that the regular troops here, or the greatest part of them, should have been sent before, to join about 3000 men, who are already in Aragon; but it could not be obtained, nor do I find a disposition that these troops shall be employed any where that might be of use. There has been, indeed, a report that they were to attempt conquests in Roussillon; but none of the confederates are let into any of the measures that are concerted between the King and Count Noyelles; nor have any of us yet been able to learn why we are come hither, nor how the King will dispose of his own person. We have, indeed, the less reason to complain, because his Spanish ministers are in the same ignorance.

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TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Barcelona, May 3.*

It is with the greatest affliction imaginable that I am obliged to give your Grace an account of the melancholy state of our affairs here, by the defeat of our army on the 25th of last month at Almanza. The inclosed paper is a copy of what my Lord

**1707.** Galway writes to me. By other advices more fresh we hear that Count Dohna, with the body of men he had got together with Major-General Shrimpton, have been forced to surrender; so that I cannot learn that 500 men are escaped out of the whole body of foot, which consisted of three-and-forty battalions, whereof I know not whether 16 or 17 were English, 19 Portuguese, and the remainder Dutch. Of our horse, about 3500 are come off; but very few English and Dutch. The enemies, by the best accounts we have had, by joining all their forces from the frontiers of Portugal, of Aragon, and from Andalusia, brought together 101 squadrons of horse, and fifty-one battalions of foot; others say sixty-three. We had but fifty-one squadrons of horse; and, as I have already mentioned, forty-three battalions, there having not been at the army one horse or foot soldier of this King's. My Lord Galway was wounded with a sword over the eye at the beginning of the action, charging with the horse. That accident contributed much to the confusion that followed. Our foot is by every body said to have done wonders, which makes the loss of it so much the more sensible. There remain now in this country of the English foot six battalions, which were not at the action; three in Gerona, and three in Alicant. Of the Dutch, three are in Aragon, and one in the kingdom of Valencia. Of regular troops the King has eight battalions, disposed, likewise, between Gerona, this place, and Aragon; and above 2000 horse. Gerona is in a tolerable condition. On the other side, I know no place that can stop an army three days; yet Count Noyelles is for dispersing the poor remainders we have left up and down in holes, where they must be lost as soon as the enemy will think fit to show themselves. If we joined all the forces I have mentioned with the recruits that came last, we could form twenty good battalions of regular troops, and near 6000 horse. This body, with the militia of this country, which is very good, intrenched on the Ebro, might perhaps stop the enemy; and we should always be masters of retiring to Tarragona and this place, whither we must be driven at last, but should be much better able to defend them than we shall be when the remainder of our foot shall be lost.

## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

1707.  
*Barcelona, May 3.*

YOUR Lordship will easily imagine how much we are stunned at so great a blow, which the enemies have the whole summer to follow up. We are here as destitute of counsel as of force.

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## TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Barcelona, May 9.*

MONTJUICH, as it now is, is liable to be insulted; and many things are necessary to be done to put Barcelona in a condition of defence. I have proposed that lines should be made about the foot of Montjuich, and from thence to the town; behind which we may, in case of necessity, encamp our horse, and as great numbers of Miquelets as we please. This, if speedily executed, may put us in a condition to make a good defence at Barcelona, which I cannot but apprehend the enemies will attempt. The greatest difficulty will be to get magazines of forage; but if the Ebro, want of provisions, or the other difficult passes in this country which the enemy must pass to come hither, give us time to the middle of June, the whole country may be obliged to bring in their harvest. This proposal, which I have often mentioned, but did insist more upon last night at the Junta, is by every body approved; and this day, I believe, Count Noyelles himself will give directions for tracing this work

1707.  


## TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Barcelona, May 15.*

I DOUBT Mequinenza will require much work; but, if it can be put in condition, it is of the greatest consequence. The whole care of that frontier, as far as Lerida, is by the King recommended to your Excellency; and if from hence care can be taken of Gerona and this place, it is all you can expect.

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## TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Barcelona, May 19.*

SINCE my last to your Grace, the enemies have taken possession of the kingdom of Valencia; except Alicant, Denia, and Xativa. The latter they sent a detachment to besiege; and we do not know yet whether they have taken it or raised the siege, as some say. The remainder of our army has passed the Ebro at Tortosa: that place, Mequinenza, and Lerida, we are at work at, and all the foot will be put into them. It is believed the enemy's main body will march into Aragon, and pass the Ebro at Zaragoza. It has been some ease to us, after our misfortunes, that we have not had to do with an enemy who has known how to pursue his victory so closely as he might have done, which has given us time to make some disposition for the defence of Catalonia. But the lethargy and helplessness of this Court is beyond expression. They have not, in three weeks' time, made one step to help themselves; and it has happened, unluckily, that the fleet, which has money on board, has been detained on the coast of Valencia some time in taking in our stores, our sick and wounded men, and some time by contrary winds: and the Court has not credit for a shilling; insomuch that I have been

obliged to borrow 2500*l.* to enable them to subsist the few 1707.  
troops they have, and to work at Montjuich, which is in the {  
same condition as the enemies left it.

Inclosed I send your Grace a paper, with some heads which the King has agreed to. The most important is the endeavouring to procure some troops from Italy. The King would have desired a much greater number, which I desired might not be insisted upon, that it might not give any pretence to alter any thing in the project on foot there. If we are so happy as to get 5000 foot, I hope we may be able to defend Catalonia. With treble that number, we should not be in a condition to act offensively; and if Spain is to be conquered, it must be by a new army, and under a different government than has been hitherto.

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TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Barcelona, May 25.*

SOME *galeras* and mules shall be provided against Colonel Richards' coming, for the carriage of our ammunition to Lerida and Mequinenza; as, strangely as it may sound that there should be no stores of powder, bullets, &c., considering what the French left here, it is certainly true that this place is very ill provided, with lead especially.

I have already mentioned my thoughts on putting English officers to the Spanish troops, which, I fear, will neither be so proper to raise men, nor to govern them when raised, as Spaniards; but this I humbly submit to your better judgment. I am very glad your Lordship has a better opinion of our condition than I must confess I had. If we are so happy as to defend this principality, after such a blow, I believe it will be doing more than is any where expected from us.

1707.  


## TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Barcelona, June 6.*

Soon after the reduction of Valencia, the enemies divided their forces; the Duke of Orleans, with a detachment, passed the Tagus, and going so far about as Navarre, joined a body of troops they had there, with which he entered Aragon; and about a week since, Zaragoza submitted to him. The body with him is said to be about 10,000 men. The Duke of Berwick divided the army with him into several bodies, one of which besieged Xativa, which defends itself very well, and we hear the enemies have raised the siege. About 1500 men of our foot, of all nations, had saved themselves in that place, Alcira, and the neighbouring country, which has occasioned a great diversion; the country having shown great constancy, and, wherever they had but the least countenance of regular troops to support them, have chosen to suffer the last extremities rather than to submit; insomuch, that to prevent the destruction of many places, Zaragoza especially, it has been necessary the King should send them leave, and advise them to yield to force for the present. One Basset, a man who is incredibly beloved by the people of Valencia, but had been put in prison when my Lord Peterborough was here, has been released, and is sent to head the people in that tract of country which we keep there, by which 5000 or 6000 men of the enemy's are diverted on that side. The Duke of Berwick, with their main body, consisting of about 4000 horse and 8000 foot, marched to the Ebro, and encamped opposite to Tortosa. He attempted to take a ravelin, which covers the head of our bridge there, without success, and after having spent a week there to no purpose, is marched back again, in order, as we suppose, to fall into the high road which leads to Aragon, to join the Duke of Orleans. The roughness of the country by which they must come into Catalonia, the rivers which may be chicaned, and the zeal of our peasantry, make us hope they may find it difficult to penetrate far. My Lord Galway



is raising some Spanish foot, and does indeed use all application possible to prevent their reaping those advantages from the battle which they might have done had they followed their victory, instead of amusing themselves as they have done. I wish I could do the same justice to the Court. 1707.

Sir Cloudesley Shovel sailed this day for the coast of Italy. Whether they will send us any foot from thence I can't tell; but here they would be more necessary at present, than where we are assured a great body is marching to begin a new war in Naples. The King has frequently assured me that he has writ several times in the strongest manner to dissuade this expedition.

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TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Barcelona, June 8.*

I HAVE been treating with several commanders of Miquelets, and have partly agreed with one who has seemed to me to be the best of them. He is to raise 500 within a month, to be Lieutenant-Colonel of them, and the regiment to be called by your name. I am in treaty with several others. I believe it may be possible to get 1500 within six weeks. I encourage their officers to hope they shall become regular troops, which the officers desire as much as the men fear.

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TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Barcelona, July 8.*

I AM honoured with your Lordship's commands of the 12th and 16th May, by Brigadier Pepper and Mr. Delaval. They

1707. came very seasonably to keep up our spirits here, where, in truth, we want cordials. Since my last to your Lordship, the enemies have taken Alcira and Xativa, in the kingdom of Valencia. The latter made an extraordinary defence, especially the inhabitants, who defended half their town five days after the other half was taken. The enemies, after having mastered them, have used unheard-of barbarities, killing the priests at the altar, and ruining even the churches and convents, insomuch that there remains only the name of that place. Our English garrison retired into the castle, and have made an honourable capitulation; but I fear the enemies have broke it, having heard nothing of them for some time, whereas both they and those of Alcira, were, by their capitulation, to have joined us in Catalonia.

The Dukes of Orleans and Berwick were on the banks of the Cinca fifteen days, and attempted to pass it several times during that time, without success; though we had only between 4000 and 5000 horse, to defend a tract of fifteen leagues. The waters, since the hot weather, are so fallen, that it was fordable almost every where, which has obliged our horse, which was mightily dispersed, and, consequently, exposed to have the enemies cut between them, to retire to the Segre. When the enemies made their last attempt on the last of June, our English dragoons beat the first of their squadrons, but were obliged afterwards to retire, which they did in very good order, with the loss of two captains and twelve men. The Segre will very soon be fordable, and we believe the enemies will besiege Lerida, where there are eight battalions of foot, commanded by the Prince of Hesse.

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TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Barcelona, July 8.*

THE garrisons of Alcira and Xativa were to be returned to us, but it is a month since those places capitulated, and all we hear

of them, (which consist of about 1400 men, mostly English and Dutch,) is, that they march and countermarch them up and down the country, so that if they are returned at all, they will be extremely reduced in their numbers by this usage. 1707.

We just now receive advices that the Duke of Orleans refuses to return us the garrison of Xativa, which were mostly English, because a Spaniard, who was governor of the town, has withdrawn himself!

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, July 16.*

THE enemies have passed the Segre with part of their army, near Mequinenza, their greatest body continuing to be encamped near Lerida, on the other side of that river. As we do not hear they have with them any great cannon or stores necessary for a siege, it is believed their design is not against Lerida, as was apprehended, but rather against Tortosa; because we know of above thirty pieces of heavy cannon which they have near that place in Peniscola, and may have received more, and been supplied with other stores by sea. It would have been of great ease to us if any frigates could have been spared us from the fleet, for the support and intercourse of our garrisons of Alicant and Denia. The latter of these places continues to make a very vigorous defence, having repulsed two assaults, with great loss on the enemy's side. My Lord Galway, with about 4000 horse, which composes at present all the army we have in the field, is near Lerida, observing the enemies; our foot is distributed in the garrisons, as I mentioned to your Lordship in my last. Count Noyelles has about 1000 horse on the frontier of Roussillon, where the enemies are very quiet. And it is said they are drawing off the few troops they had there, which makes us hope that our Italian army has at last got into motion.

1707.  


## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, July 23.*


YESTERDAY we were surprised to hear the enemies here have repassed the Segre; their deserters say, to go into quarters of refreshment during the heats, which are excessive this year, and have made them sickly. The deserters also add, that they expect cannon and supplies of ammunition from France, with which at present they are very ill provided. Denia continues to make a very vigorous defence, and the enemies have lost 1000 men before it, and we do not despair of saving it at last, their troops before it being very sickly.

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## TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Barcelona, July 23.*

By a fresh letter from the Duke of Somerset, I am discouraged from expecting the liberty I had applied for to return home. Upon which I beg leave to protest to your Lordship, that I never would have thought of declining any difficulties or uneasiness to myself, where I should hope to be able to do service. I have told your Lordship why I thought I could not, and do believe those reasons still subsist, and will do so, if Count Noyelles continues here. Having thus, with great truth, laid my sense of that matter before you, I do, with all the submission and resignation possible, leave myself entirely at your Lordship's disposal, to do with me as you shall think fitting. Assuring your Lordship at the same time, that wherever it shall be your Lordship's pleasure to have me be, I will, to the very utmost of my power, either in an employment or out of one, endeavour to deserve your Lordship's good opinion.



## TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

1707.  
*Barcelona, August 1.*

THE enemies have raised the siege of Denia, before which they lost above 1500 men. Their troops are very sickly, and desert extremely. There seems to be a great irresolution and unsteadiness in all their working, especially since we can suppose them to have learnt the progress of the Duke of Savoy, and the good prospect we have on that side; and the little vigour with which the enemies have prosecuted so great a victory, obtained so early, has very much raised the spirits, not only of our Court and troops, but of this whole province, and gives us time to put our frontier places in a better condition.

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## TO MR. METHUEN, AMBASSADOR AT LISBON.

*Barcelona, August 4.*

IN all my late letters to England, I have represented to our ministry, that, in order to carry on the war on this side with success, and to make the great expense we are at here of some use, it would be very convenient the Prince Eugene could be sent to command here; and if that were not possible, some single person should have the command of the whole, and be more authorised than any one has hitherto been. My Lord Galway has writ to the same purpose. As we may suppose the person to be pitched upon will not be a Portuguese, it seems to be absolutely necessary the troops of that nation should be commanded by an officer not above the degree of a Lieutenant-General, and he have strict orders to be subordinate to such General as her Majesty, the King of Spain, and the Allies shall

1707. think fitting to be at the head of the whole. To make the Portuguese troops which remain here of service, I have represented another thing as absolutely necessary to be done; which is, that they should be paid by the Queen's General, and be looked upon as hired troops, in the same manner as so many troops that are now in our service in Flanders. For at present, besides their testiness upon service, which nothing but my Lord Galway's great patience and address could manage, it is certain that the money we pay for them (and we know that great sums have been sent them) sticks in the chief officers' hands, so that the troops either perish for want, or commit a thousand disorders in the country to live. How inconvenient soever this might be heretofore, it is (as you will easily imagine, who know the Catalans,) of much worse consequence, now that we are reduced to this province.

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TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Camp at Tarraga, October 24.*

THE town of Lerida was taken the 13th instant, after a good defence, and a considerable loss of the enemies. The garrison retired to the castles, where they continue to make a good defence. The rains have now begun, which will make the enemies uneasy, and give us time to assemble the peasants. We can, in twice four-and-twenty hours, draw together eighteen battalions of foot, and fifty squadrons of horse, with twenty field pieces. This drawing the troops together, and raising the country, has made the enemies draw over all their troops on the other side of the river, where their horse will subsist with great difficulty. They have also abandoned Balaguer, a very considerable pass on the Segre, and by all their motions appear irresolute, whilst we are making all the efforts imaginable to save this place. Count Noyelles is turning all we do or

propose into ridicule at Barcelona; and hindered the King for 1707.  
 above a fortnight from consenting to have either troops or  
 Miquelets assembled; affirming, that Lerida would not be be-  
 sieged, till the very day the news came that the trenches were  
 opened. I have often complained of the influence he has here,  
 and he daily gives more reason for so doing; so that I may  
 venture to assure your Grace, that whatever succours of men  
 or money shall be sent here will be thrown away, unless he be  
 either removed, or have the sole command.

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TO HIS BROTHER, CAPTAIN PHILIP STANHOPE.

*Camp at Las Borjas, November 6.*

OUR public news is, that Lerida has been besieged five weeks, but makes a very good defence. We are encamped with eighteen battalions of foot, and forty-nine squadrons of horse, in sight of the town; but there being a river between us and the enemy, much superior, we can do little for their relief till you bring us succours. If they are what we are told, and come in time, I do not despair of giving them a blow which may retrieve Almanza.

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TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Camp at Las Borjas, November 6.*

WE are now all joined; we have eighteen battalions of foot, and forty-nine squadrons of horse. The enemies have fired very hard these last four or five days, but our people continue to make a very good defence. We are but four hours distant from Lerida, and which way soever one would go towards it, it is a plain. The enemies have broke the bridge of the town, but

1707. maintain one of their own bridges. We are posted so as to cover the camp of Tarragona and Tortosa, and hope to defend the entrance into the camp of Tarragona, which is the only country can subsist our horse. If we are so happy as to defend these passes, the enemies will hardly venture to put their troops in quarters on this side the Segre. They are at present extremely put to it for forage, and for some days past have only fed upon stubble. If we were strong enough to pass the Segre four or five leagues below their camp, we should cut off their provisions, and infallibly oblige them to raise the siege, or to attack us with part only of their army; but our disproportion is so very great, and our expectation of any reinforcement so very uncertain, that I fear we must quietly see this place lost. I told your Grace, in one of my late letters, that my Lord Galway had desired me to come and serve with the army, where there are few general officers, and I have now the care of all the foot of our little army. When it was uncertain whether Tortosa or Lerida would be besieged, and that it was rather apprehended for the former, I offered, and was appointed to command there.



## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

1708.  
*Barcelona, June 3, 1708.*

I AM very glad to be able to confirm to your Lordship from hence, what I had the honour to write you on the road (through Italy) of the situation and condition of affairs here, which I have found much better than I expected when I left England. The enemies passed the Segre, at Lerida, the 12th of last month, and, gaining the Ebro, marched on this side of it within two days' march of Tortosa. Another body of them marched on the other side, and are encamped about Mora, opposite to the Duke of Orleans: and they have lately made a bridge over that river, to have a communication between their two camps, and for the subsistence of the body they have on this side. The accounts of their strength vary from 18,000 to 22,000 men. It is plain by their working that their design was to besiege Tortosa; but by their long delay, and spending so much time in a very barren and mountainous country, where their horse suffers very much, we suppose they were expecting necessities for the siege. If they depended on the convoy of corn from Marseilles, which has been so happily intercepted by Sir John Leake, it is possible their design may be frustrated: and deserters lately come from them confirm us in this opinion; telling us that bread is very dear in their camp, and that they talk of passing their whole army on the side of Valencia, to subsist the better: for the parties of foot and Miquelets which Marshal Staremberg has posted behind them, and on the river between them and Lerida, make it impracticable for them to draw any thing from thence or from Aragon by water.

## APPENDIX.

### TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Camp at Valls, June 19.*

WE have now an exact account of the enemy's force, which I believe is from 20,000 to 25,000 men. We are encamped here with thirty squadrons of horse and twelve battalions: the Duke of Noailles with about 9000 men is in Ampurdan; and we have there a camp of some battalions and 1500 horse. We have an account that our fleet got to Vado the 6th instant, so we may soon expect them back with the succours, which I believe will be 4000 foot and 2000 horse. What use we shall be able to make of them when they shall come, is not easy to say. There is neither water nor forage between Cambrils and Tortosa. Some are for marching into Aragon, and believe that an insurrection in that kingdom might draw the enemies from Tortosa. We are hitherto happy, in one respect,—that there is a very good understanding between all our chiefs; and Marshal Staremberg is very much considered by every body, and will, I am persuaded, do all that can be done for the defence of this country.

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### TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Camp at Valls, June 22.*

THE Duke of Orleans has been ten days before Tortosa, and has made two bridges, one above, and another below, the town. They defeated a party of ours of 600 men at Falset, by the negligence of the officers, who were surprised. We do not yet learn that they have broke ground; but there has been daily skirmishing about the town, and our people have generally had the advantage. Great numbers of deserters come daily over to us, and above 100 are gone into Tortosa. The Duke of Orleans'

1708.

army consists of forty-five battalions of foot and sixty squadrons of horse, besides Mr. D'Asfeld's body in Valencia, which is about 5000 men, horse and foot. We are encamped here with thirty-seven squadrons of horse and twelve battalions. The garrison of Tortosa consists of nine battalions, which may be reckoned at 4000 men, and seven of the battalions very good old troops: they want neither provisions nor ammunition. The enemies have, as we know of yet, no more than seventeen pieces of battering cannon. The kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia are very well disposed, and, as we believe, ready to take up arms when we shall advise them so to do; which will not be seasonable till our succours arrive from Italy. We shall then be able to march into Aragon with 6000 horse and twenty battalions of good foot. If that kingdom should then take up arms for us, we may, by cutting off the provisions of the enemy, reduce them to very great straits.

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TO ROBERT WALPOLE, ESQ., SECRETARY AT WAR.

*Camp at Ruidoms, July 4.*

I MUST say one word about our recruits of men, which are better made in the north of England\*, as we have found by experience: and unless you give us your assistance in that matter, I am afraid they will come but very small to us.


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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, Aug. 4.*

YOUR Lordship will have heard long since, by the way of France, of the loss of Tortosa after eighteen days' siege. We had

\* I have heard that the same superiority of the recruits from the northern counties was experienced in the late war.

1708.  flattered ourselves it might have held out longer ; but it seems the works which had stood still most part of the winter, for want of money, had not been finished according to my design. The garrison, likewise, did not answer expectation, especially the Palatines, above two thirds of which deserted either during the siege or upon their marching out. It is true that the enemies, upon the marching out of the garrison, did most impudently break their faith ; and partly by money, but more by force, took about 1000 men out of the ranks. This violation of the capitulation, together with the desertion which had been before, reduced the garrison to 1200 men ; which, by the exactest returns we could get of their strength before the siege, consisted of 3600 effective duty men. . . . . If the foot we expect from Italy should come by the latter end of October, we shall certainly make a winter campaign ; and if this matter be kept secret, it is possible, then, the enemies, by dispersing and going into quarters, may give us some opportunity to attempt upon them with success ; for we have no great opinion of their generals, and they seem to have great respect for ours.

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TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Barcelona, Aug. 4.*

THE difficulty of subsisting such a body of horse as we now have in the little country that is left us, and the impossibility which there appears to be, without a squadron, to transport hither, by spring, such a body of foot as shall enable us to pass the rivers, and to maintain a communication with Catalonia, if we advance forwards ;—these difficulties, I say, have made me often wish, that if a push is to be made, it were chiefly on the side of Portugal, and that no more than 2000 or 2500 horse were left in Catalonia ; which, with the foot we shall have, if these 4000 men come from Naples, would be sufficient to

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defend this country, which is naturally very fast and very unfit for cavalry; and I believe it would not be impossible, at the beginning of winter, to march with 4000 good horse into Portugal, where it will be difficult to form an army for want of horse. This may seem, at first sight, very hazardous; but when once we know where the enemy's horse is dispersed up and down in quarters, it is to be attempted with almost a certainty of success. For when once they are over the Ebro, which must be passed below the junction of the Segre and Cinca, they need not pass another river to go to Portugal; and if once they get two days the start of the enemy's chief horse quarters, which must be done by making two marches through the mountains that divide Valencia from Aragon, they have not a defile to stop them to the frontiers of Portugal. . . . . I must tell your Grace, that I doubt Prince Eugene has done himself an unkindness with the King, or that ill offices have been done him here, as if he had declined coming to Spain this year, and had himself raised all the opposition which was made by the Court of Vienna, which if the King be once possessed of, he will not easily forget it: and by several expressions I have heard fall, I have some reason to believe it to be so. . . . . Having begun to speak of this Court, I cannot forget what your Grace said of this Queen, who, in all probability, will have as much share in the government as she pleases.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, Aug. 11.*

THIS is to acquaint your Lordship with a very extraordinary passage, which has happened to me about ten days since. My brother, the Captain of her Majesty's ship the Milford, having been despatched from Italy hither, took in his passage a Leghornese vessel, which had on board some French and Spanish passengers. The vessel was bound from Marseilles to Leghorn. Amongst other passengers was a Sicilian, who calls himself

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Dorice, who had letters of recommendation to the governor of Leghorn, and letters of credit from Marseilles to Leghorn or Genoa, for whatever money he should require. Having learnt who my brother was, he told him, after great injunctions of secrecy to every body but me, that he accounted himself very happy to have fallen into his hands; for that his business in going to Italy was to find out some English minister who might forward him to England, where he had proposals to make of the greatest consequence; but that he thought I could best answer the ends of his journey by encouraging him or dissuading him to proceed in it. My brother, hearing our camp was near Tarragona, brought him thither, where I went on board to examine him; and after a great many preambles, he told me he was in the Duke of Orleans' service, and employed by him; that he had lately left his master at Zaragoza (which particular, by several circumstances that he told me, I believe was true); that his business was to sound the dispositions of England and Holland, whether, tired with the conduct of the Courts of Vienna and Barcelona, we would make the Duke of Orleans King of Spain. Your Lordship will imagine all the arguments which a man of great wit (for so he is, and well instructed) could make use of on such a subject. My first thought upon this overture was, that he might be afraid of being kept a prisoner and ill-used, as all those Spaniards who fall into one another's hands are, and that by an artifice he had a mind to secure his liberty. To try him, therefore, I answered him that I was surprised at his making such a proposal to me; but that, since my brother had promised him that, upon discovering his secret, no hurt should happen to him, I would immediately send him back to Leghorn, the place whither he was bound, where he might dispose of himself as he should think fitting. The man, who I believe immediately guessed my meaning, begged of me not, but that he took what I had said as a full answer to his errand, and desired to be put on shore near Tortosa, where he would rejoin his master and disabuse him. This answer made me believe the man in earnest; and by what conversation passed since between us, I am convinced that both his master and he are so. Being, therefore, desirous to learn as much as I could, and thinking that in our

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ill situation of affairs it might be of service to amuse his master if he were so mad, which might slacken his endeavours against us, I heard with patience all he had to say, and afterwards had him landed where he desired; told him I would give an account of this passage home, and told him in such a manner as might rather encourage him than not: but added, that this would be looked upon as a frivolous project, unless I had some other proof that he was authorised to say what he did. Upon this he affirmed to me that a week should not pass before I had all the satisfaction that could be given in such a matter, and asked me if there was any officer among our prisoners whom I would have sent back to me, that it should be immediately complied with; and that if I thought proper, himself would return as a servant to one of them, with a credential signed by the Duke. All this I agreed to, and am in expectation of what it will come to: for though the eight days be elapsed, yet the march of the army and the absence of the officer I desired, whom I have since learnt to be at Zaragoza, may be the occasion of it. I immediately acquainted Marshal Staremberg with all that passed, as likewise the King since my return hither.\*

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TO ADMIRAL SIR JOHN LEAKE.

*Barcelona, Aug. 24.*

I HEARTILY congratulate with you on your happy success at Sardinia, as well on account of the public, as for the particular honour that will by it accrue to you, who will have the satisfaction of having yourself performed all the eminent services which have offered in this war of Spain.

Having received, four days since, a letter from my Lord Treasurer, of which I send you inclosed an extract, and at the same time the inclosed for you, I have thought proper to despatch a felucca with it in search of you, imagining it might

\* For the progress and result of this negotiation, look back to pp. 261—266.

1708.  contain some directions on the same matter. For my own part, in order that no time may be lost in attempting a thing of such consequence, and upon which our ministry seem to lay such a stress, I did immediately upon the receipt of this letter order 1800 men to march to Barcelona, who will be here in two days. I have likewise got handy ten battering guns, some mortars, a good number of bombs, 15,000 cannon-shot, and all other such materials as could be got here, with 1000 barrels of powder. I hope to get all on board the transports in five days. I proposed to the six men of war that are here to carry me with these troops, so soon as we had been ready, directly to Minorca, where I proposed to have taken post, and put every thing in readiness for you at your return this way, to have concluded your campaign by this important service. Inclosed I send you their resolutions; according to which I propose, God willing, to sail this day seven-night to Majorca, where I hope to get assistance of men, cannon, and ammunition. For you will be sensible that though I have got from hence more of every thing than I thought, myself, was possible, yet it will fall very short of what will be wanting. And, indeed, I proceed upon no other hopes than that upon this notice you will come hither with the fleet. The force I have will be sufficient to take post, and to make batteries against your arrival; when I hope you will spare us your marines, guns, powder, &c., and crown all your services in these parts by the reduction of this important fortress, which, if once in our hands, will make us always masters of these seas. I shall, with the greatest impatience imaginable, expect your answer to this letter.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, Aug. 25.*

I RECEIVED, at the same time with yours, the honour of a letter from my Lord Treasurer, recommending the business of Port



Mahon ; upon which I immediately left the army, and am making the best disposition I can to undertake it, and hope to sail in six days. I have despatched several feluccas to look for the fleet ; and if they co-operate with it, it is not impossible but we may succeed. The King has been most earnestly pressing with me for this attempt, and he shall certainly have no reason to complain of any backwardness in me ; for I am every day more than ever convinced that without a squadron in these seas we shall be reduced to great straits, and that it will be impossible to feed our horse, which can only be done by sea. Our supplies of money will also be very uncertain ; and if we come to want corn and money, and that our troops must live upon the country, no man can answer how long the Catalans will be proof against service and opposition. If our Admirals undertake the business in earnest, I am persuaded it will do ; and I have thought the likeliest method to induce them was to engage in the business, which I am like to do, with only two men of war. I carry from hence about 1800 men, ten pieces of great cannon, twelve mortars, a good quantity of bombs, cannon-shot, and powder. From Majorca I expect ten or fifteen guns more, and some men. The place is said to be in very good condition ; but we have no certain account of the garrison, which some say to be of 1000 men, others not above 400 ; but this is generally agreed,—that half are natives whom we expect great assistance from. If a sudden peace does not disintricate us out of our difficulties, I look upon the fate of Catalonia to depend on this expedition, which I will push on the best I can.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Port Mahon, Sept. 30.*

I ACQUAINTED your Lordship in my last that I had landed here the 14th instant with 2600 men ; 1200 of them English,

1708. including the marines ; about 600 Portuguese, and the rest Spaniards. We found great difficulties in landing and transporting our heavy artillery and stores through a country very rocky, and where there are very few beasts of burden ; but with continued labour we did, in twelve days, get up all our artillery, which consisted of forty-two pieces of cannon and fifteen mortars, to the place near which we proposed to make use of it ; and by the 28th, at break of day, got nine pieces in battery against two towers which supported a line the enemies had made from sea to sea. In a few hours we beat them down, and made some breaches in the line, which I designed to attack the next day. But Brigadier Wade being posted with two battalions at some distance from me on the right, some of his grenadiers, without orders, advanced to the line, and found a way to get into it. To support them, he marched with what men he could readily get together to sustain them ; and got in. So soon as we heard the fire, I took the ordinary guard of the battery, and advanced to the line next to me ; and such was the consternation of the enemy, that they nowhere stood us, but abandoned two other towers, which we could not have taken without cannon. We lodged ourselves, the same evening, at the foot of the glacis of the main castle, and traced our main battery to beat it ; but the morning following they beat a parley, and at five o'clock in the afternoon the capitulation was signed, which I have not time to get translated, but it is as they would have it. This morning I have taken possession of one gate and all their outworks, and find them to be above 1000 men under arms, which are to be transported in our ships, some to France, and some to Spain. We have not had fifty men killed or wounded in this siege. I only have had the misfortune to lose my brother\*, who had been

\* “ Captain Philip Stanhope, of the Milford galley, a young gentleman of great hopes, was killed, the ball fixing in his forehead, as he was held up by two of his sailors, to look over the wall, which was nine feet high.”— *Tindal's History*, vol. v. p. 76.

During the temporary occupation of the island by the English in 1799, I have been informed by the Earl of Rosslyn, who was present, that on clearing away the rubbish with which the Spaniards had filled up the different casemates and souterrains, the body of Captain Philip Stanhope was found in the centre of the fort. It was recognised as his, first, as there was a hole in the

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very instrumental in engaging the seamen in this enterprise; and, unfortunately, would have too great a share in the execution of it; but since he died in doing service to her Majesty and his country, I shall think his life well bestowed, as I would my own. I hope the want of ports will no longer be an objection to wintering a squadron here, her Majesty being now mistress of the two best ports in the Mediterranean,—this and Furnelles in the same island, which, though not so much known, is by many seamen preferred to this. And, having mentioned it to your Lordship, I must do justice to Captain Butler and Captain Fairburn, who, with their two ships, went in and battered the fort till they forced the garrison to yield themselves prisoners of war. A detachment of foot I sent has likewise taken prisoners of war 100 soldiers, who were in Ciudadella, the capital of this island, which is now entirely ours. A great part of our success in reducing this island is owing to the zeal and affection the people have for us, which is beyond expression; and whoever shall take care to keep up this disposition, which is easily to be done, need not fear to lose any of the three above-mentioned fortresses. This consideration makes me offer it as my humble opinion that England ought never to part with this island, which will give the law to the Mediterranean both in time of war and peace. For this reason I will leave an English garrison here; and hope I have so disposed it as not to give any jealousy or uneasiness to the King of Spain. For troops being rightly parted in Catalonia, I shall make rather a merit to myself, by carrying back thither all that I brought out, and borrow marines of the ships to leave here. As for a governor, I have with me Colonel Petit, an engineer, who, for his eminent services in both sieges of Barcelona, the good success of which may chiefly be imparted to him, had got from the King a commission of brigadier, and frequent promises of some further reward. Him, therefore, I leave here as governor, and will be answerable for his behaviour. . . . I shall stay here a few days, to settle this garrison and

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skull, apparently from a bullet, which corresponded with the account of his wound; and, secondly, as there was a tradition in Mahon, that he had been buried in that spot. The body was re-interred with military honours.

1708. } give directions for adding to the fortifications what may be necessary. We have found in it above 100 cannon, 3000 barrels of powder, and all things necessary to make a good defence, except resolution in the garrison, 500 of which are French marines.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Port Mahon, October 11.*

THE 30th of last month, Sir Edward Whitaker, with the men of war and our transport ships from Furnelles, came into this harbour a few hours before a violent storm, which did us a great deal of mischief on shore, blowing down and washing away the tents of whole battalions. And some men were drowned in their camp, insomuch that next morning our little army was entirely dispersed, and if we had not the same morning taken possession of the gate, it would have been almost impossible to have continued the siege. The 1st instant was spent in gathering together our men, whom we were forced to put under such cover as could be found near at hand. The 2d, the garrison marched out, which consisted of 543 French, and rather more Spaniards, or, I should say, natives of this island. None of the latter, except the officers, would leave this country ; so I disarmed them, and they are returned to their respective houses. When I had got the French on board, who are a chosen detachment of their marines, finding them to be much about the same number with the English and Dutch who had capitulated at Xativa, and were so barbarously used, as your Lordship may remember you was informed last year by my Lord Galway and myself, I thought it a very good occasion to stop them by way of reprisal, and have sent the late Viceroy of Majorca and all the Spanish officers to Valencia, with a letter to Mr. D'Asfeld, who commands in Valencia, and gave the orders last year for seizing our garrison of Xativa. . . . Sir Edward Whitaker

has not been able to spare me so many marines as I hoped, so I leave Southwell's regiment in garrison here, which, with 200 marines, will make above 700 good men. I shall by the next opportunity send your Lordship an establishment for this garrison, which I do not doubt will be thought to deserve that all care imaginable be taken of it. I will likewise give directions for adding some works which are very necessary, and will put this place in a condition to give great trouble to whoever shall attack it. It is likewise necessary to do something at Furnelles, without being masters of which it is impossible to besiege this, because there is no other place for the shipping which must attend such an expedition. And one great security of this place is, that it is very dangerous for the ships to ride any where on the coast. We must also be at some expense to make conveniences for watering a fleet; and I hope directions will immediately be sent from England to have a commissioner of the navy and naval stores sent hither, for which I will without loss of time prepare magazines. We have now a seventy gun ship clearing here; and it is the unanimous opinion of all our seamen whom I have seen, that there is not in Europe so convenient a place. . . . I must now, my Lord, beg one favour of your Lordship, which, if granted, will not only lay the greatest obligation upon me, but, I believe, redound very much to the service of her Majesty and the Prince. Captain Travanyan, commander of her Majesty's ship York, to whom I must do the justice, that without him this business would never have been begun nor followed; for now that my poor brother is dead, he is the only seaman I could persuade to hearken to it, and their two ships were the only two I could engage to take the resolution of coming hither, till Sir John Leake came with the fleet from Sardinia; and if we had not undertaken it on a sudden, and sailed from Barcelona, but waited for the result of a council of war at sea, I leave your Lordship to judge what would have been the issue. This gentleman is apprehensive that his forwardness and zeal, on this occasion, have differed him amongst those of his own profession. He is an old officer, of standing enough to be a flag, but what he would be most pleased with would be to be a

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commissioner of the navy at home. If, therefore, your Lordship has any regard not only to reward his service on this occasion, but to make it ever practicable for the future for those who are intrusted by her Majesty in Spain, to influence a sea captain upon any emergency that may happen for the service, I pray you to espouse this business. For now that the business is well over, and that I hope you will construe what I am going to say as I truly mean it, not to prejudice any body, but to serve Captain Travanyan, I may with confidence tell your Lordship that I have, in all this affair, met with ten times more difficulties in dealing with the sea than with the enemy.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, Nov. 9.*

FROM Mahon, my intention was to have proceeded to Denia; but I was prevented by four French men of war, who have been for some time cruising upon this coast.

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I wish I could easily find a fund to pay the Portuguese troops which are here, which is absolutely necessary to be done by somebody, or we had much better be without them; for, besides the burden they are to the country, it is impossible to keep any of our other troops which are paid, from committing disorders, when we are forced to suffer it in one nation, which makes so great a part of our horse. The Marshal would, therefore, have an establishment made by somebody for the payment of 1200 foot and 2000 horse of them. They do at this time considerably exceed that number; but we believe that, by spring, they will not have more horses in a condition to serve, and what supernumerary men they may have may be sent back to Portugal. Brigadier Wade carries with him an estimate of what this may amount to. I have been obliged to advance

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some money to them, but have done it, and shall do it, as sparingly as possible, till some resolution be taken about them. Brigadier Wade will represent to your Lordship what I would desire, if it be possible, in respect to the English forces here; and I hope I shall not be thought to ask too much. Of this your Lordship may be assured, that the few English we have here are the salt which seasons the whole army. And there is a very different regard had to our Britons both by our friends and enemies.

. . . . .

The most terrible enemy we shall have to fear next spring will be famine, if measures be not taken in time to secure our subsistence; and having well considered and examined from whence we may be supplied, we can find nothing certain, nor will Sardinia answer our expectations. From Italy nothing can be had but at extravagant rates. We therefore come to this determination, that our only dependence for corn for next summer must be upon England. I must, therefore, most earnestly recommend it to your Lordship, that, immediately upon Brigadier Wade's arrival, orders be given for providing and shipping 40,000 Winchester quarters of corn; the one half wheat, and the other half horse-meat — either barley or oats. Your Lordship may reckon, that, for all this quantity, we will account with the Queen, at the rate of five shillings and sixpence for each bushel of wheat, three shillings and nine-pence for each bushel of barley, and one fifth less for oats. . . . .

Whether we have war or peace, I cannot but hope we shall think of preserving Port Mahon; and indeed the whole island. Brigadier Wade will acquaint your Lordship that I have had some difficulties here about the government of it, which are not yet got over; therefore I believe that it would be convenient that a commission were sent to Colonel Petit to be Lieutenant-Governor of it, and instructions never to admit any troops but English in the castle and forts belonging to it, which would prevent any applications from this court to me. I named a Spaniard to be governor of the island, which is a civil employment; and in all former reigns, the governors of the island and castle were entirely independent of each other, and received their

1708. orders, the one from the council of Aragon, and the other from the council of war. This having been the constant practice heretofore, and well suiting with our present circumstances, I settled it in the same manner; but I found at my return hither another governor named, with an absolute power over the castle as well as the island. But I have told my mind very plainly upon this matter, and hope they will not press it. Whether my governor of the island will stand I cannot tell, and if they insist upon it, I cannot directly oppose it; but, as for the castles, I believe they will not pretend to meddle with them.

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TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Barcelona, Nov. 9.*

THE Mareschal has hopes of surprising Tortosa, which would let us into Valencia; and with the assistance of a squadron by sea we might extend ourselves very far, and get into better countries. Should this design fail, and we not be sufficiently provided either with troops or other necessaries to besiege Tortosa, the only thing which seems to remain is, by a descent from sea, to beget a diversion; and if we may give any credit to all the accounts we have from Granada and Andalusia, those provinces, but Granada especially, would rise unanimously for us. By this account of our state, your Grace will see how absolutely necessary it is to have constantly a squadron here to enable us both to live and move.



## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

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*Barcelona, December 19.*

SIR EDWARD WHITAKER is returned hither with his squadron, from the coast of Italy. Your Lordship will already have been informed, that the new war of Italy has prevented our getting any troops from thence as yet. Our expectation of these troops made us send up the squadron to Italy, which disabled us from relieving Denia and Alicant; in the first of which we have lost near 1000 men, 160 of them English; the latter has been surrendered by capitulation, and the two regiments of English are retired into the castle, where they want nothing necessary to make a good defence. We do not yet know whether the enemies will besiege them, or only bombard and block them: in either case we hope the castle will employ a good number of their troops for a considerable time, having provisions and water for at least six months, and magazines which are bomb proof. The worst is that there is no communication with the sea, unless a good land force go with shipping. So soon as Sir George Byng arrives we will try what can be done for the relief of it. At present, considering the posture of affairs in Italy, and that our all depends upon putting an end to the war with the Pope, which, if not ended by spring, will employ all the forces the Emperor has in Italy, it is the unanimous opinion of every body here, that the squadron cannot be better employed than in countenancing the negotiation of the Marquis de Prie; and, accordingly, Sir Edward Whitaker, who with great diligence came to us, upon the advice we sent him that the enemies were bringing a squadron on this coast, is immediately returned to Leghorn, there to wait the fate of the Marquis de Prie's negotiations. . . . .

I believe you will have already been informed from France, that they had projected the siege of Barcelona, and we know they had made contracts for all the materials necessary, which

1708. have, indeed, been countermanded since they have been acquainted with a squadron's wintering here. Without that we should certainly have been besieged the beginning of April. . . . We have lately attempted to surprise Tortosa, where, indeed, the Mareschal deserved to have succeeded, and was very near it: it proved a Cremona business. We got into the Old Town, killed the Governor and about 200 men, brought off nine officers and fifty soldiers prisoners; but, by an unlucky accident, missed our aim. We lost about 200 men killed and wounded, of which nearly half were English: the troops behaved themselves extremely well. Had this attempt been successful, we should have enlarged our quarters considerably this winter. How we shall do now to get out of Catalonia next summer, or how to live in it, I confess I do not foresee.

Your Lordship will easily imagine, that in this situation of affairs nothing could have been so grateful to me as the liberty her Majesty is pleased to allow me of coming to Parliament; and thus I could never have more pleasure in obeying your commands than in this particular, if I thought it consistent with her Majesty's service. But since this court and people think my staying with them more significant than I do myself, I must sacrifice my own satisfaction to their opinion, and shall be very little solicitous of the loss of reputation, which I foresee will attend me in the world, by this game's being ruined in my hands, if I am conscious to myself that I do the best I can, whilst it is my lot to be embarked in this galley.

I am extremely obliged to your Lordship for your other kind expressions in the same letter of the 24th of September, which is the freshest I have; for I understand that, by a mistake, the answers to my despatches by Captain Moyser were left at Genoa. I hope by them to receive some commands about Port Mahon, and taking measures to preserve that island for England, let who will be King of Spain. I have at length got the government which I left there confirmed in the manner I wished; but am still of opinion we should not temporise in that matter, but have it absolutely yielded to us. Your Lordship will but too much perceive by this letter, that it will be

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absolutely necessary to take upon ourselves a very great addition of expenses for this ensuing year, if we design to do any thing both here and in Portugal ; and I do not see why we should not in this case insist upon it as a condition, without which they must not expect that we should continue to lavish our blood and treasure. The expense of keeping it in time of peace will not be above 30,000*l.* yearly ; and about twice that sum, laid out in three or four years, will, in my poor judgment, make it impregnable. Of what consequence it is with respect to France, Spain, Italy, and Africa, is not to be expressed : it is impossible we should ever at the same time have war with all these. But of this let me pray your Lordship once more to remind you, that if ever we think of keeping the port, not to suffer any other sovereign upon the island ; for it is easily to be demonstrated, that we shall with a much less expense defend the whole island against all foreign enemies, than that we should be able to defend the fort against any prince who should have any footing on the island. I hope the Dutch will always be our friends ; but, if they should ever be otherwise, they will never be able to carry on their trade to the Levant without our leave, if we remain masters of this place : and I confess this was one reason why I did not desire any troops of that nation, when I went on this expedition, that they might have no pretension to share it with us. I may, perhaps, be thought a party concerned in urging the usefulness of this place ; but I assure your Lordship that I think myself entirely unbiassed in the matter, otherwise than every good Englishman ought to be.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, December 20.*

A FEW days after Brigadier Wade's departure I had a meeting with Mr. Flotte, first aide-de-camp, and confidant of the

1708. Duke of Orleans. I acquainted your Lordship by Brigadier Wade with what I designed to propose to him ; but, upon discoursing with him, found that his master and he have their heads so full of his being King of Spain, that I judged it would have been to little purpose, in this first conference, to have mentioned a thing so much short of their hopes and expectations, and therefore took upon me no other part than to hear and learn from him as much as I could of their notions, and of the foundation on which they build, promising only that I would make a faithful report to the Queen, and seeming desirous that his propositions might be relished in England. After one day's conversation, I made him set down in writing the substance of what we talked over, which I here send your Lordship. I have been very impatient for an opportunity of conveying it safely to your hands, which has not offered till the return of Sir Edward Whitaker from the coast of Italy. . . . .

The judgment I am able to form by all I could gather from what has passed is, that when things went ill for France, that court has indirectly led the Duke of Orleans to believe it would be no disagreeable expedient to get a peace to let him be King of Spain ; and when once a crown has been put into his head, he cannot get it out again, and is, I believe, capable of taking any measure which he shall think likely to bring him to it : and I am persuaded he has been tampering with most of the people whose names are in the enclosed paper. That most of the Castillian nobility are very much dissatisfied with their own court, and not in love with ours, is very certain. That they are capable of forming and projecting such a third scheme, I believe very likely ; but that they will have spirit to execute it, I very much doubt. That a government built upon such a bottom, I mean of Castillians, weary of the oppression of the present government, would be linked in interest to England, is very certain.

## TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

1709.  
*Barcelona, January 3. 1709.*

SINCE my last despatch we have lost Denia, and in it the foot of 1000 men, prisoners of war, as likewise the town of Alicant. Our expectation of succours from Italy engaged us to send the fleet up thither; without which it was impossible to do any thing for the relief of these places. The fleet has been up to Italy, but is returned without troops. The new war, which has been begun very foolishly, I think, by the court of Vienna against the Pope, having prevented their sending us what was promised, our squadron has notwithstanding been of some service in countenancing the Germans, and deterring the Genoese and Florentines from entering into the league with the Pope; and since we are unadvisedly engaged in this quarrel, which if not extinguished by spring, must be the entire ruin of us, we have sent back the squadron to the coast of Italy to countenance the negotiation of the Marquis de Prie, who is at Rome. We have but very imperfect accounts of what he does there; and by several letters I have seen from him, it is not easy to judge how the business will end. The court of Rome by gaining time gains every thing; and it is beyond dispute, that if they amuse us till spring, there is an end of Catalonia: for the Duke of Savoy will have no army, and consequently those French troops which naturally should be opposed to him will be sent to Rousillon. By our last advices all the Imperial troops in Italy were on full march to Rome, as well those of the kingdom of Naples as those from Lombardy. The Papalins every where behave themselves like Papalins, so we hope either to frighten them into an accommodation, or to lock up his Holiness in the castle of St. Angelo. He has expressed himself so averse to an accommodation as to declare that he will embark and go to

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Avignon ; and our last letters from the Cardinal Grimani press for the return of our squadron, to make such a resolution impracticable, if he should be mad enough to think of it in earnest. . . . . I had almost forgot to acquaint your Lordship with our attempt to surprise Tortosa, which was very near succeeding. The Mareschal marched with 2500 Imperialists, and 500 English, from our quarters in the camp of Tarragona, to the town, without ever having been discovered. We surprised there two patrouilles of horse ; and notwithstanding that our proveditors made us lose three hours' time to wait for bread, we got there time enough before day to attack the town on three sides. Lieutenant-General Wetzels, on the upper side of the river, with 1000 men, got into the Arraval, and was stopped at the old intrenchment within the town. Major-General Eck, with 1000 men, was to try on the lower side of the river, and our greatest expectation was from him ; but the palisades were found so much stronger, and more rows of them than was represented, which made it impracticable. The English scaled two old outworks, a little to the right of the great new bastion of St. Charles : but for want of hatchets, or a petard to break a door which divided them from the old rampart, miscarried. Our misfortune was the want of an hour more of night, which had certainly made the business succeed ; or, if General Wetzels, who was in the suburbs, had had good guides, he might in the first confusion have followed the enemy into the main town. In this action, the Governor, and about 200 men, were killed ; and we brought off a Lieutenant-Colonel, eight officers, and fifty soldiers, prisoners. The killed and wounded on our side are something more than 200.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, January. 30.*

SIR GEORGE BYNG is come to Mahon, and has sent home some ships to Alicant, the return of which we expect with im-

patience, to know how that siege goes on, and consider what can be done to save, if not the place, at least the two regiments which are in garrison. Our want of provisions increases daily; which has obliged me to send to Mr. Chetwynd, to get some corn sent from Italy at any rate.

1709.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, February 5.*

WE are in great apprehensions of famine; and by letters from Italy, I fear we shall not get any considerable supplies from thence, and what may come will cost extravagantly dear. Necessity, therefore, obliges us to have recourse to Barbary, where I am sending Mr. Craggs, with a present to the Dey of Algiers, to try what can be done there, and at Oran, which the Algerines have lately conquered. If this resource fail us, I know not what will become of us: I hope a considerable supply will come from England, or we shall certainly perish.

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TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Barcelona, Feb. 21.*

I AM still of opinion that such an attempt on Granada would beget a very great diversion both in favour of your Lordship and of us here, but would more particularly favour the plan you have of acting towards Andalusia. If, therefore, Wade should succeed in getting some regiments for that service, I should be of opinion, if your Lordship approves it, and that he can prevail with the commander of the squadron who convoys him to leave

1709. a few ships to attend upon him and secure his retreat in case of necessity, to attempt Almeria ; and, according to the advices I should receive from him, I would use all possible means to support him. If our attempt upon Alicant has its desired success, and that I can find it practicable to subsist that body of troops there, the Mareschal will make no difficulty of sending horse to me, and I would not doubt from thence, either by sea or land, to join Brigadier Wade, and it might not be impossible before this summer for me to meet your Lordship in Andalusia.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Port Mahon, March 3.*

HAVING received at Barcelona the good news that affairs with the Pope were happily adjusted, and letters from Sir Edward Whitaker encouraging us to hope for 3000 men from Naples, I thought it convenient to come over hither to Sir George Byng, to concert with him the relief of Alicant with these troops. . . . I am daily more confirmed in my opinion that a descent on Granada would procure a wonderful diversion if troops can be spared for it, and be greatly conducive to the reduction of Andalusia, which is certainly preferable to any other operation.



## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

1709.  
*Barcelona, March 18.*

I AM going on board this evening to join Sir George Byng, in order to make the attempt I acquainted your Lordship with in my last from Mahon.

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## TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Port Mahon, March 24.*

DURING my stay here I am fixing a plan for fortifying this place, which I will send your Lordship by the first safe opportunity, and to prevent the loss of time, am beginning to work, not doubting but it will be approved, since we think of keeping it. Your Lordship may be assured that with less than 60,000*l.* this place shall be made inexpugnable, if any place in the world may be reckoned so.

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## TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

*Port Mahon, March 29.*

I CANNOT help owning to your Grace my fears, that when we shall have set this prince upon the throne of Spain, he will not enjoy it long in peace, even though France were not (as it certainly will be) ready to foment there new divisions.

1709.

## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Port Mahon, March 30.*

YESTERDAY came in hither from Naples Sir Edward Whitaker, with above 9000 men from Naples, including 400 Italian recruits, which latter, together with some stores of war, and one ship load of barley, we send immediately to Barcelona. With the other troops, together with one Italian regiment which I left last winter at Majorca, making in all 9400 men, we shall sail in two days to attempt the relief of Alicant, where two English regiments have been shut up all this winter. If we succeed I shall change the garrison, and take out the English; and I don't know whether the best thing we could do would not be to blow up the castle, which, for want of a communication to the sea, I think is very useless.

Our friends in Catalonia continue to labour under great difficulties for want of corn, and I foresee nothing that can remedy that but the supply we expect from England. Without that I do not believe it will be possible to draw our troops together.

## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Bay of Alicant, April 20.*

I HAD the honour to acquaint your Lordship from Port Mahon and Majorca, of our setting out from thence with eleven men of war, and 9400 men, to the relief of the castle of Alicant. We left Majorca the 10th instant; but the weather, proving contrary and tempestuous, forced us on the coast of Valencia, and obliged us to anchor at Denia to prevent the separation of

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our transports, which alarmed the enemy. However, we proceeded the 15th from Denia, and arrived the 16th, early in the morning, in this bay ; and immediately Sir George Byng went in with the men of war to batter the enemy's works and trenches ; and a disposition was made to land the troops under the fire of the ships, but the weather came on so bad that it was by every body judged impracticable to land men even where there had been no opposition. Our ships being in, made and received a great fire, and some which had gone rather too near, especially the Dunkirk, got off again with some difficulty. We proposed to have landed the next day, but the weather continued so ill that it was impossible. I must do Sir George Byng the justice that he used all possible endeavours, from our first joining him at Mahon, to expedite and facilitate our undertaking ; and we are particularly obliged to him for having dissuaded us from attempting to land the first morning when we came in, not liking the weather : and it is certain that whatever had gone on shore, could not have been sustained or assisted with any thing for some days, as the weather proved. These difficulties,—the shortness of provisions of the fleet, which has at this day but three weeks' provision at whole allowance,—the apprehension that the enemies would every day be strengthened, and our garrison straitened for want of water, which we had learnt was very scarce with them,—made me resolve to propose to the enemies the delivering to them the castle and taking off the two English regiments in it, and accordingly I signed a capitulation to this purpose ; and we are now taking on board the garrison, which very well has deserved to be taken care of. The enemies had made a prodigious mine, which blew up half the mountain on which the castle stands, and a considerable part of the castle with it, in which happened to be Major-General Richards, Colonel Sibourg, Colonel Thornicroft, Major Vignol of Sibourg's regiment, and some other officers, who perished in the ruins. Had the mine been carried a few yards farther, it would have demolished the greatest part of the castle ; but happening to take but part of the hill, that part which remained was so steep as to be rather less attackable than before, and our people,

1709. though they had lost all their commanding officers, resolved to hold it out to the last. The day we capitulated for them they had eighteen days' water left; so I hope our expedition will not be thought to have been entirely useless, since we have preserved the garrison, which must otherwise have been prisoners at discretion in so short a time: and as for the castle, it having no communication with the sea, and we having no provisions to put into it, I confess I had proposed to the King the abandoning and demolishing of it if we had succeeded. We were not deceived in our opinion that the enemies would every day be strengthened; for, the day we capitulated, their strength consisted of the forces of which I send your Lordship the enclosed list, which they drew together from all the kingdom of Valencia. These have been and will be diverted from acting against Catalonia till we sail, and they have twelve days' march to the frontier; whereas we may be there much sooner, and I fear long before the campaign can begin, such is our want of provisions.

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TO ROBERT WALPOLE, ESQ., SECRETARY AT WAR.

*Alicant Road, April 21.*

THE garrison of Alicant have defended themselves to the utmost extremity, and never men bore with more cheerfulness the hardships they were exposed to by such a siege. The vacancies that have happened I intend to fill up, so as to show the utmost regard to those that have justly deserved it, by the share they have had in this defence. The regiment of Sibourg I will give to the Lieutenant-Colonel, and remove the other officers according to their rank; which I hope will not be thought a hardship upon any that are in England, and is the method I will always use on the like occasions. I think it is very just there should be some distinction made between those that serve well and those that do not serve at all.

## TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

1709.  
*Barcelona, June 15.*

MR. CRAGGS will have the honour to inform your Grace of all that has passed in relation to this Court and Port Mahon, and with how ill a grace they at last are come to offer what I believe they do not intend to keep, if they can possibly avoid it. He will likewise inform your Grace of a project to have the six English regiments that we are made to hope for sent to Sicily. The Mareschal has not yet been made acquainted with it, and will certainly be against it. In order to secure me, they have offered me the command of the expedition, which they propose should be made with 5000 Imperialists from the kingdom of Naples and these troops from England. As we are not yet sure of these troops, nor in what condition we shall be in here towards the end of the summer, and that we are also ignorant whether Sicily may be left as a retreat for the Duke of Anjou, in case we cannot get all we would by a treaty, I have only given them general answers, and told them I would recommend it to England, and expect orders upon it. The accounts we have of the strength of the enemies there, and of the disposition of the country, are so various, that it is hard to make a settled judgment, whether it be for our advantage to undertake it or not, which would altogether depend upon the time which would be requisite to put an end to it: for if it could be concluded in a winter, it would certainly be of very great advantage; but if it should become a war in form, it would certainly divert too great a force by sea and land from the more necessary support of Spain, which is the object of this war; and I wish I may be mistaken in what I have so often mentioned to your Grace of my apprehensions, that a treaty of peace will not immediately put an end to the war in Spain.

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## TO THE LORD TREASURER.

*Barcelona, June 16.*

As to Sicily, the accounts we have of the strength of the enemies' regular troops in that, and of the disposition of the country, are so various, that I do not see how to ground a settled judgment; but one thing which makes me judge it to be more difficult than has been represented, is that the Neapolitans here, who are the chief promoters of it, and who used to represent it as a slight matter, to be undertaken with 3000 or 4000 men and half a dozen ships, do now, when one comes to talk in detail of the execution, insist that there should be 10,000 men sent with a good battering train, and they all agree that it will be necessary to besiege Messina by sea and land. The enemies have in the island at least 4000 regular foot and 1500 horse, commanded by Mahoni under the Viceroy, who is a poor creature.

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## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, June 15.*

I was in hopes before this to have despatched Mr. Craggs, with a grant of the island of Minorca, but have met with an unspeakable reluctance to it from this Court. Mr. Craggs will have the honour to inform your Lordship of all the particular detail of our negotiation on this subject, and with what difficulties we have brought matters to the issue, which your Lordship will see by the powers sent to Count Gallas and Mr. Hoffman, or to either of them, to sign a treaty for the engaging it to her Majesty on certain conditions, some of which will, I

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doubt, be thought unreasonable. I think, however, that it is no misfortune to us to have learnt by this negotiation, what returns of gratitude we are to expect from these people for all that we have done for them, if ever they should apprehend themselves to be in circumstances of not wanting us. . . . .

A main objection, which I am sensible may be made, is the jealousy it may give to the Dutch. Whether this may not be obviated, and the Dutch satisfied by our giving way to their pretensions in Flanders, I humbly submit to your Lordship. Thus much I may say on that head, that if the Dutch can be made easy in Flanders, the house of Austria has not deserved of us to sacrifice the interest of any ally to them; and I am of opinion, that no acquisitions of the Dutch on the Continent ought to give us jealousy, since it would rather diminish than increase their power at sea, as we have an example in the republic of Venice, which has never made any figure at sea since they applied themselves to extend their territories on the Terra Firma. . . . . I have likewise sent over a scheme of an establishment of troops for the island in time of peace; and if it be approved of, I cannot give a greater demonstration of the opinion I have, how considerable an acquisition I judge this will be to England, than by offering to stay and live there three or four years, to put it in order. The fate of such kind of settlements generally depends upon their being well constituted at first; and though I have not the vanity to think I have more ability to settle matters well there than fifty other people, yet this I may say, I should be more industrious, and, perhaps, less interested.

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TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Barcelona, June 28.*

THIS situation of affairs, and the uncertainty we are still under, whether the French King has signed, or will sign the

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preliminaries, has made me of opinion, that the most certain way to determine him to sign them, if he should be still wavering, will be to enter into France by Roussillon, with twenty good battalions of foot, and 4000 horse. The consternation which such an undertaking, backed with a great fleet upon their coast, must necessarily produce, would, I believe, infallibly put the King of France under the necessity to recall all his troops out of Spain. The sea would furnish us with provisions, and save the vast expense of land carriage, for which no sufficient fund was ever allowed; and if we had the money, as we have it not, to answer that expense, I question whether the country can furnish us with such a number of beasts as will be necessary to subsist our army on the other side of the rivers, if we should have the good fortune to pass them without opposition; the kingdom of Aragon being so drained of corn, both for men and horses, that every thing must be carried from Tarragona or Barcelona, by land carriage. The Mareschal seems very much inclined to make this attempt so soon as we shall have certain news that the French do not sign the preliminaries; till then we must point with our greatest force towards the Segre, that we may be in a condition to press the Spaniards when the French shall have abandoned them. Our greatest difficulty, at present, is want of forage for the horse; and if, in a fortnight, we have not some certain advices of peace or war, we must try to force a passage over the Segre to live. Our troops are now cantoned from Momblanch to Cervera and Calaf, and will be joined in a week, which is as soon as we can get any quantity of the wheat newly come converted into flour, and carried up to the army. The enemies had been three months besieging Benasque, a miserable castle near the Conque de Trem, where they have lost above 1000 men, and have at last been shamefully beaten from it by the Count de La Puebla, who was much inferior to them in force, nor was it possible to strengthen him for want of bread.



## TO THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

1709.  
*Barcelona, June 28.*

THEY cannot here pitch upon a person to be sent to Flanders; and truly, knowing, as I do, the persons upon whom such a commission must fall, I do not think it a misfortune; but what is very strange is, that notwithstanding the consciousness of this Court how few people they have fit for any posts of consequence, they seem as resolutely bent as ever not to make use of any body who has been on the other side; and there is not one of the wretches now about the King, who does not think himself sure of getting the confiscation of some grandee's estate. These are the dispositions of this Court, which no reasons will alter, since it is impossible to persuade beggarly Germans and Italians not to wish to leap into good estates.

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## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Barcelona, Aug. 7.*

So soon as I received the honour of her Majesty's commands touching Cadiz, I despatched to Sir George Byng, who arrived here the 29th of last month, whither I came to him from the camp the 1st instant, and having conferred with him we are come to the resolution of proceeding, with all possible despatch, to Gibraltar. I shall carry with me one English regiment of foot, and 500 Spanish horsemen, 100 of them only mounted, and shall be tolerably well provided with ordnance stores. It was impossible to take any thing more from hence; but I hope out of the fleet to get a couple of battalions of

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marines ; and it is possible I may find the garrison of Gibraltar strong enough to spare me one more. If I meet the Palatine recruits, I will endeavour to stop them and form a battalion of them for this expedition, so that, with the seven battalions which come from Britain, it is possible I may make up to the number of twelve battalions, besides my dismounted horsemen. Should we find Cadiz well garrisoned, I doubt this whole force, though I should not be disappointed of any part of it, will hardly be sufficient to attack the place ; but I do not apprehend it to be impossible for us to take posts in the island to secure the puntal and bridge of Zuazo, in which case I should not despair of keeping the place blocked till I could be strengthened from England. It is impossible at this distance, and ignorant as we are of the condition it is in, to make any settled judgment, but we will lose no time to get thither, and do our best when we are there. I hope we shall sail in five or six days.

Our army here is encamped near the Segre, and consists of twenty-four battalions of foot, and forty-five squadrons of horse. The enemies are on the other side with twenty-six battalions of French foot, and about fifty squadrons of Spanish horse, the many reports we had of all the French troops withdrawing out of Spain not proving true. They have, indeed, sent into France, within these two months, twenty-five battalions of foot, and above twenty squadrons of horse ; by which account your Lordship will perceive how considerable a French force they had in Spain, since, after having made such a detachment, they can bring as much foot into the field as we have. There is no Spanish foot encamped, nor no French troops or governors in any garrisons.

We have received this day a hot alarm that all the troops which marched out of Aragon, joined by a detachment from Dauphiné, and commanded by the Duke of Berwick, are marching into Roussillon, and coming to besiege Gerona. Should this prove true, it would put us under very great difficulties, and, indeed, I hardly see how it would be possible, after the loss of Gerona, to support the war here. The Court is unwilling I should go out of Catalonia at this juncture ; but besides

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that I do not take any force from them (for the English regiment I take from Minorca, and the dismounted horsemen would be of little service to them without horses), I think the less likelihood there is of doing any thing here answerable to the vast expense we are at, the more necessary it is to try our fortune in another place. Sir George Byng leaves twenty ships to attend this service, and I am using all possible means to provide for the subsistence of the army here during my absence, for which purpose I am obliged to send bills to Italy to be negotiated by Mr. Chetwynd for 50,000*l*. I send Mr. Brydges particular accounts of our issues; and your Lordship must not be surprised if we are so earnest to be punctually supplied; for besides the necessity there has been of making great advances to buy corn, our army being now encamped in a country which is entirely ruined, every grain of corn, for man and beast, must be carried to it six days' journey on mules' backs, and each mule costs half a crown *per diem*, and it is with great difficulty, and not without using some violence in the country, that even at this price we can get so many as are necessary to supply us with our daily subsistence, for we never yet have been able to compass the getting before hand a magazine for six days. To prevent this excessive charge I was always of opinion that we should have kept nearer to the sea, and have acted either towards the side of Valencia, or, as I had the honour to mention to you in my last, towards Roussillon; but it has been judged more useful to support the little footing we have in the mountains on the other side of the Segre, whereby the communication of the enemy from that part of Catalonia which they possess, to Cerdagne and Roussillon, is made impracticable; and whenever we shall be in a condition to act offensively, the Mareschal seems inclined to push along the mountains towards Navarre, in order to cut off the communication between Spain and France; and if we were sure never to want sufficient numbers of beasts to carry our provisions, nor money to pay for the said beasts punctually, I believe it is the safest way of working. Though, by this account of our state here, your Lordship will perceive how difficult and unpromising a war we are engaged

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in, yet it appears at the same time that it has hitherto occasioned a great diversion to the enemy. I wish it may continue to do so till there be a general peace, and truly that is the utmost we can propose to ourselves.

We received yesterday the account of an action between the little body we have in the Conca de Trem, and a detachment of the enemies who attacked them, in which both parties have lost seven or eight hundred men. Our side have kept the post contended for, but have lost all their baggage, and the number of men killed is judged to be pretty equal. Two battalions of Portuguese foot, which were on this service, behaved themselves extremely well.

I received, three days after the date, a letter from the Duke of Orleans' aide-de-camp, who met me last winter, since when I heard no more of that matter, of which letter I send your Lordship the enclosed copy; the letter was conveyed to me by a peasant, whom I sent back without any answer. I believe it had been opened; or whether any second letter had been sent to me which fell into other hands, or whether any of the many persons whom the Duke of Orleans had made privy to his designs has betrayed them, I cannot tell, but three weeks after I received this letter, the said aide-de-camp, Messrs. Villaroel and Manriquez, Lieutenant-Generals, with twenty or thirty officers more, were seized in the enemies' army, and carried under strict guard to Madrid. It was given out in their army that they held correspondence with me.

The business of Sicily having been pressed upon us by the Court, I send your Lordship a copy of a letter I writ to the Duke of Moles on that subject, and, according to my poor opinion, if we should engage in that affair in another manner than is there expressed, I believe we should ruin our affairs in Spain without any certainty of success in Sicily. The dispositions made by the Imperialists are no way sufficient for the siege of Messina, and the principal view of the Court of Vienna is to get some footing in Sicily, fearing that otherwise that island may, at a peace, be left to the Duke of Anjou; for my own part I wish he had it secured to him at a peace, provided

he would quit Spain. The orders which are now come for Cadiz have, for the present, put out of doors all thoughts of Sicily, and till such a force can be put together, with such other necessaries to make a regular siege as may be sufficient to attack Messina, I hope it will not be thought of. 1709.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*The Chichester, Barcelona Road, August 20.*

I AM sorry to write to your Lordship from hence, but it has been impossible to get away sooner. We shall sail to-morrow on our expedition. I hope my last letter of the 7th, which went by the messenger, will have reached your Lordship some time since, therefore I shall not repeat by this occasion, which may not be very safe, what I had then the honour to write to you. The alarm I then mentioned had some foundation; for the enemies entered the Ampurdan with twenty-two battalions of foot, and twenty-five squadrons of horse, all French. The Duke of Noailles commands them: and they give out, they are to be reinforced from Dauphiné, and make the siege of Gerona; but we hardly believe they will do any thing more than forage the country, as they have done every year, and take away all the corn, of which there was a very plentiful harvest, and of which, in France, they stand in very great need. At their first entrance into the country, they surprised a battalion of Palatine foot, and about 150 horse; which were lost, by the negligence of those who commanded. We have since had a small advantage over them. Our army, with Mareschal Staremborg, has made two or three motions up and down the river Segre; the enemies, about equal in strength, observe him on the opposite side; and both sides suffer a good deal for want of forage. I fear our horse will be ruined for want of barley; the quantity which came

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from England fell a good deal short of what we expected: the country has yielded little or none, nor could we be supplied from Barbary with near what we want, so that I confess I do not see how they will subsist, and I see, as yet, but little likelihood of our getting fresh quarters for them.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*On board the Chichester, Gibraltar Road,  
Sept. 3.*

WE sailed from Barcelona the 21st of August, and are come in here the 31st. I have with me, Colonel Harrison's regiment of foot; a Spanish regiment of horse, consisting of 500 men, of which 100 are mounted; Colonel Richards, with an English company of artillery, and such a proportion of ordnance stores, as, together with the stores which were to come from Britain, would have enabled us to make a siege. We have met here with letters from my Lord Galway, and Brigadier Wade, with accounts of the state of Cadiz, and the disposition of the enemies' troops in and about that place, which are confirmed by all the advices we could get on this coast; by all which, it is evident, that Cadiz cannot be thought of at this time, even though we had treble the force which we have been made to expect. And by such other accounts as I have been able to get of the new fortifications, which have been added to the place, and built on the island, as well as on the other side of the bay, I believe it would be a very difficult undertaking to attempt it by way of a regular siege had we ever so great an army; but if we had a superior army in the country of Andalusia, it would be very easily blocked up by possessing San Lucar and Port St. Mary, which would prevent their receiving any supplies by water, and Medina Sidonia, to hinder any thing from getting in by land; and if it should ever be thought advisable to make Andalusia

the chief seat of the war in Spain, Gibraltar would be of very great use towards it. At present, we are ignorant whether the design of sending any troops from Britain this way be altered or not, having no manner of news but what we see in the enemies' prints, by which we learn they had not sailed, nor were embarked the 23d of July. So Sir George Byng sends two frigates to Portugal to get us news. We shall wait the return of them here, and if we learn nothing positive, shall return to Catalonia, whilst we have provisions for the men with us. In case the squadron and troops which we have been expecting should come, I know not what better use can be made of them than to carry them also to Catalonia; where, I confess, little can be done with them this winter, but we shall be sure of them in the spring, and they will have been seasoned to the country, and consequently much fitter for service than new troops just landed in this hot country, which have generally mouldered away to nothing, for want of being a little taken care of at first. As for any attempt upon the coast, I doubt it will be impracticable to do any thing of consequence, I mean to take a post where we could winter, and live upon the country. If, by the help of these troops, we can enlarge our quarters in Catalonia, so as to subsist our cavalry this winter, I pray your lordship to be persuaded that it is doing a great deal; for if the body of horse, which is now in good order, be ruined, we must either give up the war of Spain entirely, or, with immense charge and trouble, transport 10,000 horse into Spain, if we pretend to beat the Duke of Anjou out of it.

1709.

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The surprise and reduction of Cadiz was one amongst Lord Peterborough's schemes in 1706; and the following Extract of his Letter to General Stanhope on that subject, will further illustrate the attempted expedition in 1709.

1709.

LORD PETERBOROUGH TO GENERAL STANHOPE.

*Valencia, June 20. 1706.*

UPON the whole matter, if the Portuguese are retired, I see but one bold stroke to save us, which is, to make use of this season, when troops can hardly march by land, to embark 6000 men, and attempt Cadiz, which, at present, must be unprovided. It may be covered with the pretence of Italy. We may be from Alicant and those parts, before Cadiz, ere they suspect our design, or can take their resolutions. The truth is, at present, all the strength of Spain is in Gibraltar, Cadiz, and the places in Catalonia; all the wealth in Andalusia and Madrid. — Valencia and Aragon are great loose bodies, that follow immediately the superiority of force in the field; but, however, if once declared for us, they would amuse the enemy for some time, and it would require no little space to come and walk them over.

When once possessed of the island of Cadiz, with 6000 men, the artillery of the fleet, and assistance of men, I cannot see why those that took Barcelona might not think of the other; but certainly half the fleet might be employed to fetch succours from Portugal, which would certainly be given. Possessed of Badajos, Ciudad Rodrigo, Port St. Mary, and Seville, those places might maintain the war; and the trade with the West Indies open, can only ease England in the present expense, and reward the past. Perhaps it were no paradox to say, Cadiz taken, were better for England, and the war of Spain not wholly ended, than even the King at Madrid; but it is enough to make a virtue of necessity.



## TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

1709.

*On Board the Royal Anne, Gibraltar Road,  
Sept. 24.*

SINCE I have been here I have employed the idle time I had in viewing the works and situation of this place, which being of so much consequence to us as it is, I am sorry to find so much exposed to be insulted. The works in general are in a very bad condition, and the money they have cost I am afraid has been ill laid out. I have ordered Captain Phillips to make a plan of the town and island, which, as soon as it is done, will be sent to your Excellency. In the mean while I send Captain Paget, as your Lordship desired, who is fully informed, and will lay before your Lordship what is requisite to be immediately done, without which we are not secure of the place: and I wish, whilst we are making schemes and projects for new invasions, we may not one day lose Gibraltar by surprise, which, in the present condition it is in, I look upon as very practicable, and would at once make an end to the war in Spain. The New Mole is more exposed than any other place, and is of no less consequence. The way I propose to secure it would be by building two redoubts to cover it, which Captain Paget will explain to your Lordship. The Mole itself wants very much repairing; and, unless it be timely prevented, may be washed down by the sea. It is likewise my humble opinion that barracks ought to be built at the New Mole for at least 300 men, who should remain there as a garrison with a governor, magazines, and stores properly for that place.

I must not conceal from your Lordship, the disorder and confusion I found the stores in, which is owing as much to the want of an inspector over them, as the neglect and ignorance of the officer that is left here to look after them: and I cannot help saying, that there appears a remissness and want of care

1709. and method in the whole. The store-houses and magazines are so far decayed, that if they be not repaired before the rains come on, all the ammunition and stores must be spoiled.

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TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Gibraltar Road, Oct. 2.*

ON the 27th of last month, Sir George Byng, with six men of war, and the troops which came from Catalonia, put to sea to have carried us back thither; but contrary winds have driven us back hither; and Sir George Byng being ordered home this winter, and being short of provision, takes the opportunity of this easterly wind to get through the Straits with five of his six ships. I remain here with the troops I brought out, waiting for Admiral Baker, in order to proceed with him back to Catalonia. Mr. Morrice has sent me 26,000 *Moedas*, and promises that, by a ship which it was expected that Admiral Baker would send into Lisbon for Brigadier Wade, he will send more. . . . . I impatiently wish to get back thither, that as little time be lost as may be, in taking measures for our subsistence this winter, and the getting some kind of magazine against spring; for without a competent magazine it will be impossible to do any thing, had we ever so many troops. We shall likewise want a great number of horses to remount our cavalry. . . . . I am sensible that it is in vain to ask all that will be necessary to put us in a good condition; because it is not possible to supply in all parts so extensive a war as this is: but in case we have a peace, I do humbly recommend it as my poor opinion, that the greatest efforts which are possible be made against Spain; and that we do not deceive ourselves with the fond hopes that the Spaniards will submit till they are beaten into submission.

## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

1709.

*Gibraltar, October 12.*

YOUR Lordship may reckon that the enemies in Catalonia have at this time near double our force\*; and it is highly probable that the Duke of Anjou, being sensible that a treaty of peace may soon deprive him of the twenty-five French battalions which are in his army, besides a body entirely composed of French troops in Roussillon, will use all possible means to force the Mareschal to a battle. Your Lordship will easily imagine how uneasy it is to me to find myself here, unable to get back thither till Admiral Baker come.

## TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Gibraltar, October 12.*

I HOPE our victory in Flanders will soon put an end to the war on that side, and consequently oblige the French to recall very soon out of Catalonia the 25 battalions, which are still in that army; but, in the mean time, I am in great pain for the Mareschal, who is at least by one third weaker than the Duke of Anjou; and if the Duke of Anjou knows his own interest, he ought at any rate to hazard a battle, whilst he still has those French with him. How the Mareschal will subsist if he stay where he is, or how avoid the battle if he pass the Segre, I am a little uneasy to learn, and most impatient to be able to carry to him the reinforcement I have so long been made to expect.

\* It is to be remembered that since the departure of General Stanhope from Catalonia, Philip V. himself had taken the field in that country with reinforcements.

1709.

## TO THE EARL OF GALWAY.

*Gibraltar, October 24.*

HAVING well viewed and considered the ground, I do think it is of indispensable necessity to build at least one redoubt upon the point which commands the New Mole. . . . . Mr. Paget, and the other engineers who have viewed it, and, indeed, I myself, did project more redoubts than one, with a line or covered way of communication from the one to the other, which would, no doubt, be better; but considering how unwilling the ministry is to hear of any expense for Gibraltar, and that what is proposed is purely to discourage an enemy from attempting to surprise us, which he may be tempted to by the great facility he would find in doing it at present, I do believe that one redoubt upon the point of the hill mentioned, may be sufficient to answer that end.

## TO HIS SECRETARY, MR. ARENT FURLY.

*Port Mahon, November 30.*

You will see, by my letters to Major-General Carpenter, how matters stand. One thing I forgot to mention to him, which is a ridiculous threat, that his Majesty, finding his person in danger by my leaving Catalonia, may be obliged to take such measures for the securing it as will not be agreeable to the Allies. I don't believe it ever really entered into his head to go to Italy upon this occasion; but because one does not know how far his wise politics may carry him, I believe it will be necessary, if ever such a thing should be talked of, to assure

the Catalans that we will stand by them, and make no peace 1709.  
 either with France or Castille, till such a treaty be made as  
 shall secure to them their liberties and privileges under such  
 a government as themselves shall like, if the King should  
 have thoughts of leaving them. I think to write a circular letter  
 to this purpose, to the city, *Deputacion*, and *Brazo Militar*,  
 which letters shall be lodged in Major-General Carpenter's  
 hands, but not be delivered nor talked of, unless the Court  
 should talk of embarking.

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 TO MR. FURLY.

*Port Mahon, December 4.*

ENCLOSED you have my circular letter to the *Brazo Militar*,  
 city of Barcelona, and *Deputacion*, and three blank papers  
 signed, which must be filled with the said letters; but you  
 must inform yourself of the treatment\* which must be given  
 to them in writing. When you have filled up the said letters,  
 and sealed them, pray lodge them with Mr. Mead, with orders  
 to deliver them, in case only that there should be any discourse  
 of the King's leaving Catalonia, and not otherwise; nor would  
 I have any body know that there are such letters, only I would  
 have Mr. Mead, as in confidence, acquaint Perlas with it, and  
 he may show him the copy of it, but not let it go out of his  
 hands. You may be sure that Perlas will be more startled at  
 this than at any demonstration that could have been made;  
 and it will then be a proper time for Mr. Mead, as of himself,  
 to advise Perlas to finish all these distastes, either by signing  
 the treaty which is left with him, and sending it signed, by  
 express, after me to England; or else, by sending some person  
 of rank, with all despatch, to England, with ample powers to  
 conclude and sign in England what the Queen shall require.

I shall sail within two hours for Genoa.

\* The word *treatment* seems here to be used in its old sense of *titles*.

1709.  


## TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Genoa, December 12.*

Soon after my last letter to your Lordship from Gibraltar, Admiral Baker came with the troops, with which we had an extraordinary good passage to Catalonia, where I found the campaign was over, and our army come into quarters. So I put these troops in quarters in the camp of Tarragona, where they will be very well this winter; and I am glad to tell your Lordship that they landed much more complete, and in better condition, than it was reasonable to expect: so that I hope, by spring, her Majesty will have in Catalonia a better body of English in the field than there has been yet.

1710.

1710.

HAVING already, in the body of my work, given such large extracts from General Stanhope's Letters in this year, I shall now only add to them the original despatches of the battles of Almenara and Zaragoza, and on Brihuega, and the Journal of Mr. Lenoir.

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ORIGINAL DESPATCH OF THE BATTLE OF  
ALMENARA.

TO THE EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

*Camp at Almenara, July 31. 1710.*

MY LORD,

THREE days after the date of my last to your Lordship, which went by Mr. Craggs, our succours joined us about nine in the morning, upon which a council being called, it was strenuously urged by the English, Dutch, and Palatines, to march immediately to Lerida, in order to force the enemies to a battle, by cutting them off from that place: but the King and Mareschal strongly opposed, and showed themselves determined not to venture any thing. Their pretence for not doing it was, that the enemies' army might get to Lerida, and cross the river before we could be up with them; which afterwards proved to be otherwise, since they did not get over the river, by twelve hours, so soon as was pretended they would. Our next thought was to cross the Segre at Balaguer, and push to get over the Noguera, to which purpose I was despatched with eight squadrons of dragoons, and 1000 grenadiers, with which I marched at midnight, and took post at Alfaraz, on the Aragon side of the Noguera, at six in the morning of the 27th. The enemies had commanded ten squadrons of horse, 1000 grenadiers, and seven battalions of foot, to prevent our taking post: but notwith-

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standing that they had much less way to march, the negligence of their commanding officer, the Duke of Sarno, made them come late; for we did not discover them till nine in the morning: and when they did discover us, instead of attacking us, they possessed themselves of Almenara, a village on the Noguera, about two miles below Alfaraz, where we were. About noon, our left wing of horse passed the river, which I formed on a plain about cannon shot from the river, between which plain and the river was a deep valley. By this time the enemies' horse came up apace and formed before me about eighteen squadrons, which I was going to attack, when the Mareschal came up and prevented, seeming still determined not to hazard any thing. Both armies continued marching to get up, and about six all our infantry had passed the river, and crossed the valley I mentioned, and got upon the high ground. Behind our horse, the Mareschal was pressed several times to attack the enemies' horse, which was before us; their foot marching at a great distance behind them, in the valley where they could be of no use. About six, the enemies having got up all their horse, marched several squadrons down a little hill which was between us, upon which we all cried out, Shame, and I did earnestly press the King that we might have leave to dislodge them, which was at last complied with, but not till sunset. I herefore marched to them with the left wing, which consisted of twenty-two squadrons, which were formed in two lines, and a corps de réserve of four squadrons; the ground we were drawn up in, not allowing us to make a greater front. So soon as we began to move, the squadrons of the enemies which had come down the rising I mentioned, retired to their line. When we got up that rise, with my first line consisting of but ten squadrons, we found the enemy drawn up in two lines, the first of twenty two squadrons and the second of twenty, with two battalions of foot betwixt their lines, and a brigade of foot on their right. I was therefore forced, so soon as I came in presence, to make a halt to get up some squadrons from the second line, the ground where the enemies were being so much wider than that which I had marched from; besides that getting up the hill had put



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our line in some disorder. The enemies were so good as to give us the time we wanted; we brought up six squadrons and put our line in good order, which consisted thus of sixteen in all: six English, four Dutch, and six Palatines. Mr. Carpenter and I were on the left; Mr. Frankenberg, the Palatine General, and Major-General Pepper, on the right. So soon as ever we were thus formed we attacked them; and, by the blessing of God, broke their two lines, which consisted of forty-two squadrons. On the right were the Gardes du Corps and other choice regiments, which did not do ill, but their left made no resistance. I cannot sufficiently commend the behaviour of all the troops that were engaged, which never halted till we had driven their horse off the plain, beyond their infantry, which was in the valley; and if we had had two hours' day light more, your Lordship may be assured that not one foot soldier of their army could have escaped. The night gave them an opportunity to retire to Lerida, which they did in such confusion, that they threw away their tents, lost good part of their baggage, and some of their cannon, and have continued ever since encamped within and about the glacis of Lerida. The Duke of Anjou and all his Generals were in the action. I am sorry, now, my Lord, to tell you, that this action has cost her Majesty very dear, in the loss of two young men of quality, who would have made a great figure in this country, and done it great service,—my Lord Rochford and Count Nassau. Lord Rochford had joined us with his regiment from Italy but the day before; and he brought it in so good order, and set them so good an example, that, though they had to do with the best troops of the enemy, they beat them. I have often had occasion to mention Count Nassau to your Lordship: he was this day on the left of all, at the head of his own regiment, which was outflanked by several squadrons, and exposed to the fire of their infantry; notwithstanding which disadvantages he broke what was before him, and, after so vigorous an action, was unfortunately killed by a cannon from a battery of our own. Enclosed I send your Lord-

1710. ship the list of what other officers have been killed and wounded.

Out of the six squadrons of her Majesty's troops which were engaged, viz. two of Harvey's, two of Nassau's, two of Rochford's, we have 200 men killed and wounded, and four out of five of them with swords. A Palatine regiment which was on our left, and a Dutch regiment which was in the centre, have likewise suffered considerably; the others had better fortune, having met with little opposition. The commanding officers of all nations signalled themselves; and it has been of no small use to me, who had been very little conversant with the treble service, to have the assistance of Mr. Carpenter, who was with me during this whole action, and did not a little contribute to the good success of it. This event will, I hope, sufficiently justify the earnestness with which I have urged them to come to a battle, since only sixteen squadrons of ours have defeated their cavalry, on which they principally relied. I doubt we can hardly expect to have such another occasion of ending the war, as hath been missed twice in three days; the first time in not marching to cut them off from Lerida, and the second time in not suffering us to attack some hours sooner, as we had pressed to do, and should have succeeded with less hazard—the enemies being much stronger when we did attack them, than they had been when we first proposed it: however, I hope we shall this summer drive them over the Ebro, and, perhaps, take winter quarters there. We have reports of a battle in Flanders, which, if true, must certainly procure us a glorious peace immediately; but if the war is to last another year, I do most earnestly beg leave to repeat to your Lordship my instances for 1500 recruits for our foot, besides 150 for the battalion of Guards, and, I would now add, 280 men to be draughted out of the horse and dragoons to recruit our cavalry: for, give me leave to assure your Lordship, that if our English corps dwindle away for want of recruits, we shall find very ill consequences from it in respect both to friends and foes. . . . . This will be delivered to your Lordship by Colonel Crofts, whom the King despatches to her Majesty with this news: if any thing be wanting to satisfy your

Lordship's curiosity in the account I have given you, he will inform you.

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I am ever, with the greatest respect, &c. &c.

P. S. I must not omit acquainting your Lordship, that my Lord Falkland, who serves at present as my Aide-de-camp, behaved himself very handsomely in this action.

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## ORIGINAL DESPATCH OF THE BATTLE OF ZARAGOZA.

TO THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH.

(Lord Dartmouth succeeded Lord Sunderland as Secretary of State on  
June 26. 1710.)

*Zaragoza, August 20. 1710.*

MY LORD,

I AM very glad that my first letter to your Lordship should carry the welcome news that we have this day won a complete victory over the Duke of Anjou and his army. Your Lordship must not expect from me at present a particular account of this happy event, which I will not fail to transmit to you very suddenly: I will only, in general, tell your Lordship, that, after having made prodigious marches for eight days during the excessive heats of this country, and having wanted bread for four days, having passed two rivers, the Cinca and the Ebro, we came within a mile of this town yesterday. The enemies drew up their army; their left under the walls of it, having the river Ebro on their left, and their right extending to hills which they judged to be impracticable. Our foot came up late, which made us defer attacking them till this day, half of which was spent in

1710. making our dispositions. At twelve the signal was given to attack ; and before three the enemies' army was routed. They were, in foot, at least equal to us in numbers ; and in horse, considerably superior ; their greatest strength, both for number and quality of troops, as well as situation, was on their right, which was opposite to the troops of her Majesty, the States, and the Palatines ; yet, by the blessing of God, we had the good fortune to begin their defeat. I do not believe they have saved above 2000 of their foot. We judge there are above 4000 killed and 6000 prisoners ; all their artillery, and most, if not all, the colours of their foot, are ours ; we have above thirty colours in her Majesty's troops. The Duke of Anjou is fled, as we are told, towards Navarre. A circumstance which, I hope, will not make this success the less acceptable, is, that the resolution of pursuing and attacking the enemies' army, as well as the execution of it, is owing, the first, entirely to her Majesty's subjects, against the most strenuous opposition of this Court and the Germans ; and in the execution, I should be unjust to the troops I have the honour to command, if I did not assure you they have had the principal share. Colonel Harrison, who will have the honour to deliver this to your Lordship, has been a witness of what has passed, and will inform your Lordship more particularly than I have leisure to do at present. But of this your Lordship may be assured, that nothing shall be wanting which is in the power of her Majesty's subjects here, to reap from this battle all the advantages possible, in order to put an end as soon as may be to this very expensive war. Your Lordship will best judge whether the war will last another year ; in case it should, I beg leave to repeat to your Lordship the instances I have frequently made to my Lord Sunderland, that care be taken to recruit us in the manner I have proposed, touching which I beg that you will give Colonel Harrison leave to make application to your Lordship.

I am, ever, &c.

## ORIGINAL DESPATCH ON BRIHUEGA.

1711.  


TO THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH.

*Valladolid, January 2. 1711.*

MY LORD,

It is with unspeakable concern that I put pen to paper to acquaint your Lordship with the misfortune that has befallen us, of being taken prisoners of war at Brihuega, where were eight battalions of foot, seven of them English, and the eighth a Portuguese, commanded by English officers, and eight squadrons of horse and dragoons of her Majesty's troops, most of them very weak, as your Lordship will see by the enclosed return; nor could it be otherwise, after a campaign of so much action and fatigue.

I acquainted your Lordship by Brigadier Wade, that it had been resolved to abandon Toledo, and to retreat to Aragon; accordingly I was detached with 1000 horse, and as many foot, to bring off the garrison of Toledo, which marched out the 28th of November. The Mareschal had been obliged to separate the army, and cantoon them in villages, both to shelter them against the badness of the weather, and for their subsistence, having no magazine of corn, nor carriage to transport it, if there had been a store. The 30th of November I returned with the garrison of Toledo to Chinchon, where it was thought fit to halt till the 3d of December, that the troops of the several nations which came from Toledo might join the quarters of their respective nations; and orders were given to the army to provide for themselves in the several villages where they were cantooned, and to bake their own bread, making a provision for six days' march. The 3d, the army began their retreat, the head quarters breaking up from Chinchon, and the troops marching in several bodies from their respective villages, the English being upon the left flank, the

1711. Imperialists in the centre, and Portuguese on the right. The head quarters were that night at Villarejo, where it was agreed that the English should make three marches to Brihuega, and the Imperialists go to Cifuentes, which are about five hours distant from each other, at which places it was proposed to make fresh provision of bread, and settle the order of march for our further retreat.

Accordingly I marched with the English, and arrived at Brihuega the 6th, late at night, having been observed during my march by about 1200 of the enemy's horse, with whom we had some skirmishing the 5th, at Orche, of which I sent the Mareschal an account the same night, desiring him at the same time to send any commands he might have for me to Brihuega, where, on the 7th, I did receive from him an answer, the copy of which is here enclosed; and, accordingly to what he therein intimated to me, I used the best diligence I could to get provision, and gave him an account of it in the letter of which I likewise enclose the copy.

The 8th, about eleven of the clock before noon, there appeared some horse upon the hills near the town, upon which I ordered out a party to reconnoitre; but the enemies thickening, we thought it to no purpose to send out, because we knew they might have the same 1200 horse which had observed us, and we could not send out half their number. About three in the afternoon they began to show some foot, till which time nobody with me, nor I believe did the Mareschal imagine that they had any foot within some days' march of us. And our misfortune is owing to the incredible diligence which their army made; for having, as we have since learnt, decamped from Talavera the 1st of December, they arrived before Brihuega the 8th, which is forty-five long leagues; and such was the disposition of the country, so favourable to them, and so averse to us, that during the eight days that they marched, no manner of advice came to us of it; in short, by five o'clock we were invested by 6000 horse and 3000 foot, which made it impracticable for us to think of retiring, so we made the best disposition we could to defend ourselves, and sent the Mareschal an account of what passed.

The same evening they fired some cannon, and sent to summon us, to which we made such an answer as became us.

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Brihuega is a large town, surrounded with an old Moorish high wall, which is nowhere flanked, and in very few places was broad enough to put any men upon it, so we could not hinder their lodging themselves at the foot of the wall in several places. We therefore applied ourselves to barricade the gates well, and to oblige them to make breaches, which we resolved to dispute when they should attempt to enter them. At midnight all their foot and artillery, with the remainder of their horse, came up; by break of day they had several batteries, with which they made two breaches, and besides their battering guns, of which they had twelve pieces, they galled us with their field pieces, for the town is so surrounded on all sides but one with high hills so near it, that even with small shot they commanded most of the streets. We made entrenchments behind the breaches and barricadoes in the streets, as well as the shortness of the time and want of working tools would admit, notwithstanding that in most places our men could not work under cover for the reason I have already mentioned. Towards three in the afternoon, the enemy having made their disposition for a general assault, and brought up all their foot within musket shot on both sides of the town, sent us a second summons, to which when they had received our answer, they began the attack with all their grenadiers, supported by thirty-two battalions, and whilst they were attacking the two breaches which had been made by their cannon, they made a third by springing a mine, and found means to break passages through the town wall into some houses which were joining to it, into which they got numbers of men before they were perceived. They were, however, beaten out again, and every where repulsed with loss whilst our ammunition lasted, and even with bayonets were more than once driven out by some of our men who had spent their shot; and when no other remedy was left, the town was preserved some time by putting fire to the houses which they had possessed, when many of them were destroyed. In short, I must do that justice to all the general officers, and in general to all the officers and men, that

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all was done which could be done, the horse and dragoons having taken their share of the business on foot ; and when things were reduced to the last extremity, that the enemy had a considerable body of men in the town, and that in our whole garrison we had not 500 men who had any ammunition left, I thought myself obliged in conscience to try to save so many brave men who had done good service to the Queen, and will, I hope, live to do so again. So about seven of the clock I beat the chamade, and obtained the capitulation of which enclosed I send your Lordship a copy. We had upwards of 600 men killed and wounded, and we believe the enemy's loss about 1500. Their loss would have been much greater, at any other place ; but here, as I told your Lordship, we could not hurt them till they came up to the breaches, having no place to lodge men on those old walls, so that the greatest part of the men they lost were killed either at the breaches or within the town.

Your Lordship hath thus a true account of our misfortune ; and what further particulars you may require, Colonel Dormer will distinctly acquaint you with, to whom I must do the justice that he behaved himself extremely well, it having been his fortune to be posted where the greatest efforts were made by the enemy. Colonel Varrier, of the Scotch guards, was killed, after having performed wonders with his battalion ; Lieutenant-General Carpenter was wounded at one of the breaches, as we thought, at first, dangerously, but is, thank God, well recovered.

Lieutenant-General Wills was, during all the action, at the post which they attacked with most vigour, and which he as resolutely defended ; and I cannot again help repeating to your Lordship in general, that if after this misfortune I should ever be entrusted with troops, I never desire to serve with better men than all showed themselves to be, and whatever other things I may have failed in through ignorance, I am truly conscious to myself, that, in the condition we were reduced to, I could not do a better service to the Queen, than to endeavour to preserve them by the only way which was left. I cannot express to your Lordship how much this blow has broke my spirits, which I shall never recover.

I am ever, &c.



## MR. LENOIR'S JOURNAL.

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MR. LENOIR acted as Military Secretary during Mr. Furly's illness. His Journal, as will be perceived, extends no further than the entrance of the Allies into Madrid. I have embodied with it some extracts, under the corresponding dates, of his private letters to Mr. Furly at Barcelona.

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May 19th.—I set out this day for Caldas.

21st.—The Portuguese ambassador went to camp.

23d.—The Tartar pink, and Rye galley, arrived in eleven days from Lisbon, and brought us some money.

24th.—In the morning arrived the Dartmouth and Gosport, in nine days, from Genoa, and brought us Mr. Stanhope, Mr. Craggs, Lord Rochford, &c.

25th.—In the evening arrived the Ludlow Castle, with five transports laden with corn, and 1000 German recruits on board.

26th.—Mr. Stanhope did me the honour of a visit at Caldas.

27th.—The Dartmouth and Gosport sailed for Mahon.

28th.—This day Mr. Stanhope set out for the camp.

29th.—General Stanhope arrived at the camp of Balaguer.

June 7th.—The King arrived at the camp at Balaguer.

8th.—A general review of the army. Every body says our army makes a very promising appearance; but I believe nobody can tell, by the King's countenance, when he is pleased.

9th.—Given out in orders, that all officers shall roll by the commission they have from their own Prince.

11th.—Last night the enemy laid three bridges over the Segre, on which they passed their army, and were all over by seven o'clock this morning, leaving their tents, mules, and heavy baggage under the walls of Lerida. We sent the pontoons and baggage of the army into Balaguer. This night the Mareschal caused an entrenchment to be thrown up round the

1710. Torre de San Juan, which stands on a rising ground about 300 paces from the right of our army, where he put a battalion with three pieces of cannon and a haubitz. We do not believe the enemy will come to attack us to-morrow morn, as they gave out; yet this motion causes the Generals to be in the camp all night, and the men are to be under arms. If they do come, we are resolved to stand them. The Mareschal says he desires no better company.

June 12th.—The enemy came with their army to Belcarre, two hours from Balaguer, and but one from the left of our camp. In the morning we perceived about twelve of their squadrons marching towards us in order of battle; but, upon our firing four guns, they retired again behind the hill where they had first appeared, and that day we did not see them any more. Some say they will attack us to-morrow morning: others think they will retire to-night. I believe they will endeavour something, rather than suffer the shame of being laughed at, after having sent a trumpet to advise the Mareschal they would be with him at eleven this morning; who returned them answer, that he had been waiting for them all night, and hoped they would keep their word.

13th.—We laid all night upon our arms. About four in the morning, we perceived the whole army of the enemy marching towards us in line of battle, to attack us upon our left, which some of their parties had been to reconnoitre the day before, and where General Stanhope commanded the English. About ten o'clock they came up within cannon shot, their right wing marching between the mountains to attack us in the flank of our left, and their left in the plain, to wheel about and flank us afterwards in our front. Our cannon began to play upon them with so much success as to disorder several squadrons and battalions of each of their wings, in which we could perceive it to rake whole lanes of horse and foot. After we had fired about 140 shot, their whole army halted, which we thought was in order to refresh themselves, and come on with more vigour. But, about one o'clock, the whole army faced about, and marched off, having lost, as we have learnt since by

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deserters, and wounded men whom they were forced to leave behind them, about 300 ; amongst whom were an Irish Colonel, a Lieutenant-Colonel, four Captains, and three Lieutenants, besides horses. We were very sorry for their retreat, notwithstanding the superiority of their number ; because the goodness of our post, and the cheerfulness of our troops, gave us all probable human hopes of a complete victory. The King himself appeared every where with a great deal of cheerfulness and resolution. As the enemy was retiring, Mr. Stanhope put himself at the head of our English cavalry, and charged the horse of their right, which he put into some confusion, but received orders from the King and Mareschal to march no further. His horse was wounded under him in two places. The same night the Mareschal ordered a bridge of boats to be laid over the Segre below Balaguer, which was completed by two in the morning.

June 14th.—The army immediately marched over the two bridges, and the Mareschal resolved to pass the Noguera, and make himself master of the camp at Corbins, which the enemy left when they passed the Segre to attack us at the camp at Balaguer. By the first intelligence we had of the enemy, they were marching, with the utmost expedition, to repass the Segre, and prevent us from taking their camp. For this reason, Mr. Stanhope, who commanded the cavalry, and was got to the Noguera by four in the afternoon, perceiving some squadrons of the enemy's horse on the other side of the Segre, and fearing they would get over it before he could send to the King and Mareschal, and receive their orders to pass the Noguera, resolved to ford it over, which he immediately did, though the stream was very rapid. At Corbins he took possession of the enemy's camp there, where we found a good deal of forage, and Count Atalaya passed with the right wing at Alfaraz. We had but four horsemen and dragoons carried away by the stream. The foot came up at seven at night, but the current was so very strong that no anchors would hold. This obliged the troops to lie under their arms all night, the Mareschal himself at the head of them.

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June 15th.—With great difficulty the bridge was finished by three in the morning, when the foot passed all over. About noon the army encamped at Portella, about two cannon shot from where they passed. Mr. Stanhope had laid all the night upon the ground at the head of the cavalry, believing the enemy, who had made a forced march, might attack them with their horse (in which they are more superior), before our foot could get over. But we understood next morning, by deserters, that, despairing to arrive before us, they would stay on the other side of the Segre, and endeavour to cut off our provisions. We have been all *à l'éveillé* these five days past, during which time nobody has had their clothes off.

19th.—Last night General Gondercourt was sent out with twelve companies of grenadiers, 800 horse, and four pieces of cannon, to take post at Menargas, to oppose the enemy, if they should pass the Segre between us and Balaguer.

20th.—We had advice that General Nebot had taken 100 horse and 200 mules, near Belpuich; and that General Schonberg had taken twenty-five *galeras*, with corn and other provisions, at Montenegro. This evening a captain of the Imperialists, with 100 horse, returned from the side of Fraga, having met with a party of the enemy's, of 200 horse, at La Costa Piedragoso. He attacked and beat them, and took prisoners a Captain, a Cornet, and seventeen troopers, and their horses. Grand Jean came in the night with twenty horses and ten mules he took from the enemy at Malda. The enemy continue still at Yvras. The people of the country that come from thence, say they ransack all the villages round about for corn for bread, and oblige them even to beat and grind new corn for them, and are, nevertheless, in want.

23d.—At ten at night, our army began to repass the Noguera, and was all over by nine the next morning.

24th.—About noon the army reached Balaguer, and passed the Segre part by the stone bridge and part by the pontoons, and encamped behind the Scio, a small rivulet that falls into the Segre about two cannon shot above Balaguer. On the same day we lost at Calaf 280 men, and three Captains of Taaffe's regiment, and 2000 sacks of flour.

June 28th.—We continue fortifying our camp, and the enemy give out, they will come and visit us to-morrow. Provisions, especially flesh, are very dear with us. There are above seventy men in the hospital here, and a great many of the officers fall sick daily.

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29th.—Both armies very sickly, and the flux reigning among them.

July 19th.—General Stanhope fell sick.

22d.—The General began to recover.

26th.—In the morning our army passed the Scio, and moved down towards Balaguer, and in the march were joined by the troops from the Ampurdan, brought by Lieutenant-General Wetzel.

27th.—Our enemy having the night before marched towards Lerida, the resolution of our Generals was to have marched to intercept them before they got thither; but, upon intelligence that they had gained the entrenchments, and were passing the river, a council was called, and it was resolved to march forthwith, and endeavour to pass the Noguera at Alfaraz. Mr. Stanhope was detached to secure the passage, with twenty companies of grenadiers and eight squadrons of dragoons; which he did without any loss, although the enemy had sent seven regiments of foot and fifteen squadrons before to intercept him. This gave our army an opportunity of passing over before the enemies, who were then on their march, could form in line of battle on the plains which were on the other side of the river. After we were over, they appeared on the plains with their whole cavalry; and General Stanhope, impatient to take the advantage of attacking them before their foot, who were in the bottom by the river side, could come to their support, proposed it to the Mareschal; which was consented to with a great deal of difficulty and loss of time; so that it was sunset before our horse marched to attack them. The first line of the left wing was commanded by Mr. Stanhope, and composed of sixteen squadrons, of which were Harvey's, Nassau's, and Lord Rochford's regiments, who, with our General at their head, gave the onset, and, without having any other assistance from our

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second line, entirely defeated their cavalry, in number forty-two squadrons; and if we had had an hour or two's daylight more, we had put an end to the war in Spain. The enemy's horse, having broke in great disorder into their foot, put their whole army to flight. They made the best of their way to Lerida, leaving on their way a great quantity of ammunition and some pieces of cannon. We have taken a great many prisoners; amongst the rest, a Lieutenant-General of horse, and several officers of lower rank. Our greatest misfortune is the loss of Count Nassau and Lord Rochford, who were both killed, after having behaved themselves with great gallantry. General Stanhope received a contusion, General Carpenter a slight cut, Colonel Bland, and several other officers and men, ill wounded, Lord Rochford's Major killed, &c. This is, I hope, a good prognostic for the remaining part of the campaign. Our English have suffered most; but have behaved to a miracle, inspired by the General's example, to whom all is owing, having first proposed and then executed the handsomest action that has been done by any cavalry during the war. This account is a little confused; but I have not slept these three nights.

July 29th.—Te Deum.

August 1st.—The army marched to Benefa, where there was a great scarcity of water.

2d.—Marched to Monzon, and encamped in the gardens about it. Sent immediately a detachment of grenadiers, commanded by Colonel Bowles, to attack the work at the head of the bridge, where the enemy had a garrison, which surrendered immediately without making any resistance. Two hundred and fifty men prisoners of war. The town of Monzon the enemy abandoned, but from the castle kept a continual fire with their artillery.

3d.—We sent out a detachment, commanded by Count Atalaya, of 800 horse, 1200 grenadiers, four pieces of cannon, and two haubitz, to Balbastro.

4th.—The camp is in the Huerte, a low ground on this side the Cinca, before Monzon. The enemy have brought two guns

upon an elevation in the castle, and from thence throw balls into our camp, but without any considerable damage to us, though they are firing all day at something or another. The situation of the castle, to me, resembles that of the castle of Alicant. Hitherto I do not observe that we have fired a shot against it, nor do the Generals seem to have determined to lay a formal siege against it, though I cannot conceive it will be thought proper to proceed forward and leave so important a passage in the enemies' possession. The garrison does not consist of above 200 or 300 men.

Aug. 5th.—About eight in the evening General Stanhope was detached with 2000 horse and dragoons. He passed the bridge of Monzon; and in the morning (Aug. 6th), at ten, we arrived upon the hills that overlook Sarineña, where there had laid six squadrons of the enemy for some days, but upon the first notice of our approach they retired with great precipitation. We took in the pursuit only one Lieutenant, one Cornet, eighteen men and nine horses. Sixty-eight of the enemy's foot that were in the town retired into the steeple, from whence they kept a fire upon us in the town.

7th.—In the morning General Stanhope commanded 200 dragoons to dismount and attack the enemy in the steeple, and straw to smother them out.\* All things being ready for that service, they said *il faut être attaqué un peu*, beat the chamade, and resigned themselves at discretion. We found, as well in the steeple as in the town, a good quantity of corn and flour, which was immediately made into bread. One of our parties took twenty-four of the enemy's carts with their mules. The people express a great deal of satisfaction to see us once more in Aragon; but they give us a continual trouble of writing of safe-guards and passes in Spanish, which makes me break off here.

11th.—At night, General Stanhope marched with his party

\* It may be observed, that this method of Stanhope is the same which had been used against his grandfather's church and castle at Shelford, when stormed by the Commonwealth's party in the civil wars. See Mrs. Hutchinson's *Memoirs*, p. 255.

1710. from Sarineña, and arrived next morning by eight at Alcala de Cinca. We took 500 sheep and four galeras with provisions, which the enemies were sending to Fraga.

Aug. 12th. — By noon the grand army arrived over against us on the other side of the Cinca.

13th. — We marched with General Stanhope's party, fording over the Cinca, and joined the grand army on their march, and encamped at night at Saydi. By the miscarriage of my baggage at Balaguer (which I can have no manner of account of, or even the least hopes of any), I have not only lost all that I had been gathering together for these two years past, but am brought into a very poor condition to rub out this campaign in; and though I endeavour to put the best face I can upon my bad fortune, I am afraid the continuation of sleeping upon the ground, and other inconveniencies, which I am now exposed to, will at length very much impair my health.

14th. — The enemy's army passed the river Cinca at Fraga, and all this day were busy in taking their magazines from thence. At six we laid a bridge over the Cinca, by which our army began to pass, and were all over by ten at night; when they laid on their arms till five next morning.

15th. — Having at that hour got intelligence of the enemy's march, we immediately followed them, and came that night to Candasnos, where the enemy had come at eight in the morning. Upon the approach of our vanguard they retired in great precipitation; our horse pursuing them, of which only six squadrons of our right could come up with their rear, which they attacked; but being engaged in the defiles of Peñalba, the enemy fell upon them and drove them back again. But General Carpenter, coming up with four squadrons of English, repulsed the enemy without any considerable loss on either side, only they had taken a Cornet and some of our Spanish dragoons, which they most inhumanly killed in cold blood, after they had given them quarter. Our foot encamped that night at Candasnos, and the horse laid about two hours beyond them, advanced towards the enemy. Before I leave Candasnos, which is a very small village, I must observe that it is very remarkable



for having entertained two Princes with their armies, both competitors for a monarchy, in one day; for King Charles supped in the house the Duke dined in the same day. The people of the country all affirm that their infantry are in a very miserable condition; nevertheless, the wings which fear adds to them, helps them forwards faster than the encouragement we meet with does us, and we do not overtake them, neither do I believe we shall. Every body waits with great impatience the arrival of the paymasters; but I believe nobody has more reason than the General, who has not this day twenty pistoles by him in specie. But we are so much taken up with the good fortune that attends us at present, that the men have wanted bread and do not complain; and the horses straw and corn, and yet hold out.

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Aug. 16th.—About four in the morning the *générale* beat, and our army marched in pursuit of the enemy, and encamped at night at Bujarolos.

17th.—At four in the morning our army marched again, and encamped that night at Oseras, upon the Ebro. Here we learnt that the enemy had lain there the night before, and were gone that day towards Zaragoza. Upon our approach, finding we came up with them so fast, they returned back, and posted themselves behind a *baranca*, with the mountains on their left, and the river on their right, about a mile from us. They began to pitch their tents; and at two in the afternoon that the right wing of our cavalry came up, their infantry began to move, and post themselves upon the *hauteurs* of some little hills that flanked the *baranca*, and made a feint as if they had a mind to oppose us. It growing dark, our Generals did not think fit to attack that night.

From the Cinca to the Ebro our army was without water or bread.

We had this day advice of the Marquess de Bay's being arrived in the enemy's camp, and the command of the army was given to him in the room of Villadarias. The enemy are very apprehensive of the people's rising in arms against them, and even feared that the city would have broke down the

1710. bridge at Zaragoza upon them, which was moved by those of our party, though it did not take effect.

This night, at ten, General Carpenter was sent out with a detachment of 2000 horse, in order to fall upon a brigade of the enemy's horse, which, we were informed, was coming from Mequinenza, to join their army. He forded the river at Pino. General Stanhope went out with him as a volunteer.

Aug. 18th.—The enemy retired last night at midnight. They blew up the bridges over the Baranca, which would have taken us up a day's time to repair, so that we are laying a bridge of pontoons near Aguilar, about a mile below our camp at Pino, and it is thought we shall pass the river this evening. The men hold out as well as can be desired, and so do the horses, though we have wanted both bread and corn. Grand Jean was sent out last night with a detachment of 100 horse to animate some of the people of the country that begin to move for us.

19th.—About one in the morning our army began to pass the Ebro, and was all over by seven. About two in the afternoon, General Stanhope got with the cavalry as far as the Carthusian convent, a small league from Zaragoza. He perceived upon his march that the enemy were passing the Ebro at the town, and by three we found their whole army drawn up in line of battle, with the town upon their left, extending their right upon the heights on the side of it. By five, our army, being come up, drew up in sight of them, where both armies continued all night upon their arms; the day being too far spent, and our troops too much fatigued to attack the enemy this day.

20th.—At break of day both armies cannonaded each other, which lasted till twelve, with more execution done upon the enemy, having killed among the rest the Duc d'Havr , one of their Lieutenant-Generals that commanded their right. On our side, the only alteration that was made in the line of battle was interlining a brigade of English foot, commanded by Major-General Wade, with the first line of horse of the left wing; and the six squadrons of Portuguese horse, which made our reserve,

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were sent to General Stanhope, to be disposed of by him upon the left as he should see fit. He ordered them accordingly to keep upon the left of all, detached from the line, making a manœuvre as if they were to flank the enemy. These dispositions being made, the signal for the attack was given by two royal grenades breaking in the air about twelve, and immediately our army passed the baranca that was between us and the enemy, marched up the high ground, and there both armies engaged. The enemy, having sent fifteen squadrons to attack the Portuguese that were upon the flank, ungarnished their right wing, where they had a great superiority of horse, having brought thither most of the horse from their left, and thereby made the victory more easy to us. It began upon our left, and was every where carried with less opposition than there, so that in a little time we found ourselves masters of the field. Most of the enemy's foot were taken, with their artillery. Their baggage, having been sent away the day before, escaped; and some thousand horse got off and retreated towards Tudela. At eleven at night, Colonel Harrison was despatched with the news of the battle to the Queen.

Aug. 21st. — Te Deum sung.

23d. — The paymasters arrived.

26th. — The army marched to Utava, and a council of war was held there. We have advice that the enemies are still at Tudela in Navarre.


31st. — This morning, an hour before day, the army began to march, and about noon we arrived at the village of Plasencia: and if we can find bread, we shall continue our march to-morrow towards Madrid. The enemy advanced within four hours of the camp we left, but, upon the approach of a detachment of horse which we sent that way, they retired in great precipitation.

September 1st. — Marched to Calatro.

2d. — The horse encamped at Calatayud; the foot at Frasnó.

3d. — The foot joined us at Calatayud.

6th. — We have now thirteen days' corn for the horses, and shall to-morrow have three days' bread in advance for the whole

1710.  army. The Duke and Duchess of Anjou are still at Madrid, and their army lays about twelve leagues' advance from this place in Castille. The Court and the Generals seem to clash; and there is not the best of understanding between the latter themselves; every body attributes, and but justly, all our great success this campaign to Mr. Stanhope.\* The *générale* beats to-morrow morning an hour before day, and we march towards Castille. I do not find this Court so well inclined, as they have reason at present to proceed directly to Madrid. They seem to be still wavering. Perlas would not have come so far as we already are. The Mareschal and him have renewed their quarrels, and the Mareschal told him that the King had four or five servants that merited hanging, and that he ought to be one of the first of them. Her Majesty's Generals are obliged to be warm with them; and God knows yet how this campaign may end.

Sept. 7th. — Marched from Calatayud to Alama. The rain began to fall heavily about four in the afternoon yesterday, which dured for the space of three hours, which, with the many defiles, kept the infantry from coming up to the ground till midnight, so that yesterday we were fourteen hours on the way.

8th. — Marched to Arisa.

9th. — Encamped at the convent of Huerta, the first place in Castille. The city of Corella, and most of the country within twelve leagues of Madrid, have acknowledged obedience to the King. The Conde de Atalaya is at Siguenza, and we do not at present hear or apprehend any opposition, so that we continue our march to-morrow.

10th. — To Medina Celi.

12th. — Camp of Guieosa.

13th. — Camp of Siguenza.

14th. — Sent a party to Guadalaxara.

15th. — The Marquess de Bay, with his little army, is marched

\* Thus also General Carpenter, in his letters, ascribes the whole merit of the victories at Almenara and Zaragoza to Stanhope, who, he says, *lectored* the King and Mareschal into them. See Somerville's *Queen Anne*, p. 638.

towards Burgos. The King issued out an edict, that all his subjects, who at present should be serving against him, should have to the end of this month to come in to him and be pardoned; and what gives a great many here cause to wonder is, that hitherto not one Grandee of Spain is come to us.

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The clergy seem to embrace our party with a great deal of cheerfulness, and the people in general are very well disposed to do the same, though the unhappy events of the year 1706 keep them in awe and fear. The army commits daily great hostilities, notwithstanding the strict orders which have been issued out to the contrary; and except this be remedied, I am afraid we shall come to want provisions.

Sept. 16th.—Left Sigüenza; marched to Villa Seca.

17th.—Encamped at Hita.

18th.—Arrived at Guadalaxara.

20th.—Marched from Guadalaxara to Alcala de Henares.

21st.—Mr. Stanhope detached with 1000 horse towards Madrid. On our march some squadrons of the enemy showed themselves on our right. About half a mile from the town he was met by the magistracy. After the usual compliments, the General sent them with an escort to the King. We marched on the right of the town, and encamped in the walks of La Florida. General Stanhope went from thence to the town house, but the inhabitants seemed very sorry to see us there, and not one showed any expression of joy. Last night a party of 300 of the enemy's horse left Madrid.

24th.—General Stanhope detached Pepper with 300 horse to Guadarama.

25th.—The army marched from Alcala, and encamped at the Venta de Aguilar. The dilatation of our march to this place has given the enemy time enough to retire, and take away what they pleased from hence. They had a party of 300 horse, that marched from hence the 20th, at night: we saw some squadrons of them as we came on the way hither. The nobility and gentry, and the chief magistrates of the town, have almost all followed the Duke of Anjou, and left their ladies in convents here. The Duke has taken all he could carry away out of the

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palace, and great sums of money, having not left the value of a pistole in gold in the whole town, except what he could not discover; and five days before we arrived, there came in here, from Seville, 300,000 pieces of eight in specie, which the Duke's friends have taken care to send after him. The money and effects, which particulars have carried away, must likewise be very valuable: so that Mr. Arter, an English merchant here, told the General, if he could get 5000*l.* or 6000*l.* in the whole town, it would be a favour; and yesterday we received 8000 pieces, in reals and half reals of plate.

The General went to camp yesterday morning, and came back hither in the evening; and, I believe the King will be here to-day or to-morrow. They talk here, that the army in Portugal is coming to join us; and that my Lord Portmore, who commands the English forces there, is an elder Lieutenant-General than Mr. Stanhope, and will supersede him if we join. General Carpenter, Wade, and Pepper, are with us; the last went out yesterday with 350 horse, and all the hussars. The last news we have of the Duke was from Valladolid, and we hear the Duke of Vendome is come to command his army; and eighteen battalions are coming to join him from Dauphiné. Most of the sick people that come out of Aragon and Catalonia receive immediate *alivio* from the pureness of this air. We find no good maps here.

Sept. 27th.—Marched to the Pardo.

28th.—To Villa Verde.

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IN closing this Appendix, I shall take the opportunity of making two observations:—

First, That in the dates I have always adhered to the New Style. As the Old Style was at this period the legal one of England, whilst the other was adopted in most of the continental states, the difference requires constant attention in historians, and is very apt to mislead them. A fleet, for instance,